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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The present thesis examines how and to what extent EU (public procurement) law has an influence 
on the way a public authority organises and discharges its public service tasks. The object of the 
thesis is limited to cooperative agreements (public contracts and service concessions) concluded 
between public authorities as a means to organise or discharge public service tasks. The objectives 
of EU internal market law and public procurement law bring the decision of public authorities to 
cooperate within the scope of EU law. Each time such decision could distort competition or hinder 
market access, EU internal market law applies. The CJEU has elaborated criteria on the basis of the 
public procurement Directives, which determine when such distortion or hindrance is present. These 
criteria determine when EU (public procurement) law influences national administrative law. This 
influence is apparent in the case law of the Supreme Courts in France and England. 
 
 
  
9 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
1. Books 
 
Arrowsmith, S., Civil liability and public authorities, (Winteringham, Earlsgate Press, 1992) 
Arrowsmith, S., The law of public and utilities procurement (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005). 
Arrowmith, S. and Kunzlik, P. (eds.), Social and environmental policies in EC procurement law, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
Arrowsmith, S., EU Public Procurement Law: an introduction, www.nottingham.ac.uk.pprg. 
Arrowsmith, S., The law of public and utilities procurement, Vol. I, (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2014). 
Auby, J.-B. (dir.), L’influence du droit européen sur les catégories du droit public (Paris: Dalloz, 
2010). 
Auby, J.-B. and Dutheil de la Rochère, J. (dir.), Droit administratif européen (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 
2007). 
Auby, J.-B. and Dutheil de la Rochère, J. (dir.), Traité de droit administratif européen (Bruxelles: 
Bruylant, 2014). 
Bamforth, N. and Leyland, P., (eds.), Public law in a Multi-Layered constitution, (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2003). 
Baquero-Cruz, J., Between Competition and Free Movement the Economic Constitutional Law of 
the European Community (London: Hart Publishing, 2002). 
Barnard, C. and Scott, J. (eds.), The Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises 
(Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing, 2002). 
Barnard, C., The Substantive Law of the EU, 4th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2013). 
Beatson, J., Burrows, A. and Cartwright, J., Anson's Law of contract (Oxford: OUP, 2010). 
Bertrand, B., Le juge de l'Union européenne, juge administratif (Brussels : Bruylant, 2012). 
Bovis, C., EC Public Procurement: case law and regulation (Oxford: OUP, 2006). 
Bovis, C., EU public procurement law (Cheltenham: Edgar European Law, 2012). 
Braconnier, S., Droit des services Publics (Paris : PUF, 2007). 
Bradley, A.W. and Ewing, K.D., Constitutional and Administrative Law (London: Pearson, 2005). 
Brameret, S., Les relations des collectivités territoriales avec les sociétés d’économie mixte locales 
(Paris : LGDJ, 2012). 
Casalini, D., L’organismo di diritto pubblico e l’organizzazione in house (Napoli: Jovene Editori, 
2003).  
Chalmers, D., Davies, G. and Monti, G., European Union Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010). 
Chapus, R., Droit administratif Général, T.1 (Paris : Montchréstien, 2001). 
Clamour, G., Intérêt général et concurrence (Paris : Dalloz, 2006). 
Comba, M. and Treumer, S. (eds.), The In-house Providing in European Law (Copenhagen: Djof 
Publishing, 2010).  
10 
 
Craig, P. and De Burca, G., EU Law (Oxford: OUP, 2011). 
Craig, P., Administration Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2012). 
Craig, P., The Lisbon Treaty (Oxford: OUP, 2010). 
Dashwood, A., Dougan, M., Rodger, B., Spaventa, E. and Wyatt, D., Wyatt and Dashwood’s 
European Union Law (London: Hart Publishing, 2011). 
Davies, A., Accountability: A public law analysis of government by contract (Oxford: OUP, 2001). 
Davies, A., The Public Law of Government Contracts (Oxford: OUP, 2008). 
De Koninck, C. and Flamey, P., Overheidsopdrachten (Antwerpen: Maklu, 2006). 
de Laubadère, A., Traité élémentaire de droit administrative (Paris : 1953). 
de Laubadère, A., Moderne, F. and Delvolvé, P., Traité des contrats administratifs, T. 1 (Paris : 
LGDJ, 1981). 
Dicey, A.V., The Law of the Constitution (1885). 
Donelly, C.M., Delegation of governmental power to private parties (Oxford: OUP, 2007). 
Dreyfus, J.D., Contribution a une théorie générale des contrats entre personnes publiques (Paris : 
L'Harmattan, 1997). 
Duguit, L., Les transformations du droit public (1913). 
Durviaux, A.L., Logique de marché et marché public en droit communautaire (Bruxelles: Larcier, 
2006).  
Eckert, G., Gautier, Y., Kovar, R. and Ritleng, D. (dir.), Incidences du droit communautaire sur le 
droit public français (Strasbourg : Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2007). 
Fallon, M., Droit matériel général de Union européenne (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2002).  
Favoreu, L. and Philip, L., Les grandes décisions du Conseil Constitutionnel (Paris : Dalloz). 
Fernandez Martin, J.M., The EC Public procurement rules: a critical analysis (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1996). 
Flamme, M.A., Matheï, Ph., Flamme, Ph., Delvaux, A. and Dardenne, Cl., Praktische commentaar 
bij de reglementering van de overheidsopdrachten, 1A (Brussel: NCB, 1996-1997).  
Frier, P.-L. and Petit, J., Précis de droit administratif (Paris : Montchrestien, 2010). 
Frier, P.-L . and Petit, J., Droit administratif (Paris : Montchréstien, 2012). 
Gadhouin, P.-Y., La liberté contractuelle dans la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel (Paris : 
Dalloz, 2008). 
Gaudemet, Y., Traité de droit administratif, T.1 (Paris : LGDJ, 2001). 
Gonod, P., Melleray, F. and Yolka, Ph. (dir.), Traité de droit administratif, T.2 (Paris : Dalloz, 
2011).  
Gosselin, F., Molitor, C., Nihoul, P. and Quertainemont, Ph. (eds.), Les modes de cooperation des 
services publics locaux au regard du droit européen (Waterloo : Kluwer, 2008). 
Graells, A.S., Public procurement and the EU Competition Rules (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011). 
Guettier, Ph., Droit des contrats administratifs (Paris: Thémis, 2008). 
Gugliemi, G.J. and Koubi, G. with Dumont, G., Droit du service public (Paris : Montchrestien, 2007). 
Guinard, D., Réflexions sur la construction d'une notion juridique : l'exemple de la notion de 
services d'intérêt général (Paris : l'Harmattan, 2012). 
11 
 
Hansen, C.R., Contracts not covered or not fully covered by the Public Sector Directive 
(Copenhagen: Djof Publishing, 2012). 
Harden, I., The Contracting State (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1992).  
Hardraht, K., In-House-Geschäfte und Europäisches Vergaberecht (Berlin : Dunckler & Humblot, 
2006). 
Harlow, C. and Rawlings, R., Law and administration (Cambridge: CUP, 2009).  
Hatzopoulos, V., Regulating Services in the European Union (Oxford: OUP, 2012). 
Hauriou, M., La gestion administrative, étude historique du droit administratif (Paris : 1899). 
Hjelmborg, S.E., Jacobsen, P.S. and Poulsen, S.T., Public procurement law (Copenhagen: Djof 
Publishing, 2006). 
Hughes, O.E., Public management and Administration: an Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003). 
Jans, J.H., De Lange, R., Prechal, S. en Widdershoven, R.J.G.M., Inleiding tot het Europees 
bestuursrecht (Nijmegem: Ars Acqui Libri, 2002). 
Jans, J.H., Delange, R., Prechal, S. and Widdershoven, R.J.G.M. (dir.), Europeanisation of Public 
law (Groningen : Europa Law Publishing, 2007). 
Kapteyn, P.J.G., McDonnell, A.M., Mortelmans, K.J.M. and Timmermans, C.W.A., The Law of the 
European Union and the European Communities (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 
2008). 
Lamont, N., Chancellor of the exchequer, Autumn Statement, vol. 128, col. 996 (12 November 
1992). 
Leger, P. (éd.), Commentaire article par article des traités UE et CE (Paris : Dalloz, 2000). 
Lenaerts, K. and Van Nuffel, P., Constitutional law of the European Union (Oxford: OUP, 2005). 
Lenaerts, K. and Van Nuffel, P., European Union Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011). 
Lenaerts, K., Le juge et la Constitution aux Etats Unis d'Amérique et dans l'ordre juridique 
européen (Bruxelles : Bruylant,1988). 
Lichère, F., Droit des contrats publics (Paris : Dalloz, 2005). 
Long, M., Weil, P., Braibant, G., Delvolvé, P. and Genvois, B., Les grands arrêts de la jurisprudence 
administrative (Paris : Dalloz, 2009).  
Lott, K., Die Rechtsprechung des EuGH und die In-House-Vergabe in Deutschland (Saarbrücken: VDM 
Verlag Dr. Muller, 2008).Marique, Y., Public-private partnerships and the law, (Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar, 2014). 
Müller-Graff, P.-C., Gemeinsames Privatrecht in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Baden-Baden : 
Nomos, 1993). 
Neill, P., The European CJEU: A Case Study in Judicial Activism (London: European Policy Forum, 
1995). 
Oliver, D. and Drewry, G., Public Service Reforms: Issues of Accountability and Public Law (London: 
Pinter, 1996). 
Oliver, D., Common Values and the Public-Private Divide (London: Butterworths, 1999). 
Péquignot, G., Théorie générale du contrat administratif (Paris : Pédone, 1945). 
12 
 
Pernas Garcia, J.J., Los operaciones in house y el Derecho comunitario de contratos publicos 
(Madrid: Iustel, 2008).  
Peters, A., Theorie der Elemente der Verfassung Europas (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001). 
Poiares Maduro, M., We the Court, The European Court of Justice and the European Economic 
Constitution. A Critical Reading of Article 30 of the EC Treaty (Oxford: Hart, 1998). 
Prechal, S., Directives in EC law (Oxford: OUP, 2004). 
Pynacker Hordijk, E.H., Van Der Bend, G.W. and Van Nouhuys, J.F., Aanbestedingsrecht (Den Haag: 
Sdu Uitgevers, 2009). 
Rasmussen, H., On Law and Policy in the European Court of justice. A Comparative Study in Judicial 
Policy-Making (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986). 
Reich, N., Understanding EU law: Objectives, Principles and Methods of Community Law 
(Antwerp/Oxford: Intersentia, 2005). 
Richer, L., Droit des contrats administratifs (Paris : LGDJ, 2008).  
Richer, L., L’Europe des marchés publics (Paris : LGDJ, 2009). 
Richer, L., La qualité du cocontractant de l'administration ; contrats entre collectivités publiques 
(Paris : Ed. Le Moniteur, 1996). 
Sauter, W., and Schepel, H., State and Market in European Union Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
Schwarze, J., European administrative law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1992). 
Shiubhne, N.N. (ed.), Regulating the Internal Market (Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2006). 
Sirinelli, J., Les transformations du droit administratif par le droit de l’Union européenne (Paris : 
LGDJ, 2011). 
Snell, J., Goods and Services in EC Law (Oxford: OUP, 2002). 
Symchowisz, N., Droit public des montages contractuels complexes (Paris : Imprimerie Nationale 
Éditions, 2003). 
Szyszczak, E., The Regulation of the State in Competitive Markets in the EU (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2007). 
Trepte, P., Regulating procurement. Understanding the ends and means of public procurement 
regulation (Oxford: OUP, 2004). 
Trepte, P., Public procurement in the EU (Oxford: OUP, 2007). 
Vedel, G. and Delvolvé, P., Droit administratif (Paris : PUF, 1988). 
Vincent-Jones, P., The New Public Contracting (Oxford: OUP, 2006). 
Wade, H.W.R. and Forsyth, C.F., Administrative law (Oxford: OUP, 2009). 
Waline, M., Droit administratif (Paris : Dalloz, 2010). 
Waline, M., Droit administratif (Paris : Dalloz, 2012). 
Wauters, K., Rechtsbescherming en overheidsovereenkomsten (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2009). 
Weiss, F., Public procurement in European Community Law (London: Athlone, 1993).  
Woods, L., Free Movement of Goods and Services within the European Community (Ashgate: 
Aldershot, 2004). 
13 
 
 
 
2. Chapters in books 
 
Auby, J.-B., ‘La distinction du droit public et du droit privé’, in J.-B. Auby (dir.), L’influence du 
droit européen sur les catégories du droit public, (Paris : Dalloz, 2010). 
Armin, H., ‘The Economic Constitution within the Internal Market’, in von Bogdandy, A. and Bast, J. 
(eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Munich: C.H. Beck/Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2011), pp. 589-629. 
Arrowsmith, S. and Kunzlik, P., ‘EC regulation of public procurement’, in Arrowsmith, S. and 
Kunzlik, P., Social and environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), pp. 55-107. 
Auby, J.-B. and Dutheil de la Rochère, J., ‘Introduction générale’, in Auby, J.-B. and Dutheil de la 
Rochère, J. (dir.), Droit administratif européen (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2007), pp. 3-4. 
Barnard, C., ‘Derogations, Justifications and the Four Freedoms: Is State Interest Really 
Protected ?’, in Barnard, C. and Odudu, O. (eds.), The Outer Limits of European Union Law 
(Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2009), pp. 273-315. 
Barrière, L.-A., ‘Une approche historique de la summa divisio droit public-droit privé’, in B. Bonnet 
et P. Deumier, De l'interet de la summa divisio droit public-droit prive ?, (Paris : Dalloz, 2010). 
Beaud, C., ‘La distinction entre droit public et droit privé: un dualisme qui résiste aux critiques’, in 
J.-B. Auby and M. Freedland (eds.), The Public/Private Divide : une entente assez cordiale ?, 
(Paris : Editions Panthéon-Arras, 2004).Bell, J. and Kennedy, T.P., ‘La notion de service public au 
Royaume-Unie et en Irlande’, in Moderne, F. and Marcou, G. (eds), L'idée de service public dans le 
droit des Etats de l'Union Européenne (Paris : l'Harmattan, 2001), pp. 259-313. 
Bleeker, R.G.T. and Manunza, E.R., ‘De invloed van het Europees recht op het Nederlandse 
aanbestedingsrecht’, in Hartkamp, A.S., Sieburgh, C.H. and Keus, L.A.D. (eds.), De invloed van het 
Europese recht op het Nederlandse privaatrecht (Deventer: Kluwer, 2007), pp. 543-598. 
Burgi, M., ‘“In-House” Providing in Germany’, in Comba, M. and Treumer, S. (eds.), The In-House 
Providing in European Law (Copenhagen: Djof Publishing, 2010), pp. 71-93. 
Caranta, R., ‘The In-House Providing: The Law as it Stands in the EU’, in Comba, M. and Treumer, S. 
(eds.), The In-House Providing in European Law (Copenhagen: Djof Publishing, 2010), pp. 13-52. 
Casalini, D., ‘Beyond EU Law : the New “Public House”’, in Olykke, G.S., Hansen, C.R. and Tvarno, 
C.D., EU Public Procurement – Modernisation, Growth and Innovation (Copenhagen: Djof Publishing, 
2011), pp. 151-178. 
Comba, M., ‘In-House Providing in Italy: the circulation of a model’, in Comba, M. and Treumer, S. 
(Eds.), The In-house providing in European law (Copenhagen: Djof Publishing, 2010), pp. 95-117. 
Cotte, O., ‘La répartition des compétences entre l'Union et ses Etats membres dans le domaine des 
services d'intérêt économique général’, in G. Eckert, Y. Gautier, R. Kovar and D. Ritleng, Incidences 
du droit communautaire sur le droit public français, (Strasbourg : Presses universitaires de 
Strasbourg, 2007). 
14 
 
Craig, P. and Trybus, M., 'England and Wales', in Nogouellou, R. and Stelkens, U. (eds), Comparative 
Law on public contracts (Brussels: Bruylant, 2010), pp. 339-366. 
D’Hooghe, D., Vos, I. and De Keyser, Ph., ‘Recente evoluties in het aanbestedingsrecht’, in De 
Ketelaere, K. and Verbeke, A. (eds.), Jaarboek Bouwrecht 2004-2005 (Brugge: Die Keure, 2005), pp. 
4-20. 
de Broux, P.-O., ‘Historique et transformation de la notion de service public à la lumière du droit 
européen’, in Dumont, H., Jadoul, P., Lombaert, B., Tulkens, F. and Van Drooghenbroeck, S. (eds.), 
Le service public, T. 1 (Brussels : La Charte, 2009), pp. 1-56. 
De Witte, B., ‘Interpreting the EC Treaty like a constitution: the role of the European Court of 
Justice in comparative perspective’, in Bakker, R., Heringa, A.W. en Stroink, F. (eds.), Judicial 
Control (Antwerpen: Maklu, 1995), pp.133-152. 
Delvolvé, P., ‘Constitution et contrats publics’, in Mouvement du droit public. Mélanges Franck 
Moderne (Paris : Dalloz, 2004), pp. 469-499. 
Drexl, J., ‘Competition Law as Part of the European Constitution’, in von Bogdandy, A. and Bast, J. 
(eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Munich: C.H. Beck/Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2011), pp. 659-698. 
Dubouis, L., ‘Service public et droit de l'Union européenne un perpétuel débat’, in Juger 
l'administration, administrer la justice : Mélanges en l'honneur du Daniel Labetoulle (Paris : Dalloz, 
2007), pp. 293-306. 
Durviaux, A.L., ‘La “logique de marché” dans les relations contractuelles entre le secteur public et 
le secteur privé: développements récents’, in Thirion, N. (ed.), Le marché et l’Etat à l’heure de la 
mondialisation (Bruxelles : Larcier, 2007), pp. 41-102. 
Eckert, G., ‘La cooperation public-public, entre espoirs et inquiétudes’, in Mélanges en l’honneur 
du professeur Richer (Paris : LGDJ, 2013), pp. 617-632. 
Eckert, G., ‘La distinction entre les services d'intérêt économique général et les services d'intérêt 
général non-économiques’, in Potvin-Solis, L. (dir.), Huitièmes Journées d'Etudes du Pôle Européen 
Jean Monnet, La libération des services d'intérêt économique général en réseau en Europe 
(Bruxelles : Bruylant, 2010), pp. 3-21. 
Flauss, J.-F., ‘Rapport français’, in Schwarze, J. (ed.), Das Verwaltungsrecht unter europaïschem 
Einfluß (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996), pp. 31-121. 
Fort, F.-X., ‘Les aspects administratifs de la liberté contractuelle’, in X., Contrats publics. 
Mélanges en l’honneur du Professeur Michel Guibal, I (Montpellier : CREAM, 2006), pp. 27-43. 
Hansen, C.R., ‘Defining a Service Concession Contract will the proposed new definition of service 
concession contracts increase legal legality in the field of concessions’, in Olykke, G.S., Hansen, 
C.R. and Tvarno, C.D. (eds.), EU Public procrurement – Modernisation, Growth and Innovation 
(Copenhagen: Djof publishing, 2012), pp. 239-250.  
Hatje, A., ‘The Economic Constitution within the Internal Market’, in Bogdandy, A. v. and Bast, J. 
(eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: Hart/Beck, 2010), pp. 589-622. 
15 
 
Hulst, R. and Van Montfort, A., ‘Inter-municipal cooperation: a widespread phenomenon’, in R. 
Hulst and A. van Montfort (eds.), Inter-Municipal cooperation in Europe, (Dordrecht: Springer, 
2007). 
Jarass, H.D., ‘A Unified Approach to the Fundamental Freedoms’, in Andenas, M. and Roth, W.-H. 
(eds.), Services and Free Movement in EU Law (Oxford: OUP, 2002), pp. 141-162. 
Jegouzo, Y., ‘L'administration contractuelle en question’, in X., Mouvement du droit public. 
Mélanges en l'honneur de Franck Moderne (Paris : Dalloz, 2004), pp. 543-546. 
Joerges, C., ‘Unity in Diversity as Europe’s Vocation and Conflicts Law as Europe’s Constitutional 
Form’, in Nickel, R. and Greppi, A. (eds.), The Changing Role of Law in the Age of Supra- and 
Transnational Governance (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012), pp. 99-133. 
Joerges, C. and Rödl, F., ‘The “Social Market Economy” as Europe’s Social Model ?’, in Magnusson, 
L. and Stråth, B. (eds.), A European Social Citizenship? Preconditions for Future Policies in 
Historical Light (Brussels: Lang, 2005), pp. 125-158. 
Lang, J.T., ‘Article 10 EC – The most important “General Principle” of Community Law’, in Bernitz, 
U., Nergelius, J. en Cardner, C. (eds.), General Principles of EC Law in a Process of Development 
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2007), pp. 76-113. 
Lenaerts, K. and Vanvoorden, K., ‘The right to property in the case law of the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities’, in Vandenberghe, H. (ed.), Property and human rights (Brugge: Die 
Keure, 2006), pp. 195-240. 
Lenaerts, K., ‘Les services d’intérêt général et le droit communautaire’, in Rapport public du 
Conseil d’Etat (2002), pp. 425-437. 
Lichère, F., ‘New Award Procedures’, in Trybus, M., Caranta, R. and Edelstam, G. (eds.), European 
Union Law of Public Contracts (Brussel: Bruylant, 2013), pp. 83-95. 
Maduro, M., ‘Contrapunctual [sic] Law: Europe’s Consitutional Pluralism in Action’, in Walker, N. 
(ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hart, 2003), pp. 501-537. 
Picard, E., ‘The Public-Private Divide in French law through the History and Destiny of French 
Administrative Law’, in M. Rüffert (ed.), The Public-Private Law Divide: Potential for 
transformation, (London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2009). 
Malaret Garcia, E., ‘Public service, Public services, Public functions, and Guarantees of the Rights 
of Citizens: Unchanging needs in a changed context’, in M. Freeland and S. Sciarra (eds.), Public 
services and citizenship in European law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). 
Malvasio, F., ‘Les catégories du droit administratif économique et du service public’, in Auby, J.-B. 
(dir.), L’influence du droit européen sur les catégories du droit public (Paris : Dalloz, 2010), pp. 
739-776. 
Marique, Y., 'An English Legal perspective on Public-private partnerships', in Lichère, F. (eds), 
Public-Private Partnership Reports of the XVIII Congress of the Internatinal Academy of 
Comparative Law (Brussels: Bruylant, 2011), pp. 95-165.  
Moderne, F., ‘Les transcriptions doctrinales de l'idée de service public’, in Moderne, F. and Marcou, 
G. (dir.), L'idée de service public dans le droit des états de l'Union européenne (Paris : L'Harmattan, 
2001), pp. 9-82. 
16 
 
Nabli, B., ‘L’autorité publique et la puissance publique’, in Auby, J.-B. (dir.), L’influence du droit 
européen sur les categories du droit public (Paris: Dalloz, 2010), pp. 331-353. 
Neergaard, U., ‘Services of general economic interest under EU law constraints’, in Schiek, D., 
Liebert, U. and Schneider, H. (eds.), European Economic and Social Constitutionalism after the 
Treaty of Lisbon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 174-196. 
Neergaard, U., ‘Services of General Economic Interest’, in Krajewski, M., Neergaard, U. and Van 
Den Gronden, J. (eds), The Changing Legal Framework for Services of General Interest in Europe 
(TMC Asser Press, 2009), pp. 17-50. 
Nicinski, S., ‘Le dogme de l'autonomie de la volonté dans les contrats administratifs’, in Clamour, 
G. en Ubaud-Bergeron, M. (eds), Contrats publics, Mélanges en l'honneur du Professeur Michel 
Guibal, T.I (Montpeller : CREAM, 2006), pp. 47-50.  
Nielsen, R., ‘Framework Agreements’, in Nielsen, R. and Treumer, S. (eds), The new EU Public 
Procurement Directives (Copenhagen: Djøf Publishing, 2005), pp. 81-96.  
Odudu, O., 'Economic activity as a limit to community law’, in Barnard, C. and Odudu, O., The 
Outer Limits of European Union Law (Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2009), pp. 225-243. 
Pelikánová, I., ‘The Role of Competition Law in the Evolution of Community Law’, in H. Kanninen et 
al. (eds.), EU Competition Law in Context : Essays in Honour of Virpi Tiili, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2009).Pilone, C., ‘Reflexions autour de la notion de contrat “in house”’, in Clamour, G. and Ubaud-
Bergeron, M. (eds.), Contrats publics. Mélanges en honneur du Professeur Michel Guibal, Vol. I 
(Montpellier : CREAM, 2006), pp. 702-717. 
Pini, J., ‘Autorité et contrat dans l'administration moderne en France’, in X., Annuaire Européen 
d'administration publique (P.U.A., 1997), pp. 73-88. 
Poiares Maduro, M., 'The scope of European remedies. The case of purely internal situations and 
reverse discrimination', in Kilpatrick, C., Novitz, T. and Skidmore, P. (eds), The Future of European 
Remedies (Oxford: Hart publishing, 2000), pp. 117-140. 
Poiares Maduro, M., ‘The Chameleon State: EU Law and the Blurring of the Private/Public 
Distinction in the Market’, in R. Nickel (ed.), Conflict of Laws and Laws of Conflict in Europe and 
Beyond - Patterns of Supranational and Transnational Juridification, (Antwerp - Oxford – Portland: 
Intersentia, 2010).  
Richer, L., ‘L'introduction de la notion d'activité économique dans le droit des contrats publics’, in 
Conseil d’Etat, Rapport public 2008. Le contrat, mode d'action publique et de production de normes 
(Paris : EDCE, 2008), pp. 355-367. 
Ritling, D., ‘L’incidence du droit de l’Union Européenne sur les catégories organiques du droit 
administratifs’, in J.-B. Auby and J. Duteuil de la Rochère (eds.), Traité de droit administratif 
européen, (Bruxelles : Bruylant, 2014). 
Rubach-Larsen, A., ‘Competitive Dialogue’, in R. Nielsen and S. Treumer (eds.), The New EU Public 
Procurement Directives (Copenhagen: Djøf Publishing, 2005), pp. 71-80. 
Rüffert, M., ‘The Transformation of Administrative Law as a Transnational Methodological System’, 
in Rüffert, M. (ed.), The Transformation of Administrative Law (Sellier: European Law Publishers, 
2007), pp. 3-52. 
17 
 
Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, D., ‘L’engagement contractuel dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice des 
Communautés européennes’, in Conseil d’Etat. Rapport public 2008. Le contrat, mode d’action 
publique et de production de normes (Paris : La documentation française, 2008), pp. 369-381. 
Schweitzer, H., ‘Services of general interest: European Law’s Impact on the Role of Markets and of 
Member States’, in Cremona, M. (ed.), Market Integration and Public Services in the European 
Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 11-62. 
Smit, H. and Herzog, P.E., ‘Preliminary observations on article 222’, in Smit, H. and Herzog, P.E., 
The Law of the European Community – A commentary on the EEC Treaty, Vol. 5 (New York: Mattew 
Bunder, 1998). 
Taggart, M., ‘Reinventing Administrative Law’, in Bamforth, N. and Leyland (eds), Public Law in a 
multi layered constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003), pp. 311-334. 
Triantafyllou, D., ‘Les mutations de la notion de service public en droit comparé’, in Service public 
et Communauté Européenne entre intérêt général et le marché (Paris : La documentation 
française, 1998), pp. 33-66. 
Truchet, D., ‘Le contrat administratif, qualification juridique d’un accord de volontés’, in Cadier, L. 
(ed.), Le droit contemporain des contrats. Bilan et perspectives (Paris : Economica, 1987), pp. 185 
et s. 
Trybus, M. and Caranta, R., ‘European Union Law of Public Contracts: Public Procurement and 
Beyond’, in Trybus, M., Caranta, R. and Edelstam, G. (eds.), European Union Law of Public 
Contracts (Brussel: Bruylant, 2013), pp. 1-12.  
Trybus, M., 'From the indivisible crown to Teckal : the In-House provision of works and services in 
the United Kingdom’, in Comba, M. and Treumer, S. (eds), The In-House providing in European Law 
(Copenhagen: Djöf Publishing, 2010), pp. 187-211. 
Trybus, M., ‘Public contracts in European Union Internal Market Law: Foundations and 
Requirements’, in Noguellou, R. and Stelkens, U. (eds.), Comparative law on Public Contracts 
(Brussel: Bruylant, 2010), pp. 81-121. 
Trybus, M., ‘An Overview of the United Kingdom Public Procurement Review and Remedies System 
with an Emphasis on England and Wales’, in S. Treumer and F. Lichère (eds.), Enforcement of the 
EU public procurement rules, (Copenhagen: Djof Publishing, 2011).  
Wang, P., Cavallo Perin, R. and Casalini, D., ‘Addressing purchasing agreements between public 
sector entities: what can the WTO learn from the EU’s experience ?’, in Arrowsmith, S. and 
Anderson, R.D. (Eds.), The WTO regime on government procurement: challenge and reform 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 252-282. 
Widdershoven, R., ‘The principle of loyal cooperation. Lawmaking by the European Court of Justice 
and the Dutch Courts’, in Stroink, F. and van der Linden, E., Judicial Law-making and 
Administrative Law (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2005), pp. 3-36. 
X., ‘Un recours accru au contrat pour conduire l'action publique ou édicter des normes’, in Rapport 
public 2008. Le contrat, mode d'action publique et de production de normes (Paris : La 
Documentation Française, 2008), pp. 17-90. 
18 
 
X., ‘Contrat, loi et décision administrative unilatérale: des imbrications croissants’, in Rapport 
public 2008. Le contrat, mode d’action publique et de production de normes (Paris : La 
documentation Française, 2008), pp. 91-167. 
Zijlstra, S.E., ‘De grenzen van de overheid’, in X., Privaat bestuur? (Den Haag: Boom Juridische 
Uitgevers, 2008), pp. 9-93. 
Ziller, J., ‘Les droits administratifs nationaux: caractéristiques générales’, in Auby, J.-B. and 
Dutheil de la Rochère, J. (dir.), Traité de droit administratif européen (Bruxelles : Bruylant, 2014), 
pp. 539-559. 
 
 
3. Articles 
Akkermans, B. and Ramaekers, E., ‘Article 345 TFEU (ex Article 295 EC), Its Meaning and 
Interpretation’ (ELJ, 2010), pp. 292-314. 
Andrews, J., ‘European Charter on Local Self-Government’ (ELRev, 1986), pp. 180-181. 
Arrowsmith, S., ‘An Assessment of the New Legislative Package on Public Procurement’ (CMLR 41, 
2004), pp. 1-49. 
Arrowsmith, S., ‘Public Private Partnerships and the European Procurement Rules: EU Policies in 
conflict ?’ (CMLR, 2000), pp. 709-737. 
Arrowsmith, S., ‘The past and future evolution of EC procurement law: from framework to common 
code ?’ (PCLJ, 2006), pp. 337-384. 
Arrowsmith, S., ‘The purpose of the EU Procurement Directives: ends, means and the implications 
for national regulatory space for commercial and horizontal procurement policies’ (CYELS, 2011-
2012), pp. 1-47. 
Ashmore, R., ‘United Kingdom - reminder that contracting authorities can switch to an inhouse 
“Plan B” solution if it represents value for money and is done in good faith: Montpellier Estates Ltd 
v. Leeds City Council’ (PPLR, 2013), pp. NA68-NA72. 
Auby, J.-B., ‘Comparative approaches to the Rise of Contract in the Public Sphere’, (PL, 2007). 
Auby, J.-B., ‘Les sociétés publiques sociales. Un outil aux contours incertains’ (RFDA, 2012), pp. 99-
108. 
Auby, J.-M., ‘La notion de concession et les rapports des collectivités locales et des établissements 
publics, de l'électricité et du gaz dans la loi du 8 avril 1946’ (CJEG, 1949), pp. 1 et s. 
Avarkioti, F., ‘The application of EU Public Procurement Rules to “In-house” arrangements’ (PPLR, 
2007), pp. 22-35.  
Bailey, S. H., ‘Judicial review of contracting decisions’, (PL 2007), pp. 444-463. 
Bangui, T., ‘L'effectivité du contrôle analogue des Sociétés publiques locales’ (CMP 5, 2012), pp. 6-
9. 
Bartels, S., ‘Europees privaatrecht: over de bevoegdheidsverdeling tussen Unie en lidstaat met 
betrekking tot het eigendomsrecht’ (AA, 1999), pp. 244-251. 
Bel, G. and Warner, M.E., ‘Factors Explaining Inter-municipal Cooperation in Service Delivery: A 
Meta-Regression Analysis’, 
19 
 
http://www.union.wisc.edu/pmra2013/Paper%20Submissions/Renamed/Factors%20Explaining%20Int
ermunicipal%20Contracting%20A%20Meta%20Analysis.pdf. 
Bel, G., Fageda, W. and Mur, M., ‘Why do municipalities cooperate to provide local public services? 
An empirical analysis’, (Local Government Studies, 2013), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2013.781024. 
Berthelot, O., ‘Liberté du commerce et de l'industrie et transferts de compétences; socialisation de 
l'économie ou privatisation du service public’ (AJDA, 2003), pp. 707-710. 
Bertrand, V., ‘La réforme européenne des marchés publics dans les secteurs classiques’ (JTE, 2005), 
pp. 1-11. 
Beuter, R., ‘European public procurement reform: main innovations in the Public Sector Directive – 
a preliminary assessment’ (Eipascope 3, 2005), pp. 5-11. 
Birkinshaw, P., ‘Contrats publics et contractualisation’ (RFDA, 2006), pp. 1015 et s. 
Bossard, B., ‘Le traitement communautaire des services d'intérêt général non economiques’ (RDP, 
2006), p. 1301-1324. 
Boussard, S., ‘L’éclatement des catégories de service public et la résurgence du “service public par 
nature”’ (RFDA, 2008), pp. 43-49. 
Boutayeb, C., ‘Une recherche générale sur la place et les fonctions de l’intérêt général en droit 
communautaire’ (RTDE, 2003), pp. 587-614. 
Bovis, Ch., ‘Public procurement in the EU: jurisprudence and conceptual directions’ (PPLR, 2012), 
pp. 247-289. 
Brechon-Moulènes, C., ‘La liberté contractuelle des personnes publiques’ (AJDA, 1998), pp.643-655. 
Brown, A., ‘Changing a sub-contractor under a public services concession: Wall AG v. Stadt Frankfut 
am Main C-91/98’ (PPLR, 2010), pp. 160-166. 
Brown, A., ‘Whether German public broadcasters are financed for the most part by the state so as 
to fall within the EU procurement directives: Bayerischers Rundfunk (C-337/06)’ (PPLR, 2008), pp. 
NA 124-127. 
Cabral, P., ‘The internal market and the right to cross border medical care’ (ELR, 2004), pp. 673-
685. 
Cane, P., ‘Accountability and the public-private Distinction’, in N. Bamforth and P. Leyland (eds.), 
Public law in a Multi-Layered constitution, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003), pp. 247-276. 
Caro de Sousa, P., ‘Catch me if you can? The Market Freedoms Ever-expanding Outer Limits’ (EJLS, 
2011), pp. 162-191.  
Caruso, D., ‘Private law and public stakes in European integration: the case of property’ (ELJ, 
2004), pp. 751-765.  
Chiti, M.P., ‘The EC concept of Public administration: the case of the bodies governed by public 
law’ (EPL, 2002), pp. 473-495. 
Clamour, G., ‘Marchés et concessions “entre entités dans le secteur public”’, (CMP 6, 2014). 
de Corail, J.-L., ‘L’approche fonctionnelle du service public : sa réalité et ses limites’ (AJDA, 1997), 
pp. 20-29. 
de Mars, S., ‘The limits of general principles: a procurement case study’ (ELR, 2013), pp. 316-334. 
20 
 
De Staercke, J., ‘De toepassing van de algemene reglementering overheidsopdrachten op 
privaatrechtelijke (onderwijs)instellingen na het Cambridge-arrest van het Hof van Justitie’ (RW, 
2002-2003), pp. 161-174. 
Delvolvé, P., ‘Marchés publics: les critères des “contrats-maison”’ (RDUE, 2002), pp. 53-61. 
Delvolvé, P., ‘Service public et libertés publiques’ (RFDA, 1985), pp. 1-11. 
Déom, D., ‘Quel avenir pour le service public local à l’heure européenne’ (Mouv.comm., 2004), pp. 
462-471. 
Devroe, W., ‘Privatizations and community law: neutrality versus policy’ (CMLR, 1997), pp. 267-306. 
di Porto, E., ‘Cooperation among local governments to deliver public services: Evidence from 
France’, http://www.ieb.ub.edu/files/Di%20Porto.pdf. 
Dossier: L'administration contractuelle (2003) AJDA, pp. 970-991. 
Douence, J.-CL., ‘La dévolution contractuelle du service public local’ (Rép. Dalloz Collectivités 
locales, 1995), pp. 6150-1 et s. 
Dreyfus, J.-D., ‘Actualité des contrats entre personnes publiques’ (AJDA, 2000), pp. 575 et s. 
Dreyfus, J.-D., ‘Externalisation et liberté d’organisation du service’ (AJDA, 2009), pp. 1529-1534. 
Driguez, L. and Rodrigues, S., ‘Services sociaux d'intérêt social et droit communautaire’ (AJDA, 
2008), pp. 191-197. 
Drijber, B.J. and Stergiou, H., ‘Public procurement law and Internal market law’ (CMLR, 2008), pp. 
805-846. 
Dubois, C., ‘To be or not to be “In house” ? Observations relatives à l’exception “In house” après 
l’arrêt Carbotermo’ (CDPK, 2007), pp. 213-240. 
Duffy, A., ‘La constitutionnalisation de la liberté contractuelle’ (RDP, 2006), pp. 1569-1600. 
Durviaux, A.L. and Thirion, N., ‘Les modes de gestion des services publics locaux, la réglementation 
relative aux marchés publics et le droit communautaire’ (JT, 2004), pp. 17-27. 
Durviaux, A.L., ‘Les relations in-house: un pas de plus dans une direction délicate’ (BJCP, 2007), pp. 
22-33. 
Eckert, G., ‘Contrats entre personnes publiques et droit de la concurrence’ (AJDA, 2013), pp. 849-
852. 
Eckert, G., ‘Les contrats échappant aux règles de publicité et de mise en concurrence’ (AJDA, 2013, 
pp. 849-852), pp. 849. 
Estevan de Quesada, C., ‘Competition and transparency in public procurement markets’, (PPLR, 
2014), pp. 229-244. 
Fatôme, E. and Menemis, A., ‘Concurrence et liberté d'organisation des personnes publiques : 
éléments d'analyse’ (AJDA, 2006), pp. 67-73. 
Fatome, E. and Menemis, A., ‘Intérêt général, concurrence et service public’ (AJDA, 2006), pp. 67 
et s. 
Fatome, E. and Richer, L., ‘Les procédures de passation des contrats et pouvoir d'organisation du 
service public’ (ACCP 12, 2002), pp. 60-64. 
Fennelly, N., ‘Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice’ (Fordham International Law 
Journal, 1996), pp. 656-679. 
21 
 
Fiedziuk, N., ‘Putting services of general economic interest up for tender: reflections on applicable 
EU rules’ (CMLR, 2013), pp. 87-114. 
Fiedziuk, N., Services of General Economic Interest and the Treaty of Lisbon: Opening Doors to a 
whole new approach or, maintaing the 'status quo' (ELR, 2011), pp. 226-242. 
Flamme, M.A., ‘La libération de la concurrence dans les marchés publics au sein de la C.E.E.’ (RMC, 
1965), pp. 277-290. 
Flamme, Ph. and Flamme, M.-A., ‘Les marchés publics de services et la coordination de leurs 
procédures de passation’ (RMCUE, 1993), pp. 150-170. 
Freedland, M., ‘Government by Contract and Public Law’ (PL, 1994), pp. 86-104. 
Freedland, M., ‘Public Law and Private Finance-Placing the Private Finance Initiative in a Public 
Law’ (PL, 1998), pp. 288-307. 
Freedland, M., ‘From the Contract of Employment to the Personal Work Nexus’, (Industrial Law 
Journal, 2006). 
Gerber, J., ‘Constitutionalising Economy: German neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the “New” 
Europe’ (The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 42, No.1), pp. 25-84. 
Gerner-Beuerle, C., ‘Shareholders between the market and the state; The VW law and other 
interventions in the market’ (CMLRev., 2012), pp. 97-144. 
Guillou, Y.-R., ‘L’exonération des relations “in house” du régime des marches publics’ (ACCP 32, 
2004), pp. 72 et seq. 
Harlow, C., ‘”Public” and “Private” Law: Definition without Distinction’, (CMLR, 1980). 
Harris, B.V., ‘The “Third Source” of Authority’ (LQR, 1992), pp. 626-629. 
Hausmann, F.L. and Queisner, G., ‘In-House Contracts and Inter-Municipal Cooperation – Exceptions 
from the European Union Procurement Law should be applied with caution’ (EPPPL, 2013), pp. 231-
237. 
Hoepffner, H., ‘La nouvelle directive Concessions’, (Europe, 2014, June), pp. 9-16. 
Janicot, L., ‘L'identification du service public géré par une personne privée’ (RFDA, 2008), pp. 67-
79. 
Joerges, C., ‘What is left of the European Economic Constitution? A Melancholic Eulogy’ (ELR, 2005), 
pp. 461-489. 
Kaarreselo, T., ‘Procuring in-house: the impact of the EC procurement regime’ (PPLR, 2008), pp. 
242-254. 
Kalflèche, G., ‘Le contrôle des collectivités sur les sociétés publiques locales faut-il rénover le in 
house’ (RFDA, 2012), pp. 1120-1127. 
Karayigit, M.T., ‘The Notion of Services of General Economic Interest Revisited’ (EPL, 2009), pp. 
575-595. 
Karayigit, M.T., ‘A new type of exemption from the EU rules on public procurement established: “in 
the neighbour’s house” provision of public interest tasks’ (PPLR, 2010), pp. 183-197. 
Kotschy, B., ‘Arrêts Stadt Halle, Coname et Parking Brixen’ (RDUE, 2005), pp. 845-853. 
Kumm, M., ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe 
before and after the Constitutional Treaty’ (ELJ, 2005), pp. 262-307. 
22 
 
Laurent, D. and Rousset, O., ‘Convention de délégation de service public local et loi Sapin: la 
transparence dans le brouillard’ (LPA 1994), pp. 1 et s. 
Lenaerts, K., ‘L’égalité de traitement et droit communautaire’ (Cah.dr.eur., 1991), pp. 1-41. 
Lenaerts, K., ‘Federation and the Rule of Law. Perspectives from the European Court of Justice’, 
(Fordham Int.L.J., 2011). 
Llorens, F., ‘Le recours des personnes publiques à la vente d’immeuble en l’état futur 
d’achèvement : une condamnation partielle’ (CJEG, 1991), pp. 251 et s. 
M.T. Karayigit, ‘The notion of services of general economic interest’ (EPL, 2009), pp. 575-595. 
Marchegiani, G., ‘Les relations in-house et le syndrome du cheval à bascule’ (RMCUE, 2006), pp. 47-
57. 
Mattera, A., ‘Vers un Code européen des marchés publics. Simplification, modernisation et 
clarification de la reglementation existante’ (RDUE, 2000), pp. 528-570. 
Mensi, M., L’ouverture à la concurrence des marchés publics de services (RMCUE, 1993), pp. 59-86. 
Moderne, F., ‘L'evolution récente du droit des contrats administratifs : les conventions entre 
personnes publiques’ (RFDA, 1984), pp. 1 et s. 
Moderne, F., ‘La concurrence des services techniques de l’Etat et des techniciens privés auprès des 
collectivités locales’ (RD.imm., 1982), p. 467 et s. 
Moderne, F., ‘Les Conventions des prestations de services entre l'Etat et les collectivités’ (EFE, 
1996, no. 29), cited by Dreyfus, J.-D., ‘Actualité des contrats entre personnes publiques’ (AJDA, 
2000), pp. 575-580. 
Munro, C., ‘Competition law and public procurement: two sides of the same coin ?’ (PPLR, 2006), 
pp. 352-361. 
Neergaard, U., ‘Public service concessions and related concepts - the increased pressure from 
Community law on Member States' use of concessions’ (PPLR, 2007), pp. 387-409.  
Nettesheim, M., ‘Les services d’intérêt general en droit communautaire entre libre concurrence et 
état social’ (RIDC, 2008), pp. 608-615. 
Neveu, Ph., ‘Contractualisation et mutualisation, outils de l’intercommunalité’, in (La Semaine 
juridique Administrations et Collectivités territoriales, 2010, n° 30), p. 2242 et s.. 
Nicinski, S., ‘La loi du 28 mai 2010 pour le développement des sociétés publiques locales’ (AJDA, 
2010), pp. 1759-1765. 
Nihoul, P., ‘Les marches publics dans l’Union européenne (2003-2005)’ (JDE, 2006), pp. 264-270. 
Odudu, O., ‘The public/private distinction in EU Internal Market Law’, (RTDE, 2010), 826 et seq. 
 
Olykke, G.S., ‘How does the Court of Justice of the European Union pursue competition concerns in 
a public procurement context?’ (PPLR, 2011), pp. 179-192. 
Pescatore, P., ‘Le recours, dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des Communautés 
Européennes, à des normes déduites de la comparaison des droits des Etats membres’ (RIDC, 1980) 
pp. 337-359. 
Peyrical, J.-M., Que reste-t-il du in house? (RFDA, 2005), pp. 955-958. 
Peyrical, J.M., Les contrats de prestation entre collectivités publiques (AJDA, 2000), pp. 581-591. 
23 
 
Picard, E., La liberté contractuelle des personnes publiques constitue-t-elle un droit fondamental ? 
(AJDA, 1996), pp. 651-666. 
Pontier, J.-M., ‘Cooperation contractuelle et cooperation institutionnelle’ (Rev.Adm., 1994), pp. 
162-167.  
Poulet-Gebot Leclercq, N., ‘La contractualisation des relations entre les personnes publiques’ 
(RFDA, 1999), pp. 551-565. 
Pouyaud, D., ‘Contrats entre personne publiques’ (Juris classeur Administratif), fasc. 675. 
R.S., ‘Un organisme public de radioduffusion percevant une redevanve est-il un pouvoir 
adjudicateur?’, under Case C-337/06, Bayerischer Rundfunk a.o. v. GEWA (BJCP 4, 2008), p. 98 et s. 
Ramsey, I., ‘The New Public Procurement Directives: a partial solution to the problems of 
procurement compliance’ (EPL, 2006), pp. 275-294. 
Raynaud, F. en Fombeur, P., ‘Chronique générale de jurisprudence administrative française’ (AJDA, 
1998), pp. 553-575.  
Reitz, J.C., ‘Political Economy as a Major Architectural Principle of Public Law’ (Tulane L. Rev., 
2001), pp. 1121-1157. 
Richer, L., ‘La contractualisation comme technique de gestion des affaires publiques’ (AJDA, 2003), 
pp. 973 et s. 
Richer, L., Un contrat d'entente intercommunale n'est pas une délégation de service public (AJDA, 
2012), pp. 555-558. 
Richer, L., ‘Les contrats entre entités du secteur public’, (ACCP, 2014, n° 143), pp. 31-35.  
Rodrigues, S., Les qualifications concurrentes des activités d'intérêt général en droit communautaire 
(AJDA, 2006), pp. 84-90. 
Samson-Dye, A., ‘Irrégularité du recours à un contrat in house entre une SPLA et une collectivité 
très minoritaire’ (CMP, 2013), pp. 36-38. 
Sauter, W., ‘The Economic Constitution of the European Union’ (Col. J. Eur. L., 2 1998), pp. 27-68. 
Sauter, W., ‘Services of General Economic Interest and Universal Service in EU Law’ (ELR, 2008), 
pp. 167-192. 
Schutyser, B., ‘Het toepassingsgebied van de wetgeving overheidsopdrachten: een aantal evoluties 
in de rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie (1998-2003)’ (TBP, 2004), pp. 259-279. 
Semmelmann, C., ‘The European Union's economic constitution under the Lisbon Treaty soul-
searching among lawyers shifts the focus to procedure’ (ELR, 2010), pp. 516-542. 
Semmelmann, C., ‘Theoretical reflections on the public-private distinction and their traces in 
European Union law’, (Social legal series, 2), 
http://opo.iisj.net/index.php/osls/article/viewFile/102/71, pp. 29-30. 
Semmelmann, C., ‘The Public-Private Divide in European Union Law or an Overkill of 
Functionalism’, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2056311, p. 13. 
Simon, D. en Lagondet, F., La communication de la Commission sur les services d’intérêt général en 
Europe continuité ou rupture? (Europe 1, 1997), pp. 4-6. 
Simon, D., ‘L'intérêt général national vu par les droits européens’ (Cah. const., 2006), pp. 1-18. 
24 
 
Smith, J., ‘The European Charter on Local Self-Government: does the UK Government comply’ 
(Journal of Local Government Law, 2002), pp. 90-96. 
Snell, J., ‘The notion of Market access: a concept or a Slogan?’ (CMLR, 2010), pp. 437-472.  
Spaventa, E., ‘Leaving Keck behind? The Free Movement of Good after the rulings in commission v. 
Italy and Michelsson and Roos’ (ELR, 2009), pp. 914-932. 
Stewart, J. and Walsh, K., ‘Change in The Managemenet of Public Services’ (Public Administration, 
1992), pp. 499-518. 
Stirn, B., ‘La liberté contractuelle, droit fondamental en droit administratif’ (AJDA, 1998), pp. 673-
675. 
Szydlo, M., ‘Contracts beyond the scope of the EC procurement directives – who is bound by the 
requirement for transparency ?’ (ELR, 2009), pp. 724-730. 
T.C. Hartley, ‘The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution of the European Union’ 
(The Law Quarterly Review, 1996), pp. 95-109. 
Terneyre, Ph., ‘A propos de la liberté contractuelle’ (AJDA, 2007), pp. 1906-1911. 
Trepte, P.-A., ‘Public procurement and the Community competition rules’ (PPLR, 1993), pp. 93-114. 
Tridimas, T., ‘The Court of Justice and judicial activism’ (ELRev, 1996), pp. 199-210. 
Truchet, D., ‘Label de service public et statut du service public’ (AJDA, 1982), pp. 427-439. 
Tryfonidou, A., ‘Further steps on the road to convergence among the market freedoms’ (ELR, 2010), 
pp. 36-56. 
Tryfonidou, A., ‘Reverse discrimination in purely internal situations: An incongruity in a Citizens' 
Europe’ (LIEI, 2008), pp. 43-67. 
Van Garsse, S., ‘Nieuwe richtlijn overheidsopdrachten. Codificatie van het Europees 
aanbestedingsrecht in de klassieke sectoren’ (NjW, 2004), pp. 944-949. 
Verhoeven, A., ‘Privatisation and EC Law: Is the European Commission 'neutral' with respect to 
public versus private ownership of companies?’ (ICLQ, 1996), pp. 861-887. 
Vincent-Jones, P., ‘The New Public Contracting’ (Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 2007), 
pp. 259-278. 
Vincent-Jones, P., ‘Responsive Law and Governance in Public Services Provision: A Future for the 
Local Contracting Authority’ (Modern Law, 1998), pp. 362-381. 
Weiler, Joseph H.H., ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution? Reflections on Demos, Telos and the 
German Maastricht Decision’ (ELR, 1995), pp. 219-258. 
Weltzien, K., ‘Avoiding the procurement rules by awarding contracts to an in-house entity – scope of 
the the procurement directives in the classical sector’ (PPLR, 2005), pp. 237-255. 
Wiggen, J., ‘Public procurement rules and cooperation between public sector entities: the limits of 
the in-house doctrine under EU procurement law’ (PPLR, 2011), pp. 157-172. 
Wiggen, J., ‘Directive 2014/24/EU : the new provision on co-operation in the public sector’, (PPLR, 
2014), pp. 83-93. 
Williams, R., ‘Public-public cooperation – Teckal in practise’ (PPLR, 2012), pp. NA1-10. 
Williams, R., ‘The New Procurment Directives of the European Union’ (PPLR, 2004), pp. 153-159. 
25 
 
Withofs, V., Artikel 345 VWEU: een rem op de Europese harmonisatie van het goederenrecht? (TBBR, 
2013), pp. 67-87. 
Wolfswinkel, J., ‘The allocation of a Limited Number of Authorisations’ (Review of European 
Administrative Law, 2010), pp. 61-104.  
Young, K., ‘Local public service agreements and performance incentives for local government’, 
(Local Government Studies, 2005, 1), pp. 3-20. 
X., ‘Les Nouvelles directives européennes’ (ACCP 33, 2004), pp. 45-68. 
Zimmer, W., ‘Convention conclue par deux collectivités territoriales en vue d’exercer en 
coopération un service public’ (CMP 3, 2012), pp. 19-20. 
‘Dossier: Les nouvelles directives “marchés”’, (ACCP, 2014, n° 143) and (ACCP, 2014, n° 144). 
‘Special issue – the new EU procurement directives’, (PPLR, 2014, Issue 3) and (PPLR, 2014, Issue 4). 
 
 
4. Table of Cases 
 
CJEU 
 
Case C-305/08, Consorzio Nazionale Interuniversitario per le Scienze del Mare (CoNISMa) v. Regione Marche 
[2009] ECR I-12129. 
Case C-3/88, Commission v. Italy (“Re Data Processing”) [1989] ECR 4035. 
C-1/90, Aragonesa de Publicidad v. Departmento de Sanidad [1991] ECR I-4151. 
C-2/74, Reyners v. Belgium [1974] ECR 631. 
C-3/88, Commission v. Italy [1989] ECR 04035. 
C-6/01, Associação Nacional de Operadores de Máquinas Recreativas (Anomar) and Others v. Estado 
português [2003] ECR I-8261. 
C-8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville [1974] ECR 837. 
C-9/99, Echirolles Distribution SA v. Association du Dauphiné and Others [2000] ECR I-8207. 
C-13/63, Italian Republic v. Commission of the European Economic Community [1963] ECR 00165. 
C-13/76, Gaetano Donà v. Mario Mantero [1976] ECR 1333. 
C-15/13, Technische Universität Hamburg-Harburg, Hochschul-Informations-System GmbH v. 
Datenlotsen Informationssysteme GmbH [2014] ECR I-00000. 
C-17/92, Federación de Distribuidores Cinematográficos v. Estado Español en Unión de Productores 
de Cine y Televisión [1993] ECR I-02239.  
C-18/01, Arkkitehtuuritoimisto Riitta Korhonen Oy and Others v. Varkauden Taitotalo Oy [2003] 
ECR I-5321. 
C-19/00, SIAC Construction Ltd v. County Council of the County of Mayo [2001] ECR I-07725. 
C-20/87, Ministère public v. André Gauchard [1987] ECR 4879. 
C-22/67, Fonds national de retraite des ouvriers mineurs v. Giovanni Mura [1977] ECR 1699. 
C-26/03, Stadt Halle and RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH v. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische 
Restabfall- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] ECR I-00001. 
26 
 
C-26/62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland 
Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 00001. 
C-29/04, Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of Austria [2005] ECR I-9705. 
C-30/77, Régina v. Pierre Bouchereau [1977] ECR 01999. 
Joined Cases C-31/03 and C-34/03, Fabricom SA v. Belgian State [2005] ECR I-1559. 
C-31/87, Gebroeders Beentjes BV v. State of the Netherlands [1988] ECR 4635. 
C-33/74, Johannes Henricus Maria van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de 
Metaalnijverheid [1974] ECR 1299. 
C-36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union cycliste internationale [1974] ECR 
1405. 
C-36/75, Roland Rutili v. Ministre de l'intérieur [1975] ECR 01219. 
C-41/74, Yvonne van Duyn v. Home Office [1974] ECR 1337. 
C‐41/90, Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v. Macrotron GmbH [1991] ECR I‐1979. 
C-44/96, Mannesmann Anlagenbau Austria AG and Others v. Strohal Rotationsdruck GesmbH [1998] 
ECR I-73. 
C-45/87, Commission v. Ireland (“Dundalk”) [1988] ECR 4929. 
Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The 
Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others [1993] ECR I-1839. 
C-49/07, Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v. Elliniko Dimosio [2008] ECR I-4863. 
Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97, Christelle Deliège v. Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines 
associées ASBL, Ligue belge de judo ASBL, Union européenne de judo and François Pacquée [2000] 
ECR I-2549. 
C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati a Procuration de Milano [1995] 
ECR I-4165.  
C-59/00, Bent Mousten Vestergaard v. Spotrup Boligselkab [2001] ECR I-9505. 
C-64/08, Engelmann [2010] ECR I-08219. 
Joined Cases C-64/96 and C-65/96, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Uecker and Jacquet v. Land 
Nordrhein-Westfalen [1997] ECR I-3177. 
C-71/76, Jean Thieffry v. Conseil de l'ordre des avocats à la Cour de Paris [1977] ECR 765. 
Joined Cases C-72/10 and C-77/10, Costa and Cifone [2012] ECR I-0000. 
C-76/90, Manfred Säger v. Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd [1991] ECR I-4221. 
C-78/90, Compagnie Commerciale de l'Ouest and others v. Receveur Principal des Douanes de La 
Pallice Port [1992] ECR I-1847. 
C-82/77, Public Prosecutor of the Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Jacobus Philippus van Tiggele 
[1978] ECR 837. 
C-83/94, Leifer and Others [1995] ECR I-3231. 
C-84/03, Commission v. Spain [2005] ECR I-00139.  
C-84/95, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v. Minister for Transport, Energy and 
Communications and Others [1996] ECR I-03953. 
C-87/94, Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of Belgium [1996] ECR I-2043. 
27 
 
C-91/08, Wall AG v. La ville de Francfort-sur-le-Main and Frankfurter Entsorgungs- und Service 
(FES) GmbH [2010] ECR I-02815. 
C-92/00, Hospital Ingenieure Krankenhaustechnik Planungs-Gesellschaft mbH v. Stadt Wien [2002] 
ECR I-5553. 
C-94/12, Swm Costruzioni 2 SpA, Mannocchi Luigino DI v. Provincia di Fermo [2013] ECR I-00000. 
C-94/99, Arge Gewässerschutz v. Bundesministerium für Land- und Forsrwirtschaft [2000] ECR I-
11037. 
C-95/10, Strong Segurança SA v. Município de Sintra and Securitas-Serviços e Tecnologia de 
Segurança [2011] ECR I-01865.  
C-98/01, Commission v. United Kingdom [2003] ECR I-4641. 
C-98/86, Ministère public v. Arthur Mathot [1987] ECR 809. 
C-103/88, Fratelli Costanzo SpA v. Comune di Milano [1989] ECR 1839. 
C-107/98, Teckal Srl v. Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121. 
C-108/98, RI.SAN. Srl v. Comune di Ischia, Italia Lavoro SpA and Ischia Ambiente SpA [2000] ECR I-
05219. 
C-110/05, Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic [2009] ECR I-519. 
C-112/05, Commission v. Germany [2007] ECR I-8995. 
C-120/78, Rewe v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Bramtwein [1978] ECR 649. 
C-126/03, Commission v. Germany [2004] ECR I-11197. 
C-142/05, Mickelsson and Roos [2009] ECR I-4273. 
Joined Cases C-147/06 and C-148/06, SECAP SpA and Santorso Soc. coop. arl v. Comune di Torino 
[2008] ECR I-03565. 
Joined Cases C-158/04 and C-159/04, Alfa Vita Vassilopoulos AE and Carrefour Marinopoulos AE v. 
Elliniko Dimosio and Nomarchiaki Aftodioikisi Ioanninon [2006] ECR I-08135. 
C-158/96, Raymond Kohll v. Union des caisses de maladie [1998] ECR I-1931. 
C-159/11, Azienda Sanitaria Locale di Lecce, Università del Salento v. Ordine degli Ingegneri della 
Provincia di Lecce and Others [2012] ECR I-00000. 
C-162/99, Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic [2001] ECR I-00541. 
C-171/08, Commission v. Portugal [2010] ECR I-06817. 
C-175/78, R. v. Saunders [1979] ECR 1129. 
Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98, Pavel Pavlov and Othus v. Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische 
specialisten [2006] ECR I-6451. 
Joined Cases C-182/11 and C-183/11, Econord SpA v. Comuni di Cagno, Comune di Varese, Comune 
di Solbiate [2012] ECR I-00000. 
C-182/83, Robert Fearon & Company Limited v. Irish Land Commission [1984] ECR 3677. 
Joined Cases C-186/11 and C-209/11, Stanleybet International Ltd, William Hill Organization Ltd, 
William Hill Plc, Sportingbet plc v. Ypourgos Oikonomias kai Oikonomikon, Ypourgos Politismou 
[2013] ECR I-0000. 
C-186/87, Ian Willam Cowan v. Trésor public [1989] ECR 195. 
28 
 
C-196/08, Acoset SpA v. Conferenza Sindaci e Presidenza Prov. Reg. ATO Idrico Ragusa and Others 
[2009] ECR I-09913. 
C-196/96, Steymann v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1988] ECR 2085. 
Joined Cases C-197/11 and C-203/11, Eric Libert and Others v. Gouvernement flamand and All 
Projects & Developments NV and Others v. Vlaamse Regering [2013] ECR I-00000. 
C-198/89, Commission of the European Communities v. Hellenic Republic [1991] ECR I-00727.  
C-203/08, Sporting Exchange Ltd v. Minister van Justitie [2010] ECR I-04695. 
C-205/03P, Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología Sanitaria (FENIN) v. Commission of the 
European Communities [2006] ECR I‐6295. 
C-205/07, Lodewijk Gysbrechts and Santurel Inter BVBA [2008] ECR I-09947. 
C-206/08, Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband Gotha und Landkreisgemeinden (WAZV Gotha) v. 
Eurawasser Aufbereitungs- und Entsorgungsgesellschaft mbH [2009] ECR I-0000. 
C-212/06, Government of the French Community and Walloon Government v. Flamish Government 
[2008] ECR I-1683. 
C-214/00, Commission v. Spain [2003] ECR I-4667. 
C-220/05, Jean Auroux and Others v. Commune de Roanne [2007] ECR I-389. 
C-220/06, Asociación Profesional de Empresas de Reparto y Manipulado de Correspondencia v. 
Administración General del Estado [2007] ECR I-12175. 
C-221/12, Belgacom NV v. Interkommunale voor Teledistributie van het Gewest Antwerpen 
(INTEGAN) and Others [2013] ECR I-00000. 
Joined Cases C-223/99 and C-260/99, Agorà Srl and Excelsior Snc di Pedrotti Bruna & C. v. Ente 
Autonomo Fiera Internazionale di Milano and Ciftat Soc. coop. arl. [2001] ECR I-3605. 
C-226/09, European Commission v. Ireland [2010] ECR I-11807. 
C-231/03, Consorzio Aziende Metano (Coname) v. Comune di Cingia de' Botti [2005] ECR I-7287. 
C-237/99, Commission v. France [2001] ECR I-939; 
C-240/06, Commission v. Italy [2007] ECR I-09413. 
C-243/89, Commission v. Denmark (Storebaelt) [1993] ECR I-2253. 
C‐244/94, Fédération Française des Sociétés d'Assurance, Société Paternelle-Vie, Union des 
Assurances de Paris-Vie and Caisse d'Assurance et de Prévoyance Mutuelle des Agriculteurs v. 
Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche [1995] ECR I‐4013. 
C-244/97, Erich Ciola ν. Land Vorarlberg [1999] ECR I-02517. 
C-249/81, Commission v. Ireland [1982] ECR 4005. 
C-250/03, Giorgio Emanuele Mauri v. Ministero della Giustizia and Commissione per gli esami di 
avvocato presso la Corte d'appello di Milano [2005] ECR I-1267.  
C-260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v. 
Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others [1991] ECR I-
02925. 
C-263/86, Belgian State v. René Humbel [1988] ECR 5365. 
Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, Criminal proceedings v. Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard 
[1993] ECR I-6097. 
29 
 
C-268/99, Aldona Malgorzata Jony and Others v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2001] ECR I-8615. 
C-274/09, Privater Rettungsdienst und Krankentransport Stadler v. Zweckverband für 
Rettungsdienst und Feuerwehralarmierung Passau [2011] ECR I-1335. 
C-275/98, Unitron Scandinavia A/S and 3-S A/S, Danske Svineproducenters Serviceselskab v. 
Ministeriet for Fødevarer, Landbrug og Fiskeri [1999] ECR I-08291. 
C-281/06, Jundt v. Finanzamt Offenburg [2007] ECR I-12231. 
Joined Cases C-282 and C-283/04, Commission v. Netherlands [2006] ECR I-9141. 
C-283/00, Commission v. Spain [2003] ECR I-11697. 
Joint Cases C-285/99 and C-286/99, Impresa Lombardini SpA - Impresa Generale di Costruzioni v. 
ANAS - Ente nazionale per le strade and Società Italiana per Condotte d'Acqua SpA and Impresa Ing. 
Mantovani SpA v. ANAS - Ente nazionale per le strade and Ditta Paolo Bregoli [2001] ECR I-09233. 
C-292/12, Ragn Sells v. Sillamäe Linnavalitsus [2013] ECR I-00000. 
C-295/05, Asociación Nacional de Empresas Forestales (Asemfo) v. Transformación Agraria SA 
(Tragsa) [2007] ECR I-02999. 
C-300/01, Doris Salzmann [2003] ECR I-4899. 
C-300/07, Hans & Christophorus Oymanns GbR, Orthopädie Schuhtechnik v. AOK 
Rheinland/Hamburg [2009] ECR I-04779. 
C-300/89, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities 
[1991] ECR I-2901. 
C-302/97, Klaus Konle v. Republik Österreich [1999] ECR I-3099. 
C-305/08, Consorzio Nazionale Interuniversitario per le Scienze del Mare (CoNISMA) v. Regione 
Marche [2009] ECR I-12129. 
C-306/97, Connemara Machine Turf Co. Ltd v. Coillte Teoranta [1998] ECR I‑8761. 
C-309/99, J.C.J. Wouters, J. W. Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV v. 
Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten [2002] ECR I‐1577.  
Joined Cases C-321/94 to C-324/94, Christian Poucet v. Assurances Générales de France and Caisse 
Mutuelle Régionale du Languedoc-Roussillon and Daniel Pistre v. Caisse Autonome Nationale de 
Compensation de l' Assurance Vieillesse des Artisans (Cancava) [1997] ECR I-2343. 
C‑323/96, Commission v. Belgium [1998] ECR I‑5063. 
C-324/07, Coditel Brabant SA v. Commune d'Uccle and Région de Bruxelles-Capitale [2008] ECR I-
8457. 
C-324/98, Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v. Telekom Austria AG [2000] ECR I-
10745. 
C-336/12, Ministeriet for Forskning, Innovation og Videregående Uddannelser v. Manova A/S [2013] 
ECR I-00000. 
C-337/05, Commission v. Italy [2008] ECR I-02173. 
C-337/06, Bayerischer Rundfunk e.a. v. GEWA, [2007] ECR I-11173.  
C-337/82, St. Nikolaus Brennerei v. Hauptzollamt Krefeld [1984] ECR 1051. 
C-339/89, Alsthom Atlantique SA v. Compagnie de construction mécanique Sulzer SA [1991] ECR I-
00107. 
30 
 
C-340/04, Carbotermo SpA and Consorzio Alisei v. Comune di Busto Arsizio and AGESP SpA [2006] 
ECR I-04137. 
C-347/06, ASM Brescia SpA v. Comune di Rodengo Saiano [2008] ECR I-05641. 
C-348/10, Norma-A SIA and Dehon-ASIA v. Latgales planasanas regions [2011] ECR I-0000. 
C-352/12, Consiglio Nazionale degli Ingegneri v. Comune di Castelvecchio Subequo et Comune di 
Barisciano [2013] ECR I-00000. 
C-353/96, Commission v. Ireland [1998] ECR I-8565. 
C-355/85, Driancourt v. Cognet [1986] ECR 3231. 
Joined Cases C-357/10 and C-358/10, Duomo Gpa Srl, Gestione Servizi Pubblici Srl and Irtel Srl v. 
Comune di Baranzate and Comune di Venegono Inferiore [2012] ECR I-00000. 
C-359/93, Commission v. The Netherlands (UNIX) [1995] ECR I-157. 
C-360/96, Gemeente Arnhem and Gemeente Rheden v. BFI Holding BV [1998] ECR I-6821. 
C-367/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Portuguese Republic [2002] ECR I-04731. 
C-368/10, Commission v. Netherlands [2012] ECR I-00000. 
C-371/05, Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic [2008] ECR I-00110. 
C-373/00, Adolf Truley GmbH v. Bestattung Wien GmbH [2003] ECR I-1931. 
C-379/98, Preussen Elektra AG v. Schleswag AG [2001] ECR I-2099. 
C-380/98, The Queen v. H.M. Treasury, ex parte The University of Cambridge [2000] ECR I-8035. 
C-381/93, Alpine Investments v. Minister van Financiën [1995] ECR I-1141. 
C-382/05, Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic [2007] ECR I-6657. 
C-382/85, Bond van Adverteerders and others v. The Netherlands [1988] ECR 2085. 
C-384/93, Alpine Investments v. Minister van Financiën [1995] ECR I-1141. 
C-386/11, Piepenbrock Dienstleistungen & Co. KG v. Kreis Düren [2013] ECR I-00000. 
C-388/01, Commission v. Italy [2003] ECR I-00721. 
C-388/12, Comune di Ancona v. Regione Marche [2013] ECR I-00000.  
C-393/06, Ing. Aigner, Wasser-Wärme-Umwelt, GmbH v. Fernwärme Wien GmbH [2008] ECR I-2339. 
C-399/98, Ordine degli Architetti delle province di Milano e Lodi, Piero De Amicis, Consiglio 
Nazionale degli Architetti and Leopoldo Freyrie v. Comune di Milano, and Pirelli SpA, Milano 
Centrale Servizi SpA and Fondazione Teatro alla Scala [2001] ECR I-05409. 
C-410/04, Associazione Nazionale Autotrasporto Viaggiatori (ANAV) v. Comune di Bari and AMTAB 
Servizio SpA [2006] ECR I-03303. 
C-412/04, Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic [2008] ECR I-00619.  
C-412/93, Société d’Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 Publicité SA and M6 Publicité SA 
[1995] ECR I-179. 
C-415/93, Union Royale des Sociétés de Football Association v. Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921. 
C-419/92, Ingetraut Scholz v. Opera Universitaria di Cagliari and Cinzia Porcedda [1994] ECR I-505. 
C-421/01, Traunfellner GmbH v. Österreichische Autobahnen- und Schnellstraßen-Finanzierungs-AG 
[2003] ECR I-11941. 
C-425/12, Portgás – Sociedade de Produção e Distribuição de Gás SA v. Ministério da Agricultura, do 
Mar, do Ambiente e do Ordenamento do Territó [2013] ECR I-00000. 
31 
 
C-434/09, McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] ECR I-3375. 
C-441/02, Commission v. Germany [2006] ECR I-3449.  
C-448/98, Criminal proceedings against Jean-Pierre Guimont [2000] ECR I-10663. 
C-451/08, Helmut Müller GmbH v. Bundesanstalt für Immobilienaufgaben [2010] ECR I-02673. 
C-452/01, Margarethe Ospelt and Schlössle Weissenberg Familienstiftung [2003] ECR I-9743. 
C-454/06, Pressetext Nachrichtenagentur GmbH v. Republik Österreich (Bund), APA-OTS 
Originaltext-Service GmbH and APA Austria Presse Agentur registrierte Genossenschaft mit 
beschränkter Haftung [2008] ECR I-04401. 
C-458/03, Parking Brixen GmbH v. Gemeinde Brixen and Stadtwerke Brixen AG [2005] ECR I-08585.  
Joined Cases C-463 and C-464/04, Federconsumatori and Others and Associazione Azionariato 
Diffuso dell’AEM SpA and Others v. Comune di Milano [2007] ECR I-10419. 
C-470/99, Universale-Bau AG, Bietergemeinschaft: 1) Hinteregger & Söhne Bauges.m.b.H. Salzburg, 
2) ÖSTÜ-STETTIN Hoch- und Tiefbau GmbH v. Entsorgungsbetriebe Simmering GmbH [2002] ECR I-
11617. 
C-480/06, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany [2009] ECR I-
04747. 
C-483/99, Commission v. France [2002] ECR I-4781. 
C-503/04, Commission v. Germany [2007] ECR I-6153. 
C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium [2002] ECR I-4809. 
C-507/03, Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland [2007] ECR I-09777. 
C-513/03, Heirs of M. E. A. van Hilten-van der Heijden v. Inspecteur van de 
Belastingdienst/Particulieren/Ondernemingen outsideland te Heerlen [2006] ECR I-10653. 
Joined Cases C-515/99, C-519/99, C-524/99 and C-526/99 till C-540/99, Hans Reisch and Others v. 
Bürgermeister der Landeshauptstadt Salzburg and Grundverkehrsbeauftragter des Landes Salzburg 
and Anton Lassacher and Others v. Grundverkehrsbeauftragter des Landes Salzburg and 
Grundverkehrslandeskommission des Landes Salzburg [2002] ECR I-2147. 
C-518/06, Commission v. Italy [2009] ECR I-3491. 
C-526/11, IVD GmbH & Co. KG v. Ärztekammer Westfalen-Lippe [2013] ECR I-00000. 
C-532/03, Commission v. Ireland [2007] ECR I-11353. 
C-532/06, Emm. G. Lianakis AE, Sima Anonymi Techniki Etaireia Meleton kai Epivlepseon and 
Nikolaos Vlachopoulos v. Dimos Alexandroupolis and Others [2008] ECR I-251. 
C-543/08, Commission v. Portugal [2010] ECR I-11241. 
C-564/11, Consulta Regionale Ordine Ingegneri della Lombardia e.a. v. Comune di Pavia [2013] ECR 
I-00000. 
C-573/07, Sea Srl v. Comune de Ponte Nossa [2010] ECR I-08127. 
C-599/10, SAG ELV Slovensko a.s., FELA Management AG, ASCOM (Schweiz) AG, Asseco Central 
Europe a.s., TESLA Stropkov a.s., Autostrade per l’Italia SpA, EFKON AG, Stalexport Autostrady SA 
v. Úrad pre verejné obstarávanie [2012] ECR I-00000. 
C-810/79, Peter Uberschär v. Bundesversicherungsanstalt für Angestellte [1980] ECR 2747. 
32 
 
Case C-574/12, Centro Hospitalar de Setúbal EPE, Serviço de Utilização Comum dos Hospitais 
(SUCH) v. Eurest (Portugal) — Sociedade Europeia de Restaurantes Lda [2014] ECR I-00000. 
 
 
2. General Court (EU) 
 
T-17/02, Fred Olsen v. Commission [2005] ECR II-2031. 
T-50/05, Evropaïki Dynamiki - Proigmena Systimata Tilepikoinonion Pliroforikis kai Tilematikis AE 
v. European Commission [2010] ECR II-01071. 
T-155/04, SELEX Sistemi Integrati SpA v. Commission [2006] ECR II-4797. 
Joined Cases T-228/99 and T-233/99, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale and Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen v. Commission of the European Communities [2003] ECR II-435. 
T-289/03, British United Provident Association Ltd (BUPA), BUPA Insurance Ltd and BUPA Ireland 
Ltd v. Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR II-00081. 
T-289/09, Evropaïki Dynamiki – Proigmena Systimata Tilepikoinonion Pliroforikis kai Tilematikis AE 
v. Europese Commissie [2011] ECR II-0000. 
T-313/02, Meca-Medina and Majcen v. Commission [2004] ECR II-3291. 
 
 
3. Conseil d’Etat (France) 
 
CE fr. 26 June 1930, Bourrageas, Lebon 659. 
CE fr. 20 December 1935, Etablissements Vézia (RDP, 1936) p. 119. 
CE fr. 13 May 1938, Caisse primaire d'aide et de protection, Rec. 41. 
CE fr. 31 July 1942, Monpeurt, Lebon 239. 
CE fr. 2 April 1943, Bouguen, Lebon 86; 
CE fr. 3 November 1950, Com., p. 534.  
CE fr. 20 April 1956, Epoux Bertin, Rec. 167. 
CE fr. 13 January 1961, Magnier, no. 43548, Lebon 32. 
CE fr. 18 June 1963, Narcy, Lebon 401. 
CE fr. 28 June 1963, Narcy, Rec. 401. 
CE fr. 29 April 1970, Soc. Unipain (AJDA, 1970), p. 430.  
CE fr. 30 October 1980, Fédération française des professionnels immobiliers et commerciaux, Lebon 
348. 
CE fr. 20 January 1989, SA GBA Berry-Loire, Lebon 26. 
CE fr. 17 March 1989, Synd. psychiatre français (RFDA, 1991), p. 267. 
CE fr. 20 July 1990, Ville de Melun et Association “Melun-culture-loisirs”, Lebon 220.  
CE fr. 28 January 1998, Société Borg Warner (AJDA, 1998) p. 287. 
CE fr. 20 May 1998, Communauté de communes du Piémont de Barr, nr. 188.239 (AJDA, 1998) p. 
553. 
33 
 
CE fr. 8 February 1999, Service départemental incendie et Secours. 
CE fr. 9 July 2003, Féd. Française des entreprises gestionnaires des services, aux équipements, à 
l’énergie et à l’environnement et autres, Req. N° 239879 (CMP comm., 2003) p. 169. 
CE fr. 22 February 2007, Association du personnel relevant des établissements pour inadaptés, Rec. 
92. 
CE fr. 6 April 2007, Commune d'Aix en Provence (RFDA, 2007), p. 812. 
CE fr. 4 March 2009, Syndicat national des industries d'information de gaz (AJDA, 2009), p. 891. 
CE fr. 3 February 2012 (AJDA, 2012) p. 555. 
CE fr. 23 December 2012, no. 337396, Conseil national de l'ordre des médecins. 
CE fr. 6 November 2013, Commune de Marsannay-la-Côte, n° 365079. 
 
 
4. Cour constitutionnelle (France) 
 
C.c. no. 2000-437, 19 December 2000. 
C.c. no. 2006-543, 30 November 2006. 
 
 
5. English Courts 
 
The Bankers’ Case, (1700) 90 E.R. p. 270. 
Attorney General v. Great Eastern Railway, (App.Cas. 5, 1879/1880), p. 473. 
Bulmer Ltd v. J. Bollinger SA (1974) 2:401,418-19.  
Foster v. British Gas (1991) 2 AC, pp. 206-317.  
Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham London Burrough Council, (A.C. 2, 1992), p. 1. 
R v. Hibbit and Sanders Ex p. the Lord Chancellor’s Department, (C.O.D., 1993), p. 326, DC.R. v. 
Portsmouth City Council ex parte Peter Coles and Colwick Builders Limited and George Austin 
Limited, C.L.C. (1997), p. 407. 
R (Wheeler) v. Office of the Prime Minister (EWHC, 2008), p. 1409 admin. 
Brent London Borough Council and others v. Risk Management Partners Ltd (UKSC 7, 2011), 2 
W.L.R.166. 
Tachie v. Welwyn Hatfield BC (2013) EWHC 3972 (QB); (2014) B.L.G.R. 100 (QBD). 
  
34 
 
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
The thesis regards how and to what extent EU law can influence national administrative law. The 
possible influence on one aspect of national administrative law is examined. The thesis looks to 
what extent EU law has an impact on how national public authorities take decisions as to how to 
organise the manner in which they discharge some of their public tasks. The research was then 
narrowed to cooperation between public authorities as a means to organise or discharge public 
service tasks. The objectives of the thesis are to detect such an influence, to explain the influence, 
to examine the extent of influence. 
 
 
1. Contextual Background 
 
1.1. Phenomenon of cooperation 
 
The role of the State was greatly expanded in the 20th century. It was at this time that the 'État 
gendarme' became an 'État providence'; social protection and the economic prosperity of the citizen 
became important objectives (tasks of general interest) for the State. The practice of intervention 
by public authorities1 in every day life was profoundly changed.2  
 
The intervention of public authorities in the social and economic life of citizens was particularly 
necessary in the second half of the 20th century. This was because, namely, Europe had two major 
World Wars and a great depression. Europe had to be rebuilt after 1945 and State intervention was 
felt to be necessary.3 This emergency was especially prominent in the European countries that were 
hit the hardest by the wars. It was believed that public authorities were necessary to provide 
protection and further prosperity to their citizens. The public interest required the presence of an 
overarching public authority that would accomplish tasks and deliver services to its citizens: a 
public service or a task of general public interest. In France, for example, the deliverance of public 
services justifies the existence of public authorities and was and is still fundamental to their 
existence (see chapter 6). 
 
This thesis is not concerned with the activities of public authorities themselves but the way that 
public authorities accomplish their public service tasks and the instruments these public authorities 
                                                 
1 The concept ‘public authority’ refers in the first instance to the concept of ‘contracting authority’ as used in 
public procurement Directives: for this concept Cf. S. Arrowsmith, EU Public Procurement Law an introduction, 
www.nottingham.ac.uk.pprg and see also chapter 3. The Court of Justice of the Europan Union has defined the 
term 'public authority' for service concessions in Case C-91/08, Wall AG v. La ville de Francfort-sur-le-Main and 
Frankfurter Entsorgungs- und Service (FES) GmbH [2010] ECR I-2815, at [49] (see also chapter 3). In the 
present thesis the concept ‘public authority’ normally refers to both concepts unless expressly mentioned 
otherwise. 
2 H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth, Administrative law (Oxford: OUP, 2009), p. 3. 
3 E. Szyszczak, The regulation of the State in competitive markets in the EU (Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2007), 
p. 1. 
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need to accomplish those tasks. The public authorities’ main function is to meet the needs of the 
general public, and to do this they organise themselves in a number of different ways. There are 
three main ways to provide service delivery: the State can i) make use of its own resources (in 
house), ii) create (unilaterally) separate entities or iii) make agreements (cooperation) with other 
entities for this purpose (outsourcing). For a long time public authorities did not need the help of 
third parties as their intervention in public life was limited. The rise of social democracy and 
welfare states, the sophistication of modern society increased public interventionism and in many 
areas public authorities no longer had the capacity of doing everything themselves.4 This is where 
third parties came in.  
 
A public authority may either cooperate with the private sector or it may cooperate with other 
public authorities. It is this latter that is the central object of the study undertaken in this thesis. A 
distinction must be made between vertical (agreement with a self-established legal person or with a 
subsidiary of which the public authority is a member) and horizontal (agreement with a non-related 
public authority) cooperation. Cooperation between public authorities has increased in several 
Member States5 as a means to improve the organisation and management of public services. Today 
many public services are ensured through the cooperation between public authorities.6 For 
example, as will be explained in Chapter 6, in England and Scotland public authorities share more 
and more (public) services.  
 
 
1.2. Ways and areas of cooperation 
 
As Arrowsmith confirmed recently ‘collaborative agreements between public bodies in procurement 
and in the delivery of public services – sometimes referred to in some forms as “shared services” 
arrangements or (under EU law) “public-public partnerships” – have been given increased emphasis 
in recent years’7. Cooperation is sometimes useful for delivering a service at a lower cost and to 
have a more efficient service delivery.8 This kind of cooperation between public authorities has to 
realise efficiencies through collaboration in purchasing, provision of accommodation, and support 
services. In France, cooperation between public authorities is used in almost every administrative 
                                                 
4 T. Kaarreselo, ‘Procuring in-house: the impact of EC procurement regime’ (PPLR, 2008), p. 242. 
5 The European Union is an international organisation created by different countries and composed of different 
countries in Europe. These countries are called ‘Member States’. 
6 J. Wiggen, ‘Public procurement rules and cooperation between public sector entities: the limits of the in-
house doctrine under EU procurement law’ (PPLR, 2011), p. 157. 
7 S. Arrowsmith, The law of public and utilities procurement, Vol. I, (London : Sweet & Maxwell, 2014), p. 97. 
8 One can find on the internet economic studies to explain the advantages of cooperation in some situations: E. 
di Porto, ‘Cooperation among local governments to deliver public services: Evidence from France’, 
http://www.ieb.ub.edu/files/Di%20Porto.pdf; G. Bel and M.E. Warner, ‘Factors Explaining Inter-municipal 
Cooperation in Service Delivery: A Meta-Regression Analysis’, 
http://www.union.wisc.edu/pmra2013/Paper%20Submissions/Renamed/Factors%20Explaining%20Intermunicipa
l%20Contracting%20A%20Meta%20Analysis.pdf. 
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policy and action.9 Chapter 6 also emphasizes the increasing use of shared services in England and 
Scotland. In most Member States public authorities use different means of cooperation, in order to 
organise their public services. These different ways of cooperation are used in different areas of 
public service delivery. 
 
1.2.1. Ways of cooperation 
 
Throughout the European Union public authorities cooperate. This cooperation takes different 
forms. The present section will distinguish different criteria to categorise the ways of cooperation. 
 
A first distinction could be made between informal and formal cooperation.10 In the thesis the 
criterion used to distinguish between these two forms of cooperation, is the fact that there is a 
written document confirming the formal cooperation. Even when the cooperation is in a written 
form, a distinction can be made between agreements and ‘real’ contracts.11 The main difference 
between these two categories is the legal enforceability of ‘real’ contracts. The thesis considers 
only ‘real’ contracts. All other types of cooperation and categorization are outside the scope of the 
thesis (see also Chapter 3). 
 
Forms of cooperation can also be divided according to the type of contracting party. Public 
authorities cooperate with the private sector or with the public sector. It is this last kind of 
cooperation, cooperation with the public sector, which is the object of the thesis. Some ‘public’ 
cooperation takes place between public authorities on an equal legal footing, or between public 
authorities of different kinds or between public authorities and public companies or independent 
regulatory agencies.12 For example agreements are signed in England between local authorities and 
central government where councils commit themselves to improve their services in exchange for 
more funds.13 In Europe, one of the best known forms of  cooperation between public authorities on 
the same level is inter-municipal cooperation14.15 
 
                                                 
9 J.-D. Dreyfus, Contribution à un théorie générale des contrats entre personnes publiques, (Paris : 
L’Harmattan, 1997), p. 178.  
10 Professor Arrowsmith uses in her latest handbook on public procurement the distinction between informal 
(loan of staff) and formal collaboration (joint committees): see S. Arrowsmith, The law of public and utilities 
procurement, Vol. I, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2014), p. 97. 
11 See for this distinction P. Vincent-Jones, The New Public Contracting, (Oxford: OUP, 2006), p. 16. 
12 See J.-B. Auby, ‘Comparative approaches to the Rise of Contract in the Public Sphere’, (PL, 2007), p. 42. 
13
 Local Public Service Agreements (LPSAs) : K. Young, ‘Local public service agreements and performance 
incentives for local government’, (Local Government Studies, 2005, 1), pp. 3-20. See also Article 1 of the 
French law of 7 January 1983 on urban planning: « les collectivités locales concourent avec l’Etat à 
l’administration et à l’aménagement du territoire, au développement économique, social, sanitaire, culturel et 
scientifique, ainsi qu’à la protection de l’environnement et à l’amélioration du cadre de vie ». 
14 Municipalities establish a corporation and transfer specific tasks and sometimes authority to such 
corporation. 
15 R. Hulst and A. van Montfort (eds.), Inter-Municipal cooperation in Europe, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 238 
p. 
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A distinction can also be made according to the object of the cooperation. A cooperation can serve 
several aims: to set mutual management objectives, to exchange staffing, to coordinate policies, 
mutual consultation, etc. The object of this thesis is limited to cooperation as a means of organising 
public services. In chapter 5 of the thesis a distinction is made between horizontal or contractual 
cooperation on one hand and vertical or institutional cooperation on the other. Cooperation can also 
be achieved either by a simple agreement concluded between independent public authorities or by 
a merger or amalgation taking place between public authorities. The next section below examines 
in which areas public authorities cooperate as to the organisation and management of public 
services. 
 
1.2.2. Areas of cooperation 
 
Public authorities cooperate in different areas of policy to deliver public services. It is outside the 
scope of the thesis to provide an exhaustive overview of all the areas where public authorities 
cooperate in the various Member States. This is not the object of the thesis. However it is relevant 
to give a few examples to underscore the social and economic importance of this topic. 
 
In general, a distinction can be made between operational tasks and coordination tasks managed 
through cooperation: Operational tasks have been defined as ‘the joint production of public 
services: municipalities strive to overcome the limitations or inefficiencies of small-scale local 
government. … Coordination tasks refer to the regulation of externalities of local policies and to an 
allocation of resources and costs that is rational from a supra-local perspective’16. 
 
In England, the Local Government Association has launched a national shared services compendium 
and map which shows the councils engaged in shared service arrangements.17 A selection is also 
made according to the type of shared service arrangement.18 Arrangements are made for the 
purpose of sharing  knowledge, resources and services to provide technology solutions, support the 
professional development needs of young people advisers, the provision of ICT, legal and HR, 
sustainable management of waste. In Germany, the means of cooperation are chosen to maximise 
resources and enhance service delivery in expensive areas: water/energy supply, waste/sewage 
disposal, public transport, IT-infrastructure and maintenance.19 In France, public authorities 
cooperate in the areas of water, energy, waste, soil pollution, security, maintenance, 
infrastructure, IT.20 The same kind of cooperation can be found in Belgium. Arrowsmith also enlisted 
                                                 
16 R. Hulst and A. Van Montfort, ‘Inter-municipal cooperation: a widespread phenomenon’, in R. Hulst and A. 
van Montfort (eds.), Inter-Municipal cooperation in Europe, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), p. 11. 
17 http://www.local.gov.uk/shared-services-map. 
18 https://www.google.com/fusiontables/DataSource?docid=1AFBbo_u05-L8VStILuB2beiDxdK6-3-
CbbY7reFB#rows:id=1. 
19 M. Burgi, ‘“In-House” Providing in Germany’, in Comba, M. and Treumer, S. (eds.), The In-House Providing in 
European Law (Copenhagen: Djof Publishing, 2010), p. 73. 
20 Ph. Neveu, ‘Contractualisation et mutualisation, outils de l’intercommunalité’, in (La Semaine juridique 
Administrations et Collectivités territoriales, 2010, n° 30), p. 2242 et s.. See also chapter 6. 
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areas where collaboration between public authorities is used: payroll, human resources, leisure 
facilities, health services, refuse collection.21 
 
Inter-municipal cooperation takes place throughout Europe in a wide range of tasks: the 
coordination of local spatial plans for new housing or business parks, the mutual adjustment of local 
policies concerning investments in recreational and cultural facilities, infrastructure or economic 
development to increase the competitiveness of the region in the national or European market, 
social services, refuse collection or music education, and coordination of local employment or 
housing policies, the joint operation of a music school, a fire service department, waste processing 
units or public transport.22  
 
The case law discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 below also demonstrates in which areas public 
authorites cooperate or are willing to cooperate. The CJEU case law gives several examples of 
specific tasks performed through cooperation. Several decisions or rulings of the CJEU concern 
operation, construction or maintenance tasks.23 Sometimes public authorities transfer the 
management of a service or several public service(s) to another public authority.24 Inter-municipal 
cooperation is normally created to deliver public tasks for municipalities.25 The municipalities then 
finance collectively this provision. Sometimes public authorities cooperate to share the performance 
of a public task.26 
 
1.3. Applicable law 
 
Cooperation between public authorities was for a long time governed in the different Member States 
by national administrative law. It was considered to be an aspect of the freedom of a public 
authority to organise its own services. This possibility or principle of self-government has also been 
recognised at the European level in the European Charter on Local Self-Government (15 October 
1985).27 28 In the last couple of decades the national administrative law of the Member States has 
                                                 
21 S. Arrowsmith, The law of public and utilities procurement, Vol. I, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2014), p. 97. 
22 R. Hulst and A. Van Montfort, ‘Inter-municipal cooperation: a widespread phenomenon’, in R. Hulst and A. 
van Montfort (eds.), Inter-Municipal cooperation in Europe, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), p. 11. 
23 C-107/98, Teckal Srl v. Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121; C-231/03, Consorzio Aziende Metano (Coname) 
v. Comune di Cingia de' Botti [2005] ECR I-7287; C-573/07, Sea Srl v. Comune de Ponte Nossa [2010] ECR I-
08127; Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen GmbH v. Gemeinde Brixen and Stadtwerke Brixen AG [2005] ECR I-08585. 
24 Case C-295/05, Asociación Nacional de Empresas Forestales (Asemfo) v. Transformación Agraria SA (Tragsa) 
[2007] ECR I-02999 ; C-324/07, Coditel Brabant SA v. Commune d'Uccle and Région de Bruxelles-Capitale 
[2008] ECR I-8457 ; C-183/11, Econord SpA v. Comuni di Cagno, Comune di Varese, Comune di Solbiate [2012] 
ECR I-00000. 
25 G. Bel, W. Fageda and M. Mur, ‘Why do municipalities cooperate to provide local public services? An 
empirical analysis’, (Local Government Studies, 2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2013.781024. 
26
 C-480/06, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany [2009] ECR I-04747. 
27 Article 6(1) of the Charter provides: ‘without prejudice to more general statutory provisions, local 
authorities must be able to determine their own internal administrative structures in order to adopt them to 
local needs and ensure effective management’. 
28 The European Charter on Local Self-Government, 15 October 1985. See on this Charter: J. Andrews, 
‘European Charter on Local Self-Government’ (ELRev 1986), pp.180-181; J. Smith, ‘The European Charter on 
Local Self-Government: does the UK Government comply’ (Journal of Local Government Law, 2002), pp. 90-96. 
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been influenced by case law from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).29 One of the 
main objectives of this thesis is to examine this influence and more specifically the influence of EU 
law on cooperation between public authorities. The thesis is only interested in this kind of 
cooperation that can be qualified as a public contract or service concession. For this reason, the 
thesis uses the concept of ‘cooperative agreements’. 
 
The EU owes its existence to the fear of further wars in some ‘Western’ European countries after 
1945. Cooperation among the different countries was seen as a hopeful and effective way to avoid 
such wars as well as a means to enable Europe to establish a place for itself in the new world order. 
 
In the aftermath of World War II the European nations were not ready to relinquish their sovereignty 
to an international organisation. The sentiment was that such a step would be easier to take within 
a framework of economic objectives.30 31 Six countries founded the European Coal and Steel 
Community in 1951. On 25 March 1957, these same six countries signed two further treaties: the 
Euratom Treaty in matters of nuclear energy and the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community. The latter later became the cornerstone of an intensive and wide-ranging cooperation 
that ultimately led to the creation of the European Union (EU) (which as of 2014 has 28 Member 
States).  
 
With the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC)32 in 1957, the Member States 
implicitly opted for a closer union through economic objectives. The EU is an example par eminence 
of how the Member States endeavoured to achieve peace and stability through economic 
integration. The idea of economic unity came after the realisation that a common market with free 
movement of goods, persons, capital and services and free competition could provide a stable and 
prosperous economy. This liberal conception precludes excessive State intervention. When the EEC 
was established, the Member States transferred some of their sovereignty to the new international 
organisation. This transfer would have an impact on the competences of the Member States. 
 
The importance of a ‘free market’ has grown steadily in the EU, whereas at the national level the 
need for State intervention remains the prevailing theme. The growing influence of EU law has 
impacted on national policy regarding the tasks of a public authority (State intervention) and the 
way that public authority organises itself to accomplish the public service tasks. 
                                                 
29 Lord Denning spoke in general of an incoming tide that cannot be held back: HP Bulmer Ltd v. J. Bollinger SA 
[1974] 2:401,418-19. See also H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth, Administrative law (Oxford: OUP, 2009), p. 176. 
30 See on the economic objectives of the EU in general N. Reich, Understanding EU law: Objectives, Principles 
and Methods of Community Law (Antwerp – Oxford: Intersentia, 2005), p. 400; K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel, 
European Union Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), pp. 106-111. 
31 One of the exceptions to this was NATO. 
32 Hereafter the thesis will use the concept ‘European Union’. This concept was introduced with the Treaty on 
the European Union signed at Maastricht on February 7, OJ [1992] C 224. The European Union was the 
overarching structure for the European Communities and intergovernmental pillars. The Treaty of Lisbon (OJ 
[2007] C306) removed the pillar structure and adopted the single title of European Union with full legal 
personality.  
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The founding treaties of the EU33 had very few provisions directly aimed at relieving this tension. In 
Articles 31 and 90 EEC (now Articles 37 and 106 TFEU34 respectively) the founding Member States of 
the Treaty tried to balance between the free market and, the potential for State intervention. 
These provisions regulate situations only when public undertakings may be subject to European 
competition law. Yet there was no other provision that tried to seek such a balance.  
 
Due to a lack of provisions in the founding treaties and the lack of action of the European 
Commission the CJEU was, for a long period, the motor that drove the development of EU law.35 In 
CJEU case law there is a tendency that makes many States’ measures or decisions fall within the 
scope of EU law. As a result of a functional interpretation of EU law the CJEU found itself 
competent to rule on certain cases that, arguably, may fall under the competency of the Member 
States. State action and intervention thus risk falling completely under the scope of EU law, which 
jeopardizes the competence of Member States in traditional national branches of law. In several 
areas the CJEU seems to struggle with this tension between State action or intervention 
(competence Member States) and the internal market (competence European Union).36 Accordingly, 
the CJEU has through its case law determined the competence of the EU or its Member States to 
adjudicate on a particular matter.  
 
Through its interpretation of the public procurement Directives,37 the CJEU has made it clear that 
agreements (public contracts) concluded between public authorities could also fall within the scope 
of EU law. Thereafter, the CJEU case law extended the scope to include service concessions 
concluded between public authorities.38 That is why the thesis uses the concept of ‘cooperative 
agreements’. The definitions of ‘public contract’ and ‘service concession’ contained in the public 
procurement Directives39 each refer to the element ‘contract’ to determine the meaning of these 
concepts. Through the element ‘contract’ the CJEU confirmed agreements (or cooperation) 
                                                 
33 The Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, the Treaty of Rome establishing the 
European Economic Community, the Treaty of Rome establishing a European Atomic Energy Community. 
34 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union OJ 2010 C 84 (erratum: OJ [2010] C 181/1).  
35 T. Trimidas, ‘The Court of Justice and judicial activism’ (ELRev, 1996), p. 199 ; B. Bertrand, Le juge de 
l'Union européenne, juge administratif (Brussels : Bruylant, 2012), pp. 22-23. K. Lenaerts, Le juge et la 
Constitution aux Etats Unis d'Amérique et dans l'ordre juridique européen (Brussels : Bruylant,1988). 
36 See the case law on golden shares: C. Gerner-Beuerle, Shareholders between the market and the state; The 
VW law and other interventions in the market, CMLRev. 2012:97-144; Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal 
[2002] ECR I-4731; Case C-483/99, Commission v. France [2002] ECR I-4781; Case C-503/99, Commission v. 
Belgium (2002) ECR I-4809; Case C-98/01, Commission v. United Kingdom [2003] ECR I-4641; Joined Cases C-
282 & 283/04, Commission v. Netherlands [2006] ECR I-9141; Case C-112/05, Commission v. Germany [2007] 
ECR I-8995; Joined Cases C-463 & 464/04, Federconsumatori and Others and Associazione Azionariato Diffuso 
dell’AEM SpA and Others v. Comune di Milano [2007] ECR I-10419; Case C-171/08, Commission v. Portugal 
[2010] ECR I-06817 ; Case C-543/08, Commission v. Portugal [2010] ECR I-11241. 
37 Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and Council Directive OJ [2004] L134/1 coordinating the 
procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and 
Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and Council Directive OJ [2004] L134/114 on the 
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service 
contracts. 
38 Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen v. Gemeinde Brixen [2005] ECR I-8585. 
39 Articles 1(2)(a) and 1(4) Directive 2004/18/CE. 
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between public authorities fall under the scope of the Directives40 and of the principles of equality. 
In several Member States the decision to conclude such an agreement did not need the organization 
of a tendering procedure. A public authorithy did not have to guarantee an equal treatment. The 
choice to cooperate with another public authority was considered to belong to the liberty of public 
authorities to organize and discharge their public service tasks. The CJEU case law restrains the 
liberty of public authorities to organize and discharge public service tasks. It is this influence that is 
central to this thesis.  
 
In this way EU law intervenes in an area (organization of public services) where normally the 
competences still belong to the Member States.41 The CJEU case law on cooperative agreements 
also determines the division of powers between the EU and its Member States in EU law. The 
criteria created by the CJEU in its case law determines the application of EU law on cooperative 
agreements between public authorities and, thus, influences the delimitation of powers between 
the EU and its Member States. 
 
Case law concerning cooperative agreements between public authorities has continued to evolve. 
One of the aims of the thesis is to determine how the CJEU intentionally or unintentionally seeks, 
through its case law on cooperative agreements, to find a balance between States’ actions, that 
which falls outside the scope of EU law, and an internal market situation subject to EU law.  
 
 
 
2. EU law impact on national administrative law 
 
The influence of EU law on national administrative law had long been an unknown factor because 
until 25 years ago EU law was not a compulsory subject in several universities. Legal experts did not 
always have sufficient knowledge of this EU law so its possible influence was unclear. In 1992 Jurgen 
Schwarze wrote: ‘there is less awareness of the influence of European Community law in the other 
direction on the general administrative law of the Member States’.42 Even afterwards, EU law and 
national administrative law were seen as two different legal domains that were studied separately.  
 
The effect of EU law on national administrative law is becoming ever more palpable. National 
administrations or public authorities need to take into account EU law more, when they make a 
decision.43 Recent years have seen a quantitative increase in scholarly research on the influence of 
                                                 
40 See Case C-107/98, Teckal Srl v. Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121. 
41 See also D. Casalini, ‘Beyond EU Law : the New « Public House »’, in G. Olykke, C. Hansen and C. Tvarno 
(dir.), EU Public Procurement – Modernisation, Growth and Innovation (Copenhagen: Djof Publishing, 2012), 
pp. 151-153.  
42 J. Schwarze, European administrative law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1992), p. 1453. 
43 See Discussion paper 3; EU administrative law and national administrations: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/assises-justice-2013/files/administrative_law_en.pdf. 
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EU law on national administrative law44 although academic literature has in general remained 
limited. Some scholars named this research field ‘European administrative law’.45 
 
The thesis aspires to be a constructive addition to this research. As mentioned earlier, cooperative 
agreements between public authorities is the central focus of the thesis. This specific form of 
cooperation is traditionally handled under national administrative law. The thesis will now focus on 
the influence of EU law on this specific national body of law that in principle defines the ways in 
which a public authority can collaborate with another public authority. Thus, the thesis 
demonstrates the possible influence of EU law on national administrative law. 
 
National administrative law is a legal domain that basically remains under the competence of the 
Member States. One of the principles of national administrative law is unilateral actions by the 
public authority, based on the general public interest. To the extent that the general interest can 
justify intercession by a public authority, the latter has discretion as to how to proceed. However, 
in EU law this unilateral action is subject to the internal market rules and EU competition law.  
 
The increasing influence of EU law on national administrative law is based on well-established 
general principles of EU law, namely, the principles of i) direct effect,46 ii) primacy47 and iii) 
loyalty. 
 
The doctrine of direct effect is well established and means that EU law can be invoked directly by 
EU citizens before national courts if clear, unambiguous and unconditional. This is important 
because the legislative acts adopted in the public procurement field in the EU are directives. 
Secondly, a fundamental principle of EU law is the principle of supremacy; this means that EU law 
prevails over national law. Thus if there are national rules in the field of public procurement that 
contradict EU law, the latter will prevail. Both principles explain why EU law can have an influence 
on national law and to what extent.  
 
                                                 
44 J.H. Jans, R. Delange, S. Prechal and R.J.G.M. Widdershoven (dir.), Europeanisation of Public law 
(Groningen : Europa Law Publishing, 2007); G. Eckert, Y. Gautier, R. Kovar and D. Ritleng (dir.), Incidences du 
droit communautaire sur le droit public français (Strasbourg : Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2007); J.-B. 
Auby and J. Dutheil de la Rochère (dir.), Droit administratif européen (Bruxelles : Bruylant, 2007), p. 1122); 
J.-B. Auby (dir.), L’influence du droit européen sur les catégories du droit public (Paris : Dalloz, 2010); J.-B. 
Auby and J. Dutheil de la Rochère (dir.), Traité de droit administratif européen (Bruxelles : Bruylant, 2014). In 
regard to this thesis that examines the influence of EU law on French and English administrative law, see also 
J.-F. Flauss, ‘Rapport français’, in: J. Schwarze (ed.), Das Verwaltungsrecht unter europaïschem Einfluß 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996), pp. 31 and 273. 
45 J.-B. Auby and J. Dutheil de la Rochère, ‘Introduction générale’, in J.-B. Auby and J. Dutheil de la Rochère 
(dir.), Droit administratif européen (Bruxelles : Bruylant, 2007), pp. 3-4. 
46 See on this principle K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel, European Union Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), 
pp. 753-816; P. Craig and G. De Burca, EU Law (Oxford: OUP, 2011), pp. 256-301; A. Dashwood, M. Dougan, B. 
Rodger, E. Spaventa and D. Wyatt, Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law (London: Hart Publishing, 
2011), pp. 235-286. 
47 See on this principle K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel, European Union Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), 
pp. 753-816; P. Craig and G. De Burca, EU Law (Oxford: OUP, 2011), pp. 180-217; A. Dashwood, M. Dougan, B. 
Rodger, E. Spaventa and D. Wyatt, Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law (London: Hart Publishing, 
2011), pp. 235-286. 
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Article 4(3), first subpara. TEU confirms the principle of sincere cooperation or Union loyalty48 and 
expresses the principle of good trust set down in Article 2(2) of the UN Treaty.49 Case law regards 
this principle as being of a constitutional nature or as integral to the very core of EU constitutional 
law.50 It flows from the very nature of the EU, which can be described as cooperation between the 
Member States with transfer of sovereign rights in specific and limited fields. From this transfer was 
born a new legal order with its own legal rules and principles. The Member States must take all 
requisite measures to ensure the effective application of EU law, even if it concerns measures 
related to the organisation of public service tasks. This obligation of the Member States has been 
recently confirmed in CJEU case law on cooperative agreements between public authorities.51 
 
Given the trend of the Europeanisation of national administrative law, noted by some legal scholars, 
specialised in administrative law, the effect of EU law in national administrative law can no longer 
be ignored.52 For example, in Paul Craigs book on Englisch administrative law a whole chapter is 
devoted to EU law.53 
 
 
3. Research Questions 
 
The main objective of the thesis is to examine if EU law has had some impact and influence on how 
national public authorities take decisions as to how to organise the manner in which they discharge 
some of their public tasks. In order to test this thesis 
  
(i) narrows the research to cooperative agreements between national public authorities within 
the EU law on public contracts and service concessions 
(ii) limits the EU Member States to France and the UK. 
 
The two key and main research questions of the thesis to comply with this objective are the 
following: 
 
                                                 
48 J.H. Jans, R. De Lange, S. Prechal en R.J.G.M. Widdershoven, Inleiding tot het Europees bestuursrecht 
(Nijmegem, Ars Acqui Libri, 2002), p. 69. 
49 B. De Witte, ‘Interpreting the EC Treaty like a constitution: the role of the European Court of Justice in 
comparative perspective’, in R. Bakker, A.W. Heringa en F. Stroink (eds.), Judicial Control (Antwerpen: Maklu, 
1995), footnote 33. 
50 See K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel, Constitutional law of the European Union (Oxford: OUP, 2005), pp. 115-
123; R. Widdershoven, ‘The principle of loyal cooperation. Lawmaking by the European Court of Justice and 
the Dutch Courts’, in F. Stroink and E. van der Linden, Judicial Law-making and Administrative Law 
(Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2005), p. 6; J.T. Lang, ‘Article 10 EC – The most important ‘General Principle’ of 
Community Law’, in U. Bernitz, J. Nergelius en C. Cardner (eds.), General Principles of EC Law in a Process of 
Development (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2007), pp. 76-78. 
51 Case C-15/13, Technische Universität Hamburg-Harburg, Hochschul-Informations-System GmbH v. 
Datenlotsen Informationssysteme GmbH [2014] ECR I-00000, at [22]. 
52 H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth, Administrative law (Oxford: OUP, 2009), p.176. 
53 P. Craig, Administrative law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2012), pp. 275-297. 
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A) Do agreements between national public authorities whereby they cooperate in discharging 
their public tasks come within EU law and, in particular, within the scope of the EU public 
procurement Directives? 
 
In order to answer this question the following sub-research questions have been identified : 
 
(i) What kind of situations regarding the organisation of public tasks are influenced by EU 
(public procurement) law? (chapter 3) 
(ii) How can these situations have been influenced by EU law? (chapter 4) 
(iii) Which elements of EU internal market law are relevant to the understanding of the CJEU 
case law? (chapter 4) 
(iv) To what extent these situations are influenced by EU (public procurement) law? (chapter 5) 
  
B) Has there been influence of EU (public procurement) law in shaping or changing national 
administrative law of France and the UK?  
 
In order to answer this question the thesis has identified the following sub-research questions 
 
(i) How do public authorities in France discharge their public service tasks? Do they cooperate 
with each other? (chapter 6) 
(ii) How do public authorities in the UK discharge their public service tasks? Do they cooperate 
with each other? (chapter 6) 
(iii) What, if any, has been the influence of EU law (both legislative and case law) on how 
France and the UK organise the manner in which their national public authorities discharge their 
tasks? (chapter 6) 
 
 
4. The importance of the thesis 
 
It is submitted that in 2008 at the beginning of this thesis there was a gap in the literature that this 
thesis seeks to fill. The gap, namely how EU public procurement rules (and generally EU law) are 
applied to cooperative agreements between public authorities, was identified as a direct 
consequence of practising as a lawyer in this field. In advising national public authorities and 
private companies in regard to the application of the public procurement Directives it became clear 
that there was a such a gap.54 In practising law and in researching for the thesis, questions arose 
often from public authorities that wished to establish a cooperative association (horizontal or 
vertical) or to become a member of an existing cooperative association. 
 
                                                 
54 The author approached the University of Glasgow in 2007 to write the present thesis. 
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Law practitioners specialised in national administrative law have the tendency to fall back on 
national laws and principles regulating analogous situations. However, practical experience in 
dealing with the public procurement Directives and the CJEU case law indicated that the interaction 
between CJEU case law and the research questions identified is where the answers were likely to be 
found. Thus, practice awakened the curiosity and produced the idea to undertake a more 
fundamental investigation of this matter.  
 
CJEU case law on cooperative agreements between public authorities has induced public authorities 
to rethink how they organise the service delivery to the public: ‘As recent legal analysis and the 
transaction cost economics pointed out long since, market solutions may be well-suited for some 
public purposes but not for others’.55 
 
Each time a public authority wants to cooperate with another public authority, which happens 
regularly in certain Member States (see chapter 6 on the French and English system), the public 
authority has to review EU law, i.e. the public procurement Directives and the principle of equality.  
 
The influence of CJEU case law on cooperative agreements between public authorities through the 
interpretation and application of the public procurement Directives has been underscored in 
different Member States56: 
 
- United Kingdom / England57: 
 
‘Shared service models have been successfully used by public authorities for many years and their 
use is anticipated to increase following the United Kingdom's coalition government's Comprehensive 
Spending Review and the need for public bodies to achieve efficiency savings. Procuring a service 
provider can sometimes be a lengthy, uncertain and expensive process so understandably, 
contracting authorities are keen to take advantage of what is now commonly known as the “Teckal” 
or “in-house” exemption. 
 
Whether public authorities can contract with one another and the extent to which they can involve 
the private sector without the need to conduct a formal EU procurement process has been 
                                                 
55 D. Casalini, ‘Beyond EU Law : the New « Public House »’, in G. Olykke, C. Hansen and C. Tvarno (eds.), EU 
Public Procurement – Modernisation, Growth and Innovation (Copenhagen: Djof Publishing, 2012), p. 153. 
56 Extended studies on in-house situations were accomplished in Spain: J.J. Pernas Garcia, Los operaciones in 
house y el Derecho comunitario de contratos publicos (Madrid: Iustel, 2008); in Italy: D. Casalini, L’organismo 
di diritto pubblico e l’organizzazione in house (Napoli: Jovene Editori, 2003); in Belgium: F. Gosselin, C. 
Molitor, P. Nihoul and Ph. Quertainemont (eds.), Les modes de cooperation des services publics locaux au 
regard du droit européen (Waterloo : Kluwer, 2008); In Germany : K. Hardraht, In-House-Geschäfte und 
Europäisches Vergaberecht (Berlin : Dunckler & Humblot, 2006). 
57 See also in Scotland: ‘Shared services in the Scottish public service: impact of the EU public procurement 
rules’, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/1265/0051647.pdf. 
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considered on a number of occasions by the ECJ and domestic courts and the resulting decisions are 
complex and sometimes contradictory’.58 
 
- France:  
 
Chapter 6 of this thesis demonstrates the impact of the CJEU case law on cooperative agreements 
between public authorities in France. It influences one of the constitutional cornerstones of French 
society: the ‘service public’ and the liberty for public authorities to organize how they deliver their 
public service tasks. 
 
- In Germany:  
 
‘Die Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshof zu den In-House-Geschäften hat die Beurteilung 
von In-House Vergaben im deutchen Recht wesentlich geprägt’.59 
 
- General view:  
 
‘Today, many tasks within the public sector are carried out through cooperation between different 
public sector entities, often through the use of contracts or contract-like mechanisms. The question 
as to whether Directive 2004/18 (the Directive) applies to such cooperation has long been the 
subject of debate, as the application of the Directive to such cooperation may be seen as 
interfering in the Member States' freedom to organise their public sector as they see best fit. The 
so-called in-house doctrine developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has long 
been the centre of attention in this debate’.60 
 
The possible influence of EU law on cooperative agreements can also be illustrated with an example 
from Belgian law.61 In Belgium, under Article of 162 para. 4 of the Constitution; municipalities may 
either work together on the basis of an agreement (horizontal), or they may jointly create a new 
legal person (vertical). According to Belgian law, municipalities can freely enter into such 
cooperative associations, even if private companies are involved. Creating such cooperative 
associations is considered to be an element of the free choice to discharge public service tasks. 
Clearly, vertical cooperative associations (inter-municipal cooperation) between municipalities are 
                                                 
58 Procurement Lawyers’ Association Sharing Services Working Group [2011:3] 
help.procureweb.ac.uk/2508.file.dld. 
59 K. Lott, Die Rechtsprechung des EuGH und die In-House-Vergabe in Deutschland (Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag 
Dr. Muller, 2008), p. 58. 
60 J. Wiggen, ‘Public procurement rules and cooperation between public sector entities : the limits of the in-
house doctrine under EU procurement law’ (PPLR, 2011), p. 158). 
61 It is also the case in other Member States: Cf. M. Comba and S. Treumer (eds.), The In-house Providing in 
European Law (Copenhagen: Djof Publishing, 2010). During a work experience sojourn in a Scottish attorneys’ 
office it became clear that in Scotland as well the issue of the influence of EU law comes up whenever public 
authorities apply the system of sharing services. 
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frequently made in Belgium, particularly, in the sectors of electricity, gas, water supply, transport, 
and waste collection (major economic sectors).  
 
According to CJEU case law municipalities must ascertain whether they are subject to EU law every 
time they wish to set up such a cooperative association. The cooperation can be classified as a 
public contract or service concession contract. Therefore, EU law restricts the freedom of choice of 
the Belgian municipalities. They must investigate whether the manner in which this cooperative 
association is constituted meets the criteria set out in the CJEU case law to determine whether such 
association falls outside the scope of EU law. The same questions arise when a municipality wishes 
to become a member of such a cooperative association. Thus the municipality, taking into account 
the CJEU case law, can make an informed decision how to organise its administration and how it 
discharges its public service tasks. 
 
The application of EU law implies the holding of a competitive tendering procedure. This takes 
time, and also gives rise to subsidiary expenses that could run very high if the agreement is classed 
as a public procurement. In that case the public authority would have to engage in a complex 
tender procedure. 
 
Public authorities and private enterprises should be made aware as far as possible of the potential 
impact of EU law on certain types of cooperative agreements. This knowledge will prevent 
situations where the public authorities are post facto confronted with lawsuits that might force 
them to withdraw completely from cooperative associations that are already underway. It also 
enables private enterprises to be aware that in this context they may benefit from an open market.  
 
The thesis considers briefly the new legislative initiatives at EU level, that now contain specific 
provisions on cooperative agreements between public authorities.62  
 
 
5. Methodology and structure 
 
As stated previously, this thesis is concerned with the identification of specific EU law that has an 
impact on a specific area of national administrative law, namely the organisation of public services 
through cooperation between public authorities. This impact is found in the EU law applicable to 
public procurement and to service concession contracts, primarily due to the interpretation the 
CJEU has given to EU law.  
 
                                                 
62 Proposal for a Directive on procurement by entities in the water, energy, transport and postal services 
sectors COM(2011)895final; Proposal of the European Commission for a directive of the European Parliament 
and the Council on public procurement, COM(2011)896 final; Proposal of the European Commission for a 
directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the award of concession contracts, 
COM(2011)897final. See chapter 5. 
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The thesis draws on legal mechanisms adopted by the EU and selected Member States. At the EU 
level, the study focuses on certain provisions of the TFEU and on the public procurement Directives. 
Any investigation on the application of EU law on cooperative agreements between public 
authorities must start with an analysis of the legal texts. Accordingly, each national legal system 
has its own rules, regulations and principles that could apply when public authorities cooperate.  
 
However, the importance of the relevant case law is not to be underestimated. It is the rulings and 
judgments of the CJEU on cooperative agreements between public authorities that has developed a 
large portion from existing public procurement rules and regulations. In the light of research done, 
the CJEU’s case law illustrates the manner in which the CJEU generally exercises its competence in 
interpreting EU law; that is, in a manner that influences national administrative law. This thesis 
then explores how this influence on national administrative law manifests itself. In England and 
France, the two legal systems selected to illustrate this influence, it is especially evident in their 
case law. Accordingly, an analysis of national case law is also relevant in this domain.  
 
This investigation proceeds from the assumption that the CJEU has developed specific case law that 
can potentially influence how national administrative law does de facto determine the ways in 
which public authorities cooperate. Accordingly, the first part of the research was an analysis of 
this case law. Such an analysis brought clarity to the TFEU provisions, to the general principles of 
EU law, and to the elements of CJEU case law that can conceivably be said to underlie the evolution 
of this specific case law. 
 
After considering the relevant CJEU case law on cooperative agreements, certain elements from EU 
primary law upon which the CJEU case law is putatively based have been selected. First, several 
standard literature works63 were reviewed to select the relevant EU primary law. Next, the relevant 
EU primary law (provisions and principles) were subject to a more detailed analysis. It is important 
to note that except for the study of the concept ‘services of general (economic) interest’, European 
competition law was not deemed relevant. This does not mean that European competition law was 
not considered, but only that no clear link with the enforcement of EU competition law was 
identified. 
 
After an examination of the case law on cooperative agreements the thesis explores what influence 
it has had on the national administrative law of the selected Member States. Throughout the thesis 
remember that the EU consists of 28 Member States; hence, material and linguistic limitations make 
it impossible to study the influence of EU law in all Member States. Difficulty of language justifies 
                                                 
63 P.J.G. Kapteyn, A.M. McDonnell, K.J.M. Mortelmans and C.W.A. Timmermans, The Law of the European 
Union and the European Communities (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2008); D. Chalmers, G. 
Davies and G. Monti, European Union Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); K. Lenaerts and P. 
Van Nuffel, European Union Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011); P. Craig and G. De Burca, EU Law (Oxford: 
OUP, 2011); A. Dashwood, M. Dougan, B. Rodger, E. Spaventa and D. Wyatt, Wyatt and Dashwood’s European 
Union Law (London: Hart Publishing, 2011). 
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the choice of legal systems.64 Thus, given the language limitations of the author, the Member States 
that could be studied were the United Kingdom, Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and 
Luxemburg. However there are no rules or regulations and little case law that are concerned with 
this issue in The Netherlands. As for Luxemburg, its market is too small to provide significant data 
for this study and it is substantially influenced by the French system. Belgium and Ireland borrow 
liberally from the French and English legal system, respectively. The selection has been narrowed to 
France and England (and Scotland in some instances): ‘English and French administrative law are 
bound to be taken as examples given their representative status for different legal traditions’.65 66  
 
These two Member States are also representative of the two major forms of legal systems in Europe: 
civil law and common law.67 Each in its own way influences how the position of a public authority is 
conceived within the respective legal systems and the principles that govern their competences. It 
is reasonably presumed that one legal system is more sensitive than the other to the influence of EU 
law. This choice of two diverse legal systems should make differences more readily apparent, and 
also provide the opportunity to contrast the two legal systems to show how differently they might 
conceptualise the same situation, i.e. cooperation between public authorities. In both countries EU 
law has had an influence on national administrative law. 
 
It is acknowledged that the Member States that have been selected are not necessarily those that 
are most often brought before the CJEU. The biggest ‘client’ of the CJEU as far as this topic is 
concerned is Italy. In 50 % of the cases it is an Italian case that sets the agenda. The first case 
adjudicated on this matter was an Italian case.68 Second in importance quantitatively are cases of 
German origin. Nevertheless the choice of France and England is justified as explained above. 
 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter sets out the objectives, research 
questions and the manner in which the thesis is structured. 
 
The second chapter provides a contextual background to the public procurement Directives. This 
chapter examines the historical evolution of this body of legislative measures and regulations and 
outlines the basic objectives they seek to achieve. It helps the reader to understand the historical 
basis and purposes that partially underlie CJEU law on cooperative agreements between public 
authorities. This case law has its origins in how the CJEU has interpreted certain provisions of the 
public procurement Directives. That is why these Directives are considered in the present thesis as 
the original framework. Afterwards the CJEU expanded its case law to service concessions, reason 
                                                 
64 See M. Rüffert, ‘The Transformation of Administrative Law as a Transnational Methodological System’, in M. 
Rüffert (ed.), The Transformation of Administrative Law (Sellier, European Law Publishers, 2007), p. 9. 
65 M. Rüffert, o.c., p. 9. 
66 See also chapter 6 for other justification regarding the choice of France and England. 
67 The author is aware of the fact that this distinction is simplistic and does noet cover all EU countries: see J. 
Ziller, ‘Les droits administratifs nationaux: caractéristiques générales’, in J.-B. Auby and J. Dutheil de la 
Rochère (dir.), Traité de droit administratif européen (Bruxelles : Bruylant, 2014), p. 744. 
68 Case C-107/98, Teckal Srl v. Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121. 
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why the present thesis also regards the influence of EU primary law. Taking into account the 
research questions of the thesis it would not be logic to have a section on primary EU law in this 
chapter. Chapter 3 and chapter 4 examine to what extent primary EU law could be important for 
the subject of the thesis. 
 
The third chapter examines what kind of situations regarding the organisation of public tasks could 
be influenced by EU law. The result of this chapter is a description of the scope of the thesis. The 
chapter analyses the concepts of ‘public authority’, ‘cooperation’ and ‘public service tasks’. More 
specifically, relevant CJEU case law is examined together with the public procurement Directives, 
as to the meaning of the first two concepts. The ratione personae and ratione materiae scope of 
the thesis will be defined by these terms to avoid any confusion over terminology, since in fact each 
national legal system has its own terms for ‘public authority’ and ‘cooperation’. The concept 
‘public service tasks’ is important because cooperative agreements between public authorities is a 
means to organize these tasks. Only these tasks qualified as “public service tasks” are relevant to 
this thesis. This concept is very similar to the concept ‘services of general (economic) interest’.69 
 
The fourth chapter examines certain provisions and principles of EU primary law in order to help 
clarify CJEU case law on cooperative agreements. The chapter explains how EU law could have an 
influence on these kind of agreements. Different elements of the scope of applicability of the 
internal market rules could explain this influence. These aspects are analysed. The chapter looks for 
the element that appears to explain why under certain circumstances cooperative agreements 
between public authorities are excluded from the scope of EU law. 
 
The fifth chapter focuses on CJEU case law on cooperative agreements between public authorities. 
The chapter discusses in depth the relevant case law: its origins, the evolution of the case law and 
the lessons that can be derived. The case law was considered on the basis of the following division: 
vertical or institutional and horizontal or contractual cooperation. As the CJEU70 stated recently 
these two kinds of cooperative agreements are governed by another type of criteria to determine if 
they fall out of the scope of EU law. This thesis proposes a general explanation for the CJEU case 
law on cooperative agreements between public authorities. Finally, the thesis examines in this 
chapter the new Directives that were adopted in 2014 and which contain specific provisions on 
cooperation between public authorities. 
 
In the sixth chapter two selected national legal systems will be analysed. First the French legal 
system is presented by analysing the concept of ‘public service(s)’ and second by focussing on the 
phenomenon of cooperative agreements between public authorities. The chapter demonstrates the 
influence of EU law on one area of national administrative law i.e. how public authorities are 
                                                 
69 N. Fiedziuk, ‘Putting services of general economic interest up for tender: reflections on applicable EU rules’ 
(CMLR, 2013), pp. 87-88. 
70 Case C-159/11, Azienda Sanitaria Locale di Lecce, Università del Salento v. Ordine degli Ingegneri della 
Provincia di Lecce and Others [2012] ECR I-00000, at [31] to [34]. 
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constraint in discharging their public tasks if they choose to engage in cooperative agreements with 
other public authorities. Finally, the thesis will similarly discuss the English legal system, examining 
the same kind of questions as for the French system. 
 
The last chapter sets out the general conclusions of this thesis. 
 
  
52 
 
CHAPTER 2 – THE ORIGINAL FRAMEWORK: THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVES 
 
This thesis endeavours to show that European Union (EU) law has impacted on cooperative 
agreements between national public authorities. It is not intended to investigate the impact of each 
and every aspect of EU law. This thesis examines only the consequences of particular case law of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the aforementioned cooperative agreements. 
This case law has been developed from the preliminary references submitted to the CJEU by 
national courts concerning the interpretation of public procurement Directives.71 These Directives 
constitute the original framework of the CJEU case law on cooperative agreements. 
 
In this context it is relevant to explore the genesis and evolution of these Directives. This thesis 
makes clear to what extent these Directives contain provisions concerning cooperative agreements 
between public authorities and how these Directives may have an impact even in situations that are 
not a focal point of the Directives. On the basis of these Directives and the fact that they are a 
mere expression of the fundemantal freedoms found in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) the CJEU expanded its case law on cooperative agreements to service 
concessions. Chapter 4 of the thesis examines how EU law could have had a bearing on cooperative 
agreements between public authorities. That is why primary EU law, as a framework of the thesis 
and of the public procurement Directives, is not examined in this chapter but in chapter 4. 
 
The chapter sketches (i) the historical background of the public procurement Directives, (ii) gives a 
general view of present (iii) and recently adopted Directives, and (iv) explains the objectives of this 
specific body of EU law.  
 
 
1. Historical background of the public procurement Directives72 
 
The first and most important pillar of the EU concerns above all the establishment of an internal 
market, resting on four fundamental freedoms: free movement of goods, persons, capital, and 
services. The EU has the competence to achieve these objectives.73 Each Member State must 
guarantee that the citizens of any other Member State has equal access to its territory to the end of 
providing services to economic operators and private persons, establishing residence, and engaging 
in gainful activities. Member States cannot take measures that hinder free movement. 
 
                                                 
71 Case C-107/98, Teckal v. Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121 on vertical cooperative agreements. Case C-
480/06, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany [2009] ECR I-4747 on 
horizontal cooperative agreements. 
72 S. Arrowsmith, The law of public and utilities procurement (Londen: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), pp. 140 et 
seq.; Ch. Bovis, EC Public Procurement: case law and regulation (Oxford: OUP, 2006), pp. 95 et seq.; J.M. 
Fernandez Martin, The EC Public procurement rules: a critical analysis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 4 
et seq.; P. Trepte, Public procurement in the EU (Oxford: OUP, 2007), pp. 27 et seq.; F. Weiss, Public 
procurement in European Community Law (Londen: Athlone, 1993), pp. 40 et seq.  
73 The European Union is an overarching name, comprising the EC and EAEC (formerly Euratom). 
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Public authorities in the different Member States need goods, services and people to manage tasks 
of general interest and for which they conclude contracts with third parties. The decision to 
conclude such a contract might also be considered a measure that could hinder the realisation of 
the internal market.74 Thus in taking these kinds of decisions Member States have to ensure they 
abide by EU law.  
 
The CJEU has by its case law created the means of exercising a degree of control on what a public 
authority may or may not do when looking for a contract partner. The driver is not principles of 
private contract law, but the strictly economic objective that defines the EU, namely, the greatest 
possible competition between economic actors. To ensure free competition between the different 
undertakings interested in concluding such a contract, a public authority has to treat equally these 
undertakings and to ensure transparency. 
 
The Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the TFEU contain a number of negative obligations 
imposed on the Member States, all to the end of achieving the internal market. Member States quite 
quickly discovered that these obligations were not in themselves sufficient to banish each and every 
form of discrimination or every difference. Thus, a difference in legislation could put economic 
actors from some Member States in an unequal position. Therefore, to maintain effective 
competition harmonisation of the different national legislation was necessary in certain areas. So, 
the Member States were encouraged to take positive action. Harmonisation of national rules with 
the aim of eliminating distortions of competition is conducive to the attainment of the internal 
market.75  
 
The EU Council and the European Commission have two main instruments at their disposal to 
harmonise legislation: the regulation and the directive.76 They have made abundant use of these 
instruments. The directive as an legal instrument is used when it is necessary to implement a goal in 
different ways in the various Member States. How a matter is handled may involve social and 
economic choices or a variety of administrative procedures, depending on the individual Member 
State. Every Member State has the possibility to adjust the content of the directive to its own legal 
and judicial system. The law applicable to public contracts was in a lot of continental EU member 
states administrative law. This branch of law is rather different from member state to member 
state. This explains why the tendering of public contracts was best regulated through directives. 
 
Harmonisation has also led to the EU assuming a regulatory role in matters that prima facie did not 
come under the provisions of the treaties. A typical example, as adduced by legal scholars, is the 
adoption of Directives on public procurement, wherein the EU—via these measures—encourages the 
                                                 
74 See further Chapter 4. 
75 Case C-300/89, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities [1991] 
ECR I-2901, at [23]. 
76 On directives see S. Prechal, Directives in EC law (Oxford: OUP, 2004). 
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Member States to harmonise with one another.77 It was deemed more necessary to harmonise in this 
area, because national public authorities seemed to have a very strong protectionist tendency when 
tendering and awarding public contracts.78 Purchasing activities by Member States were identified 
as considerable non-tariff barriers.79 The TEU and TFEU, like the prior EU Treaties, contain no 
specific provisions on public procurement.80 
 
The economic importance of public contract markets in the EU needs no further emphasis.81 In light 
of the realisation of the internal market, it should be stated that public authorities are normally not 
bound by market principles when taking decisions. Their decisions are based on the pursuit of the 
general public interest and public authorities therefore, need not worry about competitiveness and 
financial attractiveness. It would regularly come about that public authorities gave the advantage 
to their own national undertakings. Such decisions could distort the market.82 These two 
circumstances were major factors making the introduction of public procurement Directives 
necessary. The provisions of the EU treaties were not sufficiently specific to prevent public 
authorities from taking discriminatory decisions fostering unequal treatment. 
 
The first sign of positive action in the field of public procurement appeared in two general 
programmes, adopted by the EU Council in 1962, which effectively removed all obstacles on 
freedom of cross-border services and establishment.83 These two general programmes contained 
several dispositions on public procurement. The need was recognised for the adoption of European 
legislation (via directives) on the specific subject. Public procurement was (and is) considered a 
very important aspect of the common / internal market84.85 The acquisition of work, goods and 
services of public authorities represents a major activity in the EU economy. Barriers to these kinds 
of trade would jeapordize—to a great extent—the realization of the internal market. Two directives 
concerning public procurement were then issued on the basis of these two programmes. 
                                                 
77 K. Lenaerts and P. Vanuffel, Constitutional law of the European Union (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), pp. 
268-269. 
78 M. Trybus and R. Caranta, ‘European Union Law of Public Contracts: Public Procurement and Beyond’, in M. 
Trybus, R. Caranta and G. Edelstam (eds.), European Union Law of Public Contracts (Brussel: Bruylant, 2013), 
p. 3.  
79 Ch. Bovis, ‘Public procurement in the EU: jurisprudence and conceptual directions’ (PPLR, 2012), p. 247. 
80 See for the reasons M. Trybus, ‘Public contracts in European Union Internal Market Law: Foundations and 
Requirements’, in R. Noguellou and U. Stelkens (eds.), Comparative law on Public Contracts (Brussel, Bruylant, 
2010), pp. 83-84. On the absence of public procurement dispositions in the original Treaty of Rome see M.A. 
Flamme, ‘La liberation de la concurrence dans les marchés publics au sein de la C.E.E.’ (RMC, 1965), p. 277, 
footnote 2 : according to the author the national parliaments would not have accepted such provisions in the 
Treaty because of the protectionist traditions of certain Member States. 
81 M. Monti, ‘A New Strategy for the Single Market: At the Service of Europe’s Economy and Society’ (May 9, 
2010), http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti_report_final_10_05_2010_en.pdf. 
82 S. Arrowsmith, ‘The past and future evolution of EC procurement law: from framework to common code ?’ 
(PCLJ, 2006), p. 339. 
83 The General Programme for the abolition of restrictions on freedom to provide services OJ 2/32 English 
Special Edition Series II Volume IX pp. 3-6 and the General Programme for the abolition of restrictions on 
freedom of establishment OJ 2/36 English Special Edition Series II Volume IX pp. 7 – 15. 
84 See S. Arrowsmith, The law of public and utilities procurement, Vol. I, (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014), p. 
1: 19 % of GDP of the 27 EU Member States and 21,6 % of the GDP in the UK. 
85 M.A. Flamme, ‘La libération de la concurrence dans les marchés publics au sein de la C.E.E.’ (RMC, 1965), p. 
277. 
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The first legislative initiatives were Directive 70/32/EEC86 and Directive 71/304/EEC87. Directive 
70/32/EEC forbade measures hindering free movement of goods. Directive 71/304/EEC, which had 
been exclusively applied to the completion of public work contracts, obliged Member States to i) lift 
restrictions affecting the right to enter into or award public works contracts, ii) perform or 
participate in the performance of such public works, on behalf of the State, regional or local 
authorities, or legal persons governed by public law. However, these Directives did not yet compel 
Member States to bring their national laws on public contracts into harmony with one another. 
 
More important, however, was the adoption of Directive 71/305/EEC.88 This Directive sought not 
simply to facilitate freedom of establishment and the free provision of cross-border services in the 
area of public procurement, but also to provide a competitive market for potential candidates. In 
the event, the drafters of the Directive attached special significance to the provision of adequate 
information for potential bidders. Thus the very first Directive on public procurement contained an 
indication of the principle of transparency.89 The second co-ordination directive was Directive 
77/62/EEC90. The two Directives are comparable in structure and content. However, both Directives 
allowed autonomy to Member States in the implementation of the Directives into national 
legislation. In particular, these Directives set out no specific awarding procedures that contracting 
authorities should follow. They merely laid down several conditions for whenever a contracting 
authority uses its own procedures. 
 
The two Directives were not successful since the Member States were not inclined to follow them. 
Moreover, public authorities awarded less public (work) contracts in that period. Finally, a number 
of activities of general interest did not fall under these Directives (utility sectors). Hence, it was 
recognised that new initiatives would need to be implemented. It was clear that the Directives 
contained no provisions that could be applied to cooperation between public authorities. Taking 
into account the insignificant influence of the Directives on national administrative law, this first 
period is not important to the research being undertaken. 
 
However, in 1985, with the adoption of the White Paper on the Internal Market,91 the position 
changed radically. The Internal Market programme required the harmonisation of Member States 
laws in many sectors that had a direct impact on achieving the EU Internal market by 1992. The 
                                                 
86 Commission Directive 70/32/EEC of 17 December 1969 on provision of goods to the State, to local authorities 
and other official bodies, OJ [1970] L 13. 
87 Council Directive 71/304/EEC of 26 July 1971 concerning the abolition of restrictions on freedom to provide 
services in respect of public works contracts and on the award of public works contracts to contractors acting 
through agencies or branches, OJ [1971] L 185/1. 
88 Council Directive 71/305/EEC of 26 July 1971 on the coordination of procedures for placement of public 
contracts for the completion of public works, OJ [1971] L. 185/5. 
89 This is discussed in greater depth in chapter 4. 
90 Council Directive 77/62/EEC of 21 December 1976 coordinating procedures for the award of public supply 
contracts, OJ [1977] L 13/1. 
91 European Commission White Paper for the Completion of the Internal Market (COM) 85 310 final. 
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adoption of the Single European Act in 1989 ensured that unanimity was no longer required for the 
adoption of harmonising directives that were necessary to achieve the Internal Market. This radical 
approach manifested itself particularly in the legislation adopted in the field of public procurement. 
There is no doubt that the internal market project largely influenced the evolution of the second 
generation of public procurement Directives.  
 
In the 1980s there was an attempt made to improve the Directives. Thus, respectively Directive 
88/295/EEC92 and Directive 89/440/EEC93 were adopted amending the previous Directives. In 
themselves these Directives brought few changes to the existing Directives, but they did add a 
plethora of new provisions that concerned, in particular, the introduction of a negotiating 
procedure, the application of EU standards, rules of notification. As there was no coordination 
between the new and the old Directives the sense of the regulatory measures was quite difficult to 
interpret. Ultimately this led to new coordinating Directives, namely, Directive 93/36/EEC94 and 
Directive 93/37/EEC,95 closely followed, by yet other set of Directives: Directive 89/665/EEC,96 
Directive 93/38/EEC,97 Directive 92/13/EEC98 and Directive 92/50/EEC.99 
 
In Council Decision 94/800/EC,100 the Council of the EU made its approval contingent on the 
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), the objective of which is to establish a multilateral 
framework of equal rights and obligations in the area of public contracts with a view to further 
liberalisation and expansion of world trade. The GPA is to date the only legally binding agreement 
in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) focusing on the subject of government procurement. It is a 
plurilateral treaty administered by a Committee on Government Procurement, which includes the 
WTO Members who have signed the GPA, and thus have rights and obligations under the Agreement. 
                                                 
92 Council Directive 88/295/EEC amending Directive 77/62/EEC coordinating procedures for the award of public 
supply contracts as well as for the repeal of some provisions of Directive 80/767/EEC, OJ [1988] L127. 
93 Council Directive 89/440/EEC amending Directive 71/304/EEC concerning the abolition of restrictions on 
freedom to provide services in respect of public works contracts and on the award of public works contracts to 
contractors acting through agencies or branches, OJ [1989] L210. 
94 Council Directive 93/36/EEC of 14 June 1993 coordinating procedures for the award of public supply 
contracts, OJ 1993, L199/1. 
95 Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of 
public works contracts, OJ [1993] L199/54. 
96 Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and 
public works contracts, OJ [1989] L395/33. 
97 Council Directive 93/38/EEC of 14 June 1993 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating 
in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, OJ [1993] pp. 84–138. 
98 Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating 
in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, OJ [1992] L 76/14. 
99 Council Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 to the coordination of procedures for the award of public 
service contracts, OJ [1992] L209. 
100 Council d ecision 94/800/EC of 22 December 1994 concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European 
Community, as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round 
multilateral negotiations (1986-1994), OJ [1994] L336/1. 
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This resulted in two new Directives that applied the obligations flowing from the GPA to the 
previous Directives: Directive 97/52/EC101 and Directive 98/4/EC.102 
 
An examination of the Directives mentioned in this section shows that they did not provide much 
information as to their application to cooperative agreements between public authorities. 
 
 
2. The public procurement Directives of 2004103 
 
Until recently there were mainly two Directives regarding public procurement in the EU.104 They are 
Directive 2004/17/EC coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, 
energy, transport and postal services sectors105 (telecommunications thus is no longer one of the 
utility sectors) and Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of public 
works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts.106 
 
However, the genesis of these Directives was a long ordeal. In 1996 the European Commission 
drafted a Green Paper entitled ‘Public procurement in the European Union: exploring the way 
forward’.107 The purpose of this Green Paper was to provide a context for a wide-ranging debate on 
public contracts within the EU. The most important targets were: an effective implementation of 
the existing case law; better accessibility to contracts; access to the markets of non-EU Member 
States; and coordination of policy on public contracts as well as other areas of policy. There was no 
doubt that Member States were not adequately implementing the Directives. The complex 
regulations and the rigid system for complex contracts were also touched upon in this Green Paper. 
 
                                                 
101 Directive of the European Parliament and the Council Directive of 13 October 1997 amending Directives 
92/50/EEC, 93/36/EEC and 93/37/EEC concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public 
service contracts, public supply contracts and public works contracts respectively, OJ [1997] L328/1. 
102 Directive of the European Parliament and the Council Directive of 13 October 1997 coordinating the 
procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, 
OJ [1998] L101/1. 
103 S. Arrowsmith, ‘An Assessment of the New Legislative Package on Public Procurement’ (CMLR 41, 2004), pp. 
1-49; V. Bertrand, ‘La réforme européenne des marchés publics dans les secteurs classiques’ (JTE, 2005), pp. 
1-11; R. Beuter, ‘European public procurement reform: main innovations in the Public Sector Directive – a 
preliminary assessment’ (Eipascope 3, 2005), pp. 5-11; D. D’Hooghe, I. Vos and Ph. De Keyser, ‘Recente 
evoluties in het aanbestedingsrecht’, in K. De Ketelaere and A. Verbeke (eds.), Jaarboek Bouwrecht 2004-2005 
(Brugge, Die Keure, 2005), pp. 4-20; A. Mattera, ‘Vers un Code européen des marchés publics. Simplification, 
modernisation et clarification de la reglementation existante’ (RDUE, 2000), pp. 528-570; I. Ramsey, ‘The New 
Public Procurement Directives: a partial solution to the problems of procurement compliance’ (EPL, 2006), pp. 
275-294; R. Williams, ‘The New Procurment Directives of the European Union’ (PPLR, 2004), pp. 153-159; X., 
‘Les Nouvelles directives européennes’ (ACCP 33, 2004), pp. 45-68. 
104 See also Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the 
coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by 
contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC 
and 2004/18/EC, OJ [2009] L 216. 
105 OJ [2004] L. 134/1. 
106 OJ [2004] L. 134/114. 
107 COM(96)583. 
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However, the Green Paper elicited over 300 responses, from which it became clear that some 
fundamental changes were needed to the existing Directives. The reactions ultimately led to a 
Commission Communication of 11 March 1998 entitled ‘public procurement in the European 
Union’.108 Its objective was to achieve a more efficient system that would result in a better public 
service, economic growth, greater competition, job creation, an assault on corruption, and lastly, 
clearer and more flexible rules and procedures. The catchwords for the impending regulation were: 
flexibility, modernisation and simplification. The interaction between the Commission and the 
various stakeholders and policy-makers eventually produced, in 2000, two proposals for directives, 
one for the public sector109 and one for the utility sectors.110 However, the proposals generated 
abundant discussion among the Commission, Council and Parliament,111 and it was only in 2004 that 
the new Directives were finally approved.  
 
Simplification and clarification found expression first and foremost in the fact that the four 
different Directives were replaced by only two Directives (2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC). The 
Directives in the classical sectors (works, supplies and services) have been consolidated into one 
Directive, which in itself entailed a significant trimming of the aggregate set of provisions (48 
Articles). Further, discrepancies among the various Directives have been eliminated by 
incorporating the same provisions into each type of public contract. Second, the provisions are 
listed in the chronological order of the award procedure. Third, the number of pecuniary thresholds 
was reduced and they are now expressed in Euros. Fourth, concepts are explicitly defined in the 
Directives and specific interpretations from the case law of the Court of Justice, have now been 
inserted in the Directives. Finally there are provisions relating to the general principles of equal 
treatment, non-discrimination, and transparency. 
 
For flexibility a new type of award procedure, namely, competitive dialogue112 was adopted. Any 
economic operator may request to participate and the contracting authority conducts a dialogue 
with the candidate admitted to the procedure for the purpose of working out one or more suitable 
alternatives capable of meeting the requirements. On that basis the selected candidates are invited 
to tender (Article 1, no. 11, (c) Directive 2004/18/EC). This procedure is intended for public 
contracts of a particularly complex nature, where the contracting authorities are unable to 
determine what means would best meet the requirements of the contracting authority or evaluate 
                                                 
108 COM(1998)143. 
109 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council coordinating the procurement 
procedures of procedures for the award of public supply contracts, public service contracts and public works 
contracts, COM(2000)275. 
110 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council coordinating the procurement 
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy and transport sectors, COM(2000)276. 
111 A more detailed overview is found in S. Van Garsse, Nieuwe richtlijn overheidsopdrachten. Codificatie van 
het Europees aanbestedingsrecht in de klassieke sectoren (NjW, 2004), pp. 945-946. 
112 See F. Lichère, ‘New Award Procedures’, in M. Trybus, R. Caranta and G. Edelstam (eds.), European Union 
Law of Public Contracts (Brussel: Bruylant, 2013), pp. 83-95; A. Rubach-Larsen, ‘Competitive Dialogue’, in R. 
Nielsen and S. Treumer (eds.), The New EU Public Procurement Directives (Copenhagen: Djøf Publishing, 2005), 
pp. 71-80. 
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what technical, financial and legal alternatives the market has to offer. Innovative projects also 
benefited from such a procedure.  
 
Second, provisions on the use of framework agreements are explicitly employed. A framework 
agreement113 is defined as an agreement between one or more economic operators for the purpose 
of fixing, for a specified period, the conditions for awarding contracts, namely, the price, and the 
projected quantity (Article 1.5 Directive 2004/18/EC).  
 
Third, it is now permitted to operate through central purchasing bodies. A central purchasing body 
is a contracting service that acquires specific deliveries and/or services for other contracting 
services or grants public contracts and concludes framework agreements in respect of specific 
works, deliveries or services for contracting authorities (Article 1.10 Directive 2004/18/EC). 
 
In the spirit of modernisation, the Directives encourage the use of electronic media in 
communication and information exchange. The use of electronic media shortens the award 
procedure. The Directives also introduce a number of innovative, electronic award techniques that 
concern electronic security. Public authorities can make use of dynamic purchasing systems. A 
dynamic purchasing system is an electronic process for purchases of common use and with general 
features available on the market that meet the requirements of the contracting authority. They are 
time limited and are permanently open to every economic operator that meets the criteria of 
selection.  
 
Finally, the Directives also introduce a number of innovations in regard to selection and award 
criteria and the integration of social and environmental objectives in the award of public contracts 
as well as in respect of technical specifications. The Directive for the utility sectors now includes a 
general mechanism for exclusion. In those cases where an activity carried out in a Member State is 
directly open to competition in market areas to which access is not restricted, the Directive is not 
applicable (Article 30 Directive 2004/17/EC).  
 
Chapter 5 demonstrates that some of the provisions of the 2004 Directives were already much 
clearer on the application of the Directives to cooperative agreements between public authorities. 
But until 2004 none of the Directives provided specific provisions that made clear to what extent 
cooperative agreements between public authorities fall out or within the scope of EU law. This 
explains why this situation has been dealt with by the CJEU, which has elaborated criteria to 
exclude, under certain circumstances, such cooperation from the scope of EU law (see chapter 5). 
The CJEU based its case law on certain concepts (contract, operator) already used in the Directives, 
but interpreted these concepts in a functional and autonomous way. This interpretation not only 
                                                 
113 See F. Lichère, ‘New Award Procedures’, in M. Trybus, R. Caranta and G. Edelstam (eds.), European Union 
Law of Public Contracts (Brussel: Bruylant, 2013), pp. 95-99; R. Nielsen, ‘Framework Agreements’, in R. 
Nielsen and S. Treumer (eds), The new EU Public Procurement Directives (Copenhagen: Djøf Publishing, 2005), 
pp. 81-96. 
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broadened the possible scope of EU law, but also created jurisprudential rules as to the extent to 
what cooperative agreements fall under the scope of EU law. 
 
The public procurement Directives adopted in 2004 contain no specific provisions concerning 
cooperative agreements between public authorities (see chapter 5), from which it may be inferred 
that the powers of the Member States are still quite ample. However, the CJEU has via its case law 
had an impact on these powers (see chapter 5). In doing so the CJEU has made use of a broad 
interpretation of the Directives and thus, as a consequence of the direct effect of some of the 
provisions of Directives. The CJEU based its case law on the objectives of the public procurement 
Directives and the internal market rules to elaborate an innovative application of EU law on 
cooperative agreements between public authorities. The Member States and their public authorities 
are bound by the CJEU interpretation. By such a device EU law has had an influence on some 
aspects of national administrative law; namely, the organisation of public service tasks.  
 
In Stadt Halle the CJEU explained that vertical cooperative agreements between public authorities, 
where one of them is a semi-public company, would clash with the objective of free and undistorted 
competition and the principle of equal treatment.114 The CJEU stated in Carbotermo115 that the 
Teckal-criteria116 ‘are aimed at preventing distortions of competition’. The CJEU, thus, asserts that 
cooperative agreements between public authorities could potentially clash with certain of the EU 
objectives. According to the CJEU, this observation also corroborates the application of EU law (i.e. 
public procurement Directives and principle of equal treatment), when these objectives are 
jeopardised as a consequence of a State measure. The objectives are imperilled whenever a 
cooperative agreement fails to meet the criteria the CJEU has developed in its Teckal-case. 
 
According to Commission v. Germany horizontal cooperative agreements between public authorities 
do not undermine the principle objective of the EU rules on public procurement, that is, the free 
movement of services and the opening of undistorted competition ‘where implementation of that 
cooperation is governed solely by considerations and requirements relating to the pursuit of 
objectives in the public interest and the principle of equal treatment of the persons concerned, 
referred to in Directive 92/50, is respected, so that no private undertaking is placed in a position of 
advantage vis-à-vis competitors’.117 Thus a potential clash with the objectives of the EU raises the 
issue of the applicability of EU law. In Ordine degli Architteti118 the CJEU developed criteria that 
                                                 
114 Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle and RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH. v. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische 
Restabfall- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] ECR I-00001, at [51]. 
115 Case C-340/04, Carbotermo SpA and Consorzio Alisei v. Comune di Busto Arsizio and AGESP SpA [2006] ECR 
I-04137, at [59]. 
116 Case C-107/98, Teckal v. Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121. The public procurement Directives are not 
applicable to cooperation between public authorities if the public authority exercises a control on the second 
on which is similar to that which it exercises over its own departments and, secondly, the second public 
authority carries out the essential activities with the controlling authority or authorities. See chapter 5. 
117 Case C-480/06, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany [2009] ECR I-
04747, at [47]. 
118 Case C-159/11, Azienda Sanitaria Locale di Lecce, Università del Salento v. Ordine degli Ingegneri della 
Provincia di Lecce and Others [2012] ECR I-00000. 
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concretise these objectives. If a horizontal cooperative agreement fails to meet these criteria, EU 
law is applicable. 
 
Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC are the framework of the present thesis. If a Member State 
has failed to implement the Directives or has implemented them incorrectly, nationals can invoke 
most provisions of the Directives in a direct way before national courts: ‘that the substantive rules 
of the procurement directives, such as the obligations on advertising, conducting the competition, 
evidence and criteria for selection and award criteria, in general have direct effect’.119 THE CJEU 
recently ruled as follows in this regards in a matter concerning the public procurement Directives: 
‘that … whenever the provisions of a directive appear, so far as their subject-matter is concerned, 
to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may be relied on before the national courts by 
individuals against the State where the latter has failed to implement the directive in domestic law 
by the end of the period prescribed or where it has failed to implement the directive correctly’.120 
If the national court is not sure about the application or meaning of the provision of EU law, it can 
start a preliminary procedure before the CJEU. A lot of case law on cooperative agreements finds its 
origin in this kind of procedures. 
 
 
3. New developments 
 
In December 2011, as announced in the Single Market Act,121 the Commission adopted its new 
proposals on public procurement. These proposals are part of an overall program aimed at a 
thorough modernization of public procurement in the EU. This program includes the revision of 
Directives 2004/17/EC (procurement in water, energy, transport and postal services sectors) and 
2004/18/EC (public works, supply and service contracts), as well as the adoption of a directive on 
concessions, which were until now not regulated at the EU level. 
 
These proposals originated in the European Commission communication on smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth.122 Public procurement is one of the market-based instruments for achieving the 
objectives set out in the 2020 strategy. Europe 2020 wants to develop an economy based on 
knowledge and innovation, the promotion of a low carbon, resource efficient and competitive 
economy, the fostering of a high-employment economy delivering social and territorial cohesion. 
The European Commission issued a Green Paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement 
                                                 
119 S. Arrowsmith, The law of Public and Utilities Procurement (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2005), p. 1393 
referring to case law in footnote 40. 
120 Case C-425/12, Portgás – Sociedade de Produção e Distribuição de Gás SA v. Ministério da Agricultura, do 
Mar, do Ambiente e do Ordenamento do Territó [2013] ECR I-00000, at [18]. 
121 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a Single Market Act – For a highly competitive social 
market economy, COM (2010) 608. 
122 Communication from the Commission of 3 March 2010 - Europe 2020 A strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020 final. 
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policy123 to initiate a consultation on new proposals. One of the issues elaborated in the Green 
Paper is on cooperative agreements between public authorities.  
 
On 20 December 2011 the Commission published its proposals for two new procedural directives on 
public procurement, one124 to replace Public Sector Directive 2004/18/EC and the second125 to 
replace Utilities Directive 2004/17/EC, with the stated aims of; simplification’ and ‘flexibilisation’ 
of the rules to improve value for money.126 The proposals aim also to enable public contracts to be 
better used to support other EU policies. The Commission also proposed a new directive to regulate 
the award of concessions.127 It based this new proposal on work done in 2004.128 
 
These proposals sparked many discussions within the European Parliament and led to numerous 
amendments. Compromise texts were the result.129 These compromise texts were submitted to the 
vote in January 2014 in the plenary session of the European Parliament. They were published in the 
Official Journal of the European Union (OJ) on 28 March 2014.130 
 
The different proposals of the EU Commission contained dispositions on the cooperative agreements 
between public authorities. A comparison between the texts originally accepted by the EU 
Commission and the published texts makes clear that major amendments had been inserted. The 
new provisions led to many discussions, which demonstrate the sensitive nature of the matter. Many 
Member States feared a too great interference of EU law on their national competences. The 
compromise texts seek a new balance in the distribution of powers between the EU and the Member 
States, inter alia regarding cooperative agreements between public authorities. These dispositions 
are not studied in-depth here.131 The new dispositions on cooperative agreements between public 
authorities are not the main focus of the present thesis.  
 
                                                 
123 Green Paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy, COM (2011) 15 final. 
124 Proposal for a directive on public procurement, COM (2011) 896 final. 
125 Proposal for a directive on procurement by entities in the water, energy, transport and postal services 
sectors, COM (2011) 895 final. 
126 See e.g. the Explanatory Memorandum to the proposal for a directive on public procurement, p.2.  
127 Proposal for a directive on the award of concession contracts, COM (2011) 897 final. 
128 See, in particular, European Commission, Green Paper on public-private partnerships and Community law 
on public contracts and concessions COM(2004) 327 final and Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions on Public-Private Partnerships and Community Law on Public Procurement and Concessions, COM 
(2005) 569 final. 
129 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on public procurement (Classical 
Directive) (First reading) – Approval of the final compromise text - 2011/0438 (COD). 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the award of concession contracts 
(First reading) – Approval of the final compromise text - 2011/0437 (COD). 
Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on procurement by entities operating in 
the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors (First reading) – Approval of the final compromise text 
- 2011/0439 (COD). 
130 Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by 
entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 
2004/17/EC; Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on 
public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC; Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts JO 2014 L94. 
131 See chapter 5. 
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4. Objectives of the public procurement Directives132 
 
A number of general objectives on which the public procurement Directives are based, is described. 
These objectives guide the CJEU in its task of interpreting the various provisions of the Directives. 
These objectives help to explain in what measure public procurement Directives and the principles 
of equal treatment and transparency are applicable to cooperative agreements between public 
authorities.133  
 
The public procurement Directives were, and remain, one of the major legislative acts furthering 
the achievement of an internal market; their legal basis is found in the TFEU provisions on free 
movement. Both Directives and the TFEU provisions on free movement seek EU integration.134 The 
Directives should be considered a further concretization to the TFEU provisions. In that sense it is 
comprehensible that the CJEU applies the same principles on cooperative agreements of public 
authorities without making a distinction regarding the kind of contract that governs the 
cooperation. The EU public procurement system is the outcome of a progressive development over a 
period of several decades with the ultimate goal of opening up public markets to competition as an 
ideal means of promoting economic efficiency.135 Early CJEU case law on public procurement is 
regularly based on Treaty provisions concerning free movement.136 
 
In Directive 71/305/EEC freedom of establishment and the free performance of services were the 
primary objectives of the opening of public markets. However, the authors of this Directive added 
the following aim as well: “To ensure development of effective competition in the field of public 
contracts”.  
 
In its first judgment in this area the CJEU laid especial stress on the freedom of establishment and 
free movement of services as objectives to the achievement of the internal market.137 In later case 
law the CJEU tends to see the achievement of a free market as a goal for facilitating attainment of 
                                                 
132 On this subject see S.E. Hjelmborg, P.S. Jacobsen and S.T. Poulsen, Public procurement law (Copenhagen: 
Djof Publishing, 2006), pp. 19-33; A.S. Graells, Public procurement and the EU Competition Rules (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2011), pp. 189-220; C.R. Hansen, Contracts not covered or not fully covered by the Public Sector 
Directive (Copenhagen: Djof Publishing, 2012), pp. 51-56; S. Arrowsmith, ‘The purpose of the EU Procurement 
Directives: ends, means and the implications for national regulatory space for commercial and horizontal 
procurement policies’ (CYELS, 2011-2012), pp. 1-47. 
133 See Chapter 5. 
134 G.S. Olykke, ‘How does the Court of Justice of the European Union pursue competition concerns in a public 
procurement context?’ (PPLR, 2011), p. 181. 
135 P. Wang, R. Cavallo Perin and D. Casalini, ‘Addressing purchasing agreements between public sector 
entities: what can the WTO learn from the EU’s experience?’, in S. Arrowsmith and R.D. Anderson (Eds.), The 
WTO regime on government procurement: challenge and reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), p. 255. 
136 See P. Trepte, Regulating procurement. Understanding the ends and means of public procurement 
regulation (Oxford: OUP, 2004), pp. 350-351. Case 45/87, Commission v. Ireland (“Dundalk”) [1988] ECR 4929; 
Case C-3/88, Commission v. Italy (“Re Data Processing”) [1989] ECR 4035; Case C-243/89, Commission v. 
Danmark (“Storebaelt”) [1993] ECR I-03353; Case C-359/93, Commission v. Netherlands (“UNIX”) [1995] ECR I-
00157. 
137 Case C-31/87, Gebroeders Beentjes BV v. the State of the Netherlands [1988] ECR 4635, at [9]. 
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the internal market and for making it easier for undertakings to pursue their business interests.138 In 
any event, the realisation of the internal market and the attainment of the conditions for a dynamic 
and effective competition139 now stand side by side as parallel objectives in the context of public 
procurement Directives.140 According to the CJEU the widest possible opening-up to competition is 
contemplated not only from the point of view of the EU’s objective of achieving the free movement 
of goods and services but also from the interest of the contracting authority, which will thus have 
greater choice as to the most advantageous tender which is most suitable for the needs of the 
public authority in question.141 
 
The Court of Justice has described the purpose of the public procurement Directives as follows: ‘the 
Directive … is aimed at eliminating restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the free 
movement of goods and services in the area of public procurements for the purpose of opening 
tenders to real and effective competition’.142 The CJEU sees this objective in broad terms as: 
‘attaining the widest possible opening-up of public contracts to competition’.143 The Directives’ 
purpose is to put an end to ‘practices that seek to limit competition in general, and the 
participation of subjects of other Member States in tender calls, in particular, by facilitating access 
to procurement procedures for service providers [in other Member States]’.144 In other words, the 
intention is to protect market participants established in another Member State,145 i.e. to avoid 
favouritism.146  
 
The intent of the Directives is to constrain public authorities and to get them to allow their works to 
be done in a similar manner as the private sector; i.e. permitting them to seek the best and 
cheapest solution. In this sense they may not favour certain situations without good reason and all 
similar situations must be treated in a like manner.  
                                                 
138 Case C-532/06, Emm. G. Lianakis AE, Sima Anonymi Techniki Etaireia Meleton kai Epivlepseon and Nikolaos 
Vlachopoulos v. Dimos Alexandroupolis and Others [2008] ECR I-251, at [39]; Case C-454/06, Pressetext 
Nachrichtenagentur GmbH v. Austria, APA-OTS Originaltext-Service GmbH and APA Austria Press Agentur 
registrierte Genossenschaft mit beschränkter Haftung [2008] ECR I-4401, at [31]. 
139 Case C-95/10, Strong Segurança SA v. Município de Sintra and Securitas-Serviços e Tecnologia de Segurança 
[2011] ECR I-01865, at [37]. For a more extended study regarding the influence of the ‘competition objective’ 
in the public procurement Directives see A.S. Graells, Public procurement and the EU competition rules 
(Oregon: Oxford and Portland, 2011), pp. 190 et seq. See also C. Estevan de Quesada, ‘Competition and 
transparency in public procurement markets’, (PPLR, 2014), pp. 229-244. 
140 Case C-454/06, Pressetext Nachrichtenagentur GmbH v. Republik Österreich (Bund), APA-OTS Originaltext-
Service GmbH and APA Austria Presse Agentur registrierte Genossenschaft mit beschränkter Haftung [2008] 
ECR I-04401, at [31]; see also Case C-480/06, Commission v. Germany [2009] ECR I-04747, at [47]. 
141 Case C-305/08, Consorzio Nazionale Interuniversitario per le Scienze del Mare (CoNISMa) v. Regione Marche 
[2009] ECR I-12129 at [37]. 
142 Case C-399/98, Ordine degli Architetti delle province di Milano e Lodi, Piero De Amicis, Consiglio Nazionale 
degli Architetti and Leopoldo Freyrie v. Comune di Milano, and Pirelli SpA, Milano Centrale Servizi SpA and 
Fondazione Teatro alla Scala [2001] ECR I-05409, at [52]. 
143 Case C-94/12, Swm Costruzioni 2 SpA, Mannocchi Luigino DI v. Provincia di Fermo [2013] ECR I-00000, at 
[34]. 
144 Case C-92/00, Hospital Ingenieure Krankenhaustechnik Planungs-Gesellschaft mbH v. Stadt Wien [2002] ECR 
I-5553, at [44]. 
145 Case C-226/09, European Commission v. Ireland [2010] ECR I-11807. 
146 Joint cases C-285/99 and C-286/99, Impresa Lombardini SpA - Impresa Generale di Costruzioni v. ANAS - 
Ente nazionale per le strade and Società Italiana per Condotte d'Acqua SpA and Impresa Ing. Mantovani SpA v. 
ANAS - Ente nazionale per le strade and Ditta Paolo Bregoli [2001] ECR I-09233, at [35].  
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On the basis of these objectives one can argue that if a State measure (the decision to cooperate) 
does not put the aims of the Directives at risk, application of EU law is not relevant147. The present 
thesis argues that CJEU case law on cooperative agreements is based on this presupposition.  
 
The objectives of the EU public procurement Directives differ radically from the objectives the 
Member States sought to achieve via the national regulations on tendering of public contracts. 
Several Member States desire, first and foremost, best value for money or aim at a revitalisation of 
the national economy by granting public contracts to their domestic firms. The Directives, together 
with the interpretation given to some of the Directives’ provisions by the CJEU, entailed a complete 
rethinking of how a public contract has to be tendered. This gave rise to tensions in the past 
between EU and national objectives. This tension is one of the important objects of study of the 
present thesis. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The public procurement Directives are among the most important directives focussed on the 
realization of the internal market. These Directives are subject to a rapid evolution. Both the 
reality and the functional interpretation of the Directives by the CJEU made several amendments 
throughout the last 4 decades necessary.  
 
However, the amendments have had as a result that the mission of Member States to implement 
these Directives is more and more difficult and the task of public authorities to apply the provisions 
of the Directives is rather hazardous. This now raises the question of whether the endeavour of the 
EU to achieve the economic objectives might impair the workings of national public authorities and 
thus the general public interest that they serve. Indeed, regular changes in the Directives for 
economic reasons, means that the Member States must adopt new national implementing measures 
that people must be retrained and that undertakings must adapt anew. This also takes energy, time 
and money. It would be better to introduce such innovations every two or three decades but not 
every ten years. Ten years is not enough time for the Directives to prove themselves. 
 
Despite the numerous changes in the Directives, the main objectives of the public procurement 
Directives remain almost the same: the realization of the internal market and effective 
competition. Preamble (1) of Directive 2014/24/EU states: ‘The award of public contracts by or on 
behalf of Member States’ authorities has to comply with the principles of the Treaty on the 
                                                 
147 The 2004 public procurement Directives also took into account secondary or horizontal policies or objectives 
(see S. Arrowmith and P. Kunzlik (eds.), Social and environmental policies in EC procurement law, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 509 p. However the present thesis demonstrates that the CJEU case law on 
cooperation between public authorities can be explained on the basis of the economic objectives of the 
Directives.  
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Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and in particular the free movement of goods, freedom 
of establishment and the freedom to provide services, as well as the principles deriving therefrom, 
such as equal treatment, non-discrimination, mutual recognition, proportionality and transparency. 
However, for public contracts above a certain value, provisions should be drawn up coordinating 
national procurement procedures so as to ensure that those principles are given practical effect and 
public procurement is opened up to competition’.148 
 
This also means that the provisions of the Directives must still be implemented and interpreted 
taking into account the more general European objectives. Another consequence of this will be that 
cooperative agreements between public authorities must be construed in terms of this perspective. 
Thus, the national objectives on the best organization of public service tasks149 are triggered by the 
economic objectives of the EU. 
 
  
                                                 
148 See also Preamble (2) Directive 2014/25/EU. 
149 Cooperative agreements between public authorities are considered in the present thesis to be a means of 
organising public service tasks. 
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CHAPTER 3 – CONCEPTS 
 
The starting point of this thesis is that public authorities or contracting authorities work together in 
order to organize or to discharge their publics’ or general tasks interest. They cooperate and they 
contract with each other. This type of cooperation is influenced by EU law. The aim of the thesis is 
to examine this influence. 
 
In order to mark out the research field of the study and to make clear where EU law has a bearing 
on national administrative law the relevant concepts must be defined. The field of study is 
principally concerned with EU law so the definitions of these concepts are found in this law. The 
central actor of the thesis is the (i) public or contracting authority. It determines the ratione 
personae scope of the thesis. The situation that was studied is the cooperation between public 
authorities, i.e. cooperative agreements. The concept of (ii) ‘cooperative agreement’ determines 
the ratione materiae scope of this thesis. The influence is felt regarding the organization and 
management of (iii) public tasks or tasks of general interest. As such the presence of these concepts 
in a particular situation does not exclude the application of EU law, but under certain circumstances 
cooperative agreements between public authorities ensuring the implementation of public service 
task fall outside the scope of EU law. 
 
The CJEU normally uses a teleological interpretation to give a meaning to the concepts used in EU 
law.150 In a teleological interpretation the judge endeavours to discover the purpose or object of a 
particular term and will interpret the term such that an effet utile is the outcome: ‘in interpreting 
a provision of Community law it is necessary to consider its wording, context and aims’.151 Thus, a 
text must be so construed that its potential consequence in practice would be in consonance with 
the perceived purpose (doctrine of effectiveness). Such a method of interpretation is similarly 
discernible in Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.152 ‘A treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’. In casu the interpretation must 
promote the further development of the EU.153 
 
This method of interpretation was applied by the CJEU as early as in the ruling in Van Gend & 
Loos.154 The CJEU interprets EU law in the light of the political, economic and social objectives that 
constitute the foundations of EU law. Clearly, these objectives evolve continuously over the course 
                                                 
150 For an extensive explanation on the CJEU's approach to legal interpretation and the reasons for the 
teleological interpretation see N. Fennelly, ‘Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice’ (Fordham 
International Law Journal, 1996), pp. 656-679. 
151 Case C-84/95, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v. Minister for Transport, Energy and 
Communications and others [1996] ECR I-03953, at [11]; Case 337/82, St. Nikolaus Brennerei v. Hauptzollamt 
Krefeld [1984] ECR 1051, at [10]; Case C-83/94, Leifer and Others [1995] ECR I-3231, at [22]. 
152 Opened for signature May 23,1969,1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M.679. 
153 On the objectives of EU internal market law, see chapter 4. 
154 Case C-26/62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland 
Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 00001. 
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of time; therefore, such a method of interpretation is likewise evolutionary by nature and hence EU 
law is not a given. This is also the principal criticism levied at the CJEU; namely, that by giving 
preference to this method of interpretation the CJEU appears to have assumed a legislative role.155 
This interpretation method has to guarantee the widest possible application as to ensure the 
realization of the internal market. 
 
The CJEU has realised two fundamental ideas through its use of the teleological method of 
interpretation: i) a greater unity of EU law and the creation by the Court of its own legal system, 
i.e. the unity and autonomy of EU law.156 And ii) fundamental principles such as direct effect and 
primacy of EU law, the liability of Member States for failure to acknowledge EU law are all products 
of the aforementioned teleological interpretation. 
 
In public procurement cases the CJEU refers regularly to the preambles of the Directives setting out 
their context and objectives (see Chapter 2). The concepts ‘public or contracting authority’ and 
‘cooperation or contract’ are interpreted on the basis of the teleological method, i.e. the 
objectives of the public procurement Directives and internal market law. When defining them, one 
must take into account both the context of the provision as well as the objectives of the public 
procurement Directives.157 The CJEU gives two reasons for the need for an autonomous 
interpretation. First, the provisions in the Directives do not refer to national law for determining 
the meaning and scope of its provisions. Therefore it is logical in this context that it be defined at 
the supranational level. Secondly, an autonomous interpretation ensures a uniform application of 
European Union law that benefits the equal treatment of EU nationals. 
 
The consequence of the principle of autonomous interpretation is that only the CJEU will be able to 
determine authoritatively what these concepts means. Trepte notes that this signifies that the CJEU 
case law will be difficult to predict, given its tendency to interpret broadly its scope.158 
 
 
1. The meaning of ‘public authority’ or ‘contracting authority’ 
 
Only decisions of a particular kind of legal person form the subject of the study. The thesis qualifies 
these legal persons in general as ‘public authorities’. The meaning of 'public authority' cannot be 
found in any treaty concluded between the EU Member States.159 Two kind of cooperative 
                                                 
155 H. Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European CJEU. A Comparative Study in Judicial Policy-Making 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986); P. Neill, The European CJEU: A Case Study in Judicial Activism 
(London: European Policy Forum, 1995); T.C. Hartley, ‘The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the 
Constitution of the European Union’ (The Law Quarterly Review, 1996), pp. 95-109. 
156 P. Pescatore, ‘Le recours, dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes, à des 
normes déduites de la comparaison des droits des Etats membres’ (RIDC, 1980), p. 337. 
157 Case C‑373/00, Adolf Truley GmbH v. Bestattung Wien GmbH [2003] ECR I‑1931, at [40]. 
158 P. Trepte, Public procurement in the EU (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007), p. 104. 
159 In Chapter 4 the thesis establishes the concept ‘Member State’, used in the EU treaties, covers to a great 
extend the concept ‘public authority’. 
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agreements (public contract and service concession) are object of this study. For each of these 
agreements a different concept determines the scope of application ratione personae of the thesis. 
The public procurement Directives that form the basis for the research, use the concept of 
'contracting authority'. These Directives define it in a precise way. Regarding service concessions 
the Court of Justice uses the concept ‘public authority’. Hereafter, which authorities are a 
'contracting authority' and which are a 'public authority' is defined in detail.  
 
1.1. Contracting authority160 
 
1.1.1. Preliminary remarks 
 
Both the Public Sector Directive (2004/18/CE) as well as the Utilities Directive (2004/17/CE) use the 
same definition of ‘contracting authority’: ‘“Contracting authorities” are States, regional or local 
authorities, bodies governed by public law, associations formed by one or several of such authorities 
or one or several of such bodies governed by public law’.161 First the definition lists a number of 
traditional authorities, then includes 'bodies governed by public law’ and finally mentions the 
concept of ‘association’. These three categories are discussed further hereafter. The Directives do 
not contain a definition for each of the categories and thus the intervention of the CJEU has been 
necessary. Member States do not have the competence to exclude entities from these categories. 
They are bound by the definition of the Directives, as interpreted by by the CJEU in its case law. 
 
Regarding the concept of 'contracting authority', the public procurement Directives did not limit the 
term to traditional authorities, but have also extended the term to include other legal entities 
which are under the control of traditional public authorities. The public procurement Directives 
employ their own definition of 'contracting authority' since the different legal cultures of the 
Member States had to be taken into account. Thus, the term is not limited to an entity regulated by 
public law.162  
 
The CJEU defines 'contracting authority' in such a broad manner that it embraces a large number of 
legal situations falling inside the scope of the public procurement Directives, considering that any 
evasion of the rules is a disadvantage for the realization of a unified internal market. Legal entities 
that do not come within the scope of the term ‘contracting authorities’, are, therefore, not bound 
by the strict rules of the Directives. 
 
                                                 
160 The present thesis will only take into account the concept ‘contracting authorities’ and not the other 
entities falling under the scope of Directive 2004/17/EC or 2014/25/EU. These entities are less important for 
the present study. 
161 Article 2.1 (a) Directive 2004/17/EC; Article 1.9 Directive 2004/18/EC. 
162 Case C-214/00, Commission v. Spain [2003] ECR I-4667. 
70 
 
Once a body is recognized as a contracting authority, the public procurement Directives will apply 
to all contracts offered by the contracting authority, both those that are part of its activities in the 
general public interest as well as those with a purely commercial character.163 This was confirmed 
by the CJEU in its judgments in Mannesmann164 and Commission v. Germany.165 Making a distinction 
based on the tasks of a contracting authority would not serve the 'effet utile' of the public 
procurement Directives nor would it promote legal certainty. 
 
A body that performs only commercial tasks will not be part of the ‘State’. The sole commercial 
character of a body rules out the specific connection with a public authority that is necessary in 
order to be considered a 'contracting authority' according to the functional interpretation given by 
the CJEU to the term.166 It was not necessary to include such commercial bodies within the scope of 
the public procurement Directives, since competition is not in jeopardy given the lack of 
government interference. The decisions of commercial bodies are normally market based and do not 
imperil free trade and free competition.167 Only in the presence of governmental interference 
decisions can be taken which can favour an economic operator. 
 
The 2014 public procurement Directives do not substantially alter their personal scope. The 
definition of contracting authority remains in essence the same. 
 
1.1.2. Traditional authorities 
 
Among the traditional authorities a distinction must be made between the State, regional and local 
authorities. The Directives do not always define these terms in detail, so the CJEU case law has 
done so. 
 
The 'State' is the main contracting authority and is usually the principal user of public contracts. 
Although the meaning of the State seems obvious, the CJEU had to address some specific situations 
in order to define with more clarity the concept of a State. 
 
First, the CJEU considered bodies having an organic relationship with the public authority. Bodies 
that have an organic relationship with the State should in any case be regarded as a ‘State’. In 
Vlaamse Raad, the CJEU clarified what is the ‘core’ of the concept ‘State’.168 The CJEU stressed 
                                                 
163 S. Arrowsmith, The law of public and utilities procurement (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), p. 253: “This 
reflects the directives, which apply to the State and regional and local authorities regardless of the nature of 
their activities.”; P. Trepte, Public procurement in the EU (Oxford: OUP, 2007), p. 99. 
164 Case C-44/96, Mannesmann Anlagenbau Austria AG and Others v. Strohal Rotationsdruck GesmbH [1998] 
ECR I-73. 
165 Case C-126/03, Commission v. Germany [2004] ECR I-11197. 
166 Opinion Advocate General Alber Case C-306/97, Connemara Machine Turf Co. Ltd v. Coillte Teoranta [1998] 
ECR I‑8761, at [27-29]. 
167 See however Articles 101–107 TFEU. 
168 S. Arrowsmith, The law of public and utilities procurement (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), p. 255: 
“core” entities. 
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that the concept ‘State’ necessarily encompasses all bodies with legislative, executive or judicial 
powers. This also applies to the bodies that exercise those powers at a regional level.169 
Consequently, the CJEU concluded that the Vlaamse Raad170 is a part of the concept ‘State’. The 
CJEU did not have to use the term 'State' in order to classify the Vlaamse Raad as a contracting 
authority since the Vlaamse Raad is an integral part of the Flemish Community of the Flemish 
Region, and could therefore be considered to be a ‘regional or local authority’.171 The current 
Directives in particular refer to the regional or local authorities as contracting authorities. The 
concept of a ‘State’ is an autonomous concept that does not depend on a national interpretation.172 
 
Secondly, the CJEU has also accepted as part of the State bodies with no organic relationship to the 
State. Thus even those bodies without an organic relationship with the State can be considered an 
integral part of the State. In Beentjes173 the CJEU applied a functional interpretation of the term 
‘State’. This case was also the first one where the CJEU applied this interpretation method to 
enlarge the scope of the Directives. 
 
In Beentjes the CJEU was faced with a local land consolidation committee, a body that had no legal 
personality and therefore could not be considered as a ‘body governed by public law’. Nor was 
there an organic relationship with a contracting authority, so that the committee was not 
considered to be an integral part of the State in accordance with the early case-law of the CJEU.174 
Therefore, the public procurement Directives would normally not be applied to the local land 
consolidation committee. The CJEU could only resolve this void in the Directives through a broader 
interpretation of the term ‘State’. 
 
The CJEU considered that the local land consolidation committee was a part of the State although it 
was not formally an integral part of it. In these situations, the CJEU deems the fact that the 
composition and functions of the committee are governed by national legislation important. Also 
that the committee depends on a local contracting authority (province) as far as the appointment of 
its members are concerned; that it is bound to apply rules laid down by a central committee 
established by royal decree whose members are appointed by the Crown; and that the State ensures 
observance of the obligations arising out of measures of the committee and finances the public 
works contracts awarded.175  
 
                                                 
169 Case C‑323/96, Commission v. Belgium [1998] ECR I‑5063, at [27]. 
170 Flemish Parliament. Flanders is one of the Regions in Belgium. 
171 E.H. Pynacker Hordijk, G.W. Van Der Bend and J.F. Van Nouhuys, Aanbestedingsrecht (Den Haag: SDU, 
2004), p. 38. 
172 Case C‑323/96, Commission v. Belgium [1998] ECR I‑5063, at [42]. 
173 Case 31/87, Gebroeders Beentjes BV v. State of the Netherlands [1988] ECR 4635. 
174 The organic and formal interpretation: Case 36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union 
cycliste internationale [1974] ECR 1405; Case 249/81, Commission v. Ireland [1982] ECR 4005. 
175 Case 31/87, Gebroeders Beentjes BV v. State of the Netherlands [1988] ECR 4635, at [8]. 
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In other words, the CJEU considers also factors and indications such as the intention and the 
purpose of establishment of an entity, in order to determine whether it is part of the State.176 
 
The CJEU based its reasoning on the objectives of the public procurement Directives and the 
fundamental principles enshrined in the TFEU. These principles are compromised when the public 
procurement Directives are deemed not applicable, simply because the contract is awarded by a 
body which, although created to perform tasks of general public interest, is not formally a part of 
the government’s administration. 
 
The CJEU case law has been consistent in its application of a functional interpretation to the term 
’State’.177 The CJEU has adapted the concept of ‘State’ into a sort of safety net for bodies that are 
likely to fall outside of the scope of the public procurement Directives. These bodies, despite their 
close ties with the traditional public authorities have no formal links with them nor can they be 
considered as ‘bodies governed by public law’ due to their lack of legal personality. This is in line 
with CJEU case law, which has always attempted to widen the scope of the public procurement 
Directives as much as possible in order to guarantee both a maximum protection of equality 
between the contractors as well as an optimal competitive environment. 
 
Arrowsmith suggests that only bodies without legal personality can be considered as a ‘State’. 
Therefore, if they have legal personality, there is a high probability that they are ‘bodies governed 
by public law’ and there will be no need for a safety net.178 
 
In Scala179 the CJEU stated that a municipality is a regional or local authority within the meaning of 
Article 1, para b of Directive 93/37 on public works180 and therefore falls within that provision given 
the definition of the concept ‘contracting authority’. Regional or local authorities are, by 
definition, contracting authorities.181 
 
1.1.3. Associations formed by one or several authorities 
 
                                                 
176 C. Bovis, EC Public Procurement: case law and regulation (Oxford: OUP, 2006), p. 365. 
177 Case C-353/96, Commission v. Ireland [1998] ECR I-8565; Case C-306/97, Connemara Machine Turf Co. Ltd 
v. Coillte Teoranta [1998] ECR I-8761. 
178 S. Arrowsmith, The law of public and utilities procurement (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), p. 255. 
179 Case C-399/98, Ordine degli Architetti delle province di Milano e Lodi, Piero De Amicis, Consiglio Nazionale 
degli Architetti and Leopoldo Freyrie v. Comune di Milano, and Pirelli SpA, Milano Centrale Servizi SpA and 
Fondazione Teatro alla Scala [2001] ECR I-5409, at [57]. In case of public work contracts: Case C-220/05, Jean 
Auroux and Others v. Commune de Roanne [2007] ECR I-385, at [43]. 
180 Directive 93/37/EEC concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts 
[1993] OJ L199/54. 
181 Case C-126/03, Commission v. Germany [2004] ECR I-11197, at [18]. See also joined Cases C-182/11 and C-
183/11, Econord v. Comune di Cagno, Comune di Varese, Comune di Solbiate [2012] ECR I-00000, at [25]. 
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The term ‘associations formed by one or several authorities’ seems to refer to an inter-municipal 
and an inter-provincial body.182 The CJEU has stated that this category of contracting authorities is 
a residual category. This is also illustrated by the position of this phrase in the Directive’s text.183  
 
Therefore, one must first determine whether a body is not a ‘State, Community, Region, province or 
municipality’, or a ‘body governed by public law’, before it can be captured under this heading. 
This obviously depends on whether the association has legal personality. This category is only 
relevant for situations where public authorities cooperate contractually. Once they have created 
another legal person, it cannot be considered anymore as an association. In that situation the 
concept ‘body governed by public law’ will be relevant. 
 
1.1.4. Body governed by public law 
 
Article 1.9 Directive 2004/18 states that 
  
‘A “body governed by public law” means any body: 
(a) established for the specific purpose of meeting needs in the general interest, not having an 
industrial or commercial character; 
 
(b) having legal personality; and 
 
(c) financed, for the most part, by the State, regional or local authorities, or other bodies 
governed by public law; or subject to management supervision by those bodies; or having an 
administrative, managerial or supervisory board, more than half of whose members are appointed 
by the State, regional or local authorities, or by other bodies governed by public law.’ 
 
Article 1.9 of Directive 2004/18/EC adds: ‘Non-exhaustive lists of bodies and categories of bodies 
governed by public law which fulfil the criteria referred to in (a), (b) and (c) of the second 
subparagraph are set out in Annex III’. This annex then groups together per Member State a number 
of bodies that are considered to be ‘bodies governed by public law’ under the public procurement 
Directives. The CJEU has repeatedly confirmed that this list is not exhaustive.184 On the other hand, 
the inclusion of a body in this list by a Member State does not create an irrefutable presumption 
that it is a ‘body governed by public law’. Even if this is the case, an examination of the nature and 
characteristics of the body is required.185 A Member State does not have the possibility to extend 
                                                 
182 C. De Koninck and P. Flamey, Overheidsopdrachten (Antwerpen: Maklu, 2006), p. 29. 
183 Case C-360/96, Gemeente Arnhem and Gemeente Rheden v. BFI Holding BV [1998] ECR I-6821, at [27]. 
184 See f.e. Case C‑373/00, Adolf Truley GmbH v. Bestattung Wien GmbH [2003] ECR I‑1931, at [39]; Case C-
283/00, Commission v. Spain [2003] ECR I-11697, at [77]. 
185 Case C-300/07, Hans & Christophorus Oymanns GbR, Orthopädie Schuhtechnik v. AOK Rheinland/Hamburg 
[2009] ECR I-04779, at [42-43]. 
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the meaning of the term. It cannot include bodies, which do not comply with the definition of ‘body 
governed by public law’. 
 
Following the wide interpretation of the term ‘contracting authority’ in Beentjes, the CJEU has also 
interpreted the concept ‘bodies governed by public law’ in a functional and autonomous way. Thus, 
the CJEU stated in Commission v. France that ‘it is in the light of those objectives that 'contracting 
authority‘, including a body governed by public law, must be interpreted in functional terms’.186 
The CJEU has repeated this several times187 and added that the concept should be given a broad 
interpretation.188 
 
The idea behind the broad interpretation is to include as many bodies as possible in the definition of 
‘contracting authority.189 Every entity that has the possibility to take decisions without bothering if 
it will have an effect on its economic functioning or financial standing could be defined as a 
‘contracting authority’. The aim of the concept ‘body governed by public law’ is to include entities 
that are closely linked to traditional public authorities. From this rationale the terms ‘bodies 
governed by public law’ and ‘contracting authorities’ will have their own meaning under EU Law. 
Each element of the definition to determine the presence of such an entity will be interpreted in a 
same manner.  
 
An entity is a ‘body governed by public law’ when it meets three conditions: (i) established for the 
specific purpose of meeting needs in the general public interest not having an industrial or 
commercial character; (ii) having legal personality; and (iii) demonstrating a certain degree of 
dependence on a contracting authority. 
 
The three conditions are cumulative190 and will be discussed individually below. Although the term 
at first glance might suggest something else, a ‘body governed by public law’ does include private 
bodies that meet the mentioned conditions. In this manner, the CJEU avoids the danger that the 
application of the Directives would be nullified when entities regulated by public law permit 
autonomous bodies, ruled by private law, to award contracts on their behalf.  
 
                                                 
186 Case C-237/99, Commission v. France [2001] ECR I-939, at [43]. For the autonomous interpretation, see 
Case C-84/03, Commission v. Spain [2005] ECR I-139, at [27]; Case C‑373/00, Adolf Truley GmbH v. Bestattung 
Wien GmbH [2003] ECR I‑1931, at [36]. 
187 Case C-470/99, Universale-Bau AG, Bietergemeinschaft: 1) Hinteregger & Söhne Bauges.m.b.H. Salzburg, 2) 
ÖSTÜ-STETTIN Hoch- und Tiefbau GmbH v. Entsorgungsbetriebe Simmering GmbH [2002] ECR I-11617, at [53]; 
Case C-84/03, Commission v. Spain [2005] ECR I-139, at [27]; Case C-283/00, Commission v. Spain [2003] ECR I-
11697, at [73]; Case C-214/00, Commission v. Spain [2003] ECR I-4667, at [53]. 
188 Case C‑373/00, Adolf Truley GmbH v. Bestattung Wien GmbH [2003] ECR I‑1931, at [43]. 
189 At [43]. 
190 Case C-18/01, Arkkitehtuuritoimisto Riitta Korhonen Oy and Others v. Varkauden Taitotalo Oy [2003] ECR I-
5321; Case C‑373/00, Adolf Truley GmbH v. Bestattung Wien GmbH [2003] ECR I‑1931; Case C-237/99, 
Commission v. France [2001] ECR I-939; Case C-283/00, Commission v. Spain [2003] ECR I-11697; Case C-
214/00, Commission v. Spain [2003] ECR I-4667. 
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Under the first condition, the body must be established for the particular purpose of meeting needs 
in the general public interest, not having an industrial or commercial character. Some legal scholars 
pretend that this criterion derives from French administrative law.191 
 
The CJEU has made clear that both the aspect of ‘general interest’ and ‘not having an industrial or 
commercial character’ have to be examined separately.192 Both have to be present in order to have 
a body governed by public law. Indeed, there are needs that, although they have an industrial or 
commercial character, are to be considered as needs in the general public interest.193 
 
The words ‘established for the specific purpose’ suggest that the objective of the general public 
interest must be explicitly apparent in the articles of Association.194 However, the CJEU has ruled 
otherwise. It is necessary to consider the activities that the body actually carries out.195 The legal 
form is irrelevant. 
 
The term ‘general interest’ is vague and hard to define. Its definition depends on time and social 
context, and thus fluctuates. It is not a surprise that in practice the interpretation of this concept 
presents most of the problems.196 The CJEU has always maintained that the ‘general interest’ is an 
autonomous concept of EU law. The judgment in Agora and Korhonen makes clear that the body 
cannot solely act in an individual interest.197 Where the activities of the body meet the needs of an 
indefinite number of people, the general public interest seems to be apparent.  
 
It is immaterial that such needs are also met or can be met by private undertakings. More important 
is the decision of a State or a local or regional authority to meet the needs, or to retain a decisive 
influence over the body in question.198 This decision will be made when it is clear that the private 
sector cannot partially or fully meet such a need. The desire to retain a decisive influence over the 
body indicates precisely that it discharges tasks of general interest.199 On that matter there seems 
                                                 
191 M.P. Chiti, ‘The EC concept of Public administration: the case of the bodies governed by public law’ (EPL, 
2002), p. 489. 
192 Joined Cases C-223/99 and C-260/99, Agorà Srl and Excelsior Snc di Pedrotti Bruna & C. v. Ente Autonomo 
Fiera Internazionale di Milano and Ciftat Soc. coop. arl. [2001] ECR I-3605, at [32] et seq.; B. Schutyser, ‘Het 
toepassingsgebied van de wetgeving overheidsopdrachten: een aantal evoluties in de rechtspraak van het Hof 
van Justitie (1998-2003)’ (TBP, 2004), p. 261. 
193 Case C-360/96, Gemeente Arnhem and Gemeente Rheden v. BFI Holding BV [1998] ECR I-6821. 
194 E.H. Pynacker Hordijk, G.W. Van Der Bend and J.F. Van Nouhuys, Aanbestedingsrecht (Den Haag: SDU, 
2004), p. 47. 
195 Case C-470/99, Universale-Bau AG, Bietergemeinschaft: 1) Hinteregger & Söhne Bauges.m.b.H. Salzburg, 2) 
ÖSTÜ-STETTIN Hoch- und Tiefbau GmbH v. Entsorgungsbetriebe Simmering GmbH [2002] ECR I-11617, at [56]. 
196 E.H. Pynacker Hordijk, G.W. Van Der Bend and J.F. Van Nouhuys, Aanbestedingsrecht (Den Haag: SDU, 
2004), p. 40. 
197 Joined Cases C-223/99 and C-260/99, Agorà Srl and Excelsior Snc di Pedrotti Bruna & C. v. Ente Autonomo 
Fiera Internazionale di Milano and Ciftat Soc. coop. arl. [2001] ECR I-3605, at [34]; Case C-18/01, Korhonen 
and Others [2003] ECR I-5321, at [44]. 
198 Case C-393/06, Ing. Aigner, Wasser-Wärme-Umwelt, GmbH v. Fernwärme Wien GmbH [2008] ECR I-2339, at 
[40]. See also a comparable definition for the concept ‘service of general interest’ in the present Chapter 
section 3. 
199 Compare Case C‑373/00, Adolf Truley GmbH v. Bestattung Wien GmbH [2003] ECR I‑1931, at [51] and [52]. 
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to be a parallel with the quasi in house case law of the CJEU.200 Where contracting or public 
authorities conclude contracts with each other, which may fall within the scope of the public 
procurement Directives or of the EU Treaty rules, it seems that the object of that contract (public 
service tasks, required in the general public interest) will also determine whether one contracting 
authority exercises a control over the other contracting authority as it would have over its own 
departments.  
 
The CJEU has come to the following general definition in its case law: needs are in the general 
interest when they are not met otherwise by the availability of goods or services in the market 
place and, for reasons associated with the general interest, the State chooses to provide, or over 
which the State wishes to retain a decisive influence.201 Trepte considers that the CJEU has looked 
towards state requirements with a specific task that must be achieved.202 
 
The needs of general public interest that a body meets cannot be of commercial or industrial 
nature. This latter characteristic is significant for the application of the public procurement 
Directives and does specify the nature. The CJEU, therefore, takes into account all relevant factual 
and legal elements such as the circumstances prevailing when the body concerned was established 
and the conditions under which it exercises its activity.203 
 
To determine these elements the CJEU uses a number of 'negatively' and 'positively' expressed 
considerations. In order to meet this criterion, a judge examines whether the body carries on its 
activities in a competitive environment.204 The existence of significant competition does not in itself 
justify the classification of ‘commercial or industrial in nature’, nor does the activity of the body 
solely for the benefit of commercial undertakings.205  
 
In addition, a judge must also examine whether the body operates in normal market conditions, 
whether it does not primarily aim to make a profit, whether it does not bear the losses associated 
with the exercise of its activity, and whether the activity has public financing.206 All the criteria 
expressed, to a greater or lesser extent, the idea that the body concerned can take into account 
factors other than the economic considerations when closing a contract. A private undertaking will, 
on the other hand, always be driven by economic motives when choosing a contractual partner. 
 
                                                 
200 This case law will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
201 See Case C-360/96, Gemeente Arnhem and Gemeente Rheden v. BFI Holding BV [1998] ECR I-6821, at [50] 
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Autonomo Fiera Internazionale di Milano and Ciftat Soc. coop. arl. [2001] ECR I-3605, at [37]. 
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203 At [41]. 
204 Case C-393/06, Ing. Aigner, Wasser-Wärme-Umwelt, GmbH v. Fernwärme Wien GmbH [2008] ECR I-2339, at 
[41]. 
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5321, at [50]. 
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Why should the needs in the general interest be other than of commercial or industrial nature? The 
answer is obvious: ‘the need to compete may force the entity to purchase in a commercial 
matter’.207 
 
The second condition to be categorised as a ‘body governed by public law’, is to have legal 
personality. This condition is clear and does not instigate much discussion. Stated once more: The 
public or private nature of the entity is not decisive. 
 
This criterion though, is vital for determining whether a judge considers a body to be a contracting 
authority that falls within the category of traditional public authorities or whether it falls within the 
category of bodies governed by public law. An association of contracting public authorities belongs 
to the traditional authorities if they have no legal personality. When the body has legal personality, 
it is not part of the traditional authorities, unless of course it is itself a traditional contracting 
authority. In the case of the presence of a legal personality, the body can only be a body governed 
by public law if it satisfies all other conditions.208 
 
The third condition requires a close dependence on another contracting public authority. There are 
three criteria provided in order to establish this dependence: funding, supervision, and composition 
of the body. The objective of the third condition is to make the public procurement rules applicable 
to legal entities over which a contracting authority has a lasting influence. It is possible that the 
contracting authority, directly or indirectly, influences this entity to act in a non-market conform 
way in the awarding of contracts by that entity.209 
 
These three criteria are alternative, not cumulative.210 The three criteria in the third condition each 
reflect the close dependence of a body on the State, or on local or regional authorities or on other 
bodies governed by public law.211 Thus, it is sufficient that only one of these conditions is met for 
sufficient dependency. If one of the criteria is fulfilled the contracting authority is able to influence 
the decisions of the other body.212 Hence, this body cannot behave as a private company and 
accordingly violate the rules of the market.  
 
The first alternative criterion for the dependence condition to be met is that the activities are 
financed for the most part by the traditional contracting authorities or bodies governed by public 
law. Based on the decisions concerning this criterion, a judge seems to be obliged to examine three 
                                                 
207 S. Arrowsmith, The law of public and utilities procurement (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), p. 269. 
208 See Case C-353/96, Commission v. Ireland [1998] ECR I-8565, at [32]; Case C-306/97, Connemara Machine 
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elements: i) what is the amount of financing, ii) where does the financing come from and iii) is 
there anything in return for the finance awarded?  
 
First, Article 1(9) of Directive 2004/18 requires that the financing of the activities comes from the 
contracting authorities. The phrase ‘for the most part’ must be interpreted in its ordinary meaning, 
i.e. ‘more than half’.213 To determine correctly the percentage of public financing of a particular 
body account must be taken of all of its income, including that which results from a commercial 
activity.214 
 
According to the CJEU the way in which a particular body is financed is not an ‘absolute 
criterion’.215 The CJEU pointed out that not all payments made by a contracting authority have the 
effect of creating a specific relationship of subordination, as set out by the third criterion. In other 
words, not all funds that flow from a contracting authority to a public body are eligible to be 
qualified as ‘financing’ within the meaning of the public procurement Directives. The CJEU clarifies 
that ‘only payments which go to finance or support the activities of the body concerned without any 
specific consideration therefor may be described as ‘public financing’.216 Advocate General Alber 
opined that financing can only consist of supporting the general activity of the body.217 
 
On the contrary, an indemnity for an activity, based on a reciprocal contract freely negotiated 
between the contracting parties, does not fall within the concept of ‘public financing’. The CJEU 
admits that such funds flows could create a relationship of subordination, but the nature of the 
relationship is not the same as the specific relationship as set out by the third criterion: ‘rather, it 
is analogous to the dependency that exists in normal commercial relationships’.218 
 
The term ‘normal commercial relationships’ seems not the exclude that some activities, based on 
contractual provisions, could be deemed to be ‘financed by a contracting authority’. Some forms of 
payments, following a commercial agreement, can indeed be addressed, where such an agreement 
does not exist in a pure commercial context. Advocate General Alber explicitly states that an 
indemnity for a contractual activity could nevertheless create a relationship of dependence as set 
out in the third criterion, in particular when a contractual activity of the body simultaneously 
constitutes an activity that is of general interest or that serves academic purposes.219 
 
                                                 
213 Case C-380/98, The Queen tegen H.M. Treasury, ex parte The University of Cambridge [2000] ECR I-8035, at 
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To determine what can be considered as being a purely commercial agreement, Arrowsmith 
suggests applying the same principles that are found in state aid regulations.220 Advocate General 
Alber pointed out what he seems to consider as being ‘normal commercial relationships’: ‘As a rule 
such dependency does not arise precisely where an establishment receives payment as 
consideration for an activity which it offers in the same way as an undertaking operating on the 
market independently in competition with private undertakings and on the basis of a specific 
contract for the supply of services’.221 
 
From all these principles, the CJEU concludes that grants for the support of research work may be 
regarded as financed by a contracting authority. This is financing that goes to the institution as a 
whole in the context of its research work.222 Similarly, scholarships may be classified as ‘public 
financing’, since there is no contractual consideration.223 However, payments for finance activities 
of executing a specific research or the organisation of seminars cannot be regarded as public 
financing. The contracting authority has in fact an economic interest in providing this service.224 
 
Where direct financing by the contracting authority is concerned, there is no problem in concluding 
that the first alternative criterion is fulfilled. The CJEU has considered the question whether the 
same applies in the case of indirect financing. Bodies benefiting from indirect financing are, 
according to the CJEU, eligible to be regarded as ‘contracting authorities’.225 Article 1.9 of Directive 
2004/18/EC does not clarify the way in which the financing should be done. Bayerischer Rundfunk 
concerned a German public television station of which more than half of its income was generated 
by contributions paid by citizens. The contributions were collected by a central agency in Germany. 
 
The CJEU took the following facts in account in order to conclude that the said case concerned 
‘public financing’: 
 
- The contribution by which the activities of the body concerned were financed is based on a 
Staatsvertrag, which constitutes a government act. In other words, the contribution does not follow 
from an agreement between this body and the users, and definitely not from an agreement between 
the body and the central agency. The mere possession of a television set is sufficient to be liable for 
payment of the contribution. 
- The amount of the contribution is set by the Parliaments and governments of the Länder. 
- When collecting the contribution, the central agency disposes of powers of a public 
authority. 
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In that regard it is of no relevance whether the government collects the contribution and 
subsequently makes it available to the broadcasting organisations or whether the government 
attributes the right to collect the contribution directly to these organisations. As a consequence, 
indirect public financing is also regarded to be public financing in the light of the financing 
criterion. In other words, the CJEU applies an extensive definition of the concept ‘financed for the 
most by bodies of public law’.226 
 
This decision seems logical, as a contribution that is independent from the actual use of the 
television set constitutes a form of public funding. This is not the case with subscription payment or 
pay-per-view for commercial networks, where the payment follows an agreement between the 
networks and the receivers.227 
 
The CJEU decided similarly in a case where a legal health insurance fund made an announcement 
for the request of offers for manufacturing and delivering shoes.228 As the contributions payable by 
the insured to the legal health insurance funds are imposed, calculated and collected in accordance 
with rules of public law, such funds can be regarded as being bodies of public law and should 
therefore apply the public procurement Directives.229 
 
The dependence of a contracting authority can also result from the degree of supervision such 
authority has over the management of the concerned body. Contrary to the criteria of financing and 
composition of the decision-making body, which are quantitative criteria, the criterion of 
management supervision is of a qualitative nature.230 This results in the inevitable consequence that 
the supervision criterion will require interpretation. 
 
The CJEU has underlined that the management supervision must give rise to dependence on the 
contracting authorities equivalent to that which exists where one of the other alternative criteria is 
fulfilled (financing and composition of decision making body).231 The supervision should nonetheless 
lead to the possibility for the public authority to influence the decisions of the body in relation to 
public contracts.232 Supervision in relation to public contracts can emerge from a strong general 
dependence (possible also influencing other fields) not only through a supervision specifically 
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directed to the award processes.233 An indirect supervision is sufficient.234 The possibility of 
supervision must also exist prior to the making of the decisions. A possible control a posteriori is not 
sufficient.235 
 
The question arises as to which criteria should determine whether the degree of supervision by the 
government over an entity leads to a strong dependence. Following Advocate General Mischo’s 
view, the legal and regulatory framework surrounding the concerned entity is the determining 
criterion.236 From such framework several possible powers of control emerge, which can lead to the 
conclusion that sufficient dependence exists. Such exercise was made by the CJEU in the cases 
Commission v. France237 and Adolf Truly238. 
 
In Commission v. France, the CJEU seemed to distinguish between two hypotheses either the rules 
of management are not detailed or very detailed by law. In the latter case, the regulator has 
already limited the operating radius of the entity. In such situation, regular supervision suffices, so 
it seems, to consider it as strong influence. Under ‘regular supervision’ it is understood that the 
public authority does not have the power to interfere directly with decisions of the management of 
the entity (in casu a social housing company). A regular supervision is therefore not sufficient to 
establish dependence within the meaning of Article 1(9) of Directive 2004/18/EC where the rules of 
management are not in detail governed by law. 
 
In particular these ‘strict rules’ consist of the fact that; i) the law determined the activities of the 
social housing company; ii) the articles of association contained provisions included in an annexe to 
the law providing standard provisions; iii) that the technical characteristics; and iv) the cost price of 
the activities of the entity were fixed by an administrative act.  
 
The CJEU subsequently deducted the existence of sufficient supervision from several specific 
elements. The public authority had the power to dissolve the entity and to appoint a liquidator. In 
addition the public authority could suspend the governance bodies and appoint an administrator. 
This last power did not fall within the scope of the regular supervision, but implies a true 
interference by the government. Although in this case the government could only execute these 
powers on an exceptional basis (in particular in case of serious irregularities on behalf of the 
management), a situation of permanent supervision was nevertheless present. In addition, the 
public authority could impose a certain management profile on the entity. There also existed, by 
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decree, an inter-ministerial service of supervison over the entity, controlling in particular any 
persons, to whom a measure is imposed by the minister, would also actually execute such measure.  
 
In the Adolf Truley case, the CJEU took into account the following elements. The public authorities 
verified not only the annual accounts of the entity (by definition a posterior control, thus not 
sufficient to create supervision), but also its conduct from the point of view of proper accounting, 
regularity, economy, efficiency and expediency. The public authorities were in addition authorised 
to inspect the business premises and facilities of the entity and to report the results of those 
inspections to the regional authority, which held all the shares in the entity in question.239 
 
The CJEU does not clarify how important it considers each of these criteria to be, and whether any 
specific criterion is considered to be decisive, nor whether the criteria are cumulative. The CJEU 
simply states that, if the criteria are fulfilled, a situation of ‘supervision’ is present. In any case, 
there exists a different interpretation than the description of the term ‘control’, as it results from 
the ‘quasi in house’ case law. In particular when a public authority exercises a control over another 
legal person in a similar way as it does over its own service, such cooperation is not subject to the 
regulation with regard to public contracts.240 
 
In accordance with the third alternative dependence criterion, this dependence is established when 
the majority of the members of the governance, managing, or the supervising body have been 
appointed by other contracting entities. 
 
Despite the fact that the legal provision explicitly mentions ‘more than half’, Pynacker Hordijck et 
al. are of the opinion that such provision must also be interpreted in a functional way.241 This would 
mean in the first place that dependence would also be established in case the public authority, 
instead of appointing the nominal majority of the members of the decision making body within the 
entity, has appointed a number of members who together hold a decisive majority. 
 
The CJEU has not yet rendered a decision by which it expresses the meaning of the third 
dependence condition. In Connemara242 the CJEU considered the concerned entity to be an entity of 
public law and stated that the State had the power to appoint the principal officers of the entity. In 
addition, the CJEU mentioned that the State had been given the possibility to ‘control’ the entity, 
so that it is not clear which element has lead to the establishment of dependence. 
 
At what point in time should one determine whether the three conditions have been fulfilled? The 
CJEU explicitly stated that the determination must be made on an annual basis and that the 
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budgetary year during which a procurement procedure is commenced must be regarded as the most 
appropriate period for calculating the method of financing of that body. An entity, which is 
considered to be a contracting authority at the commencement of the procurement procedure, will 
maintain such qualification until this procedure has been completed.243  
 
As the Directives do not provide any indication as to how to identify the moment at which the 
evaluation should be done, the CJEU has based its decision on the provisions regarding indicative 
notices. According to these provisions contracting authorities should make public the indicative 
notices as soon as possible after the beginning of the budgetary year, where the total amount of the 
procurement that they envisage awarding during the subsequent twelve months, amounts above the 
thresholds. According to the CJEU, the provisions imply that the contracting authority retains that 
status for twelve months from the beginning of each budgetary year.244   
 
Advocate General Alber had suggested in his Opinion preceding the University of Cambridge 
judgment a possibility to reassess the entity’s status during the procedure in case of significant 
changes in funding.245 Such changes could indeed have as a consequence that the entity does no 
longer comply with the three conditions, in a way that, while the procedure is pending, no mention 
can be made of a ‘contracting authority’. However, the CJEU has not taken into account such 
consideration in the judgment in University of Cambridge case. The CJEU attached great 
importance to the principle of legal certainty, requiring that the rules are clear and their 
application foreseeable for all those concerned.246 In other words, third parties and, of course, the 
contracting authority itself should know from the commencement of the budgetary year whether 
the contracts they envisage for the subsequent year fall within the scope of the public procurement 
Directives. 
 
 
1.2. Public authority 
 
The CJEU case law on cooperative agreements between public authorities does not only apply to 
contracts normally falling within the scope of the public procurement Directives. The CJEU has 
extended its case law also to service concessions. This type of agreement however falls outside the 
scope of the public procurement Directives.247 
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This means that for these contracts, in principle, the concepts as set out in the aforementioned 
Directives are not relevant. The scope of the Directives is based on, amongst others, the concept 
‘contracting authority’. Contracting authorities are subject to the public procurement Directives. 
The question arises whether this concept can be transposed to service concessions in order to 
understand the ratione personae scope of this category of contracts. 
 
As until recently no specific directives with regard to service concessions existed, the provisions of 
the TFEU applied.248 It is obvious that a parallel exists concerning the ratione personae scope of the 
TFEU and of the public procurement Directives. It is also on these Treaty provisions that the CJEU 
has based its case law that public authorities, which conclude service concession contracts, must 
comply with the principle of equal treatment and the duty of transparency.249 The provisions on free 
movement (Articles 34, 49 and 56 TFEU) determine their ratione personae scope. According to these 
provisions, the scope is determined based on the concept of ‘Member State’.250 
 
The Treaty however does not provide a definition of ‘Member State’. According to the CJEU, there 
are the traditional public authorities, as listed by Directive 2004/18/EC: the State and the 
territorial bodies.251 It further deals with professional organisations or other institutions of public 
law, such as universities.252 Also all institutions under the strict control or supervision of a member 
state fall within the scope of the concept ‘Member State’ within the meaning of the provisions on 
free movement.253 The free movement principles apply to private bodies supported by the state 
through finance.254 The element of dependence can also be found in the public procurement 
Directives when they provide a definition of a ‘body governed by public law’.  
 
In Coditel Brabant,255 a case which concerned a service concession, the CJEU referred to a public 
authority which is a contracting authority,256 thus suggesting that it considers the terms 'public 
authority' and 'contracting authority' to be synonyms. Legal scholars already built upon the concept 
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of 'contracting authority' to characterize the concept 'public authority' in the context of awarding 
government contracts257 other than public contracts.258 This is how the CJEU ruled in its decision 
Wall AG.259 
 
In Wall AG, the CJEU had its first opportunity to examine the public entities to which the principles 
applicable to service concessions (equal treatment and duty of transparency) apply. The case 
concerned a matter in which the city of Frankfurt signed a concession agreement with the 
Frankfurter Entsorgungs- und Service (FES), a legal person governed by private law. The execution 
of a part thereof was subcontracted by FES to Wall AG, in particular the performance of the 
advertising services. At a certain moment, FES changed its subcontractor and the question arose as 
to the nature of FES. Is it a ‘public authority’ bound by the provisions on free movement, the 
principle of equal treatment and the duty of transparency? 
 
The CJEU followed the reasoning that the definition of the term ‘contracting authority’ in the 
public procurement Directives can inspire to find a definition of ‘public authority’: ‘To establish 
whether an entity with characteristics such as those of FES may be equated to a public authority 
bound by the obligation of transparency, some aspects of the definition of ‘contracting authority’ in 
Article 1(b) of Directive 92/50 on public service contracts should be taken as guidance, to the 
extent that they correspond to the requirements produced by the application to service concessions 
of the obligation of transparency flowing from Articles 43 EC and 49 EC’260. The idea behind this 
consideration seems to be that only those entities, which are not inspired by economical needs and 
thus can choose a contracting partner, should be subject to the principle of equal treatment and 
the duty of transparency. 
 
According to the CJEU, an entity must comply with two conditions to be considered a ‘public 
authority’: first, the undertaking in question is effectively controlled by the State or another public 
authority, and, secondly, it does not compete on the market. The first condition corresponds to the 
dependency criterion, by which the Directive 2004/18/EC provides, amongst others, a definition of 
a ‘body governed by public law’. The second condition seems to be similar to the element of 
‘general interest, not having an industrial or commercial character’ as set out in the definition of 
the concept ‘body governed by public law’. 
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The CJEU did not further explain the two conditions in this case. However, the CJEU did check 
whether the factual elements of the case complied with the conditions, in order to decide whether 
FES constituted a ‘public authority’. As regards the first condition, the CJEU concluded that 
although 51% of the share capital of FES is owned by the city of Frankfurt, a majority of three 
quarters of the votes is needed for the decision of a general meeting of shareholders. In addition, 
on the supervisory board of FES, the city of Frankfurt has only a quarter of the votes. As far as the 
second condition is concerned, the CJEU concluded that FES operates in the market and that it 
obtains more than half its turnover from bilateral contracts. 
 
The same objectives as those guiding the public procurement Directives serve as a base to describe 
the concept 'public authority’. The CJEU refers in Wall AG to the following objectives: the free 
movement of services and the opening up of the market to undistorted competition in the Member 
States.261 These objectives necessitate a broad interpretation of the concept of a ‘public authority’. 
Wall AG contains criteria that could determine whether an entity is a public authority for any 
contract that does not fall within the scope of the public procurement Directives.262 
 
The recently published Directive on service concessions (Directive 2014/23/EU) now uses the 
concept of ‘contracting authority’ and defines it in Article 6. It received the same definition as the 
concept used in the public procurement Directives. It can be presumed that the CJEU interpretes 
the concepts in the same way taking into account the objectives of the internal market rules and 
the provisions on the fundamental freedoms. 
 
 
2. Cooperative agreements 
 
Considering the focus of the thesis, not every form of cooperation between public authorities will 
be addressed. This thesis is limited to the forms of cooperation between public authorities that 
have all the characteristics of a public contract or a service concession. To determine the object of 
the study, it is important to determine the meaning of ‘public contract’ and ‘service concession’. 
 
In this context it is not the intention to analyze the two terms in all its components. In the case of 
public contracts only the element ‘contract’ will be addressed. As will become apparent, this 
element forms the starting point for the CJEU case law on cooperative agreements that will be 
examined in Chapter 5 (2.1.). The concept ‘service concession’, which is also a contract, will be 
compared in particular with the concept ‘public contract’ (2.2.).  
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2.1. Public contract 
 
The subject of this thesis falls into the scope of Directive 2004/17/EC and Directive 2004/18/EC. 
Article 1 of Directive 2004/18/EC determines for the public sector the scope of the public 
procurement regime: ‘‘Public contracts’ are contracts for pecuniary interest concluded in writing 
between one or more economic operators and one or more contracting authorities and having as 
their object the execution of works, the supply of products or the provision of services within the 
meaning of this Directives’. Directive 2004/17/EC contains a comparable definition. (Article 1.2.(a)) 
The distinguishing characteristics for the ratione materiae scope are: (i) a contract, (ii) for 
pecuniary interest, (iii) concluded in writing, and the (iv) execution of works, supply of products or 
provision of services.  
 
Not all the elements are decisive to define the concept ‘public contract’. The element (iii) is not 
relevant. This element does not determine the presence of a public contract. The elements (ii) and 
(iv) are not important to explain the CJEU case law on cooperative agreements. They will not be 
analyzed in detail. For the purpose of this research, it is submitted that the relevant element or 
starting point for the CJEU case law on cooperative agreements between public authorities was the 
existence of a contract.263 264  
 
The application of Directives 2004/17/CE and 2004/18/EC requires the presence of a ‘contract’. In 
general the CJEU emphasizes the importance of the element ‘contract’ to determine whether there 
is a public contract.265 
 
First, within the public procurement Directives, the concept ‘contract’ has an autonomous meaning. 
As with defining other concepts in the public procurement Directives, the CJEU uses a functional 
interpretation266 of the term ‘contract’. Consequently, CJEU case law seems to distinguish several 
elements that have to be established in order to be in the presence of a ‘contract’. 
 
An analysis of the relevant CJEU case law demonstrates that it is not possible to have a consistent 
definition of the concept ‘contract’. The definition of many of the concepts used in the public 
procurement Directives has evolved over a number of CJEU judgments267 and is not yet definitive. 
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The principles developed in the context of EU internal market law influence and impact on the 
meaning of ‘contract’. The CJEU distinguishes, according to the thesis, two elements in its case law 
to define the concept of ‘contract’ within the meaning of the public procurement Directives: two 
different wills and the freedom to negotiate.  
 
A first attempt at defining the term ‘contract’ can be found in the Opinion of Advocate General 
Cosmas in Teckal.268 He emphasizes that a contract is synallagmatic. There is a meeting of wills 
between two different persons, the contracting authority and the supplier. In other words, there 
are mutual acts of performance, the creation of rights and obligations for the parties to the 
contract and interdependence of their respective acts of performance. According to the Advocate 
General, for public procurement Directives to apply it is essential that the party entering into the 
contract with the public authority, namely the supplier, has a real third-party status vis-à-vis that 
public authority; that is to say, the supplier must be a separate person from the public authority.269 
This could be inspired from the traditional French definition of an administrative contract (‘contrat 
administratif’).270  
 
In its ruling in this case the CJEU did not give any complete definition. It limited itself to 
characterizing a contract as an agreement between two separate persons.271 It seemed that the 
CJEU would follow a more traditional definition of the concept: there is a consensus between both 
parties either as to the choice over whether to enter into a relationship. Also the choice over 
whether to accept particular terms or the possibility for one of the parties or a third party to 
override and/or alter the agreed terms.272 The presence of two independent legal bodies is in all 
events the first element to determine whether there is a contract. 
 
Nevertheless, the unilateral nature of certain decisions in the context of the award of a public 
contract does not rule out the term ‘contract’ as shown by the CJEU in the Scala-case.273 Scala 
involved the restoration and renovation of the historic building of the Scala Theatre, the renovation 
of the municipal buildings of the Ansaldo complex and the construction of a new theatre in the 
quarter Bicocca. The City of Milan decided to integrate the works into a major renovation of an 
                                                                                                                                                        
développements récents’, in N. Thirion (ed.), Le marché et l’Etat à l’heure de la mondialisation (Bruxelles : 
Larcier, 2007), p. 42. 
268 Opinion of G.Cosmas, case C-107/98, Teckal Srl v. Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121, at [52]. 
269 At [53 et seq.]. 
270 For a definition of the concept ‘contrat administratif’ see A. de Laubadère, F. Moderne and P. Delvolvé, 
Traité des contrats administratifs, T. 1 (Paris : LGDJ, 1981), pp. 29 et seq.; see also D. Truchet, “Le contrat 
administratif, qualification juridique d’un accord de volontés”, in L. Cadier (ed.), Le droit contemporain des 
contrats. Bilan et perspectives (Paris : Economica, 1987), p. 186; F. Lichère, Droit des contrats publics (Paris : 
Dalloz, 2005), p. 10; X., “Contrat, loi et décision administrative unilatérale: des imbrications croissants”, in 
Rapport public 2008. Le contrat, mode d’action publique et de production de normes (Paris : La 
documentation Française, 2008), pp. 92-93. 
271 Case C-107/98, Teckal Srl v. Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121, at [49]. 
272 S. Arrowsmith, The law of public and utilities procurement (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), p. 284, 6.2. 
273 Case C-399/98, Ordine degli Architetti delle Province di Milano e Lodi, Piero De Amicis, Consiglio Nazionale 
degli Architetti and Leopoldo Freyrie v. Comune di Milano, and Pirelli SpA, Milano Centrale Servizi SpA and 
Fondazione Teatro alla Scala [2001] ECR I-05409.  
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entire site (unilateral decision) where the owner of that site, according to Italian law as the holder 
of a subdivision permit, should be responsible for the carrying out of the works. It was also agreed 
that the owner would be responsible for the infrastructure works. The parties to these transactions 
were of the opinion that there was no contract.  
 
In this case the CJEU noted that the City of Milan did have a choice under the relevant building and 
planning regulations as to how to arrange for the construction of the development project. The City 
may deviate from the rule of immediate construction of the project by the contractor and opt for 
the later construction of the project by another contractor under an award procedure. This option 
would give the contracting entity an opportunity to award the works contract to another contractor 
and would therefore justify the application of the Directive. The CJEU concluded that a contract did 
exist. 
 
More important than the presence of two legal bodies to determine the concept of ‘contract’, is the 
manner in which these two legal bodies relate to each other. In principle, it is essential that the 
two agree. It is only by the convergence of the wills of both parties that legal effects can arise. This 
expresses the idea of freedom of contract. Contracting parties choose freely with whom they want 
to contract, how they want to contract, and what they want to contract. Yet, the CJEU ruled that if 
a contracting authority cannot choose its contracting party, the categorisation of a ‘contract’ under 
the public procurement legislation is not excluded (Scala).274 Under EU law freedom of choice is not 
relevant for a contract to exist. 
 
On the other hand one can also find herein the principle of consensualism. To determine whether a 
contract exists under the public procurement Directives, one must, according to the CJEU in Scala, 
investigate whether there is a possibility of negotiation on the actual content of the 
performances.275 Some specific legal effects must be realized due to the consensus of the parties. In 
Scala the parties decided which infrastructure works the promotor was to construct and what the 
relevant conditions were. The contracting authority receives, as a result of the consensus, also a 
legal title to the facilities.276 There can be no question of a contract when the contracting authority 
unilaterally imposes obligations on the entrepreneur that differ from the contractual terms that the 
entrepreneur normally applies.277  
 
To date, the CJEU has not made any definitive statements concerning the degree of negotiation 
that is sufficient to decide whether a contract exists. Perhaps, as a starting point, a different 
                                                 
274 At [52]. 
275 See also J. Wiggen, ‘Public procurement rules and cooperation between public sector entities : the limits of 
the in-house doctrine under EU procurement law’ (PPLR, 2011), p. 170. 
276 At [71]. 
277 Case C-220/06, Asociación Profesional de Empresas de Reparto y Manipulado de Correspondencia v. 
Administration General del Estado [2007] ECR I-12175, at [54]; see also Opinion Advocate General Mazak joined 
cases C-197/11 and C-203/11, Libert and Others ECR I-00000 [88]. 
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judgment of the CJEU278 can be considered where the CJEU had to rule on a modification to a 
contract and to what extent this change constitutes a new contract. The CJEU refers in this case to 
considerations from earlier case law involving a modification when the parties renegotiate the 
essential terms. Thus, one could argue that a contract exists when parties negotiate and reach an 
agreement on the essential terms of a contract. 
 
Another judgment of the CJEU that is relevant to this issue is a case that concerns an ambulance 
providing service. The ambulance service had signed a contract with a contracting authority where 
the funding conditions were regulated with respect to the operation of the service. Based on the 
actual facts, however, the CJEU could not exclude that the ambulance service did not derive the 
power for the execution of this contract directly from the law. When a person provides services 
under its own powers derived directly from the law, it does not constitute a contract within the 
meaning of the directives on public procurement.279 In such a situation there is not really a third 
person on whose demand the contract is executed, so there is no question of consensualism. The 
contractor, who executes an agreement under a regulatory or statutory provision is not in a 
contractual relationship.280 
 
Conclusion: 
 
Based on the relevant case law, it is clear that the CJEU is not bound by the categorisation of a 
cooperation or agreement when establishing the existence of a contract. The CJEU analyzes the 
facts of a case and then assesses to which degree negotiation between the present parties is 
possible, making abstraction of the unilateral or reciprocal nature of a decision.  
 
This case law has the great disadvantage of being very unpredictable since the CJEU, in its quest, 
will again and again be guided by the goals of the public procurement Directives that were set out 
in Chapter 2. Furthermore, an evolving definition has the advantage of being able to adapt to the 
subtleties of public authorities in order to avoid the application of the public procurement 
Directives. Finally, the analysis of the case law does not support a contention that the CJEU is far 
removed from national traditions when defining the term ‘contract’.  
 
 
2.2. Service concession 
 
                                                 
278 Case C-454/06, Pressetext Nachrichtenagentur GmbH v. Republik Österreich (Bund), APA-OTS Originaltext-
Service GmbH and APA Austria Presse Agentur registrierte Genossenschaft mit beschränkter Haftung [2008] 
ECR I-04401, at [34]. 
279 Case C-532/03, Commission v. Ireland [2007] ECR I-11353, at [37]. 
280 See Preamble of Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to coordination of procedures for the award 
of public service contracts. 
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Service concession is the second form of concluded by a public authority that has been subjected by 
the CJEU to the application of EU law and more specifically to the principle of equality. First, it will 
be analyzed how this concept was introduced in EU law. Thereafter this concept will be defined 
taking into account the public procurement Directives and the CJEU case law. Finally this section 
deals with the main difference between a service concession and a public contract: the transfer of 
risk. 
 
2.2.1. Foundations in EU law 
 
The Treaty of Rome281 did not contain any specific provision on ‘service concessions’, nor can this 
concept be found in the amending treaties. The concept ‘concession’ appeared for the first time in 
EU law in 1962. The General Programme for the abolition of restrictions on freedom to provide 
services282 and the General Programme for the abolition of restrictions on freedom of 
establishment283 contain each a reference to this concept. Both programmes provide obligations for 
the Member States to abolish restrictive provisions and set out actions in regard to citizens of other 
Member States. These obligations concerned also obtaining concessions or licences delivered by the 
State or another public body. 
 
A description of the concept ‘concession’ can be found for the first time in Article 3.1. of Council 
Directive 71/305/EEC.284 This provision directly makes a link with the concept ‘public work 
contract’ (article 1(A)) and indicates the distinctive element between both contracts: ‘a contract of 
the same type as that indicated in article 1 (A) except for the fact that the consideration for the 
works to be carried out consists either solely in the right to exploit the construction or in this right 
together with payment’. The right to exploit was already a major element of the concept 
‘concession’. 
 
This Directive did not contain any definition of the term ‘service concession’. The first generation of 
Directives on public procurement did not concern ‘public service contracts’. Thus, it was logical 
that the first Directives did not contain any definition of the concept ‘service concession’. For the 
first time Directive 92/50/CEE285 provided specific dispositions related to the tendering of public 
service contracts. In the proposal for the Directive a definition of the concept ‘service concession’ 
was included: ‘a 'public service concession' is a contract other than a public works concession within 
the meaning of Article 1(d) of Directive 71/305/EEC, concluded between an authority and another 
entity of its choice whereby the former transfers the execution of a service to the public lying 
                                                 
281 Treaty of 27 March 1957 establishing the European Economic Community. 
282 Series II Volume IX pp. 3-6. 
283 Series II Volume IX pp. 7-15. 
284 Series I Volume 1971(II), pp. 682-692. 
285 Council Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of 
public service contracts, OJ [1992] L 209 pp.1–24. 
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within its responsibility to the latter and the latter accepts to execute the activity in return for the 
right to exploit the service or this right together with payment’ (Article 1, h). 
 
Although the Commission itself was in favour of including a regulation on service concessions in the 
Directive, there was a difference of opinion between the Member States within the Council.286 
France and the other Latin countries felt especially that such intuitu personae agreements could 
not be competitively awarded. These countries also feared an increased competition for their 
business interests in such enterprises, which regularly exercise such activity in a monopoly.287 As a 
result, the final text of the Directive did not contain any reference to the term ‘concession’.  
 
Directive 2004/18/CE for the first time contained a definition of the concept ‘service concession’. 
Article 1, paragraph 4 of Directive 2004/18/CE defines the concept ‘service concession’ as ‘a 
contract of the same type as a public service contract except for the fact that the consideration for 
the provision of services consists either solely in the right to exploit the service or in this right 
together with payment’. This contract is still excluded from the scope of the public procurement 
Directives. 
 
As already mentioned above the EU institutions have for the first time approved in 2014 a whole 
new Directive on concessions.288 The main characterics of the concept ‘concession’ are 
maintained.289 This Directive provides a detailed regulatory regime for the tendering of work and 
service concessions.  
 
2.2.2. Basic elements290 
 
On the basis of Article 1, paragraph 4 Directive 2004/18/CE the CJEU has developed the meaning of 
‘service concession’. The CJEU interprets the concept autonomously: ‘The question whether the 
agreements at issue should or should not be classed as service concessions must therefore be 
considered exclusively in the light of Community law’.291 
 
                                                 
286 Case C-324/98, Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v. Telekom Austria AG, joined party: 
Herold Business Data AG [2000] ECR I-10745, at [48].  
287 M.A. Flamme, Ph. Matheï, Ph. Flamme, A. Delvaux and Cl. Dardenne, Praktische commentaar bij de 
reglementering van de overheidsopdrachten, 1A (Brussel: NCB, 1996-1997), p. 134. See also Ch. Bovis, EU 
public procurement law (Cheltenham: Edgar European Law, 2012), p. 337. 
288 Directive 2014/23/EU. 
289 H. Hoepffner, ‘La nouvelle directive Concessions’, (Europe, 2014, June), p. 10. 
290 See on the early case law: U. Neergaard, ‘Public service concessions and related concepts - the increased 
pressure from Community law on Member States' use of concessions’ (PPLR, 2007), pp. 387-409. See also more 
recently: C.R. Hansen, ‘Defining a Service Concession Contract will the proposed new definition of service 
concession contracts increase legal legality in the field of concessions’, in G.S. Olykke, C.R. Hansen and C.D. 
Tvarno (eds.), EU Public procrurement – Modernisation, Growth and Innovation (Copenhagen: Djof publishing, 
2012), pp. 239-250.  
291 Case C-382/05, Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic [2007] ECR I-6657; Case C-
348/10, Norma-A SIA and Dehon-ASIA v. Latgales planasanas regions [2011] ECR I-0000, at [40]. 
93 
 
The concept 'service concession' was mentioned for the first time in the BFI judgment.292 Unlike the 
CJEU, Advocate General La Pergola advanced in this case a number of criteria to qualify a service 
concession: the beneficiary of a concession is the user and not the awarding public authority, the 
payment of a sum of money by third parties to the contract holder, the concession operator 
operates a service of general interest and the concession operator bears the economic risk of the 
operation of the service.293  
 
In his Opinion in Telaustria Verlag294 Advocate General Fennelly relies on the definition of the 
concept of 'public service contract' to define the concept of service concession. He considered the 
lack of consideration on the part of the contracting authority as a basic characteristic of a service 
concession. According to Fennelly the concessionaire had itself the largest or at least the 
substantial economic risk associated with the exploitation of the service concession.  
 
In defining the concept the CJEU was inspired, prior to a definition in the public procurement 
Directives, by the term ‘public works concessions’.295 Article 1, paragraph 4 of Directive 93/38/EEC 
referred only to contracts for pecuniary interest concluded in writing and, without making express 
reference to public service concessions. It provided only indications about the contracting parties 
and about the object of the contract, defining them in particular in the light of the method of 
remunerating the service provider and without drawing any distinction between contracts in which 
the consideration is fixed and those in which the consideration consists in a right of exploitation.296 
 
There is only a question of a service concession when there is a contract.297 This could be inferred 
from the case Sporting Exchange.298 In this case the CJEU literally considers: ‘the issue of a single 
licence is not the same as a service concession’.299 On the one hand, the CJEU states that a licence, 
an unilateral legal act, is not a service concession. On the other hand, the CJEU always adds the 
term ‘contract’ when it talks about a service concession. 
 
What does not appear necessary is that a service concession concerns a public service. If the public 
nature should have been a condition, the Directive would also have mentioned it. Usually it will of 
course involve a public service, precisely because it is a task that a public authority transfers to a 
third party. 
                                                 
292 Case C-360/96, Gemeente Arnhem and Gemeente Rheden v. BFI Holding BV [1998] ECR I-6821. 
293 Opinion Advocate General La Pergola Case C-360/96, Gemeente Arnhem and Gemeente Rheden v. BFI 
Holding BV [1998] ECR I-6821, at [26]; see also Ch. Bovis, EC Public Procurement: Case law and Regulation 
(Oxford: OUP, 2006), pp. 334-335. Opinion Advocat Genenal Alber Case C-108/98, RI.SAN srl and Comune 
d’Ischia, Italia Lavoro SpA and Ischia Ambiente SpA [1999] ECR I-05219, at [50]. 
294 Opinion Advocate General Case C-324/98, Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v. Telekom 
Austria AG, joined party: Herold Business Data AG [2000] ECR I-10745, at [30]. 
295 L. Richer, L’Europe des marchés publics (Paris : LGDJ, 2009), p. 205. 
296 Case C-324/98, Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v. Telekom Austria AG, joined party: 
Herold Business Data AG [2000] ECR I-10745, at [43]. 
297 See also E.H. Pynacker Hordijk, G.W. Van Der Bend and J.F. Van Nouhuys, Aanbestedingsrecht (Den Haag: 
Sdu Uitgevers, 2009), p. 100. 
298 Case C-203/08, Sporting Exchange Ltd v. Minister van Justitie [2010] ECR I-04695. 
299 At [46]. 
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The CJEU for the first time defined implicitly the concept ‘service concession’ in Telaustria300 as a 
contract in which the consideration consists in a right of exploitation. This is also the first 
distinctive criterion approved by the CJEU regarding a service concession, more specifically the 
transfer of the right to operate the service. The service provider is not reimbursed by the public 
authority concerned but by third parties who use the service.301 A service concession is not a 
contract for pecuniary interest like a public contract falling under the scope of the public 
procurement Directives. 
 
The provider takes the risk for operating the services in question. The public body hands over the 
risk of exploitation, which the CJEU considers to be the second important criterion of the concept 
‘service concession’. This element cannot be found in the Directive’s definition. Thus, the CJEU 
once again took a ‘legislative’ role. This element will now be examined in detail, because it was the 
source of most of the case law on the meaning of ‘service concession’. It is the most distinctive 
element.302 
 
2.2.3.Transfer of risk 
 
In different cases the CJEU had the opportunity to clarify the second important criterion to qualify a 
service concession: to what extent the public authority has to transfer the risk?  
 
In Eurawasser,303 although rendered in the framework of Directive 2004/17/EC, the CJEU specified 
that it is irrelevant whether the fee paid by third parties or consumers is governed by private or 
public law. In the same ruling, the CJEU held that the actual risk assumed by the provider does not 
have to be significant.304 It is only required that the public authority hands over all or a substantial 
part of the risk. The general risks resulting from possible amendments to the contract, made in the 
course of performance of the contract, cannot be taken into account. 
 
The right to exploit the service, either alone, or together with payment, entails that the provider of 
the service takes the risk of operating the service. That risk may, at the outset, be very limited. It 
is necessary for classification as a service concession that the contracting authority transfers to the 
concession holder a significant share of the risk which it faces. 
                                                 
300 Case C-324/98, Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v. Telekom Austria AG, joined party: 
Herold Business Data AG [2000] ECR I-10745, at [43]. 
301 Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen GmbH. v. Gemeinde Brixen and Stadtwerke Brixen AG [2005] ECR I-08585, at 
[40]. 
302 C.R. Hansen, ‘Defining a Service Concession Contract will the proposed new definition of service concession 
contracts increase legal legality in the field of concessions’, in G.S. Olykke, C.R. Hansen and C.D. Tvarno 
(eds.), EU Public procrurement – Modernisation, Growth and Innovation (Copenhagen: Djof publishing, 2012), 
p. 240. 
303 Case C-206/08, Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband Gotha und Landkreisgemeinden (WAZV Gotha) v. 
Eurawasser Aufbereitungs- und Entsorgungsgesellschaft mbH [2009] ECR I-8377, at [55]. 
304 At [71]. 
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In that regard, it must be stated that the risk of the economic operation of the service must be 
understood as the risk of exposure to the vagaries of the market,305 that may consist of the risk of i) 
competition from other operators, ii) that supply of the services will not match demand, iii) those 
liable will be unable to pay for the services provided, iv) the risk that the costs of operating the 
services will not fully be met by revenue, or v) liability for harm or damage resulting from an 
inadequacy of the service.306 By contrast, risks such as those linked to bad management or errors of 
judgment by the economic operator are not decisive for the purposes of classification as a public 
service contract or a service concession, since those risks are inherent in every contract, whether it 
be a public service contract or a service concession.307 
 
In Privater Rettungsdienst the CJEU confirmed that the fees allotted to the provider by another 
public body did not suffice to cover all operating expenses.308 The providers faced a deficit and they 
were exposed to this risk. Finally, it was proved that there was competition on the market for this 
activity. Under those circumstances the CJEU concluded that the contract must be defined as a 
‘service concession’.  
 
As regards the exposure to the vagaries of the market the CJEU examined in the case of Norma-A 
the applicable legislation and the terms of the contract.309 Having regard to the terms of the 
contract and to the national law provisions, the CJEU concluded that the provider did not bear a 
significant share of the operating risk. The public authority would reimburse the service provider for 
any operating losses. 
 
The CJEU has in its case law further described the term ‘operating risk’ or 'risk of the economic 
exploitation’, which is the risk of being exposed to the fluctuations of the market. According to the 
CJEU, this could be manifested in different, non cumulative, ways: the risk of competition from 
other market participants; the risk of mismatch between the supply and the demand of services; 
the risk of insolvency of those that must pay for the services that are supplied; the risk that the 
costs are not fully covered by the income; or the risk of liability for damages due to defective 
services.310 
 
 
                                                 
305 See also Case C-206/08, Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband Gotha und Landkreisgemeinden (WAZV Gotha) 
v. Eurawasser Aufbereitungs- und Entsorgungsgesellschaft mbH [2009] ECR I-8377, at [66] and [67]. 
306 Case C-274/09, Privater Rettungsdienst und Krankentransport Stadler v. Zweckverband für Rettungsdienst 
und Feuerwehralarmierung Passau [2011] ECR I-1335, at [37] ; Case C-348/10, Norma-A SIA and Dehon-ASIA v. 
Latgales planasanas regions [2011] ECR I-0000, at [48]  
307 Case C-274/09, Privater Rettungsdienst und Krankentransport Stadler v. Zweckverband für Rettungsdienst 
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308 At [40]. 
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3. Public tasks 
 
The concept ‘public service’ or ‘public task’ is unknown in EU law and has also not been defined by 
the CJEU in its case law. However, for a better grasp of the case law on cooperative agreements 
between public authorities it is necessary to make clear what is meant by ‘public service’, ‘public 
interest tasks’ and ‘public tasks’.311 
 
In this thesis it is argued that these terms must be given a comparable meaning to the meaning 
given to ‘service of general interest’ (SGI) (see 3.2.). The definition of SGI should be used as a 
reference to the understanding of the term ‘public task’. First, the historical evolution of the place 
of ‘public tasks’ and ‘services of general interests’ in EU law is briefly set out, followed by a more 
detailed analysis of this concept.  
 
3.1. Historic development 
 
The organisation of a public authority or the management of its ‘public (service) tasks’ falls outside 
the scope of the EU Treaty provisions. That is why in the original provisions of the EEC Treaty there 
is no mention of public tasks. Only Article 77 EEC (now Article 93 TFEU) contained a reference to 
the term 'public service' in the context of transport policy and Article 90 EEC (now 106 TFEU) 
addressed ‘services of general economic interest’. 
 
As public authorities in social welfare states took upon themselves more tasks that touched upon 
the economic sector, the need arose to define the public service tasks that come within the scope 
of the EU Treaty and, therefore, governed by EU law.312 Member States such as France wished to 
maintain an extensive autonomy in respect of the organization and the management of public 
service tasks or services of general interest. As a result a tension occurred between the pursuit of 
the internal market objective and the conservation of Member States competences. 
 
Public (service) tasks and SGI, however, have their place in the EU. Only the approach between the 
national philosophy and the goals of the EU are different. The term 'public service' is perceived in 
legal systems that are inspired by French law from the idea of a public authority as an entity with 
special prerogatives, while the institutions of the EU act within the objective to achieve an internal 
market. In this latter context, however, the SGIs do matter. In certain circumstances they can be 
considered to be an economic activity and, thus, EU law will have its impact. (see also Chapter 4) 
                                                 
311 In the latest case law the CJEU uses the concept ‘public task’ in English and the concept ‘service public’ in 
French: Case C-159/11, Azienda Sanitaria Locale di Lecce, Università del Salento v. Ordine degli Ingegneri 
della Provincia di Lecce and Others [2012] ECR I-00000. 
312 For an overview of the conflicting opinions on the place of the CJEU’s concept of ‘public service task’ or 
‘service of general interest’ see H. Schweitzer, ‘Services of general interest: European Law’s Impact on the 
Role of Markets and of Member States’, in M. Cremona (ed.), Market Integration and Public Services in the 
European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 11-62; M. Nettesheim, Les services d’intérêt 
general en droit communautaire entre libre concurrence et état social (RIDC, 2008), pp. 608-615. 
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An approximation of both approaches should be possible since the perceptions should cross at some 
point.  
 
With the Treaty of the EU,313 signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, several non-economic policy 
issues were introduced at the European level such as the creation of an European citizenship 
conferred on all nationals of the EU Member States. Thus EU nationals secured rights not only in 
their roles as economic actors in the EU market but also in their own rights as EU citizens. Thus 
certain safeguards have been granted to EU citizens to access the services of general interest. 
Access to SGI is perceived as a fundamental right. However, wherever access is mentioned, the right 
to an optimal service of general interest is also necessarily implied. Thus when a public authority 
appeals to a third party to carry out a service of general interest, EU nationals will be well served if 
these third parties are selected through a competitive procedure. 
 
The European Commission was the first to give the SGI a place within the EU law by publishing a 
Communication314 to this effect. In this Communication the Commission placed services of general 
interest at the heart of the EU’s society. The services of general interest, according to another 
Commission’s Communication,315 are a key aspect in the EU model of society. In 1999, the Member 
States inserted, through the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 2 October 1999, Article 16 in the 
EC Treaty (now Article 14 TFEU). By introducing this EU Treaty provision it seems that the carrying 
out of services of general economic interest is perceived as an obligation imposed on the EU and on 
the Member States316 and that the access to services of general economic interest is a fundamental 
right of European citizens.  
 
The European Commission recently issed two documents on services of general interest: the Green 
Paper on services of general interest317 and the White Paper on services of general interest.318 In 
both documents, the Commission tries to distinguish between non-economic services of general 
interest falling outside the scope of the EU Treaty, and the services of general economic interest, 
which fall within it.  
 
Social objectives have acquired more importance in the current verison of the EU Treaty (or EU 
priorities). Some important Treaty articles have been altered or new articles added by the Treaty of 
Lisbon. The Treaty of Lisbon altered Article 16 EC (now Article 14 TFEU) as follows: 
 
                                                 
313 OJ 1992 L 191. 
314 Communication on services of general interest in Europe of the Commission d.d. 11 September 1996, 
COM(96)443final; D. Simon en F. Lagondet, La communication de la Commission sur les services d’intérêt 
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315 Memorandum of the Commission on services of general interest in Europe OJ 2001 C 17/4. 
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(2002), p. 427. Article 36 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union OJ [2012] C 326, pp. 391-
407.  
317 COM/2003/0270. 
318 COM/2004/0374. 
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‘Without prejudice to Article 4 of the Treaty on European Union or to Articles 93, 106 and 107 of 
this Treaty, and given the place occupied by services of general economic interest in the shared 
values of the Union as well as their role in promoting social and territorial cohesion, the Union and 
the Member States, each within their respective powers and within the scope of application of the 
Treaties, shall take care that such services operate on the basis of principles and conditions, 
particularly economic and financial conditions, which enable them to fulfil their missions. The 
European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish these principles and set these conditions without 
prejudice to the competence of Member States, in compliance with the Treaties, to provide, to 
commission and to fund such services’. 
 
Finally, the 26th Protocol to the Treaty of Lisbon emphasizes the importance of the SGEIs. This 
Protocol allows Member States to provide, to commission and to organize non-economic services of 
general interest (Article 2 of the Protocol). The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU of 7 
December 2000 recognizes the right of every European citizen to access the services of general 
economic interest (article 36). 
 
These documents emphasize a trend that gives the concept ‘service of general interest’ economic 
or non-economic, a EU meaning. These services play an important role in achieving a social, 
economic, and territorial EU cohesion.319 In all the sectors the EU institutions are competent, this 
EU concept will gradually define to what extent that competence can be used. According to some, 
the services of general (economic) interest (SG(E)I) has acquired a constitutional dimension as a 
consequence of this increased attention.320 
 
3.2. The concept 'services of general interest' 
 
According to the CJEU, a public authority has the ability to perform its public tasks with its own 
administrative, technical and other resources without having to use a tendering procedure.321 The 
CJEU further adds that public authorities may exercise the possibility to use their own resources to 
perform the public interest tasks conferred on them in cooperation with other public authorities.322 
Finally, it has been accepted that EU law does not require public authorities to use any particular 
form in order to carry out jointly their public service tasks.323 
 
                                                 
319 F. Malvasio, ‘Les catégories du droit administratif économique et du service public’, in J.-B. Auby (dir.), 
L’influence du droit européen sur les catégories du droit public (Paris : Dalloz, 2010), p. 763. 
320 U. Neergaard, ‘Services of general economic interest under EU law constraints’, in D. Schiek, U. Liebert and 
H. Schneider (eds.), European Economic and Social Constitutionalism after the Treaty of Lisbon (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 181. 
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Restabfall- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] ECR I-00001, at [48]. 
322 Case C-324/07, Coditel Brabant SA v. Commune d'Uccle and Région de Bruxelles-Capitale [2008] ECR I-8457, 
at [49]. 
323 Case C-480/06, Commission v. Germany [2009] ECR I-04747, at [47]. 
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The concept ‘public (service) task’ or ‘public service obligation’ determines whether a particular 
agreement or cooperation between public authorities falls within or outside the scope of EU 
legislation. EU law does, however, use the concept of service of general (economic) interest (SGEI) 
(see Art. 106 TFEU). It is generally agreed that the terms 'public service' and 'services of general 
interest' are closely interrelated.324 The General Court of the EU itself admitted as follows: ‘that the 
concept of public service obligation … corresponds to that of the services of general economic 
interest as designated by the contested decision and that it does not differ from that referred to in 
Article 86(2) EC’.325 Therefore, the concept of ‘public service task’ can be explained by the concept 
of 'services of general interest'.326 If the CJEU case law on cooperative agreements needs to have 
the same consequences in all Member States, this concept also has to receive the same 
interpretation. 
 
The question remains what is meant by services of general interest? Generally no treaty or other 
secondary legal text in EU law contains a definition of this concept. In principle it is national law 
that determines the meaning of ‘services of general interest’, its nature and its extent.327 The 
influence of EU law on the meaning of the term is perceptible when the CJEU investigates whether 
a State has classified an activity as a SG(E)I in order to avoid applying EU law (Article 106 TFEU). 
Member States enjoy a wide discretion, subject only to control for manifest error.328 ‘A Member 
State’s power … to define services of general economic interest is not unlimited and cannot be 
exercised arbitrarily for the sole purpose of exempting a particular sector … from the application of 
competition rules’329. 
 
EU competition law will serve as a basis to define the concept ‘service of general interest’. This 
definition should ascertain the meaning of the term within the context of the rules governing the 
fundamental freedoms. The fact that little attention has been given to the above term in the 
context of the fundamental freedoms can be explained by the fact that the concept SG(E)I is not 
decisive to determine if a situation falls under the scope of the internal market rules. However, the 
definition takes on a significant role when the application of the free movement rules to 
cooperative contracts between public authorities is at issue.  
                                                 
324 N. Fiedziuk, ‘Putting services of general economic interest up for tender: reflections on applicable EU rules’ 
(CMLR, 2013), pp. 87-88; J. Sirinelli, Les transformations du droit administratif par le droit de l’Union 
européenne (Paris : LGDJ, 2011), p. 269; F. Malvasio, ‘Les catégories du droit administratif économique et du 
service public’, in J.-B. Auby (dir.), L’influence du droit européen sur les catégories du droit public (Paris : 
Dalloz, 2010), p. 763 ; L. Dubouis, ‘Service public et droit de l'Union européenne un perpétuel débat’, in Juger 
l'administration, administrer la justice : Mélanges en l'honneur du Daniel LABETOULLE (Paris : Dalloz, 2007), p. 
295. 
325 Case T‐289/03, British United Provident Association Ltd (BUPA), BUPA Insurance Ltd and BUPA Ireland Ltd 
v. Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR II‐81, at [162]. 
326 See in this regard Case T-289/03, British United Provident Association Ltd (BUPA), BUPA Insurance Ltd and 
BUPA Ireland Ltd v. Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR II-00081, at 165: Here the CJEU 
makes use of the term ‘service of general interest’ when it is a matter of applying Article 106.2 TFEU and 
Article 107 TFEU. 
327 Case T-289/03, British United Provident Association Ltd (BUPA) v. Commission [2008], at [167]. 
328 At [166]; Case T-17/02, Fred Olsen v. Commission [2005] ECR II-2031, at [216]. 
329 Case T-289/03, British United Provident Association Ltd (BUPA) v. Commission [2008] ECR II-81, at [168]. 
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The European Commission proposed in 2003 a definition for the concept SGI: ‘The term ‘services of 
general interest’ cannot be found in the Treaty itself. It is derived in EU practice from the term 
‘services of general economic interest’ and covers both market and non-market services delivered 
by public authorities as being of general interest and subject to specific public service 
obligations’.330 Two elements are important to analyse the concept ‘SGI’: i) it is either economic or 
non-economic; ii) it must be of a general interest. Both aspects are examined. 
 
Services of general interest are either economic or non-economic in nature. How is this distinction 
established? The distinction is not obvious. Indeed, like other concepts in European law, this will be 
interpreted functionally and evolutionary.331 At times there is a reference to the concept of 
‘economic activity’ as used in competition law and the rules relating to fundamental freedoms.332  
 
An economic activity within the meaning of competition law is ‘any activity consisting in offering 
goods and services on a given market’.333 It concerns ‘market services’.334 The case law on market 
services335 is too numerous to be considered here. Moreover, the distinction between economically 
or not economically as used in competition law is irrelevant to this thesis, which is concerned only 
with the free movement rules. Indeed, in both cases, the presence can lead to the inapplicability of 
EU law, specifically with regards to the principle of equality and public procurement Directives. 
 
In the context of the rules on free movement, the carrying out of a non-economic general interest 
service could be an economic activity when it is carried out for remuneration from a public 
authority.336 Thus, the concept of economic activity has a different meaning in competition law 
than it has in internal market law. 
 
Some authors advocate and recognize a common meaning for the term 'economic activity'. Thus, the 
only valid criterion to be applied in order to determine whether an activity falls within the scope of 
                                                 
330 Green paper on services of general interest COM(2003) 270 final, at [16]. 
331 W. Sauter, ‘Services of General Economic Interest and Universal Service in EU Law’ (ELR, 2008), p. 175. 
332 U. Neergaard, ‘Services of General Economic Interest’, in M. Krajewski, U. Neergaard and J. Van Den 
Gronden (eds), The Changing Legal Rramework for Services of General Interest in Europe (TMC Asser Press, 
2009), p. 23; M.T. Karayagit, ‘The Concept of Services of General Economic Interest Revisited’ (EPL, 2009), p. 
586. 
333 Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98, Pavel Pavlov and Othus v. Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische 
specialisten [2006] ECR I-6451, at [75]. 
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European Communities [2006] ECR I‐6295, at [25]; Case C‐309/99, J.C.J. Wouters, J. W. Savelbergh and 
Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten [2002] ECR 
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Union des Assurances de Paris-Vie and Caisse d'Assurance et de Prévoyance Mutuelle des Agriculteurs v. 
Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche [1995] ECR I‐4013, at [21]; Case C‐41/90, Klaus Höfner and Fritz 
Elser v. Macrotron GmbH [1991] ECR I‐1979, at [22]. 
336 For several examples, see B. Bossard, ‘Le traitement communautaire des services d'intérêt général non 
economiques’ (RDP, 2006), p. 1315; L. Driguez and S. Rodrigues, ‘Services sociaux d'intérêt social et droit 
communautaire’ (AJDA, 2008), p. 193. 
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the EU Treaty’s provisions on free movement of goods or services,337 is whether the service is 
marketable.338 Thus two questions need to be answered: a) is there a market and 2) does the entity 
that provides the service of general interest, provides a good or service. From the CJEU case law it 
can be seen that a public authority decides whether a market exists and when the service should be 
placed on the market. There is a need for public service when the market actors have no sufficient 
incentives to do so and market forces may not result in a satisfactory provision.339 The choice of a 
public authority to organize its services in a particular way does not suffice to rule out an economic 
relationship.340 
 
The services must be of general interest and this element is the only important one for the thesis. 
Indeed the CJEU case law on cooperative agreements does not make any difference between 
economic public tasks or non-economic public tasks. When are services of general or of particular 
interest? Public authorities consider SGI being of particular importance to citizens so that if there 
was no public intervention the services would either not be supplied satisfactorily or would be 
supplied under different conditions.341  
 
Society has also an interest in the public service being completed. Service is of public interest and 
not only for an individual or a group of individuals,342 but for everyone, it is universal. The service or 
task has an essential character, which promotes social cohesion.343  
 
In the BUPA case, the CJEU attempted to convey some minimum criteria to characterize a task or 
service of general economic interest: ‘These are, notably, the presence of an act of the public 
authority entrusting the operation in question with an SGEI mission and the universal and 
compulsory nature of that mission’.344 On this basis the following criteria can be added to the 
concept ‘service of general interest’: a person must be entrusted with the exercise of the activity 
through an act of public authority.345  
 
Some legal scholars defend the proposition that there is throughout the European Union a ‘common 
denominator’ underlying public services: ‘the fact that they are regarded as being in the public 
                                                 
337 G. Eckert, ‘La distinction entre les services d'intérêt économique général et les services d'intérêt général 
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interest, and as such are performed by public law or private law organizations under state control 
or subject to specific state intervention’346. According to other legal scholars the term ‘public task,’ 
as used in the CJEU case law on cooperative agreements between public authorities (see Chapter 
5), can be defined as a task carried out according to an obligation under public law.347 These 
definitions emphasizes the convergence between the concepts ‘public services’ / 'public tasks' and 
'services of general interest'.  
 
4. Public / Private divide 
 
The way the CJEU has defined the examined concepts influences the public / private divide in the 
legal systems of the Member States. The public / private divide is a well-known distinction in legal 
theory. In most EU Member States this classic distinction exists in one way or another. It is one of 
the most important distinctions in legal theory.348 However the meaning of this distinction, what is 
understood under public and private law, differs from one Member State to another. Member States 
use different criteria to make the distinction.349 Several reference points can be used to categorise 
a situation or act as public or private.350 Thus it is difficult to make general statements about the 
distinction and about the meaning of the concepts of ‘private law’ and ‘public law’. 
 
This explains why EU law does not take into account national distinctions. EU law adopted a 
functional approach: ‘Primary and secondary law was, and largely still is, organised along the lines 
of the overall objective of (economic) integration as reflected in different subject matters’351. 
Every action or decision (public or private) which endangers the realisation of the internal market 
comes within the scope of EU law. Notwithstanding this indifference, the public / private divide co-
exist within the domain of EU law352 as it will be illustrated briefly below. This will then be followed 
by an examination of the divide in two Member States: France and the UK (especially England) 
which are the selected two EU Member States. Next, the thesis will examine the relationship 
between the CJEU case law on the cooperation between public authorities and the divide in the EU 
and the Member States.  
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In 2010 Odudu distinguished three phases in the evolution of the public and private distinction in 
the EU.353 In a first phase the distinction corresponded, according to Odudu to the divide between 
the internal market rules applicable to the State and the competition rules applicable to 
undertakings/private partners. In a second phase the nature of the activity and the identity of the 
entity that undertakes the activity, become important to determine if competition (market activity) 
or internal market (regulatory activity) rules are applicable. Finally, in the third phase the CJEU 
seems to reject the public private divide. The distinction has therefore become more and more 
blurred.354 
 
4.1. France 
 
France is one of the Member States in which the public-private divide is acknowledged by the 
judicial system. The organisation, management and actions of French government are regulated by 
a separate branch of the legal system, namely administrative law. Chapter 6 explains the rules to 
determine in what situations administrative law will be applicable.  The nature of the legal entity 
involved in the legal relationship, as well as the nature of the activity, to which this legal 
relationship relates, are essential. Administrative and constitutional law (ie public law) are in 
France separate branches of the legal system from private law.  
 
Three debates are ongoing in France in relation to the public-private divide: 1) Private law scholars 
and public law scholars are both under the impression that respectively private law or public law 
are becoming more important; 2) The divide between private law and public law is not 
impermeable; 3) The divide between private law and public law is merely ideological.355 These 
evolutions in the divide will be reviewed briefly.  
 
Firstly, the premise that is gaining widespread acceptance is that in situations in which citizens are 
involved, the law applicable to the factual situation cannot change dependending on whether one of 
the parties involved is a public entity. In tort law, for instance, “public law” and “private law” are 
moving closer.356  On the other hand, the role of public authority in society, as well as the way in 
which it serves the public interest, is changing. In the framework of this thesis, it is important to 
note that even in France, public authorities are cooperating more and more with the private sector 
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to manage the delivery of services of general interest or to organize their public service sector.357 
358 More frequently, public authorities are applying instruments of private law to fulfill their public 
service obligations, or they simply delegate certain competences or tasks to the private sector.  The 
public service sector is itself becoming more compelled to behave as an economic operator.  
 
New tendencies in the way in which public authorities manage public service, imply a shift in the 
public-private divide. The divide itself, however, continues to retain its place in France.359  
 
4.2. England 
  
For a long time, a separate branch of administrative or public law did not exist in England. (see 
further Chapter 6) For this reason, the concept of a “divide” did not even apply. This finding results 
from the fact that in England separate courts, competent to review decisions of public authorities, 
never existed.  
 
The divide was introduced for the first time in the 1970s and 1980s by judges to secure a stronger 
and more extensive system of judicial review.360 Public lawyers have propagated the existence of an 
independent public law, on the basis of the observation that public authorities have special 
prerogatives and that therefore private law simply does not apply.  The most important objective of 
administrative law is to keep the powers of public authorities under control.361 This is the role of 
judicial review (see Chapter 6).  According to some, public law concerns the exercise of power by 
public bodies and the control mechanisms.362 Public authorities also accomplish specific tasks, 
causing these services to be considered public.363 They serve the public interest, an interest not of 
an economical nature. Public law rules should facilitate the accomplishment of these tasks. 
Moreover, public authorities act on behalf of citizens, to whom they are accountable. Specific rules 
govern accountability, rules that are also to be considered public.364   
 
Law scholars have considered liberalization, privatization and management a threat to the 
existence of a separate public law classification.365 According to some of them, a separate public 
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law remains necessary, even when using instruments of private law: it makes the government 
accountable to citizens, it facilitates contracting activities and it protects the contractor.366  
 
More and more often, certain social, economic and regulatory matters are being managed by 
institutions, which are not public bodies. This does not simplify the task of understanding the 
divided between public and private law.367 The lack of clarity of the divide remains even today.368 
Some might even call it a paradox: on the one hand the divide still exists, on the other hand it 
appears outmoded.369 Private law is determined in referral to phenomena such as privatization, 
contracting out, public-private partnerships, internal markets, etc. Authority is shared between 
public authorities and private parties. Therefore, the distinction is heavily criticized. Some authors 
even advocate a uniform judicial system without such a division.370 
 
In general, this thesis maintains that a public law and private law divide exists, but that it is subject 
to evolution. Whereas citizens used to be fully subject to public authorities, they are nowadays 
becoming more and more equal parties. However, even in the latest state of the relationship, there 
are interests that require rules of public law.  
 
4.3. EU 
 
EU law applicable to service concessions and public contracts results in free competition, which is a 
primary aim of the EU, influencing the public authorities’ decisions.  The paramount aims are not 
the interests of the public authorities, but the interests of the market. (see chapter 2). This already 
demonstrates a shift in the public/private divide at a national level. The most important aim of 
public procurement rules at a national level was the maximisation of the profit for public 
authorities (public purpose). The public procurement Directives aim to eliminate restrictions on the 
freedom of establishment and the free movement of goods and services in the area of public 
procurements for the purpose of opening tenders to real and effective competition (private 
purpose) (see Chapter 2).  
 
Moreover, the personal scope of this specific are of EU law results in a categorization of private 
entities (eg. hospitals) as public authorities, and in a submission of these private entities to rules of 
law which are of a rather public law-nature371 (see further Chapter 3). The criteria determining the 
presence of a contracting or public authority demonstrate that the activity of the entity determines 
the application of the ‘public’ procurement rules and thus influences the public / private divide. 
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One might say that in doing so, EU law takes into account the shifts within the public/private divide 
at a national level.  
 
The legal acts, carried out by private legal entities undertaking these tasks, are ‘public contracts’ 
because the legal entities, which are largely subject to private law, when entering an agreement 
categorizes as a service concession or as a public contract, have to behave as if they are public 
legal entities. In this situation, the impact of EU law has the surprising effect, namely that the use 
of an instrument of private law results in the application of public law ‘tinted’ legislation.  In our 
opinion, this unintentional influence defeats the privatisation of law applicable to public authorities 
and to acts of public authorities. A question therefore arises as to whether EU law should take into 
consideration certain tendencies emerging in the Member States, or to shape them by exercising its 
influence. 
 
The cooperation between public authorities is a characteristic of the contractualisation of the 
government, and of the use of instruments of private law by public authorities. Chapter 6 
demonstrates that in France this category of agreements was entered into freely without 
application of certain principles of public law. When discussing the English system, it will become 
clear that, in principle, all contracts made by a public authority are regulated by common law (see 
however chapter 6 regarding the principles of judicial review). Through the law of public contracts, 
rules of administrative law have penetrated this field. Moreover, the CJEU reduces the free 
disposition of a public authority to cooperate with whom it pleases. In Chapter 5, this thesis will 
point out that if a public authority chooses a contract with another public authority, of which a 
private entity is one shareholder, public contract law normally will apply.  
 
As a result, the Court ignores tendencies that are evolving in most Member States. Thus a situation 
or  cooperation, which in many EU Member States is considered to be governed by private law, is 
influenced by administrative law due to the impact of CJEU case law on cooperation. As a result, a 
backwards evolution takes place, causing the “public” element in the divide to become more 
relevant again. In France, for instance, all agreements closed by a government are now being 
categorised as a “contrat public” (see chapter 6), whereas classically a distinction was made 
between “contrats administratifs” and “contrats de droit privé”.372 
 
5. Concluding observations 
 
The subject of this thesis is cooperative agreements between public authorities. Chapter 3 has 
explained the concepts of ‘cooperative agreement’ and ‘public authority’. The following chapters in 
the thesis consider only this kind of cooperation. The thesis tries to prove that the CJEU case law on 
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this type of cooperation has an impact on the way public authorities in the Member States organize 
or manage their public tasks. To understand this influence a definition of the concept ‘public task’ 
was necessary. The thesis proposes a EU definition inspired by the concept ‘service of general 
interest’. 
 
Each term has been given an autonomous EU definition. As a result situations, which are normally 
covered by national administrative law, do come within the scope of EU law. The chapter 
demonstrates that the functional interpretation of the CJEU brings more and more situations under 
the scope of EU law. This evolution in CJEU case law also explains in part why cooperative 
agreements between public authorities are influence by EU law. However the concept of general 
interest raises the question if these agreements do not take a special place in EU law, even if they 
regulate an economic activity. It is one of the questions the thesis examines. 
 
The examined concepts also prove that EU law does not only have an influence on national 
concepts, but that the definition of certain EU concepts are also influenced by national law. 
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CHAPTER 4 – INFLUENCE OF EU LAW ON PUBLIC AUTHORITY DECISIONS 
 
In chapter 6, it is shown that the public authorities in France and the United Kingdom cooperate 
with one another in the organisation or management of their public service tasks. The way a public 
authority organises its public service tasks does not normally fall within the scope of EU law. EU law 
is first and foremost oriented toward economic objectives and in principle is predominantly 
concerned with setting rules in the economic sector. It concerns public authority decisions that have 
an influence on free trade or free competition. One of the distinguishing features of a public 
authority is precisely that in principle it has no economic objectives,373 which is why the 
organisation of its departments, and the management of its public service tasks falls a priori outside 
the regulatory activities of the EU. The objectives of a public authority are first and foremost 
‘social’374 in nature, and the European Economic Communities (EEC) did not pursue such objectives 
in 1957.375  
 
However, as this thesis will strive to make clear, EU law does have bearing on how a public 
authority organises and discharges its public service tasks. The starting point is the case law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) based on public procurement Directives and the 
applicability of the Directives to cooperative agreements between public authorities, as examined 
in detail below in chapter 5. Taking the principle of equality as a general principle of EU law, the 
Court has expanded the case law to include service concessions concluded between public 
authorities.376 As developed in chapter 3 the notion ‘cooperative agreement’ is only of relevance to 
the thesis if it has the characteristics of a public contract or a service concession. 
 
One of the research goals of the thesis is to discover how it is possible the EU law could have an 
influence on cooperative agreements concluded between public authorities. The inquiry of this case 
law has brought to light a number of possible elements of influence and by the same token has 
dismissed a number of others as not being germane to the issue. This chapter takes up the 
conclusions of the research and situates the relevant case law within the larger body of EU law. The 
CJEU already confirmed that secondary legislation and its interpretation must always be understood 
within the scope of the relevant Treaty provisions.377 
 
                                                 
373 Chapter 3 of the present thesis explained the notion ‘public authority’. One of the featuring elements to 
define this notion is the activity of this kind of entity. A public authority needs to have activities of general 
interest, which are not industrial or commercial in nature. 
374 The notion ‘social’ is used here to explain that a public authority serves the interests of the public. 
375 In regard to the place of social objectives in EU law see P. Craig, The Lisbon Treaty (Oxford/ OUP, 2010), 
pp. 286-330. These objectives have been occupying more and more space since the Lisbon Treaty. Article 3(3) 
TEU refers explicitly to a social market economy, social progress, social exclusion, social justice and solidarity. 
376 This specific CJEU case law is comprehensively explored in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
377 Case C-158/96, Raymond Kohll v. Union des caisses de maladie [1998] ECR I-1931. 
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The first issue to be determined is the basis of public procurement Directives in EU law and the 
legal principles implicit in the conclusion of government contracts,378 or to put it more precisely: is 
the basis the internal market rules or the EU competition law. The objectives and provisions of one 
of these areas of EU law help to explain the genesis and content of public procurement Directives. 
CJEU case law on cooperative agreements could also be explained and understood in this broader 
framework. But taking this further, it will be even more important to explore how it is possible that 
such cooperative agreements may be influenced by EU law. 
 
The investigation should demonstrate that the internal market rules lie at the basis of the public 
procurement Directives and of the principles applicable to certain categories of government 
contracts. The scope of applicability of these rules and principles should thus also help to explain 
why certain types of cooperative agreements between public authorities do not come under EU law. 
This chapter will also seek to identify which aspects of EU law are germane to the specific CJEU 
case law on cooperative agreements. Which aspect of the scope of applicability could explain this 
case law whereby these agreements are, under certain conditions, excluded from the scope of EU 
law? The following aspects are analysed: 1) state measure, 2) interstate interest, 3) restriction and 
4) justification. 
 
 
1. Internal Market law or Competition law? 
 
In chapter 3, the thesis concluded that public procurement Directives, the interpretation of which is 
at the very source of CJEU case law on cooperative agreements, are aimed ultimately at the 
realisation of the internal market and are oriented toward free competition. This raises the 
question of which area of EU law public procurement Directives are more properly situated: the 
internal market rules or competition law? (1.1.) After answering this question, the thesis then goes 
on to examine briefly the more specific framework of CJEU case law on cooperative agreements: 
the internal market rules (1.2.) and freedom of services (1.3.).  
 
1.1. Relevant EU framework 
 
A public authority acts in the general public interest. It daily takes decisions and actions to 
safeguard these interests.379 Most often these actions and decisions also have legal repercussions. 
Some of the consequences may be economic in nature, and may indeed have an impact on the 
market itself. Where a decision or action of a public authority has an impact on the operation of the 
economic market, EU law has to be considered, given that a key objective of the EU is the 
                                                 
378 The notion ‘government contract’ refers to the range of contracts concluded by public authorities with an 
independent legal person. 
379 The present thesis only concerns individual decisions taken by a public authority. 
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accomplishment of an internal market where goods and services are freely provided across national 
borders. The impact of EU law on decisions of public authorities is continuously growing.380 
 
A decision of a public authority to conclude a contract (public contract, service concession) is a 
decision that a public authority may take in the general public interest. In absolute terms both 
internal market rules and the rules of competition may be applied: the decision may either hinder 
free movement or distort competition between private entities – for example, by creating a 
monopoly.381 Especially important for the thesis is to know which of the two areas of EU law 
constitutes the broader framework for the public procurement Directives. Indeed, if general EU law 
can provide an explanation for CJEU case law on cooperative agreements, similarly this must be 
sought within this framework. 
 
It is generally accepted that public procurement Directives are based on the internal market 
rules,382 and that the Directives ‘are in essence a concrete expression of several fundamental 
freedoms relating to the internal market’.383 The Directives are not directly related to competition 
law.384 More specifically, the Directives are based on the rules on free movement (see also chapter 
2).385 The objective of the Directives is to facilitate the free movement of goods and services.386 The 
reason the public procurement Directives exist is to remove the barriers in public markets, a 
corollary of removing trade barriers. Internal market rules aim in general to prohibit State measures 
that hinder free trade. Procurement is one of the important barriers to trade, taking into account 
its economic importance and the preferences of public authorities for national industry.387 
 
CJEU case law on cooperative agreements concerns decisions taken by a public authority to 
cooperate with another public authority and the extent to which such a decision is governed by EU 
law. In this situation it is assumed a priori that the decision is not taken by a private undertaking 
but that it is a public action, and, as such, falls within the scope of the EU rules on free movement. 
Chapter 3 makes clear that the scope of the thesis is confined to public authorities. It is part of the 
essence of public authorities that they fundamentally do not engage in commercial activities. An 
undertaking is an entity engaged in an economic activity.388 The notion of undertaking determines 
                                                 
380 See C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and administration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 
89-92: the spill-over effect. 
381 Regarding EU competition law on public contracts see C. Munro, ‘Competition law and public procurement : 
two sides of the same coin ?’ (PPLR, 2006), pp. 352 et seq.; P.-A. Trepte, ‘Public procurement and the 
Community competition rules’ (PPLR, 1993), pp. 93-114. 
382 S. Arrowsmith, The law of Public and Utilities Procurement (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2005), p. 126; S.E. 
Hjelmborg, P.S. Jacobsen and S.T. Poulsen, Public procurement law (Copenhagen: Djof Publishing, 2006), p. 
35; B.J. Drijber and H. Stergiou, ‘Public procurement law and Internal market law’ (CMLR, 2008), p. 805. 
383 J. Wolfswinkel, ‘The allocation of a Limited Number of Authorisations’ (Review of European Administrative 
Law, 2010), pp. 74-75.  
384 Opinion Adv. Gen. Stix-Hackl, Case C-274/02, Sintesi SpA v Autorità per la Vigilanza sui Lavori Pubblici, 
[2004] ECR I-09215 at [30]. 
385 G.S. Olykke, ‘How does the Court of Justice of the European Union pursue competition concerns in a public 
procurement context?’ (PPLR, 2011), p. 180. 
386 Opinion Adv. Gen. Trstenjak Case C-503/04, Commission v. Germany [2007] ECR I-6153, at [76]. 
387 See for example Case 45/87, Commission v. Ireland ("Dundalk") [1988] ECR 4929. 
388 Case C-41/90, Höfner and Elsner v. Macrotron [1991] ECR I-1979, at [21]. 
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the applicability of EU competition law. Competition law is mostly applicable to actions and 
decisions taken by undertakings. However, such actions and decisions do not come within the scope 
of the thesis.  
 
 
1.2. Internal Market389 
 
The realisation of an internal market, ensuring the free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital amongst the various EU Member States, was, and essentially remains, the main objective of 
the European Union. This emphasises the economic objective of the EU. This objective is the basis 
for the case law in which the Court of Justice has recognised the EU as a union based on the rule of 
law.390 In this sense, EU law should be applied only when in a situation, an action, or a decision 
might clash with the EU objectives. 
 
The economic goals of the EU are now stated in article 3.2. TEU: ‘The Union shall establish an 
internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced 
economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full 
employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of 
the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological progress’. In contrast to the previous 
versions of the Treaty, the establishment of an internal market391 is no longer merely a means to 
meet the goals of the European Union, but has become a goal in itself. The cornerstones of this 
internal market are the fundamental freedoms.  
 
The provisions regarding these goals do not in themselves create any subjective rights nor do they 
impose any duties on the Member States.392 The provisions, however, are a cardinal point of 
reference for interpreting the substantive provisions of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (e.g. the rules of free movement)393 
and of the provisions of the EU directives. The objectives help determine how and to what extent a 
public authority needs to guarantee free movement within the European Union. (teleological 
                                                 
389 Some general books on the internal market rules: C. Barnard and J. Scott (eds.), The Law of the Single 
European Market: Unpacking the Premises (Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing, 2002); N.N. Shiubhne (ed.), 
Regulating the Internal Market (Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006); C. Barnard, The 
Substantive Law of the EU, 4th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2013). 
390 L. Azoulai, The forms and forces of European legal integration (EUI Working Papers, 2011/06), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1899484, pp. 2-3.  
391 This term entered EU law mainly via the White Paper Completing the Internal Market, COM(85) 310 final. 
392 Case C-339/89, Alsthom Atlantique SA v. Compagnie de construction mécanique Sulzer SA [1991] ECR I-
00107; Case C-9/99, Echirolles Distribution SA v. Association du Dauphiné and Others [2000] ECR I-8207. 
393 M. Fallon, Droit matériel général de Union européenne (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2002), p. 17 with reference to 
case C-78/90, Compagnie Commerciale de l'Ouest and others v. Receveur Principal des Douanes de La Pallice 
Port [1992] ECR I-1847; Case C-260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon 
Prossopikou v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others [1991] ECR 
I-02925. 
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interpretation394). The CJEU also used a teleological interpretation in its case law on cooperative 
agreements between public authorities.395 
 
The TFEU contains a large number of provisions that should guarantee the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital, the so-called fundamental freedoms. They have to be considered as 
constitutional Union rights.396 The CJEU uses a teleological interpretation to define the scope of 
those rights. The rights must achieve their full effect (‘effet utile’). The CJEU seeks through the 
notions used in the Treaties (f.ex. Member State or restriction) or in directives (f.ex. public 
procurement Directives: public authority or contract) to identify as many persons and situations 
that jeopardize the realisation of the internal market. The realisation of free movement is one of 
the basic requisites for the ultimate achievement of an internal market. This is still an ongoing 
process. Free trade should in the end lead to comparative advantage and economies of scale. 
 
The free movement provisions are aimed at removing barriers between Member States: ‘The market 
freedoms are traditionally considered to have an identity of aim: to contribute to the completion 
and functioning of the internal market through the elimination of obstacles to economic free 
movement between Member States and the creation of an area without internal frontiers in which 
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured’.397 
 
A key element in the realisation of this free movement is the principle of non-discrimination on the 
ground of nationality (Art. 18 TFEU). By virtue of this principle, every restriction on free movement 
based on nationality is a priori prohibited. For one thing this guarantees equal treatment for all 
European citizens: ‘it requires that persons in a situation governed by Community law be placed on 
a completely equal footing with nationals of the member state’.398 This principle is less important 
for matters of public contracts, because Articles 34, 49 and 56 TFEUwhich are the bedrock for 
public procurement Directives and the principle of equal treatment applicable to public contracts 
and service concessionscontain similar provisions that exclude discriminative behaviour. 
 
Public procurement Directives are based on and include concrete applications of, in particular, the 
TFEU dispositions on the free movement of goods and on free movement of services.399 In essence, 
the Directives are above all ‘a concrete expression of … the free provision of services’.400 This thesis 
is concerned with how public authorities organise and manage their public service tasks. 
                                                 
394 See on this notion Chapter 3. 
395 See Chapter 5. 
396 J. Baquero-Cruz, Between Competition and Free Movement the Economic Constitutional Law of the 
European Community (London: Hart Publishing, 2002), p. 81. 
397 P. Caro de Sousa, ‘Catch me if you can? The Market Freedoms Ever-expanding Outer Limits’ (EJLS, 2011), p. 
167.  
398 Case 186/87, Ian Willam Cowan v. Trésor public [1989] ECR 195, at [219]. 
399 Opinion Adv. Gen. Stix-Hackl, Case C-274/02, Sintesi SpA v Autorità per la Vigilanza sui Lavori Pubblici, 
[2004] ECR I-09215 at [29]. 
400 B.J. Drijber and H. Stergiou, ‘Public procurement law and internal market law’ (CMLR, 2009), p. 805. 
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Consequently, the thesis is above all interested in the provision of services, hence, it is focussed 
exclusively on the freedom of services (see section 1.3.). 
 
Chapter 2 demonstrated that two objectives underlie the public procurement Directives: the 
realisation of the internal market and ensuring effective competition. Before the Treaty of Lisbon 
the activities of the EU institutions had to ensure such effective competition (Article 3 EC). This 
objective disappeared in the TFEU. The objective can now only be found in Protocol n° 27 on the 
Internal Market and Competition401: ‘Considering that the internal market as set out in Article 3 of 
the Treaty on European Union includes a system ensuring that competition is not distorted’. Legal 
scholars claim that this ‘objective’ is challenged by its disappearance in the EU treaties, although 
they confirm the necessity to protect effective competition in order to realise the internal 
market.402 Taking into account these shifts in the EU treaties it is rather surprising that the CJEU 
emphasized the opening-up to undistorted competition recently as the principle objective of the EU 
rules in the field of public procurement.403 Although this objective remains important in the field of 
public procurement, it is difficult to defend that it is the principle objective in the light of the 
Treaty of Lisbon. 
 
 
1.3. Freedom of services404 
 
Article 56 TFEU states that ‘restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Community shall 
be prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a State of the 
Community other than that of the person for whom the services are intended’. The purpose of this 
provision is to open the service markets in all the Member States to providers from other Member 
States.405  
 
The application of Article 56 TFEU is in the first instance contingent on the concept ‘service’. 
Article 57 TFEU regards services as activities not falling under the other freedoms. This article also 
provides for a definition: those which are ‘normally provided for remuneration’. The notion of 
‘service’ actually refers to a specific form of the notion ‘economic activity’. The two notions define 
one another mutually. 
 
In the context of the free movement of services the CJEU makes use of two classic criteria to 
determine if there is an economic activity: (1) there must be a demand or supply of services and (2) 
                                                 
401 OJ [2010] C83/309. 
402 J. Drexl, ‘Competition Law as Part of the European Constitution’, in A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), 
Principles of European Constitutional Law (Munich: C.H. Beck/Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), pp. 664-665. 
403 Case C-15/13, Technische Universität Hamburg-Harburg, Hochschul-Informations-System GmbH v. 
Datenlotsen Informationssysteme GmbH [2014] ECR I-00000, at [22]. 
404 Some general books on freedom of services: J. Snell, Goods and Services in EC Law (Oxford: OUP, 2002); L. 
Woods, Free Movement of Goods and Services within the European Community (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2004); V. 
Hatzopoulos, Regulating Services in the European Union (Oxford: OUP, 2012). 
405 Case C-226/09, European Commission v. Ireland [2010] ECR I-11807, at [30]. 
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a remuneration must be present.406 Contracts concerning the demand or the supply of services do 
not concern the manufacture or supply of goods.407 Public tasks delivered by an undertaking or a 
public authority to another public authority can also be considered as services. The second 
criterion, in particular, stirred up some debate within the case law. The Court of Justice proffered 
an extensive interpretation to this criterion.  
 
The meaning originally attached to the term ‘remuneration’ has also undergone an extensive 
evolution in CJEU case law. Remuneration is normally determined by an agreement between 
providers and recipients of services.408 The Court recently ruled that remuneration need not be 
agreed between the parties, nor does it need to be provided by the service recipient, and it can 
even be subject to later reimbursement by a third party.409 
 
Remuneration does not imply that a payment must necessarily take place in money form. It is 
sufficient that the service provider receives something of equivalence in exchange.410 Nor is an 
immediate payment on the part of the beneficiary necessary.411 The service cannot be free of 
charge, but the provider should not necessarily make a profit.412  
 
In Ordine deghli Architetti the CJEU had to investigate whether a horizontal cooperative agreement 
between public authorities falls within the scope of public procurement Directives.413 However, the 
CJEU first looked into whether this form of cooperation could be qualified as a public service 
contract. Indeed, only in that case are the aforementioned Directives applicable. A public service 
contract requires a contract for pecuniary interest (a remuneration) and a service. The CJEU ruled 
that both elements were present. Nevertheless, the CJEU examined if this cooperative agreement, 
that could be defined as a public contract, did not fall outside the scope of EU law after all. 
Consequently, CJEU case law on cooperative agreements is not based simply on the notions of 
‘service’ or ‘remuneration’. 
 
It also follows from Article 56 TFEU this provision is applicable only in matters concerning cross-
border services. The meaning of this notion is discussed in point 4 below.  
 
 
                                                 
406 O. Odudu, 'Economic activity as a limit to community law' in C. Barnard and O. Odudu, The Outer Limits of 
European Union Law (Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2009), pp. 228-229. 
407 Case C-268/99, Aldona Malgorzata Jony and Others v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2001] ECR I-8615, at 
[71].  
408 Case 263/86, Belgian State v. René Humbel [1988] ECR 5365, at [17]. 
409 P. Caro de Susa, ‘Catch me if you can? The Market Freedoms Ever-expanding Outer Limits’ (EJLS, 2011), p. 
181; P. Cabral, ‘The internal market and the right to cross border medical care’ (ELR, 2004), p. 677; L. Woods, 
Free Movement of Goods and Services within the European Community (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2004), pp. 168-
174. 
410 Case 196/96, Steymann v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1988] ECR 2085. 
411 Case 382/85, Bond van Adverteerders and others v. The Netherlands [1988] ECR 2085, at [16]. 
412 Case C-281/06, Jundt v. Finanzamt Offenburg [2007] ECR I-12231, at [32] to [33]. 
413 Case C-159/11, Azienda Sanitaria Locale di Lecce, Università del Salento v. Ordine degli Ingegneri della 
Provincia di Lecce and Others [2012] ECR I-00000. 
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2. Applicability of EU law to State Measures 
 
For the rules of the internal market to apply, there must exist a State measure as defined by EU 
case law. The notion ‘State Measure’ consists of two elements: Measure and State. Both terms will 
be briefly analysed. 
 
The first consideration that raises the issue of the applicability of EU internal market law is, of 
course, that some measure has been taken. For a long time the question was raised if individual 
decisions (f.ex. tendering decisions, the decision to cooperate with other public authorities) were 
also covered by this notion. It is implicitly clear from CJEU case law that the notion ‘measure’ 
receives an extensive interpretation.  
 
Any decision or action that affects the fundamental freedoms and deters cross-border trade is 
covered by the notion ‘measure’. It may be a directive, an individual decision,414 or even an 
administrative practice. It may concern an obligation, a prohibition, a condition, or a restriction. 
The action needs not to have any direct influence on an economic activity. An indirect influence is 
sufficient.415 Every decision taken in the context of a procurement procedure could constitute a 
measure.416 The present thesis is solely interested in individual decisions, for instance, the decision 
to cooperate. 
 
The thesis studies a specific decision to cooperate. This decision is taken by a public authority or a 
contracting authority. Chapter 3 examined the notions ‘public authority’ and ‘contracting 
authority’. It was suggested that these concepts were actually derived from the concepts ‘State’ or 
‘Member State’.  
 
To what extent do decisions of public authorities that concern the organisation of public tasks fall 
within the applicability of EU law? This question is linked by some scholars to Article 345 TFEU.417 
This Article reads as follows: ‘The treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States 
governing the system of property ownership’. The Member States retain their competence over 
property ownership. 
 
According to some legal scholars,418 the authors of the Treaty of Rome added this provision to 
persuade the Member States to sign the Treaty. The provision was intended primarily to facilitate 
                                                 
414 Case C-244/97, Erich Ciola ν. Land Vorarlberg [1999] ECR I-02517, at [32]. 
415 H.D. Jarass, ‘A Unified Approach to the Fundamental Freedoms’, in M. Andenas and W.-H. Roth (eds.), 
Services and Free Movement in EU Law (Oxford: OUP, 2002), p. 149. 
416 M. Trybus, ‘Public contracts in European Union Internal Market Law: Foundations and Requirements’, in R. 
Noguellou and U. Stelkens (eds.), Comparative law on Public Contracts (Brussel: Bruylant, 2010), p. 90. 
417 C. Boutayeb, ‘Une recherche générale sur la place et les fonctions de l’intérêt général and droit 
communautaire’ (RTDE, 2003), p. 593; A.L. Durviaux and N. Thirion, ‘Les modes de gestion des services publics 
locaux, la réglementation relative aux marchés publics et le droit communautaire’ (JT, 2004), p. 26. 
418 K. Lenaerts and K. Vanvoorden, ‘The right to property in the case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities’, in H. Vandenberghe (ed.), Property and human rights (Brugge: Die Keure, 2006), p. 
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the nationalisation process of the industrial sector that made its advent in the 1950s.419 The Member 
States have the right to a public sector and moreover a public sector that can intervene on the 
Market.420 Article 345 TFEU is one of the provisions in the treaties, which confirm explicitly a 
competence of the Member States. 
 
The principle of neutrality, as derived from Article 345 TFEU, has various implications for the 
competences of the public authorities in each Member State. This principle guarantees the freedom 
of a public authority to decide whether, when, and how it will embark upon privatisation.421 A 
public authority itself decides whether an economic activity should be taken on, and if so, whether 
it should do so in cooperation with another public authority, or whether it should delegate this 
economic activity on to a third party422: ‘A public authority which is a contracting authority has the 
possibility of performing the tasks conferred on it in the public interest by using its own 
administrative, technical, and other resources, without being obliged to call on outside entities not 
forming part of its own departments’.423 In brief, the Member States themselves determine the way 
they intervene in the economic market and how they organise their apparatus.424 
 
This provision is usually linked with the competence of Member States to organise the delivery of 
services of general interest.425 By virtue of being the owner of undertakings that perform services of 
general interest, a public authority is able to control the quality of the delivered public service. 
Public ownership is one way to organise a service of general interest. The European Union would, in 
accordance with Article 345 TFEU, be neutral as regards the way a public authority organises and 
discharges its missions of general interest. By extension, cooperative agreements between public 
authorities, which is one of the ways to organise or discharge public service tasks, would also be 
covered by the principle of neutrality. 
 
Based on a thorough examination of the preparatory works of Article 345 TFEU, the Article itself 
and the place of this Article in the Treaty, most authors infer that the provision refers to all 
measures taken by a public authority to shape its national economic activity. The EU has to adopt a 
neutral attitude toward privatization and nationalisation.426 The Commission and the European 
                                                                                                                                                        
198; H. Smit and P.E. Herzog, ‘Preliminary observations on article 222’, in H. Smit and P.E. Herzog, The Law of 
the European Community – A commentary on the EEC Treaty, Vol. 5 (New York: Mattew Bunder, 1998), at 6-
216.58. 
419 D. Caruso, ‘Private Law and Public Stakes in European Integration: the case of Property’ (ELJ, 2004), p. 755. 
420 A. Verhoeven, ‘Privatisation and EU Law: Is the European Commission ‘Neutral’ with Respect to Public v. 
Private Ownership of Companies’ (ICLQ, 1996), p. 863. 
421 Ibidem, p. 863. 
422 M.T. Karayigit,The notion of services of general economic interest (EPL, 2009), p. 580. 
423 Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle and RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH v. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische 
Restabfall- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] ECR I-00001, at [48]. 
424 E. Szyszczak, The Regulation of the State in Competitive Markets in the EU (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), 
p. 107. 
425 C. Boutayeb, ‘Une recherche générale sur la place et les fonctions de l’intérêt général and droit 
communautaire’ (RTDE, 2003), p. 593; A.L. Durviaux and N. Thirion, ‘Les modes de gestion des services publics 
locaux, la réglementation relative aux marchés publics et le droit communautaire’ (JT, 2004), p. 26. 
426 P. Leger (éd.), Commentaire article par article des traités UE et CE (Brussels, 2000), p. 1878; W. Devroe, 
‘Privatizations and community law: neutrality versus policy’ (CMLR, 1997), p. 268; P.-C. Müller-Graff, 
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Parliament draw a similar conclusion on the basis of other legislation and interventions.427 The 
principle of neutrality merely signifies that each Member State may organise as it thinks fit the 
system of ownership of undertakings.428 
 
The Court does, however, place Article 345 TFEU within the other competences of the European 
Union and the objectives of the TFEU. According to the Court,429 property in terms of competence 
still belongs to the Member States, but the property regimes, as they exist in every Member State, 
do not escape application of the fundamental rules of the TFEU. Thus, the CJEU gives a restrictive 
interpretation to Article 345 TFEU. What are these fundamental rules? 
 
It is beyond the scope of the thesis to deal with each judgment of the Court that recognises such a 
fundamental right. Only the case law that shows any relevance to the subject of the thesis will be 
mentioned. Thus, the Court recognised in a whole series of judgments and rulings430 the provisions 
on free movement of services and on freedom of establishment (Articles 49 and 56 TFEU) as being 
fundamental rules. It is based on these provisions that the Court of Justice derived the principle of 
equal treatment, a principle that requires a public authority signing a public contract or service 
concession contract to guarantee transparency.431 These provisions and principles are the basis for 
the public procurement Directives and they oblige public authorities to organise tendering 
procedures. These provisions and principles are applicable even if a public authority takes a 
measure that concerns the organisation or management of public service tasks. 
 
In general, the Court of Justice confirms that if public authorities decide something about their 
property regime, they are still bound by the rules on free movement and, thus, also implicitly by 
the Directives on public procurement.432 It therefore seems logical that the Court of Justice has 
never referred to the Article 345 TFEU to exclude from the scope of European Union law measures 
with regard to the organisation of the services of public interest.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Gemeinsames Privatrecht in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Baden-Baden : Nomos, 1993), p. 23; S. Bartels, 
‘Europees privaatrecht: over de bevoegdheidsverdeling tussen Unie en lidstaat met betrekking tot het 
eigendomsrecht’ (AA, 1999), pp. 250-251; B. Akkermans and E. Ramaekers, ‘Article 345 TFEU (ex Article 295 
EC), Its Meanings and Interpretations’ (ELJ, 2010), p. 314; D. Caruso, ‘Private law and public stakes in 
European integration: the case of property’ (ELJ, 2004), p. 755. See however V. Withofs, Artikel 345 VWEU: 
een rem op de Europese harmonisatie van het goederenrecht? (TBBR, 2013), p. 71. 
427 B. Akkermans and E. Ramaekers, ‘Article 345 TFEU (ex Article 295 EC), Its Meaning and Interpretation’ (ELJ, 
2010), p. 308. 
428 Case C-367/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Portuguese Republic [2002] ECR I-04731, at 
[28]. 
429 Joined cases T-228/99 and T-233/99, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale and Land Nordrhein-Westfalen 
v. Commission of the European Communities [2003] ECR II-435, at [192]; Case C-302/97, Klaus Konle v. 
Republik Österreich [1999] ECR I-3099, at [38]. 
430 Case 182/83, Robert Fearon & Company Limited v. Irish Land Commission [1984] ECR 3677; Case C-302/97, 
Klaus Konle v. Republik Österreich [1999] ECR I-3099; Case C-300/01, Doris Salzmann [2003] ECR I-4899; Case 
C-452/01, Margarethe Ospelt and Schlössle Weissenberg Familienstiftung [2003] ECR I-9743. 
431 Case C-87/94, Commission v. Belgium (Walloon Buses) [1996] ECR I-02043; Case C-275/98, Unitron 
Scandinavia A/S [1999] ECR 1-8305, at [31]; Case C-324/98, Telaustria Verlags Gmbh [2000] ECR I-10745.  
432 Case 182/83, Robert Fearon and Company Ltd v. The Irish Land Commission [1984] ECR 3677, at [7] and [8]; 
Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal [2002] ECR I-4731, at [48]. See also Case C-483/99, Commission v. 
France [2002] ECR I-4781, at [44] and Case C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium [2002] ECR I-4809, at [44]. 
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On the basis of Article 345 TFEU, the Court seems to seek a balance of powers between the EU and 
the Member States,433 a balance the Court also appears to be searching for in its case law on 
cooperative agreements between public authorities. 
 
The primacy of the free movement provisions in a number of national competences can be 
explained in yet another way. In the 1950s, some European countries decided to transfer 
competences to institutions that were jointly established. A common interest (peace, progress) 
justified this transfer. It seems logical that in such situation, when a conflict incurs, the national 
interest must yield to the supranational interest.434 
 
It follows from the CJEU’s case law that a decision to tender a public contract or a service 
concession falls within the meaning of ‘measure’.435 This is also the case where a public authority 
decides to cooperate with another public authority through a public contract or a service 
concession. This kind of decisions are State measures. These decisions or measures have been taken 
by public authorities. A first confirmation can be found in Commission v. Italy436 where the CJEU 
implicitly confirmed that an agreement between a public authority and an entity entirely owned by 
the same public authority falls under the scope of Articles 49 and 56 TFEU and the principle of 
equality. 
 
As already mentioned, the Member States originally had the competence to determine how their 
public authorities organise public services and the means they could use to accomplish tasks of 
general public interest. One of these means is cooperation with another public authority. Originally, 
in the relationship between State and Market in EU law, the State had priority in this field of action. 
Consequently, the Member States possess the authority to regulate this field.  
 
In the European Union this national competence is embedded in the mainly economic objectives 
toward which the European Union strives. The legal precepts that inform the endeavour to achieve 
these objectives have priority over national competences. The functional interpretation given by 
the CJEU has the effect that the EU rules not only influence those national regulations and decisions 
that are economic in nature but also have an impact on regulations governing the organization and 
management of public services and on individual decisions taken in this regard.  
 
                                                 
433 A. Verhoeven, ‘Privatisation and EC Law: Is the European Commission 'neutral' with respect to public versus 
private ownership of companies?’ (ICLQ, 1996), p. 865. 
434 Cf. D. Simon, ‘L'intérêt général national vu par les droits européens’ (Cah. const., 2006), p. 3 . 
435 M. Trybus, ‘Public contracts in European Union Internal Market Law: Foundations and Requirements’, in R. 
Noguellou and U. Stelkens (eds.), Comparative law on Public Contracts (Brussel: Bruylant, 2010), p. 90 with 
reference to Case C-243/89, Commission v. Danmark (Storebaelt) [1993] ECR I-2253; Case C-359/93, 
Commission v. The Netherlands (UNIX) [1995] ECR I-157; Case C-59/00, Bent Mousten Vestergaard v. Spotrup 
Boligselkab [2001] ECR I-9505. 
436 Case C-3/88, Commission v. Italy [1989] ECR 04035, at [8] and [9]. 
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Thus, by its very nature the European Union carries the greater weight and this preponderance 
means that the objectives of its rules and regulations are generally deferred to in all actions taken 
by a public authority. Moreover, through its case law, the CJEU strives to strike a permanent 
balance between the powers of the EU and those of the Member States. This endeavour leaves its 
mark on the evolution of the European Economic Constitution.437 CJEU case law on cooperative 
agreements between public authorities is an example of this endeavour, which is emphasised in the 
thesis. The notion ‘European Economic Constitution’ is defined for the purpose of the thesis as ‘a 
mere analytical tool for describing the relationship between the market and intervention in a given 
legal order. An economic constitution understood in these terms includes provisions and case law 
that are fundamental for the economic orientation of a community regardless of what their 
underlying philosophical concepts are and whether they are laid down in a document or derived 
from court cases’.438 
 
In developing its case law the CJEU brought under the jurisdiction of EU law the relationship of 
cooperation that takes place between public authorities. The Court approached the relationship 
from the standpoint of the objectives and rules upon which the EU legal order rests. If such 
cooperation distorts or threatens to distort competition or if it hinders market access, then EU law 
applies (i.e. the public procurement Directives and the principle of equal treatment). In this sense, 
CJEU case law on cooperative agreements is a concrete example of the manner in which the Court 
interprets Article 345 TFEU in general. The Member States are indeed competent to regulate the 
organisation of their own administration, but decisions in this regard remain subject to the rules of 
the internal market. 
 
However, the notion ‘measure’ is not decisive for placing cooperative agreements between public 
authorities beyond the range of applicability of EU law. Every action, every decision by a State is 
                                                 
437 H. Armin, ‘The Economic Constitution within the Internal Market’, in A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), 
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Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hart, 2003); M. Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: 
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438 C. Semmelmann, ‘The European Union's economic constitution under the Lisbon Treaty soul-searching 
among lawyers shifts the focus to procedure’ (ELR, 2010), p. 517 with reference regarding the first sentence of 
this quote, cf. W. Sauter, ‘The Economic Constitution of the European Union’, (Col. J. Eur. L. 2, 1998), p. 29; 
M. Poiares Maduro, We the Court, The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution. A 
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Verfassung Europas (Duncker & Humblot, 2001), p. 124; A. Hatje, ‘The Economic Constitution within the 
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indeed a measure, according to EU law. Even when a public authority calls upon its own 
administration, it is taking a measure. 
 
According to legal experts,439 the CJEU case law on cooperative agreements should be understood in 
terms of the CJEU’s mistrust of certain public authority decisions. The Court mistrusts the various 
devices that public authorities use to avoid the application of the public procurement Directives. 
Public authorities supposedly do this by creating all sorts of institutions or agreements, which then 
may not come under the term ‘contracting authority’, and hence need not comply with the 
provisions of the public procurement Directives. To avoid such evasions, CJEU has broadly 
interpreted the notions ‘contracting authority’ and ‘body governed by public law. The CJEU case 
law on cooperative agreements could be understood in the same way according to these scholars. 
These scholars seem to seek an explanation for this case law in the notion ‘State’. 
 
The presence of a body governed by public law and the application of the public procurement 
Directives on cooperative agreements between public authorities is determined in both cases by a 
dependency factor. The criteria (financing, control, creation of management bodies) that define 
this dependency for a body governed by public law and, consequently, the notion of contracting 
authority, are broadly interpreted by the CJEU (see chapter 3). In deference to cooperative 
agreements between public authorities, the dependency criteria are given a rather strict 
interpretation.440 Indeed, a broad interpretation would in this case preclude precisely the 
application of EU law. But in both cases the criteria to determine if a situation falls within the 
range of applicability of EU law and the objectives that lie at the basis of EU law, i.e. the public 
procurement Directives, have a role in determining to what extent a situation falls within the scope 
of EU law. 
 
The CJEU case law on cooperative agreements cannot be elucidated with reference to the notion of 
‘contracting authority’ or ‘body governed by public law’ nor with reference to the nature of an 
institution subject to EU law. In the first place, the CJEU itself introduced the term ‘contract’ as an 
element in the definition of the term ‘public procurement’ to underpin this case law.441 The CJEU 
never took the notion ‘public authority’ and, thus, the notion of ‘State’, as a starting point in this 
specific case law. Finally, cooperative agreements concluded between public authorities existed in 
France and Belgium already before the creation of the EU. There is no prove that those kind of 
arrangements were or are used to circumvent the application of EU law. 
 
                                                 
439 W. Sauter and H. Schepel, State and Market in European Union Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), p. 55. 
440 See Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle und RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH v. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische 
Restabfall- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] ECR I-00001, at [46]; Case C-458/03, Parking 
Brixen GmbH v. Gemeinde Brixen [2005] ECR I-08585, at [64]. 
441 Case C-107/98, Teckal v. Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121. See Chapter 4 of the thesis. 
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It will appear that other elements than the concepts of State, measure or public authority are more 
likely to explain the CJEU case law on cooperative agreements between public authorities. 
 
 
3. Interstate element 
 
EU law is only applicable if the situation contains an interstate element. According to the TFEU, 
free movement entails the prohibition of every restriction ‘between Member States’442 and on the 
territory of another Member State443: ‘that the Treaty rules governing freedom of movement and 
regulations adopted to implement them cannot be applied to cases which have no factor linking 
them with any of the situations governed by Community law and all elements of which are purely 
internal to a single Member State’.444  
 
Any situation occurring solely within one Member State falls normally outside the scope of European 
Union law. A purely internal situation may be defined as a situation in which no factual element 
shows a connection beyond the borders of any Member State. This term is also a factor in 
determining the division of competences between the Member States and the European Union. 
 
A purely internal situation also bears comparison with the case law on cooperative agreements 
between public authorities. In the latter case, EU law is not applicable when the connection 
between the public or contracting authority and its subsidiary is so close that an economic activity 
is hardly in question when the two legal persons build up a relationship. The relationship remains in-
house. In a purely internal situation, an economic activity remains within the national borders. 
Perhaps there is something to learn from what case law has developed regarding the notion ‘purely 
internal situation’. 
 
Case law on purely internal situations has undergone a significant evolution. This evolution is taken 
up in the first point. As regards the awarding of public and service concession contracts falling 
outside the scope of public procurement Directives, the Court has developed its own criterion. 
Namely the Court operates on a cross-border interest in order to delimit the competence of the 
European Union. The public procurement Directives themselves are applicable, irrespective of the 
presence of a cross-border element. The value of the contract determines whether this specific EU 
law applies. In such a situation a cross-border interest is presumed.  
 
                                                 
442 Articles 28, 30, 34, 35 and 63.1 TFEU.  
443 Article 43 TFEU. 
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[2008] ECR I-1683, at [33], and Case C-434/09, McCarthy [2011] ECR I-3375, at [45]; Joined Cases C-197/11 and 
C-203/11, Eric Libert and Others v. Gouvernement flamand and All Projects & Developments NV and Others v. 
Vlaamse Regering [2013] ECR I-00000, at [33]. 
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In Saunders445 the Court of Justice referred for the first time to the notion of 'situations which are 
wholly internal to a Member State’. In that situation there is no European factor, according to the 
Court. With this criterion the Court created one of the levers to delimit the scope of European 
Union law, and more specifically of the provisions of free movement. Traditionally the Court has 
deemed it necessary that a national border would be effectively and physically crossed.446 Obviously 
this is easily discernible. When all elements are situated within one Member State, European Union 
law regarding free movement is not applicable.447 In Saunders the CJEU took a purely geographical 
approach. The free movement provisions do not apply to activities that have no factor linking them 
to any of the situations governed by EU law and/or that are confined in all aspects within a single 
Member State.448 
 
Since Saunders the CJEU case law has evolved significantly. The Court confirmed in more recent 
case law449 that the application of rules concerning the free movement of goods is not ruled out 
merely because all the elements of a certain case are situated within a single Member State. In 
Guimont450 the CJEU also stated that a preliminary question from a national court would only be 
rejected if it were quite obvious that the interpretation of European Union law sought, bears no 
relation to the actual nature of the case or to the subject matter of the main action.451 According to 
Guimont, the CJEU is also competent if the interpretation of EU law sought by the referring court 
may be useful to it if its national law were to require it to grant the same rights as those, which an 
operator of another Member State would derive from EU law in the same situation.452 This case law 
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has been extended to the freedom of capital,453 the freedom of services454 and the freedom of 
establishment.455 
 
In a market that is slowly becoming one, it is progressively hard to draw a distinction between 
purely internal situations and ‘European’ situations. Since for the awarding of government contracts 
the CJEU has developed a proper criterion to delineate the division of competences between the EU 
and the Member States in matters of interstate trade, the notion of a ‘purely internal situation’ and 
the CJEU case law elucidating this concept are less important for the thesis. However, this 
particular case law also suggests that the influence of EU law is expanding to the detriment of 
national law. 
 
In the context of awarding ‘public contracts’ (public procurement and service concessions), the 
Court of Justice has devised a special criterion to check whether a situation is governed by 
European Union law: ‘cross border interest’.456 
 
In Coname457 the Court ruled that within the scope of the freedom of establishment and free 
movement of services, European Union law (i.e. the principle of equal treatment and the obligation 
of transparency) would be applicable only if an undertaking from one Member State was interested 
in providing the service for a public authority of another Member State. Thus, it is sufficient that an 
undertaking established in another Member State might be interested in providing a service to a 
public authority to fall under the scope of EU law.458 
 
Based on this consideration, the Court has made the following distinction in Commission v. 
Ireland.459 If a contract clearly shows a cross-border interest, the principles of Articles 49 and 56 
TFEU are to be applied. This case law has, thus, formulated a general criterion by which under 
European law in the future, public authorities and national courts will have to decide whether at 
the awarding of a public procurement contract or a service concession the principle of equal 
treatment and the transparency obligation should be respected.460 The public procurement 
                                                 
453 Joined Cases C-515/99, C-519/99, C-524/99 and C-526/99 till C-540/99, Hans Reisch and Others v. 
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Directives have been given concrete form by virtue of this criterion providing thresholds under 
which the Directives are not applicable. 
 
Recently, in addressing a preliminary question, the Court has taken the opportunity to give some 
guidelines on how a public authority or a national judge might verify whether there is a contract of 
cross-border interest.461 The Court had to rule on the applicability of the fundamental principles of 
European Union law to a contract that was not above the thresholds set in the public procurement 
Directives. The Court ruled that cross-border interest exists in the following case: ‘A works contract 
could, for example, be of such cross-border interest because of its estimated value in conjunction 
with its technical complexity or the fact that the works are to be located in a place which is likely 
to attract the interest of foreign operators’.462 
 
Furthermore, the Court mentioned objective criteria that could be set at a national or local level to 
quantify in clear terms the cross-border interest. According to the Court, such criteria could, for 
example, be the significant size of the sum being paid for that contract combined with the place of 
execution of the works, or the modest economic value of the contract in question. The Court, 
however, added that ‘in certain cases, account must be taken of the fact that the borders straddle 
conurbations which are situated in the territory of different Member States and that, in those 
circumstances, even low-value contracts may be of certain cross-border interest’.463 
 
The following criteria can be distinguished for differentiating cross-border traffic: the location 
where the contract has to be performed, financial value of the contract, the economic interest of 
the contract for an undertaking and the technical characteristics of the agreement.464  
 
On the basis of CJEU case law concerning the element ‘cross border interest’, it is clear that the 
CJEU applies a broad interpretation to the concept of ‘intra-Union trade’. According to this 
interpretation, the Court goes further than the case law on cooperative agreements. The evolution 
of CJEU case law on ‘intra-Union trade’ implicates that there are few situations left which are 
purely internal. The evolution of CJEU case law on cooperative agreements broadened the 
situations which are internal. The difference between the CJEU case law on cross-border interest 
and on cooperative agreements is that in a purely internal situation, the CJEU just checks whether 
all relevant elements of a situation or of an activity can be confined in one single Member State.465 
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This category of case law examines, according to the Court, if a particular situation is of cross-
border importance and inquires if foreign companies might be interested in providing services.466 
Hypothetically, in that situation the State measure can have an influence on the provision of an 
economic activity. The absence of the ‘intra trade’ element explains the non-application of EU law. 
In the context of CJEU case law on cooperative agreements, EU law does not apply because the 
State measure does not affect the provision of an economic activity. It has no effect on free 
competition regardless of whether the situation is purely internal or not. The nature of the 
relationship precludes a market interest. The cross-border element is not relevant.  
 
 
4. Restriction 
 
One of the most important aspects of the realisation of the internal market is to ensure that 
everything (goods, persons, services and capital) moves freely between the Member States of the 
European Union. Free movement must be guaranteed. As far as this thesis is concerned, this means 
that in principle public markets should be open to providers from other Member States. This 
assurance of free movement between the Member States is a key element in the effective 
realisation of the internal market.467 Therefore, EU intervention is necessary only when an action or 
decision (i.e. a State measure) imperils the realisation of the internal market. 
 
A situation is of relevance for EU law when it threatens to hinder free movement, which by 
extension poses a risk to the realisation of the internal market. Is a state measure a restriction468 to 
free trade? 
 
First this section shall explore the question of when a State measure contains some hindrance to 
interstate trade. Central to this question is the notion of ‘market access’. (4.1.) In regard to the 
tendering of public contracts and service concessions, the CJEU has recognised a number of specific 
principles designed to secure market access. (4.2.) After this section the question arises to what 
extent the CJEU case law on cooperative agreements can be explained by the concept of restriction 
and the interpretation given to it by the CJEU? (4.3.). 
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468 See on this notion A. Tryfonidou, ‘What can the Court’s response to reverse discrimination and purely 
internal situations contribute to our understanding of the relationship between the ‘restriction’ and 
‘discrimination’ concepts in EU free movement law?’, 
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4.1. Market access 
 
The Court of Justice has ruled often on the meaning of ‘restriction’ or ‘obstacle’ in the context of 
the application of the fundamental freedoms. This case law has evolved over time and has not 
always been unequivocal but depended on which of the four fundamental freedoms (persons, goods, 
services, and capital) the Court was called upon to adjudicate. Legal scholars have sought to find 
some consistent thread running through the case law that would serve to determine when EU law is 
applicable. This continuous thread perhaps also has some bearing on CJEU case law on cooperative 
agreements.  
 
Only a State measure that entails a restriction to free movement falls under the scope of EU law. 
How the term ‘restriction’ is understood will determine the applicability of EU law  insofar as the 
other conditions requisite for rendering this law applicable (e.g. no internal situation) are present. 
How the concept of ‘restriction’ is interpreted also says something about how far economic 
integration has advanced. In this section the thesis explores the meaning of this term and examines 
to what extent it is relevant to the central theme. 
 
The provisions concerning free movement may be read in two ways. Either that only State measures 
of a discriminatory nature against imports from another Member State can be regarded as hindering 
free trade (restrictive interpretation) or that all State measures can be regarded as hindering free 
trade (broad interpretation).469 Discriminatory measures are exclusively concerned with the 
criterion ‘nationality’.  
 
In Dassonville470 the CJEU choose the second option: ‘All trading rules enacted by Member States 
that are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade 
are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions’.471 In Van 
Tiggele472 and Cassis de Dijon473 the Court added to this that a measure has an equivalent effect 
prohibited by Article 30 EC even if the rules apply without distinction to all products. 
 
The Court confirmed and applied the Dassonville doctrine to the free movement of services: ‘all 
requirements imposed on the person providing the service by reason, in particular, of his nationality 
or of the fact that he does not habitually reside in the State where the service is provided, which do 
not apply to persons established within the national territory or which may prevent or otherwise 
                                                 
469 Cf. J. Snell, Goods and Services in EC Law (Oxford: OUP, 2002), p. 2; C. Barnard, The substantive Law of the 
EU (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 17-29. 
470 Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville [1974] ECR 837. 
471 At [5]. 
472 Case 82/77, Public Prosecutor of the Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Jacobus Philippus van Tiggele [1978] 
ECR 837, at [5]. 
473 Case 120/78, Rewe v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Bramtwein [1978] ECR 649. 
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obstruct the activities of the person providing the service’.474 Henceforth the Court seemed to 
favour a uniform principle for all freedoms. The free movement of persons, goods, services and 
capital concerns ‘not only the elimination of all discrimination against a person… on the grounds of 
his nationality but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to 
national providers… and to those of other Member States, when it is liable to prohibit or otherwise 
impede the activities of a provider... established in another Member State where he lawfully 
provides similar services’.475  
 
From the moment the CJEU started to treat discriminatory and non-discriminatory measures 
equally, this difference could no longer determine the applicability of EU law. Consequently another 
criterion was needed to provide clarity. In any event, the difference between a discriminatory and a 
non-discriminatory measure could not explain the CJEU case law on cooperative agreements. These 
agreements are not excluded from the scope of EU law because they discriminate foreign 
undertakings. 
 
The CJEU case law contains a new criterion to discover whether a restriction to free trade is 
present, which is known as the ‘market access’-criterion. 
 
In Säger,476 cited earlier on and later reaffirmed in Gebhard,477 the Court deemed that a restriction 
may be present ‘when it is liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a provider... 
established in another Member State where he lawfully provides similar services'. However, this 
consideration says nothing explicit about ‘market access’. Keck and Mitthourd478 seems to be the 
first case where the Court has used this notion: ‘Provided that those conditions are fulfilled, the 
application of such rules to the sale of products from another Member State meeting the 
requirements laid down by that State is not by nature such as to prevent their access to the market 
or to impede access any more than it impedes the access of domestic products. Such rules therefore 
fall outside the scope of Article 30 of the Treaty’. As regards freedom of services, the notion 
‘market access’ is clearly taken up for the first time in Alpine Investments479: ‘that the application 
of such provisions is not such as to prevent access by the latter to the market of the importing 
Member State or to impede such access more than it impedes access by domestic products’.480 This 
                                                 
474 Case 33/74, Johannes Henricus Maria van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de 
Metaalnijverheid [1974] ECR 1299, at [10]. 
475 Case C-76/90, Manfred Säger v. Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd [1991] ECR I-4221, at [12]. See also Case C-55/94, 
Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati a Procuration de Milano [1995] ECR I-4165, at [37]; 
Case C415/93, Union Royale des Sociétés de Football Association v. Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921; Case C-381/93, 
Alpine Investments v. Minister van Financiën [1995] ECR I-1141. 
476 Case C-76/90, Manfred Säger v. Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd [1991] ECR I-4221. 
477 Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati a Procuration de Milano [1995] ECR 
I-4165. 
478 Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, Criminal proceedings v. Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard [1993] ECR I-
6097, at [17]. 
479 Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments v. Minister van Financiën [1995] ECR I-1141. 
480 At [37]. 
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phraseology later found its way naturally into CJEU case law. Does this actually mean that ‘market 
access’ is the fundamental criterion to determine whether a restriction exists? 
 
Two views are defended. One side of legals scholars481 defends the view that the market access test 
is the ultimate criterion that determines whether a breach of the fundamental rules concerning free 
movement has occurred. Measures fall within the scope of EU law if they could hinder access to a 
relevant market. A number of Advocate Generals also think along the same lines.482 However, some 
other legal scholars are not convinced that this criterion can hold up.483 
 
On the basis of the case law in question, the market access-criterion seems a good choice for 
clarifying most of the case law handed down by the CJEU in matters concerning State measures 
hindering free movement: ‘There is one guiding principle which seems to provide an appropriate 
test: That principle is that all enterprises that engage in a legitimate economic activity in a Member 
State should have unfettered access to the whole of the Community market, unless there is a valid 
reason for denying them full access to a part of that market’.484 485  
 
As per the freedom of goods, the Court procrastinated to apply the market access-criterion. Only in 
2009, in the Commission v. Italy486 and Mickelsson487 cases did the Court apply this criterion in the 
context of the free movement of goods. Thus, it appears that a similar criterion is emerging in CJEU 
case law. The notion ‘restriction’ covers measures taken by a Member State, which, although 
applicable without distinction, affect access to the market for enterprises from other Member 
States and so hinder intra-Community trade.  
 
The applicability of the fundamental freedoms is no longer determined solely by the nature of the 
measure, but primarily by the success of an undertaking in attaining access to a specific market. 
The purpose of the provisions regarding the fundamental freedoms decides whether or not these 
provisions apply to a particular situation.  
 
                                                 
481 See A. Tryfonidou, ‘Further steps on the road to convergence among the market freedoms’ (ELR, 2010), pp. 
47-51. 
482 Opinion of A.G. Maduro in joined cases C-158/04 and C-159/04, Alfa Vita Vassilopoulos AE and Carrefour 
Marinopoulos AE v. Elliniko Dimosio and Nomarchiaki Aftodioikisi Ioanninon [2006] ECR I-08135, at [45]; 
Opinion of AG Bot in Case C-110/05, Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic [2009] ECR I-
519, at [108] to [138]; Opinion of AG Trstenjak in Case C-205/07, Lodewijk Gysbrechts and Santurel Inter BVBA 
[2008] ECR I-09947, at [59] to [61]. 
483 See E. Spaventa, ‘Leaving Keck behind? The Free Movement of Good after the rulings in commission v. Italy 
and Michelsson and Roos’ (ELR, 2009), p. 929; J. Snell, ‘The notion of Market access: a concept or a Slogan?’ 
(CMLR, 2010), pp. 448-449.  
484 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs to Case C-412/93, Société d’Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 
Publicité SA and M6 Publicité SA [1995] ECR I-179, at [41]. 
485 See for a recent affirmation concerning the market access-criterion: C. Barnard, The substantive law of the 
EU (Oxford: OUP, 2013), pp. 18-25. 
486 Case C-518/06, Commission v. Italy [2009] ECR I-3491. 
487 Case C-142/05, Mickelsson and Roos [2009] ECR I-4273. 
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4.2. Principles of government contract law488 
 
The public procurement Directives are aimed at guaranteeing free access and promoting 
competition via harmonisation of the diverse national legislations and to this end the CJEU imposed 
certain obligations with regard to the award of a contract: specifically, the obligation of non-
discrimination, the obligation of equal treatment and the obligation of transparency.489 The 
provisions of public procurement Directives are likewise interpreted and complemented on the basis 
of these obligations. The same principles have been recognised by the CJEU to apply to service 
concessions on the basis of the TFEU provisions on free movement. 
 
These principles help ensure undistorted market access for public procurement markets and service 
concession markets. They are applicable only insofar as market access can be distorted by a specific 
situation. CJEU case law on cooperative agreements defines when such a distortion is present or not 
in two specific situations. (See chapter 5) 
 
4.2.1. Equal treatment 
 
Equality is one of the basic cornerstones of the internal market. However, this principle is not 
simply a milepost on the way toward the achievement of economic union, but it has also 
contributed to the genesis of the European Union legal order. It is a democratic guarantee that 
European institutions and the Member States have put in place to ensure that no unjustified 
distinctions are drawn. This is also why the CJEU deems the general principle of equality to be a 
general principle of constitutional law.490 
 
In accordance with the principle of equality, equal circumstances may not be treated unequally or 
unequal circumstances may not be treated equally, unless this is justified objectively491: 
‘Discrimination in substance would consist in treating either similar situations differently or 
different situations identically’.492 Discrimination or inequality cannot arise in legal situations that 
are not comparable.493 If the Court establishes that an inequality is nevertheless present, it will 
then explore whether the given differences may not be justified in the particular case in the light of 
                                                 
488 See for recent studies: C.R. Hansen, Contracts not covered or not fully covered (Copenhagen: Djof 
publishing, 2012), pp. 51-66; S. de Mars, ‘The limits of general principles: a procurement case study’ (ELR, 
2013), pp. 316-334. 
489 Case C-599/10, SAG ELV Slovensko a.s., FELA Management AG, ASCOM (Schweiz) AG, Asseco Central Europe 
a.s., TESLA Stropkov a.s., Autostrade per l’Italia SpA, EFKON AG, Stalexport Autostrady SA v. Úrad pre 
verejné obstarávanie [2012] ECR I-00000. 
490 Case C-162/99, Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic [2001] ECR I-00541, at [23]. 
491 See for public procurement: Joined cases C-31/03 and C-34/03, Fabricom SA v. Belgian State [2005] ECR I-
1559, at [27];Case C-336/12, Ministeriet for Forskning, Innovation og Videregående Uddannelser v. Manova A/S 
[2013] ECR I-00000, at [30]; Case T-289/09, 20 September 2011, Evropaïki Dynamiki – Proigmena Systimata 
Tilepikoinonion Pliroforikis kai Tilematikis AE v. Europese Commissie [2011] ECR II-0000. 
492 Case 13/63, Italian Republic v. Commission of the European Economic Community [1963] ECR 00165, at [4]. 
493 Case 22/67, Fonds national de retraite des ouvriers mineurs v. Giovanni Mura [1977] ECR 1699, at [9] tot 
[10]. 
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the objective served by the provisions in question.494 The principle of non-discrimination on grounds 
of nationality (Article 18 TFEU) is merely an expression of this more general principle of equal 
treatment.495  
 
Equal treatment in the awarding of contracts concluded by public authorities aims at achieving a 
single internal market: ‘the application of the principle of equal treatment to public procurement 
procedures does not constitute an end in itself, but must be viewed in the light of the aims that it is 
intended to achieve’.496 Equal treatment assures interested undertakings established in other 
Member States that they will have the same opportunity to conclude the contract. It ensures a 
degree of competitiveness. 
 
A public authority must treat undertakings from another Member State equally, a responsibility 
flowing from the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality. This principle of non-
discrimination was affirmed by the CJEU (i.e. without reference to public procurement Directives) 
in two milestone decisions: Unitron Scandinavia497 and Telaustria Verlag.498 
 
In an Interpretative Communication of the European Commission, dated April 12, 2000 on 
concessions, the Commission affirmed the principle of equal treatment.499 According to the 
Commission, this principle follows from the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality 
and from the fundamental freedoms, and is also applicable to situations other than public 
procurement, such as concessions. In Parking Brixen500 the CJEU stated that public authorities 
concluding service concessions must comply with the principle of non-discrimination and the 
principle of equal treatment.501 This last principle applies regardless of nationality.502 
 
In particular, in the context of the public procurement Directives, the Court confirmed that the 
principle of equal treatment of tenderers aims at the promotion of a healthy and purposeful 
competition among firms participating in the public tendering procedure. According to the CJEU this 
                                                 
494 K. Lengertz, ‘L’égalité de traitement et droit communautaire’ (Cah.dr.eur., 1991), p. 21. 
495 Case 810/79, Peter Uberschär v. Bundesversicherungsanstalt für Angestellte [1980] ECR 2747, at [16]. 
496 Joined cases C-31/03 and C-34/03, Fabricom SA v. Belgian State [2005] ECR I-1559, at [29]; Case C-336/12, 
Ministeriet for Forskning, Innovation og Videregående Uddannelser v. Manova A/S [2013] ECR I-00000, at [30]. 
497 Case C-275/98, Unitron Scandinavia A/S and 3-S A/S, Danske Svineproducenters Serviceselskab v. 
Ministeriet for Fødevarer, Landbrug og Fiskeri [1999] ECR I-08291. 
498 Case C-324/98, Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v. Telekom Austria AG, joined party: 
Herold Business Data AG [2000] ECR I-10745. 
499 OJ [2000] C 121/2. 
500 Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen GmbH v. Gemeinde Brixen and Stadtwerke Brixen AG [2005] ECR I-08585.  
501 At [46]. Case C-410/04, Associazione Nazionale Autotrasporto Viaggiatori (ANAV) v. Comune di Bari and 
AMTAB Servizio SpA [2006] ECR I-03303, at [20]; Case 196/08, Acoset SpA v. Conferenza Sindaci e Presidenza 
Prov. Reg. ATO Idrico Ragusa and Others [2009] ECR I-09913, at [48].  
502 Critised by S. Arrowsmith and P. Kunzlik, ‘EC regulation of public procurement’, in S. Arrowsmith and P. 
Kunzlik, Social and environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), p. 86. 
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principle implies that tenderers must be in a position of equality both when they formulate their 
tenders and when the adjudicating authority is assessing those tenders.503 
 
4.2.2. Transparency 
 
In Telaustria Verlag the CJEU acknowledged for the first time, on the basis of a number of 
provisions from the EU Treaty, that when a public authority awards a public service concession it 
must comply with the obligation of transparency.504 In Parking Brixen the CJEU summed up the basic 
consequences of the obligation of transparency.505 The obligation of transparency which is imposed 
on the public authority consists of ensuring, for the benefit of any potential tenderer, a degree of 
advertising sufficient to enable the service concession to be opened up to competition and the 
impartiality of procurement procedures to be reviewed.  
 
The obligation of transparency on the basis of the public procurement Directives appears for the 
first time in Beentjes.506 Although the Court did not explicitly mention an obligation of transparency 
it does affirm that a contracting authority ‘must provide adequate information on the terms and 
applicable to any tender offer’.507 
 
The Walloon buses case marks the first time that an obligation of transparency and even a principle 
of transparency flowing from the preambles of Directive 90/531 pertaining to utility sectors was 
stated in clear language. In one of the preambles, contracting authorities are enjoined to guarantee 
a minimum of transparency in awarding contracts. The Court considered on this basis: 
‘Furthermore, the 33rd recital in the preamble shows that the Directive aims to ensure a minimum 
level of transparency in the award of the contracts to which it applies. The procedure for comparing 
tenders therefore had to comply at every stage with both the principle of the equal treatment of 
tenderers and the principle of transparency so as to afford equality of opportunity to all tenderers 
when formulating their tenders’.508 
 
According CJEU case law an obligation to transparency implies for every contracting authority ‘that 
sufficient information must be guaranteed to every potential tenderer, so that the services market 
                                                 
503 Case C-19/00, SIAC Construction Ltd v. County Council of the County of Mayo [2001] ECR I-07725; Case C-
470/99, Universale-Bau AG and Bietergemeinschaft: Hinteregger & Söhne Bauges.mbH Salzburg, ÖSTÜ-STETTIN 
Hoch- und Tiefbau GmbH [2002] ECR I-11617, at [93]; T-50/05, Evropaïki Dynamiki - Proigmena Systimata 
Tilepikoinonion Pliroforikis kai Tilematikis AE v. European Commission [2010] ECR II-01071, at [56]. 
504 Case C-324/98, Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v. Telekom Austria AG, joined party: 
Herold Business Data AG [2000] ECR I-10745. 
505 Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen GmbH v. Gemeinde Brixen and Stadtwerke Brixen AG [2005] ECR I-08585, at 
[49]; see also Case C-410/04, Associazione Nazionale Autotrasporto Viaggiatori (ANAV) v. Comune di Bari and 
AMTAB Servizio SpA [2006] ECR I-03303, at [21]. 
506 Case C-31/87, Gebroeders Beentjes BV v. the Netherlands [1988] ECR 4635. 
507 At [21]. 
508 Case C-87/94, Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of Belgium [1996] ECR I-2043, at [54]. 
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is always open to competition and the tendering procedures can be tested for impartiality’.509 The 
obligation of transparency must ensure ‘that the principle of equal treatment of tenderers, with 
which every tendering procedure governed by the Directive must comply, is taken into account’.510 
 
The principle of transparency entails that all conditions and terms of the award procedure be 
clearly, precisely, and unambiguously worded in the procurement notice or in the contractual 
conditions. This allows all reasonably well-informed tenderers to know the exact scope of the 
award. It enables the tenderers, to interpret the contractuale conditions in the same way. Finally, 
the contracting authority is able to verify whether the bids meet the award criteria.511 
 
In the context of the public procurement Directives, the obligation of transparency and the 
principle of equal treatment have become the leading principle applied by the CJEU when filling 
lacunae in the Directives and interpreting unclear provisions. 
 
4.3. Cooperative agreements between public authorities 
 
Equal treatment in public procurement is intended to afford equality of opportunity to all 
tenders.512 This applies to service concessions as well. All tenderers must have equal opportunity to 
enter a particular market (i.e. public market). The idea of equal treatment is merely another 
expression of the objective of free market access. However, free market access is only guaranteed 
if operators are in a like situation or when there is a relevant market. If there is a difference 
between two situations, this can clarify whether or not EU law is applicable. 
 
According to the thesis, Parking Brixen513 differentiates clearly both situations, where the 
application or non-applicability of EU law on cooperative agreements may be ascertained: ‘in the 
field of public procurement and public service concessions, the principle of equal treatment and the 
specific expressions of that principle, namely the prohibition on discrimination on grounds of 
nationality and Articles 43 EC and 49 EC,514 are to be applied in cases where a public authority 
entrusts the supply of economic activities to a third party. By contrast, it is not appropriate to apply 
the Community rules on public procurement or public service concessions in cases where a public 
authority performs tasks in the public interest for which it is responsible by its own administrative, 
technical and other means, without calling upon external entities’.515  
 
                                                 
509 Case C-470/99, Universale-Bau AG and Bietergemeinschaft: Hinteregger & Söhne Bauges GmbH Salzburg, 
ÖSTÜ-STETTIN Hoch- und Tiefbau GmbH [2002] ECR I-11617, at [92]. 
510 Case C-421/01, Traunfellner GmbH v. Österreichische Autobahnen- und Schnellstraßen-Finanzierungs-AG 
[2003] ECR I-11941, at [29]. 
511 Case C-368/10, Commission v. Netherlands [2012] ECR I-00000, at [88]. 
512 Case 87/94, Commission v. Belgium [1996] ECR I-2043, at [33] and [54]. 
513 Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen GmbH v. Gemeinde Brixen and Stadtwerke Brixen AG [2005] ECR I-08585. 
514 Now Articles 49 and 56 TFEU. 
515 At [61]. 
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The CJEU equates the second situation in Parking Brixen with a situation that, according to Teckal 
case law, falls outside the range of applicability of EU law516 and also other forms of cooperative 
agreements between authorities.517 A comparable idea is discernible in Sporting Exchange.518 The 
obligation of transparency, and thus EU law, applies if a Member State allows an operator to carry 
on an economic activity.519 Effects on the market will determine whether a particular situation is 
subject to EU law, i.e. the principle of equal treatment or public procurement Directives. If a state 
measure advantages an economic activity, it could distort free competition or hinder free trade. 
This is different if a public authority carries out by itself a public service task or carries it out 
jointly with other public authorities without the intervention of an undertaking. 
 
Thus the CJEU distinguishes between two different situations: in the one, EU law is applicable, in 
the other it is not. Further, application of EU law in the second situation could lead to an 
inequality. Thus, the principle of equality can be a primary explanation for CJEU case law on 
cooperative agreements. Two considerations would seem to account elements for the difference in 
treatment: 1) the object of the state measure and 2) the nature of the executor of the task 
(whether there is a third party or not). 
 
The object of a measure is one of the points Hatzopoulos highlights to determine whether an 
economic activity is present and therefore EU law must be applied.520 According to Hatzopoulos 
certain measures, and thus also State measures, are exempt from the application of EU law when 
they are alien to the regulation of an economic activity. 
 
He links the CJEU case law on cooperative agreements to this aspect. According to Hatzopoulos. 
measures whereby public authorities cooperate with other public authorities on an institutional or 
contractual level to meet their obligations (services of general interest) vis-a-vis citizens should not 
be ensnared by public procurement rules521 and, thus, the principle of equality. These measures are 
intended to subserve an objective of general interest and they are necessary to achieve these 
objectives. They have nothing to do with an economic activity. In order to situate CJEU case law on 
cooperative agreements within the Court’s case law he refers to two cases. 
 
In Deliège522 the CJEU intervened in a case where a Belgian judoka sought an order requiring the 
Belgian Sport Federations to take the appropriate steps to allow her to attend certain international 
tournaments and she brought an action seeking a ruling that the Belgian selection system for 
international tournaments is unlawful. The CJEU had to examine whether certain rules and systems 
                                                 
516 At [62]. 
517 Case C-480/06, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany [2009] ECR I-
04747, at [46] to [47]. 
518 Case C-203/08, Sporting Exchange Ltd v. Minister van Justitie [2010] ECR I-04695. 
519 At [47]. 
520 V. Hatzopoulos, Regulating Services in the European Union (Oxford: OUP, 2012), pp. 78-83. 
521 Ibidem p. 81. 
522 Joined cases C-51/96 and C-191/97, Christelle Deliège v. Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées 
ASBL, Ligue belge de judo ASBL, Union européenne de judo and François Pacquée [2000] ECR I-2549. 
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of the Belgian sports federations523 were not in conflict with the free movement of persons and 
services. In the first place it had to weigh whether an economic activity was present. The Court 
proposed that this could be the case even when it is only a question of the performance of a sport. 
Assuming that an economic activity existed, the Court had to examine whether such measures by a 
sports federation also constituted a restriction. The CJEU considers that the restriction in the case 
was ‘a limitation inherent to the conduct of an international high-level sports event’.524 Such rules 
may not in themselves be regarded as constituting a restriction on the freedom to provide services, 
prohibited by Article 56 TFEU.  
 
Deliège builds on a number of considerations from Donà.525 The provisions concerning free 
movement of persons and services prohibit no measures that exclude certain persons insofar as this 
is based on reasons that are not economic in nature and which are of sporting (non economic) 
interest only.526 The restriction must remain limited to its proper objectives.527 
 
The second case, this time examined by the General Court, is Meca-Medina.528 In this case, the 
Court had to defer to decisions taken by anti-doping organisations, in which two athletes were 
barred for a specified time. This raised the question, inter alia, of whether this amounted to an 
obstruction of free movement. The Court reasoned: ‘Such regulations, which relate to the particular 
nature and context of sporting events, are inherent in the organisation and proper conduct of 
sporting competition and cannot be regarded as constituting a restriction on the Community rules 
on the freedom of movement of workers and the freedom to provide services. In that context, it has 
been held that the rules on the composition of national teams, or the rules relating to the selection 
by sports federations of those of their members who may participate in high-level international 
competitions constitute purely sporting rules which therefore, by their nature, fall outside the 
scope of Articles 39 EC and 49 EC’.529 By their very nature such rules fall outside the scope of EU 
law. 
 
In Deliège and Meca-Medina a measure was taken which precludes free movement. However, 
according to the CJEU the measure cannot be considered as a restriction. In each of these cases the 
measure had another aim than an economic one. The measure concerned the organisation of the 
sport federation. This federation took a measure in the two cases to ensure the preservation of its 
own interests. These measures do not disadvantage a European citizen, because the specific citizen 
is not placed in the same situation as his competitors. The specific citizen has infringed a regulation 
of its organization. That is the reason why he cannot move freely. 
                                                 
523 In this case, it is a matter of the rules of selection that limit the number of participants in such 
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Public authorities apply measures or take decisions that concern the general public interest. The 
decision of a public authority to cooperate with another public authority could constitute a 
restriction. If these measures solely subserve the general interest, and are necessary for this, they 
fall beyond the scope of EU law.  
 
According to Donà and Deliège, there is no hindrance to access of the market if a decision-making 
institution applies a measure that is based on reasons that are not economic in nature and pursue 
the specific interest represented by the institution. In other words, if a public authority cooperates 
with another public authority and this is justified solely in terms of the objectives such a public 
authority pursues, i.e. objectives of general interest, there is no restriction and hence EU law is not 
applicable.  
 
In Commission v. Germany530 (horizontal cooperative agreement) the CJEU considered: ‘such 
cooperation between public authorities does not undermine the principal objective of the 
Community rules on public procurement, that is, the free movement of services and the opening-up 
of undistorted competition in all the Member States, where implementation of that cooperation is 
governed solely by considerations and requirements relating to the pursuit of objectives in the 
public interest’.531 The Teckal-criteria formalise (in the context of a vertical cooperative 
agreement) the idea that a particular measure falls outside EU law if it strives for objectives in the 
public interest. The Court seems to make this link in Stadt Halle.532 The relationship between a 
public authority and its departments is in itself contingent on requirements and considerations 
proper to the pursuit of objectives in the public interest. The Teckal-relation is in the same vein. 
 
Through the interpretation of the public procurement Directives the CJEU expresses a more general 
idea of EU law, taking into account the fact that directives in themselves only clarify the rights 
already granted by the EU Treaties.533 When public authorities cooperate to organise or manage 
their public services, the restriction to trade or to free competition is inherent to the conduct of a 
public authority. This kind of ‘State’ measures concerns an internal situation within a public 
authority. The aim of such a measure is to organise better its proper administration in order to 
improve the provision of services of general interest. It seems to express the idea that public 
authorities in different Member States are free to organise their public service and that Member 
States are competent to make regulations in this regard. 
 
                                                 
530 Case C-480/06, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany [2009] ECR I-
04747. 
531 At [47]. 
532 Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle and RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH v. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische 
Restabfall- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] ECR I-00001, at [49] and [50]. 
533 See Case 2/74, Reyners v. Belgium [1974] ECR 631. 
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Beyond the context of ‘general interest’, in which the measure is situated, the CJEU case law on 
cooperative agreements also requires that private undertakings not be given an advantage., This 
criterion, however, externalises the same idea. If not a single private undertaking receives an 
advantage, free competition is also not distorted and in this sense the measure has no economic 
consequences. 
 
CJEU case law on cooperative agreements can consequently be elucidated in terms of the concept 
of ‘restriction’ and in terms of the object of the restriction. In some situations the object of the 
restriction has no influence on the market and will not distort competition. On the grounds of the 
principle of equality such situations cannot fall within the scope of EU law. 
 
According to Article 345 TFEU Member States are free how to regulate the organisation of public 
tasks. In the same line of thinking public authorities are free to organize these tasks. They have the 
freedom to discharge the tasks with their own administration. This justifies, according to the CJEU, 
why cooperative agreements under certain conditions do not fall under the scope of EU (public 
procurement) law.534 Apparently the CJEU presumes that the choice for an in house-provision has no 
effect on the market and that every situation which is similar to such provision does not have that 
effect. The criteria, the CJEU developed to exclude certain cooperative agreements between public 
authorities out of the scope of EU law, must reflect this similarity. That is why these criteria have 
to be strictly interpreted. 
 
 
5. Justifications535 
 
A number of factors of general interest allow a State not to observe the principles underpinning the 
fundamental freedoms when it takes a measure with cross-border effect. There is a difference 
between derogations provided expressis verbis in the TFEU and the mandatory requirements 
affirmed by the CJEU in its case law.  
 
Articles 51, 52 and 62 TFEU provide a number of hypothetical situations where a State need not 
maintain the fundamental freedoms and, thus, the principles derived from them as well. The list 
provided by the TFEU is exhaustive536 and the derogations have to be interpreted strictly.537 
 
                                                 
534 Case C-15/13, Technische Universität Hamburg-Harburg, Hochschul-Informations-System GmbH v. 
Datenlotsen Informationssysteme GmbH [2014] ECR I-00000, at [25]. 
535 C. Barnard, ‘Derogations, Justifications and the Four Freedoms: Is State Interest Really Protected ?’, in C. 
Barnard and O. Odudu (eds.), The Outer Limits of European Union Law (Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2009), pp. 
273-315. 
536 Case C-17/92, Federación de Distribuidores Cinematográficos v. Estado Español en Unión de Productores de 
Cine y Televisión [1993] ECR I-02239, at [20]; Case 388/01, Commission v. Italy [2003] ECR I-00721, at [20]. 
537 Case C-441/02, Commission v. Germany [2006] ECR I-3449, at [32] to [35].  
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A State can limit the free movement of services to protect public order, public safety and public 
health (Article 62 TFEU). Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 
April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States (CRD) further develops this regime of exception.538 
Measures for protecting public order and safety may be decided solely by virtue of the personal 
characteristics of those concerned.539 A subject, for instance, can be rejected merely if the 
presence or behaviour of the party concerned poses a real and sufficient threat540 to a fundamental 
interest of the commonweal.541 However the thesis does not go more deeply into the extensive case 
law on derogations as this is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
Over the years, the Court of Justice has also adduced a number of additional reasons to justify a 
restriction on a fundamental freedom in addition to those given in the TFEU.  
 
In the seminal case Vanbinsbergen, the Court ruled that departures from the principle of free 
movement of services were possible ‘where they have as their purpose the application of 
professional rules justified by the general good’.542 In the other seminal case Cassis de Dijon the 
Court went further down this route regarding the free movement of goods: ‘obstacles to movement 
within the Community resulting from disparities between the national laws relating to marketing of 
the products in question must be accepted in so far as those provisions may be recognised as being 
necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of 
fiscal supervision, the protection of commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer’.543 
 
The CJEU accepts a mandatory requirement if four conditions are met:544 
 
- A measure must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; 
 
- A measure must be justified by the imperative requirement of serving the general interest; 
 
- The measure had to be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursued; 
 
- The measure could not go beyond what beyond what was necessary to attain it. 
 
Legal doctrine has divided the mandatory requirements into four categories: 1) the protection of 
third parties, 2) civil liberties, 3) the need to prevent distortions in the market and 4) the 
                                                 
538 OJ [2004] L 158/77. 
539 Art. 27(2) CRD. See also Case 41/74, Yvonne van Duyn v. Home Office [1974] ECR 1337. 
540 Case 36/75, Roland Rutili v. Ministre de l'intérieur [1975] ECR 01219, at [28]. 
541 Case 30/77, Régina v. Pierre Bouchereau [1977] ECR 01999, at [35]. 
542 Case 33/74, Johannes Henricus Maria van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de 
Metaalnijverheid [1974] ECR 1299, at [12]. 
543 Case 120/78, Rewe v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Bramtwein [1978] ECR 649, at [8]. 
544 Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati a Procuration de Milano [1995] ECR 
I-4165, at [17]. 
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preservation of public order.545 In this context, the Court of Justice tends to have a critical eye to 
the mandatory requirements used by public authorities.  
 
In respect of the application of public procurement Directives and the principle of equal treatment, 
the Court has already had several occasions to investigate whether or not a Member State could not 
invoke a derogation or mandatory requirement to avoid a competitive tendering procedure. 
 
In Coname546 the CJEU for the first time openly conceded that there are ‘objective circumstances’ 
which could justify that the award of a public contract or service concession could be exempted 
from the application of EU law. The Court did not explain the notion ‘objective circumstances’. In 
Commission v. Italy,547 the Court proffered ‘reasons of overriding general interest’ giving the 
following example: ‘the objectives of consumer protection and the prevention of both fraud and 
incitement to squander on gaming, as well as the general need to preserve public order’. This is in 
accord with a number of mandatory requirements as explained above. ASM Brescia548 added an 
example to the issue of ‘objective circumstances’: the necessity of complying with the principle of 
legal certainty. 
 
One may now ask if ‘reasons of overriding general interest’ and ‘objective circumstances’ are 
essentially the same thing. The CJEU recently answered this question affirmatively.549 
 
The EU rules on derogations and mandatory requirements are not relevant for the thesis. The 
presumption in the thesis is that the case law on cooperative agreements between public 
authorities does not create a derogation from the applicability of EU law. This case law excludes 
such situations from the scope of EU law. Both categories of law, however, have as a characteristic 
that they balance values of market integration against other values. The CJEU case law on 
cooperative agreements could be seen as CJEU protection of certain social values. The freedom to 
organise the deliverance of public tasks could be in favour of the citizen who needs to have access 
to the public task. 
 
 
6. General conclusions 
 
Chapter 5 endeavours to show that in certain situations cooperative agreements between public 
authorities fall out of the scope of EU law. This follows from the CJEU interpretation of public 
                                                 
545 C. Barnard, ‘Derogations, Justifications and the Four Freedoms: Is State Interest Really Protected ?’, in C. 
Barnard and O. Odudu (eds.), The Outer Limits of European Union Law (Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2009), pp. 
277-278. 
546 Case C-231/03, Consorzio Aziende Metano (Coname) v. Comune di Cingia de' Botti [2005] ECR I-7287, at 
[19]. 
547 Case C-240/06, Commission v. Italy [2007] ECR I-09413, at [26] and [27]. 
548 Case C-347/06, ASM Brescia SpA v. Comune di Rodengo Saiano [2008] ECR I-5641, at [64]. 
549 Case C-221/12, Belgacom NV v. Interkommunale voor Teledistributie van het Gewest Antwerpen (INTEGAN) 
and Others [2013] ECR I-00000, at [38]. 
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procurement Directives and the principle of equality. In its case law the CJEU has developed its own 
criteria to exclude this kind of cooperation from EU law. In this chapter the thesis examines how the 
application of EU law to cooperative agreements between public authorities can be explained.  
 
The thesis submits that CJEU case law on cooperative agreements has to be explained in terms of 
the internal market rules. Public procurement Directives are rooted in these rules and more 
specifically in the rules on the fundamental freedoms. These rules are relevant when certain 
conditions of applicability have been met. Consequently, the question of how EU law is applicable 
to cooperative agreements between public authorities must be answered in terms of these 
conditions of applicability and any exceptions thereto. 
 
The following conditions determine the applicability of the rules on the fundamental freedoms and 
are of relevance for the thesis: the presence of a State measure, interstate trade, and a restriction. 
At the core of any cooperative agreement between public authorities is invariably a decision of a 
public authority. This kind of decision (the decision to cooperate) must be considered a State 
measure. As a state measure, the decision to cooperate falls under the scope of EU law. 
 
Since any cooperative agreement between public authorities is premised on a State measure, this 
condition does not determine whether such cooperation falls inside or outside the scope of EU law. 
If cooperative agreements between public authorities fall outside the scope of EU law, that is 
because neither domestic nor foreign undertakings are interested in the task, or in other words, 
because the contract is of no economic interest. Hence the presence or absence of an inter-State 
element plays no role in determining whether EU law on cooperative agreements is applicable. 
 
The CJEU case law on cooperative agreements can not be considered a derogation to the 
applicability of EU law, because this case law concerns precisely the criteria that exclude such a 
situation from the applicability of EU law.  
 
The ‘principle of equality’ and the concept of ‘restriction’ are presumably relevant. When economic 
operators are not concerned by or interested in the conclusion of an agreement (i.e. between public 
authorities) the State measure (decision to cooperate) can also not restrict market access. If the 
State measure is meant only to accomplish public service tasks without thereby disadvantaging a 
private initiative or firm, then there is no restriction. Consequently, EU law is not applicable. 
 
A difference in the situation may arise when a public authority cooperates either to ensure its own 
public service tasks or to entrust the provision of an economic activity. When the first kind of 
cooperation is governed solely by considerations of general interest and a private initiative is not 
involved, free competition cannot be distorted. In fact, the situation stays ‘in house’. This justifies 
the exclusion from the scope of EU law. In that case private undertakings will not be interested in 
market access. This is different from a situation where the provision of an economic activity is 
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entrusted. In that case a private undertaking will want to conclude a contract with the public 
authority. As a consequence, in this situation the public authorities will have to give all interested 
undertakings an equal chance to conclude the contract. Market access may in this case not be 
restricted. The purpose of the measure determines whether a restriction or an unequal situation 
exists. According to the thesis it is here that CJEU case law on cooperative agreements could have 
its foundation.  
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CHAPTER 5 – COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN PUBLIC AUTHORITIES: OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF EU 
LAW? 
 
Since the emergence of the nation state (18th and 19th centuries) in Western Europe, public service 
tasks have essentially been carried out by the following public authorities: central and local 
government. They have normally used their own resources to deliver these services. The thesis 
refers to this practice as ‘in-house provision’. However, it did not exclude the use of contracts by 
public authorities. As already explained in chapter 1, the complexity of society and increasing 
demands of citizens made a centralised organization of public administration and in house-provision 
of public service tasks increasingly more difficult. 
 
The 1980s in Britain saw the emergence of the idea of ‘New Public Management’550 (NPM) as a way 
to achieve efficient and cost-effective management of public service tasks. In effect, the ‘New 
Public Management’ gave a new twist to the way public authorities organise or manage their public 
service tasks. There was ‘a transition from traditional bureaucratic methods and structures in 
favour of market-based and business-like regimes of public service’.551 Subsequently, these changes 
were gradually instituted in the majority of European countries as well. The creation of agencies 
and non-departmental bodies was among those changes.552 In addition, public authorities were 
increasingly using contracts to provide public services.553 Sometimes public authorities have needed 
to cooperate with third parties to ensure complete and cost effective delivery of public services; 
that is, tasks of public interest. They outsourced public service tasks. In-house provision and 
outsourcing are the summa divisio of how a public authority organises and manages the delivery of 
public service tasks. 
 
Local authorities, in particular, are faced with the fact that they are no longer able to fulfil their 
public service(s) on their own. One of the possibilities to tackle this problem is cooperation: ‘To 
tackle the many traditional and new tasks of municipalities – and local authorities in general – is, 
particularly in times of restricted budgets, not always easy, especially for smaller authorities. In 
addition, many tasks, in particular in the areas of environment and transport are not confined to 
the municipality. Conversely, inter-municipal cooperation without calling on private capital is owing 
to its synergistic effects a method used in Member States for performing public functions in an 
efficient and cost-effective manner’.554  
 
                                                 
550 O.E. Hughes, Public management and Administration: an Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003); D. Oliver and G. Drewry, Public Service Reforms: Issues of Accountability and Public Law (London: 
Pinter, 1996); J. Stewart and K. Walsh, ‘Change in The Managemenet of Public Services’ (Public 
Administration, 1992), pp. 499 et seq. 
551 C.M. Donelly, Delegation of governmental power to private parties (Oxford: OUP, 2007), p. 62. 
552 See P. Craig, Administrative law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2012), pp. 75-106. 
553 On the relation between New public contracting and New public management see: P. Vincent-Jones, The 
new public contracting (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 43-49. 
554 Opinion Adv. Gen. Trstenjak under Case C-324/07, Coditel Brabant SA v. Commune d’Uccle et Région 
Bruxelles-Capital [2008] ECR I-8457, at [87]. 
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A public authority may then, for example appeal to other public authorities in such a context. 
Therefore, public authorities cooperate and share services.555 Cooperation between public 
authorities is one of the ways that a public authority organises and discharges its public service 
tasks.556 Public authorities cooperate in different ways. The thesis is only interested in cooperation 
based on an agreement. Two kinds of agreements must be distinguished: either the public 
authorities create jointly a new independent legal person and delegate the public service or task to 
the subsidiary they control (institutional or vertical cooperation), or there is cooperation in the 
form of a contract between public authorities (contractual or horizontal cooperation). Vertical 
cooperation refers to what in the thesis is referred to as ‘quasi-in-house’557 relations. In both cases, 
the following distinction can be made: either the operator called upon is fully public owned or it is 
not. This distinction has had a fundamental influence on how the application of EU law to vertical 
and horizontal cooperative agreements was approached. The following examination of the CJEU law 
will make this clear. (See sections 2 and 3) 
 
As seen in chapter 4, under EU law the manner in which a public authority organises its public 
service tasks is normally within the scope of the competence of the Member States. Accordingly, 
Advocate General La Pergola considered in his Opinion BFI558: ‘The question of a public authority's 
freedom to organise itself in the way best suited to meet the community's requirements need not, I 
think, detain us. The organizational arrangements chosen by a public authority must not allow the 
application of provisions designed to govern the quite different and well-defined situation in which 
a private individual provides a service for a public authority in return for remuneration. This is clear 
from the wording of the Directive’.559 However, the thesis examines the extent to which the public 
procurement Directives or the EU principle of equal treatment may influence the manner in which 
these issues are resolved and, thus, impinge upon the scope of the competences of Member States. 
The impact of EU public procurement law on contractual relationships between public authorities is 
an important topic, as is evident from the fact that the European Commission dedicated a working 
paper to this topic in 2011.560 
 
Each decision of a public authority, as well as the decision to cooperate, is a ‘State measure’ that 
could hinder trade or distort competition and to that extent EU law has a bearing. As for the 
organisation or management of public service tasks, the CJEU has always sought to take into 
                                                 
555 The Scottish procurement directorate gives the following definition to ‘shared services’: Shared Services in 
this context means the provision of services from one public body to one or more others either directly 
(through a lead authority) or via a delivery vehicle (such as a special purpose vehicle) 
(http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/1265/0054682.pdf). 
556 D. Casalini, ‘Beyond EU Law: the New “Public House”’, in G.S.Olykke, C.R. Hansen and C.D. Tvarno, EU 
Public procurement – Modernisation, Growth and Innovation (Copenhagen: Djof Publishing, 2011), p. 153. 
557 The CJEU exempts contracts concluded between public authorities from the scope of EU law, which concern 
situations similar (quasi) to in-house provision. 
558 Opinion of La Pergola, case 360/96, Gemeente Arnhem and Gemeente Rheden v. BFI Holding BV [1998] ECR 
I-06821, at [37]. 
559 At [37]. 
560 Commission Staff Working Paper concerning the application of EU public procurement law to relations 
between contracting authorities (‘public-public cooperation’) SEC(2011) 1169 final. 
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account the influence of EU on the various ways public authorities organise and manage their public 
service tasks. 
 
This thesis is also of relevance for the division of powers between EU and the Member States. 
Indeed, in its case law on cooperative agreements the CJEU has always sought to balance the 
‘Member States’ freedom to organise their own public services against the EU goals of opening up 
the market and ensuring equal competition’.561 This emphasises the constitutional importance of 
the research. 
 
This chapter will begin by briefly examining the extent to which EU law is applicable to the 
organisation or management of public service tasks. A distinction will be made in this regard 
between in-house provision and cooperation between public authorities. (1.) Next, the chapter 
delves deeper into cooperative agreements between public authorities. A distinction has to be made 
between vertical or institutional cooperative agreements (2.) and horizontal or contractual 
cooperative agreements (3.). The CJEU has recently made clear that both forms of cooperative 
agreements are object of a different case law.562 It states that for both forms of cooperation there 
are other criteria that may be applied to keep them from falling out of the scope of EU law. 
Although the CJEU case law seems to distinguish three kind of situations that could be excluded 
from the scope of EU law (in house, vertical and horizontal cooperative agreements), the present 
chapter tries the find a common explanation for this exclusion. 
 
Late in 2011 the EU Commission signalled the need for a revision of the existing public procurement 
Directives. Accordingly, a need was now also felt for a Directive on service concessions. In chapter 2 
the thesis explained certain Member States (e.g. France) opposed to the creation of specific 
directives on services concessions in previous reforms of the public procurement Directives. The 
new Directives, approved by European Parliament in January and February 2014 and published in 
the Official Journal of the European Union on 28 March 2014, now also include detailed provisions 
on their applicability to cooperative agreements between public authorities. The thesis will look 
into these new provisions. (4.) 
 
 
1. Applicability of EU law 
 
The chapter clarifies to what extent EU law is applicable to the organisation or management of 
public service tasks. Four areas may be distinguished: 1) in-house provision, 2) cooperation between 
public authorities, 3) a contract with a private undertaking and 4) transfer of a public service task. 
When a public authority engages a private undertaking to organise or discharge its public service 
                                                 
561 J. Wiggen, ‘Public procurement rules and cooperation between public sector entities: the limits of the in-
house doctrine under EU procurement law’ (PPLR, 2011), p. 158. 
562 Case C-159/11, Azienda Sanitaria Locale di Lecce, Università del Salento v. Ordine degli Ingegneri della 
Provincia di Lecce and Others [2012] ECR I-00000, at [31] to [34]. 
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tasks, it is clear that EU law applies insofar as an interstate element is present. In this situation, the 
public authority concludes a contract with an economic operator executing an economic activity. 
Hence, the thesis will not investigate the latter situation, even though it is doubtlessly influenced 
by EU law; likewise with the situation where a public authority delegates its competence to manage 
a public service task to a third person: In this case there is indeed no cooperation, instead, the 
public authority takes a decision unilaterally. This then leaves only the first two situations.  
 
1.1. In-house provision 
 
Public authorities primarily make use of their own services to accomplish their public service tasks. 
In this situation the public authority does not consult the market. The question arises whether EU 
law governs such a situation. 
 
In Stadt Halle563 the CJEU delivered a preliminary ruling on the applicability of public procurement 
Directives to such a situation. To answer this question the Court makes a fundamental distinction 
between the situation where a public authority uses its own departments to accomplish a task from 
the situation where the public authority takes recourse to a third party. In the first situation the 
Court ruled as follows: a public authority ‘has the possibility of performing the tasks conferred on it 
in the public interest by using its own administrative, technical or other resources, without being 
obliged to call on outside entities not forming part of its own departments’.564 Cosmas confirmed 
already in its Opinion prior to Teckal that EU law does not require public authorities to observe the 
procedure that ensures effective competition between interested parties, if where those public 
authorities wish to discharge the public service tasks with their own administration.565 In-house 
provision is not subject to public procurement Directives. However, it follows from Teckal566 that 
the situation whereby a public authority has recourse to a third party is, in principle, subject to 
public procurement Directives. 
 
As such the Court confirmed a wide set opinion in the continental law systems.567 If a public 
authority takes recourse to its own resources, it does not sign a contract: ‘In such a case, there can 
be no question of a contract for pecuniary interest concluded with an entity legally distinct from 
the contracting authority’.568 In this case there are no two different wills. Procuring entities are not 
obliged in all situations to apply EU rules concerning public procurements.  
 
                                                 
563 Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle and RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH. v. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische 
Restabfall- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] ECR I-00001. 
564 At [48]. 
565 Opinion of G. Cosmas, case C-107/98, Teckal Srl v. Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121, at [54]. 
566 Case C-107/98, Teckal v. Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121. 
567 Ph. Flamme and M.-A. Flamme, Les marchés publics de services et la coordination de leurs procédures de 
passation (RMCUE, 1993), p. 157, nr. 16; M. Mensi, L’ouverture à la concurrence des marchés publics de 
services (RMCUE, 1993), p. 67. 
568 Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle and RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH. v. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische 
Restabfall- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] ECR I-00001, at [48]. 
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In Coditel Brabant569 the Court makes this assessment regarding in-house provision separately from 
the question of whether a contract for pecuniary interest concluded with an entity legally distinct 
from the contracting authority exists. Coditel Brabant concerned a service concession, a contract 
not subject to the public procurement Directives. Nevertheless, the Court considered: ‘a public 
authority has the possibility of performing the public interest tasks conferred on it by using its own 
administrative, technical and other resources, without being obliged to call on outside entities not 
forming part of its own departments’.570 Even where a relationship may be regarded as a service 
concession if two independent wills would be present, an in-house provision falls outside the scope 
of EU law. The principle of equality does not apply. 
 
The Court reaffirmed this in Commission v. Germany,571 where the competence of the Member 
States over in-house arrangements appears to rest on the postulate that free movement of services 
is not thereby hindered and that free competition is not distorted.572 Chapter 4 defends the point 
that the hindering of market access or the distortion of competition determines mostly whether EU 
law is applicable on cooperative agreements between public authorities. According to Deliège573 one 
could argue that the decision to call on its own departments is a measure inherent to the conduct of 
a public authority in respect of its own organisation and, as such, it does not affect the market.574 
With regard to the principle of equality, neither situation is comparable and, thus, the same legal 
rules do not apply. 
 
In doing this, the Court relies on an important criterion of demarcation regarding the distribution of 
powers between the EU and its Member States. The CJEU makes a choice of constitutional import in 
Stadt Halle, Coditel Brabant and in Commission v. Germany. If a public authority has its own 
services to carry out a task, it need not apply EU law. It is not required to set up an awarding 
procedure.  
 
The CJEU leaves public authorities a free choice regarding how a public authority organises its 
public service tasks and whether the task will be carried out by its own services. In both cases the 
decision is left to the discretionary powers of the Member States and not to the EU. This also 
implies that the Member States (and not the EU) are empowered in this area to exercise regulatory 
powers.575 The constitutional option appears to rest on the economic objectives inherent to the 
European Union. In this sense this case law is part of the European Economic Constitution (see on 
this concept chapter 4). 
 
                                                 
569 Case C-324/07, Commune d’Uccle et Région Bruxelles-Capital [2008] ECR I-08457. 
570 At [48]. 
571 Case C-480/06, Commission v. Germany [2009] ECR I-04747. 
572 At [45] and [47]. 
573 Joined cases C-51/96 and C-191/97, Christelle Deliège v. Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées 
ASBL, Ligue belge de judo ASBL, Union européenne de judo and François Pacquée [2000] ECR I-2549. 
574 See chapter 4. 
575 See also the European Communication on Public private partnerships and Community Law on Public 
Contracts and Concessions, COM(2005) 569 final. 
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As it will be explained in chapter 6, in England, public authorities were obliged in the 1980s to 
outsource tasks even when they wished to have these tasks carried out by their own departments. 
This is called ‘compulsory competitive tendering’. Again, according to EU law this is a policy choice 
the Member States can make. Indeed, this belongs, according to Stadt Halle,576 to their sphere of 
competence. EU Law does not stipulate in this situation that a general obligation exists for Member 
States to resort to the market.577 
 
Therefore EU law has no influence on in-house provision. Each of the Member States is free to 
regulate this situation as it sees fit. The following section of this chapter investigates the extent to 
which this also holds true when a public authority cooperates with another public authority (vertical 
or horizontal). 
 
1.2. Cooperative agreements 
 
The present section addresses three questions: 1) The first question that arises is whether the 
public procurement Directives or the principle of equality are at all applicable to cooperative 
agreements between public authorities (1.2.1.), 2) the second question concerns the kind of 
cooperation between public authorities to which CJEU case law is applicable (1.2.2.) and 3) the 
third question explores whether EU law itself explicitly provides for exceptions to its applicability.  
 
1.2.1. Under the scope of EU law? 
 
In chapter 4 the thesis demonstrated that the decision to cooperate with another public authority 
constitutes a state measure. In this capacity such a decision can well fall within the scope of 
applicability of the fundamental freedom rules and the principle of equality. However, the 
applicability of EU law to cooperative agreements between public authorities raises a problem in 
the context of public procurement Directives. The Directives describe very precisely their area of 
applicability. But does this tell us anything about cooperative agreements between public 
authorities?  
 
A legislative act could address a particular situation in two ways: either it remarks explicitly about 
its own applicability to the situation, or it contains a provision that exempts a situation from the 
applicability of the legislative act. (see section 1.2.3.) The present section explores to what extent 
the public procurement Directives contain a provision in one or the other of these two senses that is 
relevant to cooperative agreements between public authorities. Before the adoption of Directive 
2004/17/EC and Directive 2004/18/EC, it was not very clear whether cooperative agreements 
between public authorities would fall within the scope of public procurement regulations. 
                                                 
576 C-26/03, Stadt Halle and RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH. v. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische Restabfall- 
und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] ECR I-00001. 
577 A. Sanchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (London: Hart Publishing, 2011), pp. 
232-234. 
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In some EU Member States the applicability of public procurement Directives on cooperative 
agreements between public authorities was originally not so evident as it seems today.578 Chapter 6, 
which examins the French legal system with regard to cooperative agreements between public 
authorities, makes clear that in France the ‘Conseil d’État’579 (Council of State) has long shielded 
such cooperation from application of the French legislation on the awarding of public contracts.580  
 
One could argue that the public procurement Directives or the principles of equality and 
transparency are only applicable when a public authority turns to the private sector.581 German 
scholars defended until recently that the public procurement Directives must be confined to ‘public 
entities buying from or cooperating with the private sector and hence opening up competition’.582 
This point of view was still shared by Advocate General La Pergola in its Opinion to BFI.583 In his 
view the Directives only apply to players active on the market. A public authority normally seeks 
solely to benefit the general interest, i.e. an activity that is not bound by market principles. Thus, 
if a public authority seeks the help of another public authority, it would not endanger the free 
market. 
 
However, Article 1(c) of Directive 92/50/EEC584 provided that: ‘service provider shall mean any 
natural or legal person, including a public body,585 which offers services’. For the first time a 
potential indication that public procurement regulations apply to cooperative agreements between 
public authorities was included in the relevant Directives. 
 
The provisions of Directive 2004/17/EC and Directive 2004/18/EC contain sufficient grounds to infer 
that cooperative agreements between public authorities fall within their scope. For instance, 
Recital 4 in the Preamble to Directive 2004/18/EC makes it clear that a body governed by public 
law can participate as a tenderer. Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Directive 2004/18/EC does not 
take into account the public or private nature of the tenderer in regard to the application of the 
                                                 
578 M. Burgi, ‘In-House’ Providing in Germany’, in M. Comba and S. Treumer (eds.), The In-House Providing in 
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583 See Opinion of La Pergola, case 360/96, Gemeente Arnhem and Gemeente Rheden v. BFI Holding BV [1998] 
ECR I-06821, at [37]. 
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service contracts’, OJ 1992 L 209, 1-24. 
585 Emphasised by the author. 
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public procurement regime.586 Article 1(7) Directive 2004/17/EC and Article 1(8) of Directive 
2004/18/EC include for every kind of public contracts a public entity as a possible contractor. 
 
Thus, these Directives are clear as to their applicability to cooperative agreements between public 
authorities. However, these Directives do not include any special provision defining whether these 
kinds of agreements fall within the scope of the Directives.  
 
This is rather surprising insofar as the aim of the European Commission in drafting Directive 
2004/17/EC and Directive 2004/18/EC was to clarify the existing rules, especially for situations 
where issues were difficult to resolve through an interpretation of the provisions.587 Thus, the 
Commission also made an attempt to include a provision to cover the more specific quasi-in-house 
provision of public service tasks as confirmed in Teckal,588 which focused on vertical cooperative 
agreements between public authorities589: ‘This Directive shall not apply to public contracts 
awarded by a contracting authority to a legally distinct entity owned exclusively by that contracting 
authority, if the entity concerned does not have autonomous decision-making powers in relation to 
the contracting authority on account of the latter exercising over that entity a control which is 
similar to that which it exercises over its own departments; [and] the entity carries out all its 
activities with the contracting authority which owns it’ (Article 19(a)). But within the Council, the 
Member States could not agree on a definition of quasi-in-house.590 They left it to the CJEU to 
further elaborate the scope in its case law.  
 
As it will be evident in section 4, the recently approved Directives on public procurement and 
services concessions591 by the European Parliament contain provisions that address both vertical and 
horizontal cooperative agreements between public authorities (see 4). 
 
Since 1999 the CJEU concluded in several cases that cooperative agreements between public 
authorities also fell within the scope of public procurement Directives. This confirms that the 
Directives adopted before 2004 contain provisions leading to the conclusion that cooperative 
agreements between public authorities fall under their scope.  
 
In Teckal592 the CJEU acknowledged for the first time the applicability of public procurement 
Directives to cooperative agreements between public authorities. Indeed, the Court held that the 
Directives are applicable to a contract between a municipality (contracting authority) and one other 
                                                 
586 Case C-305/08, Consorzio Nazionale Interuniversitario per le Scienze del Mare (CoNISMA) v. Regione Marche 
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body, ‘whether or not that entity is itself a contracting authority’.593 The qualification of 
‘contractor’ is not important for determining the applicability of the public procurement regime. 
However, Advocate General La Pergola took a different view. According to his Opinion in BFI594 
public contracts between public bodies could be excluded from the scope of public procurement 
Directives. This Opinion could be defended because the Directives did not provide any disposition on 
this subject.  
 
In ARGE595 the CJEU confirmed that the public procurement Directives authorise the participation of 
public bodies in an award procedure for a public procurement contract.596 A public authority could 
be a contracting party. The next step confirming the applicability of the public procurement regime 
to a contract between two public bodies (or cooperative agreement between public authorities) was 
a small one. 
 
The CJEU was clearer in a case decided in 2005.597 The Spanish law on public procurement excluded 
from its scope cooperation agreements between the State authorities, on the one hand, and the 
Social Security, autonomous communities, local bodies, their autonomous bodies and any other 
public body, on the other hand, or between these bodie’. The Commission alleged that the Kingdom 
of Spain had excluded from the codified law cooperative agreements concluded between bodies 
governed by public law, although those agreements may constitute public contracts for the purpose 
of Directives 93/36/EEC and 93/37/EEC. In accordance with Article 1(a) of Directive 93/36/EEC, it 
is sufficient, in principle, if the contract was concluded between a local authority and a person 
legally distinct from it. This approach must also be applied to inter-administrative agreements, 
according to the CJEU. Agreements between public authorities cannot be excluded, a priori, from 
the scope of the public procurement Directives.598 
 
Finally, the CJEU decided in CoNISMa599 as follows: ‘It therefore follows from both Community rules 
and the Court’s case-law that any person or entity which, in the light of the conditions laid down in 
a contract notice, believes that it is capable of carrying out the contract, either directly or by using 
subcontractors, is eligible to submit a tender or put itself forward as a candidate, regardless of 
whether it is governed by public law or private law, whether it is active as a matter of course on 
the market or only on an occasional basis and whether or not it is subsidised by public funds’.600 The 
nature of the economic operator or of the contracting partner is irrelevant to the application of the 
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public procurement Directives. The CJEU based the above judgement on one of the fundamental 
principles of the Directives; namely, the widest possible opening to competition. This is in the 
interest of all parties, public authorities and undertakings. 
 
It therefore follows from the Court's case law that also cooperative agreement between public 
authorities could possibly fall within the scope of Directives 2004/17/EC or 2004/18/EC. The CJEU 
based the applicability of the Directives to cooperative agreements on a formal element, i.e. the 
presence of a contract. However, Conisma proves that a functional explanation is present. A public 
authority acting as an economic operator has to be exposed to an equal treatment as a private 
operator to ensure free competition. Once the application of the Directives affirmed the risk 
existed that if a public authority outsourced its services by contract the public procurement regime 
or the principles of equality and transparency always must be applied even if the contract partner is 
a public authority. The Directives provide for only one exception that, moreover, is subject to strict 
conditions (see 1.2.3.) Since at issue is an exception, these conditions receive a strict 
interpretation. 
 
This would restrict enormously the possibilities of a public authority to seek help outside its own 
departments. In the last two decades the CJEU, expressing itself on this problem, has created 
distinct case law on the subject to limit the application of EU law to these situations (see 2. and 3.) 
Thus the Court of Justice thereby assumed the role of European lawmaker and this in turn raised 
the question of the democratic legitimacy of the case law. 
 
1.2.2. Kind of cooperation 
 
The CJEU had to consider in Teckal601 a situation that in principle came within the scope of EU law. 
The preliminary question in Teckal concerned the interpretation of the public procurement 
Directives. The CJEU confirmed the applicability of the Directives on cooperative agreements 
between public authorities (see 1.2.1.) However, is this case law really transposable to other 
agreements concluded between public authorities? In several cases the CJEU has given an explicit 
answer. 
 
In Parking Brixen602 and other case law, the CJEU excluded the obligation of transparency in service 
concessions if the public authority providing the concession exercises over the subsidiary a control 
similar to that it exercises over its own departments and this concession holder also performs the 
greater part of its activities on behalf of the body (or bodies) that it control(s). The Court thereby 
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affirms that EU law is applicable if a service concession is concluded between two or more public 
authorities.603 
 
Accordingly, the CJEU has also repeatedly reaffirmed that if the value of a contract is under the 
threshold set under EU public procurement rules it has no effect on the applicability of the Teckal 
case law.604 
 
Thus far our analysis has concerned only the scope of applicability of vertical cooperative 
agreements. But is it also valid for horizontal cooperative agreements? 
 
Commission v. Germany605 and Ordine deghli Ingegneri606 concern a public contract falling under the 
scope of the public procurement Directives. These are the two leading cases introducing a new 
situation (horizontal cooperative agreements between public authorities) that falls out of the scope 
of EU law. The next issue to be considered is whether this case law can be applied to a service 
concession. Parking Brixen607 is the relevant case to answer this question.  
 
In this last case the CJEU had to examine if a public service concession must be put out to 
competition in a similar manner to a public procurement contract. The Court confirmed that a 
service concession does not fall within the scope of the public procurement Directives. Irrespective 
of this ruling these contracts are, according to the Court, obliged to comply with the fundamental 
rules of the TFEU. Thus, public service concessions are bound by EU law. Likewise, the 
considerations developed in Teckal608 and in Stadt Halle609 regarding quasi-in-house and in-house 
situations are transposable to the interpretation and application of Treaty provisions and to the 
principles that relate to service concessions.  
 
There is no reason why the CJEU analysis on horizontal cooperative agreements should not be 
transposable to a (public) service concession. The Court also makes this clear in Ordine degli 
Ingegneri: ‘However, the fact that the contract at issue in the main proceedings is capable of 
falling, as the case may be, either under Directive 2004/18 or the fundamental rules and general 
principles of the FEU Treaty does not affect the answer to be given to the question posed. The 
criteria laid down in the case law of the Court in order to determine whether an invitation to tender 
is mandatory are relevant both with regard to the interpretation of that Directive and with regard 
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to the interpretation of those rules and principles of the FEU Treaty’.610 This consideration also 
proves that the CJEU case law on horizontal cooperative agreements also applies to contracts below 
EU thresholds. 
 
More generally, in Parking Brixen the Court established that the Teckal-criteria apply every time a 
public authority charges a third party with the execution of an economic activity.611 Thus the CJEU 
seems to be saying that these criteria can be applied to all kinds of contracts concluded between 
authorities. Already elsewhere, it was argued that the principle of equal treatment and the 
obligation to transparency are applicable to all kinds of contracts concluded between public 
authorities.612 Hence, if this principle is to be observed, exceptions to its application must also be 
applicable to these contracts.613 
 
The same reasoning could also be applied to unilateral relations between public authorities. Several 
times the CJEU has confirmed that public authorities, which grant unilateral advantages to 
economic operators, are bound by the fundamental rules of the Treaties, including in particular 
Articles 49 and 56 TFEU, the principles of equal treatment and of non-discrimination on grounds of 
nationality and the consequent obligation of transparency.614 Exemptions to the applicability of 
these principles should apply in the same manner. 
 
1.2.3. Exclusion 
 
Directive 2004/18/EC provides one explicit exception to the applicability of the public procurement 
regime to cooperative agreements between public authorities.  
 
Article 18 of Directive 2004/18/EC615 stipulates: ‘This Directive shall not apply to public service 
contracts awarded by a contracting authority to another contracting authority or to an association 
of contracting authorities on the basis of an exclusive right which they enjoy pursuant to a 
published law, regulation or administrative provision which is compatible with the Treaty’.616  
 
Article 18 addresses specifically a situation where a public authority cooperates with another public 
authority. However, the cooperation is based exclusively on the acknowledgement of an exclusive 
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right. In such a situation an award procedure is not necessary, according to Article 18 because the 
Directives do not apply. The granting of an exclusive right excludes every other competitor.617 As a 
preliminary observation one should bear in mind that the mentioned exception excludes the EU 
internal market rules, which are fundamental in the European Union and it should be interpreted 
strictly inasmuch as it is an exception.618 This provision has been considered by the CJEU on three 
occasions. 
 
In BFI619 the CJEU had to examine a situation where two Dutch towns established a company that 
would provide waste disposal services for the two towns. These services had been allotted without 
any tendering procedure. The Dutch court thought such an award could fall within the scope of 
Article 6 of Directive 92/50/CEE. According to the Dutch court the only problem was whether the 
company was a contracting authority. The CJEU examined this issue thoroughly and by implication 
acknowledged that this was a major condition for the applicability of Article 6. Furthermore the 
CJEU found it essential that the exclusive right be pursuant to a published law, regulation or 
administrative provision, thus confirming the second condition on which applicability of Article 18 of 
Directive 2004/18/EC depends.  
 
The Teckal620 ruling also had a bearing on the interpretation of the scope of Article 6 of Directive 
92/50/EEC. The question arose whether this article could be applied to a public supply contract. 
The CJEU answered in the negative and thus restricted the range of applicability of the Article. 
Article 6 concerns only public service contracts. There is no explanation for this difference to be 
found in the Directives themselves and the lack of explanation is confirmed by the CJEU in Teckal. 
The interpretation in Teckal was the starting point for the CJEU to create an autonomous exemption 
to the application of public procurement rules to the several kinds of public contracts (work, service 
and supply). Since the Directives at that time contained no provision comparable to Article 6 for 
public work contracts and public supply contracts, the CJEU began a quest for a general exception 
system for when public authorities cooperate. The quasi-in-house case law has its origins here. 
 
Finally a Spanish Court submitted a preliminary question to the CJEU as to the applicability of the 
public procurement regime to reserved and non-reserved postal services awarded to Correos 
without a public call for tenders.621 Reserved postal services are not subject to competition since no 
other economic operator is authorised to offer those services. As to the non-reserved postal services 
the CJEU examined whether the exemption provided by Article 6 of Directive 92/50/EEC might not 
be applicable. Based on its previous case law the Court recognised three conditions for application 
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of Article 6: (1) the article applies only to public services, (2) the public authority grants an 
exclusive right and (3) the granting must be compatible with the Treaty (TFEU). These conditions 
are cumulative. 
 
Conferring an exclusive right to provide non-reserved postal services would contradict the 
objectives and provisions of Directive 97/67/EC ‘on common rules for the development of the 
internal market of Community postal services and the improvement of quality of service’622 which 
aims to establish gradual and controlled liberalisation in the postal sector.623 It would not be 
compatible with the Treaty provisions to grant in such a situation an exclusive right to a contractor. 
 
This case law presents an extremely restrictive interpretation of Article 6 (and Article 18 of 
Directive 2004/18/CE). A contracting authority can directly award a contract to another public body 
only under the strict conditions laid down in the Directive.624 This provision could not be used to 
effect a broader derogation to the public procurement regime in situations where a public authority 
seeks cooperation with a distinct legal body that does not ‘play on the market’. Consequently, the 
CJEU had to look for other criteria whereby other cooperative agreements between public 
authorities could be removed from within the scope of public procurement Directives and EU law in 
general. The criteria will be examined below. 
 
 
2. Institutional or vertical cooperative agreements 
 
This section examines under what condition vertical cooperative agreements between public 
authorities fall beyond the scope of EU law. First, the thesis examines broadly the origins of the 
CJEU case law (2.1.). Next it explains the two criteria employed by the CJEU to place vertical 
cooperative agreements beyond the applicability of EU law: the control-criterion (2.2.) and the 
activities-criterion (2.3.). 
 
2.1. Origins of the case law 
 
In order to accomplish tasks of general interest more efficiently and less expensively, public 
authorities may establish an independent legal entity on their own (unilateral decision) or together 
with private partners or with other public authorities (contract). These separate legal entities 
perform tasks either directly for the benefit of the public authority, which is member of the 
separate legal entity (public contract) or they themselves perform a task of general interest on 
behalf of one or more of the member(s) (service concession). One question that arises in the thesis 
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is whether and when contractual cooperative agreements between public authorities fall outside 
the scope of TFEU and of public procurement Directives. 
 
Between the 1970s and the 1990s the CJEU did not have to examine these kinds of issues with 
regard to the public procurement Directives and the TFEU. Early on, in a 1998 communication 
entitled ‘Public procurement in the European Union’, the European Commission laid down that an 
agreement ‘awarded within the public administration, for example between a central and local 
administration or between an administration and a company wholly owned by it’ could constitute an 
‘in house’- provision.625 The presence of a third party does not, according to the Commission, 
always mean that public procurement Directives are applicable. But the Commission is wrong to use 
the term ‘in-house’ in this situation. The examples it gives are more like quasi in-house situations. 
It is this kind of situation the CJEU had to deal with in Teckal.626 
 
Teckal was the first case where the CJEU ruled on the subject. As discussed earlier, the CJEU 
confirmed the applicability of EU law to cooperative agreements between public authorities in this 
matter. Accordingly in this case the CJEU has also developed for the first time criteria such that 
under certain circumstances cooperative agreements between public authorities lie beyond the 
scope of EU law. Since Teckal lies at the origin of CJEU case law on cooperative agreements it 
deserves a more extended treatment.  
 
In Teckal the CJEU had to rule on a contract placed by the municipal Council of Viano in Italy and 
concluded with a consortium of municipalities, called AGAC, of which Viano itself was a member 
(vertical cooperation). The AGAC consortium had been set up by several municipalities, including 
Viano, to manage energy and environmental services. The Viano Council entrusted to AGAC the 
management of heating installations in municipal buildings, together with the supply of fuel to 
those buildings. The Council failed to hold any competitive tendering procedure involving third 
parties. Teckal, being a private company active in the supply of heating products and services, 
alleged that the Council, before placing the contract with AGAC, should have followed the 
tendering procedures for public contracts required under the public procurement directives. 
 
The applicability of the tendering procedures set out in the public procurement Directives is 
dependent on how the term ‘public contract’ is construed. If the agreement between the 
municipality of Viano and AGAC can be classified as a public contract, the Directives are applicable. 
The CJEU stated it was for the national court to determine whether the relationship between the 
municipality of Viano and AGAC constituted a public contract and, in particular, whether there had 
been an agreement between two separate entities. The role of the CJEU is simply to provide an 
interpretation for EU law, i.e. public procurement Directives. 
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To resolve the issue of the applicability of public procurement Directives the CJEU suggested the 
national judge to proceed from the concept ‘contract’ as an element of the definition of the term 
‘public contract’. According to Advocate General Cosmas a contract exists if there is ‘a concordance 
of wills between two different persons, the contracting authority and the supplier, and, second, the 
commercial relationship that is created consists in the supply of a product for pecuniary 
remuneration’.627 The contract is a synallagmatic act. The CJEU noted that it is sufficient in 
principle if the contract was concluded between, on the one hand, a local authority and, on the 
other, a person legally distinct from that local authority to apply the public procurement Directives. 
The CJEU thus appears to follow the reasoning of the Advocate General in its Opinion. In opting for 
the concept of ‘contract’ as a starting point to examine the applicability of the public procurement 
Directives on cooperative agreements between public authorities the CJEU has elected a notion of 
EU law. This implies that this concept has an autonomous meaning and that will be broadly 
interpreted (See chapter 3).  
 
The CJEU could have limited itself to the affirmation that a contract is present and then conclude 
that public procurement rules must be applied. Instead, it considered that cooperative agreements 
between public authorities under certain circumstances fall outside the scope of EU law, possibly 
realising that otherwise public authorities in several Member States would be extensively limited in 
their freedom to organise their public service. In several continental countries cooperation between 
public authorities is governed by administrative law. The freedom of a public authority to organise 
its own public services is one of the leading principles of this law. 
 
The CJEU had to find a criterion or criteria that would exclude from the scope of public 
procurement Directives arrangements where two different persons cooperate. As already noted the 
public procurement Directives contain only one exception to their application on cooperation 
between public authorities, which is Article 18 of Directive 2004/18/EC (former Article 6 of 
Directive 92/50/EEC). This exception was not applicable in Teckal. The CJEU had to create a new 
exception or exemption. As such the Court could not adopt a formal criterion but instead had to 
find a more flexible one. A formal criterion exclusively based on a classical interpretation of the 
concept of contract (the presence of two independent legal persons) invariably leads to the 
conclusion that the public procurement regime applies. (see chapter 6 on the French system) 
 
The CJEU seems to have taken inspiration from a number of Opinions of several Advocate Generals 
to create its innovative case law on vertical cooperative agreements. In BFI628 two Dutch 
municipalities, Arnhem and Rheden, decided to reorganise the way in which they fulfilled their 
obligations in regard to the collection and disposal of household waste. They therefore decided 
jointly to create a limited company (‘ARA Holding BV’) where this new entity would carry out these 
tasks on their behalf. Advocate General La Pergola concluded that ARA was still an organ of the 
                                                 
627 Opinion of G. Cosmas, case C-107/98, Teckal Srl v. Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121, at [52]. 
628 Case C-360/96, Gemeente Arnhem and Gemeente Rheden v. BFI Holding [1998] ECR I-6821. 
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participating municipalities in a broad and indirect sense.629 According to him there is only a form of 
inter-departmental delegation involved. In order to designate ARA as an organ, the Advocate 
General refers to the financial ties and to the composition of management board. These elements 
will reappear later in CJEU rulings to determine whether a contracting authority exercises control 
over the provider similar to that which it exercises over its own departments.630 Even if the 
executor of a task has third-party status, this does not necessarily mean that a contract is present. 
In some circumstances (sufficient control) the ‘third party’ is still a part of the public administration 
and thus the situation must be regarded as ‘in-house’. 
 
In RI.SAN631 Advocate General Alber dealt extensively with quasi-in-house arrangements. By decision 
of the municipal council of 19 March 1996, the Municipality of Ischia formed a mixed-capital limited 
company to run the solid urban waste collection service. Advocate General Alber confirmed that the 
public procurement Directives do not cover in-house services provided by part of the same public 
administration. In that case there is no third party entrusted with providing the service.632 He also 
looked at the situation in which a public authority appeals to another public authority of which it 
holds a part. According to Alber the fact that the other public authority is a private company does 
not per se preclude it from being part of the public administration. The third party must be 
classified in according to a functional interpretation.633 The CJEU, however, concluded otherwise in 
its case law.634 The degree of influence exercised by the public administration over the company is 
decisive. If one can establish both financial and organizational interconnections between Ischia and 
Ischia Ambiente, then the services can be qualified as an in-house service.635  
 
The first Teckal-criterion, the control criterion (which will be discussed below), is already evident in 
these two Opinions. Fundamental to the possible application of the public procurement regime is 
the state of dependency of the new constituted ‘company’. Legal autonomy is of no importance. 
 
In Teckal the contracting authority did not have recourse to its own resources, but to a third party. 
In order to decide if a third party was present the Advocate General looked at the kind of control, 
which the public authority has over third persons and to whom the particular third party provides 
services. As regards this control, the Advocate General seems to use a rather formal approach based 
on administrative law, as it exists in certain continental legal systems (e.g. Belgium and France). He 
refers to a ‘hierarchical control’ and a ‘kind of control which an entity exercises over an internal 
                                                 
629 Opinion of A. La Pergola case C-360/96, Gemeente Arnhem and Gemeente Rheden v. BFI Holding BV [1998] 
ECR I-06821, at [36]. 
630 See Case C-107/98, Teckal v. Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121. 
631 Opinion of S. Alber case C-108/98, RI.SAN. Srl v. Comune di Ischia, Italia Lavoro SpA and Ischia Ambiente 
SpA [2000] ECR I-05219. 
632 At [50]. 
633 At [52]. 
634 See Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle and RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH v. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische 
Restabfall- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] ECR I-00001, at [49]. 
635 At [53] and [54]. 
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body’.636 The fact that AGAC provides services to private or public bodies that are not members of a 
cooperative venture seems to be one of the factors in the Advocate General's conclusion that AGAC 
cannot be regarded as a quasi-in-house situation.637 Thus, for the first time the second Teckal-
criterion (activities) also appears in the reasoning on the legal status of a possible in-house 
provision.  
 
According to the Court, the new exemption to application of the public procurement rules would be 
present where ‘the local authority exercises over the person concerned a control which is similar to 
that which it exercises over its own departments and, at the same time, that person carries out the 
essential part of its activities with the controlling local authority or authorities’.638 The use of the 
term ‘departments’ derives from the original reason for setting up autonomous bodies, which was to 
manage public services outside the administration.  
 
The CJEU proposed two criteria to exempt an arrangement between two public bodies (or 
cooperative agreements between contracting authorities) from the public procurement regime: first 
there must be a control which is similar to that which it exercises over its own departments and, 
secondly, the carrying out of the essential part of the activities with the controlling authority or 
authorities. These are the so-called ‘Teckal criteria’ (control and activities). Both criteria express 
the idea of (in)dependency.639 Are the two wills independent and thus are we in the presence of a 
contract? These two substantial criteria make it possible to distinguish two situations: a vertical 
cooperative agreement falling inside or outside the scope of EU law. Whenever the two Teckal-
criteria are met, the situation is comparable to in house-provision. The principle of equality 
requires that the two situations be treated equally and thus that both are beyond the reach of EU 
law. 
 
The Teckal criteria are of a cumulative nature.640 The two criteria must be met ‘at the same 
time’.641 In his Opinion prior to the ARGE-case, Advocate General Leger gives an explanation to the 
necessity of these two criteria: ‘the principle set out in that judgement (Teckal) is based on the 
criterion that the operator is independent. An entity is not necessarily deprived of freedom of 
action simply because the decisions affecting it are taken by the local authority that controls it, if it 
is able to carry out a substantial part of its economic activity for other operators. However, the 
entity must be considered to be wholly linked to the controlling authority if, in addition, the 
organisational relationship between the authority and the entity in question is coupled with the fact 
that the latter provides its services more or less exclusively to the authority. Such circumstances 
                                                 
636 Opinion of G. Cosmas, case C-107/98, Teckal Srl v. Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121, at [61]. 
637 At [62]. 
638 Case C-107/98, Teckal v. Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121at [50]. 
639 J.-M. Peyrical, Que reste-t-il du in house? (RFDA, 2005), p. 956. 
640 P. Delvolve, ‘Marchés publics: les critères des ‘contrats-maison’ (RDUE, 2002), p. 55; P. Nihoul, ‘Les 
marches publics dans l’Union européenne (2003-2005)’ (JDE, 2006), p. 270; C. Dubois, ‘To be or not to be ‘In 
house’? Observations relatives à l’exception ‘In house’ après l’arrêt Carbotermo’ (CDPK, 2007), p. 219. 
641 Case C-107/98, Teckal v. Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121, at [50]. 
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show that the local authority intends to use the services not just for public purposes but also, and 
principally, for its own benefit’.642  
 
In Teckal the CJEU did not give any further explanation in respect of the criteria. It seems that the 
Court left it to the national courts to concretise the Teckal-criteria. This raises the question of on 
what basis does the CJEU provide these two new criteria. After all, nothing comes from nothing. 
The Court nowhere refers to relevant European directives or to earlier case law. Instead, as 
indicated above, certain aspects of the criteria already found expression in Opinions of Advocate 
Generals. On the basis of these opinions, some legal scholars think that Italian law is at the origins 
of these criteria.643 
 
The two criteria are in themselves formal and based on public law, but are to be interpreted in a 
functional manner.644 The big difference with other CJEU case law is that this functional 
interpretation reduces the influence of EU law on national law. Regarding the first criteria the CJEU 
could not speak about a full or identical control because in such circumstances it was obvious that 
the public procurement Directives did not apply.645 In the presence of full control, one cannot 
identify two different wills. This explains why the Court used the word ‘similar’ in Teckal. The 
situation, to which the Court refers, is comparable to a real in house-relation, yet it is not the 
same. For that reason, one should describe the Teckal case law as quasi-in-house. 
 
It appears that the Court has avoided the possible risk that all agreements concluded by public 
authorities would fall under the public procurement regime, even agreements concluded with 
related public bodies.646 The Court here behaves as legislator, and from a democratic perspective 
this must be criticised. However, the Court is rather creating a rule specifying precisely where EU 
law may not be applied and, in particular, in a situation where the Directives seem to imply the 
opposite. This interpretation consequently seems to favour the Member States. For once the Court 
is not extending applicability of EU law but is instead providing an instrument whereby the 
applicability of EU law can be limited. 
 
The question that then arises is whether it was wise for the Court to establish such criteria in the 
first ruling where the question arose about the applicability of EU law to vertical cooperative 
agreements. The Court seems itself to have answered this question implicitly in the negative when 
                                                 
642 Opinion Advocate General Léger C-94/99, ARGE Gewässerschutz v. Bundesministerium für Land- und 
Forstwirtschaft [2002] ECR I-11037, at [73] and [74]. 
643 M. Comba, ‘In-House Providing in Italy: the circulation of a model’, in M. Comba and S. Treumer (Eds.), The 
In-house providing in European law (Copenhagen: Djof Publishing, 2010), pp. 101-103. 
644 See also Opinion Advocate General Stix-Hackl case C-26/03, Stadt Halle and RPL Recyclingpark Lochau 
GmbH v. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische Restabfall- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] ECR I-
00001, at [65]. 
645 D. Deom, ‘Quel avenir pour le service public local à l’heure européenne’ (Mouv.comm., 2004), p. 464. 
646 Y.-R. Guillou, ‘L’exonération des relations ‘in house’ du régime des marches publics’, (ACCP 32,2004), p. 
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issuing its first ruling647 in regard to a horizontal cooperative association. The Court seems to have 
deliberately not yet spelled out any criteria. Furthermore, the two Teckal criteria are strictly 
formal criteria that in part hinder a functional interpretation. Thus it required an entire evolution 
of CJEU case law to arrive at an interpretation that provides more freedom to public authorities to 
organise their own public services. The thesis purports to argue that it would have been better if 
the CJEU, as in Deliege648 had applied a completely functional construction on the public 
procurement Directives; the result would have been the same. 
 
In Teckal the Court attempts with the concept ‘contract’ to find a solution to the problem of the 
applicability of the public procurement Directives to cooperative agreements between public 
authorities. The reasoning seems to be that if certain criteria are met, there are not two 
expressions of will and hence there is also no contract. Some authors believe that the CJEU case law 
on cooperative agreements still takes the concept ‘contract’ as a starting point.649 The ruling in 
RI.SAN650 seems to contradict this statement. In this ruling the CJEU found it of no importance if a 
contract was present to apply the free movement rules.651 In Parking Brixen,652 however, the Court 
seems to deny that quasi-in-house case law is based on the concept ‘contract’. This notion is not 
relevant for the applicability of the principles of equal treatment and transparency to the awarding 
of a service concession. Consequently the concept ‘contract’ may likewise not be relevant for 
placing the same situation beyond the scope of these provisions and these principles. According to 
this thesis, the CJEU case law proves that the notion ‘contract’ is not able to explain why vertical 
and horizontal cooperative agreements under certain circumstances fall out of the scope of EU law. 
 
By opting for this notion of ‘contract’ as a primary premise, the CJEU likewise bound itself to its 
case law in which the concept of ‘public contract’ is interpreted broadly in order to place as many 
arrangements as possible under the jurisdiction of the Directives. This choice is also decisive for the 
interpretation the Court would give to the two criteria that were designed precisely in Teckal to 
create an exception to the applicability of the Directives. This necessarily had to lead to a strict 
interpretation. But this was still not enough to affect a real balance between, on the one hand, the 
competence of the Member States to regulate the organisation of their public service tasks and the 
competence of the EU on the other. 
 
                                                 
647 Case C-480/06, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany [2009] ECR I-
04747. 
648 Joined cases C-51/96 and C-191/97, Christelle Deliège v. Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées 
ASBL, Ligue belge de judo ASBL, Union européenne de judo and François Pacquée [2000] ECR I-2549. 
649 J. Wiggen, ‘Public procurement rules and cooperation between public sector entities : the limits of the in-
house doctrine under EU procurement law’ (PPLR, 2011), pp. 157 et s. 
650 Case C-108/98, RI.SAN. Srl v. Comune di Ischia, Italia Lavoro SpA and Ischia Ambiente SpA [2000] ECR I-
05219. 
651 At [20]. 
652 Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen GmbH v. Gemeinde Brixen [2005] ECR I-08585, at [60]. 
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For a long time public authorities had to wait for further elaboration of the two Teckal criteria. 
However, the CJEU, since 2005, has had in several opportunities to provide further explanation on 
the two Teckal-criteria. 
 
2.2. The control criterion 
 
In the first place the CJEU ruled in Teckal that a public authority must have a control over the third 
party similar to that which it exercises over its own departments, for a cooperative agreement to 
fall beyond the reach of EU law. Most of the Court's case law is concerned with this criterion. It is 
the most controversial criterion and it is also the one that is most difficult to interpret. As 
mentioned above the CJEU did not explain in Teckal what it meant by exercising over another 
person a control that is similar to that which a public authority exercises over its own departments. 
Before 2005, the CJEU did not have the opportunity to clarify the control criterion.653 
 
What kind of elements are important to determine whether a public authority has the necessary 
control to equate it to that it exercises over its own departments? In their Opinions preceding ARGE 
and Stadt Halle Advocates General Leger and Stix-Hackl took the opportunity to explain their view 
on the control criterion. According to Leger it is for the national court to consider in detail the 
evidence available.654 Leger did not provide any concrete examples on how to check the sufficiency 
of the control. But Stix-Hackl tried to find a definition at European level. In general she considered 
that it was not enough to make a purely abstract assessment based on the legal form chosen for the 
entity over which control is exercised. Provisions governing the specific situation would be 
decisive.655 
 
The ‘control’ question arises in three different situations, which Advocate General Stix-Hackl 
distinguished in her Opinion to Stadt Halle : (1) awards to wholly owned companies, owned 100% by 
the contracting authority or entities which may be equated with that public authority; (2) awards to 
joint public companies whose shares are held by a number of contracting authorities; (3) and 
awards to semi-public companies, in which genuinely private parties hold a stake.656 According to 
the thesis a distinction may be drawn on the basis of case law between two situations: either the 
third party consists of at least one private undertaking as shareholder (private input) or, the only or 
all shareholder(s) are public authorities (public input). For both situations CJEU case law is 
                                                 
653 It is with Stadt Halle the CJEU made its first finding explaining the control-criterion: Case C-26/03, Stadt 
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available. This case law will be examined in this Section. Next, the Section will look into whether it 
is enough for the various shareholders of an entity to exercise jointly control over it. 
 
2.2.1. Private input 
 
Since the 1980s public authorities all over Europe have evaluated alternative models of financing 
and operating national and regional public infrastructure. Public Private Partnerships (PPP) were 
increasingly used.657 Given the economic crisis, public authorities do not always have the finances to 
complete complex tasks. PPP is a modern way to manage public tasks. Private partners not only 
provide a service to a public authority, but they also participate in several kinds of risks of the 
public authority. The European Commission also saw the importance of PPPs, and accordingly, has 
issued a number of diverse guidelines of relevance to these matters.658 
 
A number of public authorities saw in Teckal a means to set up PPPs as a way of escaping the public 
procurement rules.659 It would follow that all cooperative agreements between public authorities 
themselves lie beyond the scope of public procurement Directives even if a public authority 
contains a private shareholder —provided, of course, that the two Teckal-criteria are met. Indeed 
the Court did not specify in Teckal what kind of shareholders the operator, executing the contract, 
had to be composed of.  
 
In light of the growing use of PPP it is useful to question whether the assignment of tasks by a public 
authority to a legal person created separately by a public authority with a private shareholder is not 
also subject to public procurement Directives. Are such entities able to benefit from the exemption 
created by the Court in Teckal, or more specifically, in such a situation is control exercised in a 
form similar to the exercise of control over one’s own services? These questions also implicitly 
contain the question of to what extent the element of 'capital’ is important for meeting the first 
Teckal-criterion? Considering the economic importance of PPP and the knowledge that the 
application of public procurement Directives entails ancillary costs, energy and time the answer to 
this question was of major practical importance. 
 
At the beginning of 2005 the CJEU examined this in Stadt Halle.660 The Court had to deal with a 
situation where a public authority (the city of Halle) awarded a contract for waste disposal to a 
company (RPL Lochau), 75.1% owned by the public authority and the remaining 24.9% by a private 
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limited liability company (private input). The contract was awarded without any competitive 
procedure. Thus, the public authority did not apply EU law (public procurement Directives). 
 
The situation as described in the documents submitted to the Court was not an internal 
relationship. As the public authority and the supplier were not participating in a real in-house 
situation the CJEU had recourse to Teckal.661 In the Teckal case the distinct entity was wholly owned 
by the contracting authority but in Stadt Halle there was a significant amount of private capital in 
the ownership of the supplier. According to the Court the participation, even as a minority, of a 
private undertaking in the capital of a company in which the particular contracting authority is also 
a participant, excludes the possibility of that contracting authority exercising control over that 
company similar to the control it exercises over its own departments.662 The Court created a 
presumption. Private participation excludes the application of the Teckal-solution. 
 
The Court thus took a different view from Advocate General Stix-Hackl who considered that the 
level of a public contracting authority’s shareholding cannot be the only critical factor and that the 
Teckal-criteria must be extended to apply not only to wholly owned companies but also to semi-
public companies.663 In her Opinion the Advocate General advanced some notions to help to 
determine control, notions that the CJEU would use in its later case law: supervisory powers, 
namely a comprehensive control on strategic market decisions, and individual management 
decisions.664  
 
The CJEU advanced two reasons for its finding. First, the relationship between a public authority 
and its own departments is fully governed by public interest considerations whilst private capital 
investment in an undertaking follows private interest considerations. Second, the award of a public 
contract to a semi-public company without calling for tenders would interfere with the objectives 
of undistorted competition and equal treatment, in particular because ‘such a procedure would 
offer a private undertaking an advantage over its competitors’.665 It is the last consideration that 
convinced legal scholars to approve the ruling: ‘Any other position would amount to an elusion of 
the principles of transparency and open and fair competition’.666 
 
The Court primarily looks at the relationship between the contracting authority and its departments 
or its subsidiaries. The aim of the relationship (or the measure) influences the application of EU 
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law. If the relationship is governed by considerations and requirements proper to the pursuit of 
objectives in the public interest, EU law is then less likely to be applicable. 
 
Second, the Court based its ruling on the objectives of the public procurement Directives, which are 
also linked to goals of the internal market: the objective of free and undistorted competition and 
the principle of equal treatment. Insofar as a situation created by a public authority favours a 
private company, the application of EU law is relevant. At this point the ‘market access’ criterion 
becomes a relevant consideration. If a State measure (decision to cooperate) prevents or makes 
extremely difficult access by companies to the national market there is a violation of the principle 
of equality. In that situation it distorts competition. 
 
This reinforces the opinion of Hatzopoulos that the object of a measure influences the presence of 
an economic activity and hence EU law would be applicable.667 In Deliège668 the CJEU assumed that 
a restriction to the fundamental freedoms falls outside the scope of EU law if this limitation is 
inherent to the conduct of the State (i.e. a national sport federation) (see chapter 4). One could 
argue that the presence of a private undertaking confirms the economic object of the State 
measure (i.e. the decision to cooperate). 
 
Although the Court seemed to consider Teckal as an exception to the application of the public 
procurement Directives, Stadt Halle’s ruling669 appeared to consider otherwise. In the case of a 
purely in-house situation a contracting authority is not required to apply the public procurement 
Directives. The Court added that a call for tenders is also not mandatory in other circumstances. 
Thus, the Court referred to the quasi-in-house situation and it seems that this situation also falls 
outside the scope of European Union law and more specifically of the public procurement 
Directives. 
 
In Mödling670 the Court adds that the contribution of private capital pursues other objectives. In 
using the expression ‘other objectives’, the Court meant economic objectives or objectives that are 
not of general public interest. The nature of the capital of which company is composed, also 
determines the economic nature of the relationship between a contracting authority and a third 
party and thus the applicability of the public procurement Directives and EU law in general. 
 
With these considerations the CJEU gave a more restrictive interpretation to the concept of control 
than it is used to do in competition cases: ‘Thus, the fact that the contracting authority has a 
majority holding in the capital of its subsidiary, the fact that it exercises the majority of the voting 
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rights and the fact that it appoints the majority of the members of the subsidiary’s managerial 
bodies may – together with any agreements between the members – combine to support the 
conclusion as to the existence of control within the meaning of competition law and make the 
subsidiary a public undertaking within the meaning of Article 86 (1) EC; such considerations are not 
sufficient, however, to support the assumption of a – more extensive – control similar to that which 
it exercises over its own departments’.671 It also seems to go further than the dependency relation 
requires to qualify a legal person as a body governed by public law (See chapter 3). For there to be 
a dependency it is sufficient, for instance, that it be demonstrated that the legal person is for the 
most part financed by a public authority or several public authorities. This consequently does not 
rule out the presence of a private shareholder. 
 
The Stadt Halle’s ruling can be found in more brief considerations in Coname,672 ANAV,673 Agusta674 
and Coditel Brabant675: in so far as the enterprise is a company which is open, even in part, to 
private capital, that fact precludes it from being regarded as a structure for the ‘in-house’ 
management of a public service on behalf of the controlling local authority. As a result, the mere 
existence of a private shareholder in an enterprise precludes an a priori application of the quasi in 
house-exemption.676  
 
Thus public private partnerships, embracing the recourse of the public authority for resources to 
the private partner, will always fall within the scope of Directive 2004/18/EC. This shows the 
influence EU law has on the choices of a public authority for organising its public tasks. If a public 
authority chooses to do this via a PPP, its freedom of contract is limited. Indeed, the choice of 
contract partner is restrained by certain principles and the award procedures are provided in the 
public procurement Directives. The CJEU emphasizes the restrictive character of the quasi-in-house 
case law.677 This case law must not be understood in a broad sense. The choice of how a public 
authority has to organise its own public services is thus limited. 
 
Thus in Stadt Halle the CJEU makes a second constitutional choice. Whenever a public authority 
chooses to allow its public service tasks to be carried out by an entity in which private capital is 
involved, then such a situation falls within the competence of the EU. 
 
Once the presence of private capital in an undertaking is established, that completes a task for a 
public authority, was sufficient to confirm that the agreement with this public authority fell under 
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the public procurement Directives, another question arises as to the relevant point in the public 
procurement procedure the consideration of private capital should be determined. 
 
In Mödling678 the CJEU gave its answer to this question. It is generally appropriate to consider the 
public authority’s possible obligation to set up a public tendering procedure in the context of the 
circumstances prevailing on the date on which the particular public contract is awarded. Private 
capital must consequently be deemed to be present at the same moment the contract is awarded. 
But the particular circumstances of a case could, according to the Court, require that events 
occurring subsequently be taken into account.679 In the specific case there were reasons to give 
consideration to facts that occurred after the contract was awarded so that the control criterion is 
met.  
 
According to the Court, Mödling has to be considered an exceptional ruling.680 Normally, the actual 
date on which the public contract is awarded determines whether the provisions of the public 
procurement Directives must be applied. Only in very special circumstances must the public 
authority take into account events that took place after the contract has been awarded. Such is 
obviously the case where a public authority seeks to avoid the application of tendering procedures. 
In Sea, the Court confirms the presence of special circumstances ‘when shares in the contracting 
company, previously wholly owned by the contracting authority, are transferred to a private 
undertaking shortly after the contract at issue has been awarded to that company’.681 The CJEU 
dismantled the artificial construction.682  
 
According to the Court, the fact that a company with limited shares is also open in the future to 
private capital, does not per se negate control similar to the control a public authority exercises 
over its own departments. The fact that after the attribution of the contract, but still during the 
period for which that contract was valid, private shareholders were permitted to hold capital in 
that company would at that same moment be tantamount to modification of a fundamental 
condition of the contract, which would in turn, according to the Court, require the contract to be 
put out for competitive tender.683  
 
  
                                                 
678 Case C-29/04, Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of Austria [2005] ECR I-09705, at [47]. 
679 At [39]. 
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682 See also F. Avarkioti, ‘The application of EU Public Procurement Rules to ‘In-house’ arrangements’ (PPLR, 
2007), p. 30. In Commission v. Germany the Court advanced the same element to judge a horizontal 
cooperative agreements: Case C-480/06, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of 
Germany [2009] ECR I-04747, at [48]. 
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167 
 
2.2.2. Public input 
 
It is understandable that the CJEU had a more restrictive view on situations where a public 
authority engages a semi-public enterprise if one considers the economic purposes of the European 
Treaties (TEU and TFEU) and of Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC. The presence of a private 
undertaking as shareholder of a contracting partner can give competitive advantage if the 
contracting partner is chosen without an award procedure being completed on the principle of 
equality. Public authorities were eager to know if the Court would have the same restrictive point 
of view when an undertaking is fully public owned with only public capital.  
 
This form of cooperation has been the subject of a long and on-going evolution in case law. As time 
passes, the CJEU seems to be applying the control-criterion with more flexibility. However, one may 
ask whether this flexibility is an actual choice of the CJEU, rather than being caused by the de facto 
and de jure elements of each case.  
 
The CJEU had two possible ways to resolve the problem of cooperative agreements between ‘public-
owned’ public authorities. On the one hand, it could devise a presumption as it did in Stadt Halle684: 
namely, when a subsidiary is fully owned by public capital, the control-criterion is fulfilled. On the 
other hand it could examine all elements of the case and decide whether on their basis a ‘similar’ 
control exists.  
 
In Parking Brixen685 the CJEU took the second option, as Advocate General Kokott likewise did in her 
Opinion686 where she followed the strict interpretation of the first Teckal-criterion in earlier 
decisions on private input.687 A national judge must, according to the Court, take account of all the 
legislative provisions and relevant circumstances. From that assessment it must follow that the 
operator in question is under a type of control that enables the public authority to influence the 
operator’s decisions.688 This control must be sufficiently powerful to have decisive influence over 
both strategic objectives and significant decisions. In Econord689 the CJEU synthesises this control as 
a structural and functional control. According to Econord this control has to be effective. A public 
authority has to prove that it complies with the first Teckal-criterion. However, how can a public 
authority prove this? 
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In Centro Hospitalar de Setúbal690 the fact that the contractor had the legal form of an association 
governed by private law and that it was non-profit, was irrelevant to solve the problem of the first 
Teckal-criterion.691  
 
The CJEU examines  if a power of decisive influence is present in order to verify the control-
criterion.  It depends on the degree of independence an operator enjoys from the public 
authority.692 The independence of an operator enables it to operate independently of the public 
authority that has engaged it. Thus an operator may be considered to be like any other undertaking 
operating on the market. As a criterion, the independence of an undertaking may be construed as a 
factor directly associated with the objectives of the European Union; namely, free trade and free 
competition. If a public authority should conclude an agreement with such an independent 
undertaking without compliance with the principle of equality or without the tendering procedures 
provided in the public procurement Directives, this undertaking receives an unfair advantage over 
its competitors. Thus, this bears a link to the ‘market access’ criterion as used by the Court of 
Justice when adjudicating on the application of TFEU provisions on free movement. If the 
contracting party is market-oriented, competition is distorted since other undertakings are not 
given the chance to enter the market. 
 
As an illustration of the degree of independence, and thus to demonstrate that a decisive influence 
exists, the CJEU in its case law has placed emphasis on a number of different factors. On the basis 
of this case law there are mainly three factors that are important: capital, the market-oriented 
character and control mechanisms.693 Once again, the CJEU provides no simple explanation as to 
why it considers these factors to be important or what legislation it invokes to give these factors 
prominence. 
 
From Stadt Halle it becomes clear that the nature of the capital says something about the possible 
objectives of the operator the public authority engages in.694 The objectives determine in part that 
the operator will act as an undertaking and consequently a state measure in respect of said 
operator could also give the operator an advantage and thus distort competition. As regards capital 
the Stadt Halle ruling confirmed that capital must be entirely public. But is this enough to claim it is 
a 'similar' control'? In Carbotermo the Court considers: ‘The fact that the contracting authority 
holds, alone or together with other public authorities, all of the share capital in a successful 
tenderer tends to indicate, without being decisive, that that contracting authority exercises over 
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that company a control similar to that which it exercises over its own departments’.695 The presence 
of fully public owned capital suggests that control is similar. But Coditel Brabant shows that this is 
not enough to satisfy the first Teckal-criterion. The Court considered it necessary in this case to 
explore still other factors of relevance.696 It underscores the rather restrictive position of the CJEU, 
i.e. to keep cooperative agreements between public authorities within the scope of EU law. 
 
For a similar control to exist in the present sense, the operator may not be market-oriented. In 
Parking Brixen the CJEU amasses a number of factual elements to come to the conclusion that the 
operator is market-oriented. The Court places particular emphasis on one item, namely, the 
considerable and broad powers of the administrative board to manage the operator. It shows the 
broad independence of the operator.697 This element reappears in Carbotermo. The Court noted 
that the day-to-day management of the subsidiary by its board of executives was not constrained by 
any special supervision or veto powers enjoyed by the public authority.698 It was also significant that 
the subsidiary concerned was only indirectly owned by the public authority through an intermediary 
holding company. This could weaken any control exercised over the subsidiary.699 Thus, as in 
Parking Brixen, the Court looked at the measure of independence of the public authority performing 
the task. Thus, if such independence is established, the public authority must be subject to 
competition whenever it concludes a contract with another public authority. 
 
However, in Coditel Brabant the CJEU makes clear that even if an administrative board enjoys the 
widest powers, it cannot automatically render the operator market-oriented for all that. The 
operator’s objectives seem also to be important. If the operator aims solely at objectives of general 
interest that are the same as the objectives of the public authority or authorities affiliated with it, 
the operator is then not market-oriented.700 This is also the position of Hatzopoulos namely, that 
the object of a measure is one of the elements to determine whether EU law must be applied.701 
Cooperative agreements between public authorities that aim only at objectives of public interest 
have no or little influence on the market. 
 
The notion of ‘control mechanisms’ is used to assess to what extent the organs of the operator are 
able to take independent decisions. In Sea702 this was decisive in the consideration that a similar 
control was present. The affiliated public authorities had in this case much influence, via the organs 
of the operator, to make important decisions.703 In Econord704 the Court considered that it is 
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certainly not essential that each of those public authorities should in itself have an individual power 
of control over that entity.705 But each of the public authorities has to establish that it has effective 
control to meet the first Teckal-criterion. A pure formal affiliation is not sufficient to exempt the 
public authority from putting in place a tendering procedure. It is not sufficient that a public 
authority holds a capital share in the entity. It must also play a role in its managing bodies.706 In 
Coditel Brabant the Court had already ruled that control must be effective.707 The effective control 
must be present on the basis of the elements capital, the market-oriented character and control 
mechanisms. 
 
2.2.3. Jointly exercised control 
 
The preceding point made clear what kind of control the CJEU expects to fulfil the first Teckal-
criterion. Another question that has arisen in the examined case law is to what extend this control 
has to be present in one public authority if several public authorities are affiliated to the operator 
with whom it cooperates. 
 
According to the CJEU in Carbotermo708 control need not be exercised only by one public authority 
alone, but could also be exercised together with other public authorities.709 It is this last 
consideration the Court used in two subsequent cases (Asemfo710 and Coditel711) to temper a more 
restrictive interpretation of the first Teckal-criterion. Although Carbotermo seems at first glance to 
opt for a strict interpretation of the first Teckal-criterion, this decision left the door open to other 
possible ways for public authorities to cooperate without EU law being applicable.  
 
The most important contribution concerning the jointly exercised control is found in Coditel 
Brabant.712 Must the ‘similar control’-criterion be met exclusively by one public authority or is it 
sufficient to be met collectively, i.e. by all the public authorities together composing the operator?  
 
The CJEU found a jointly exercised control to be sufficient. To require the control exercised by a 
public authority in such a case to be individual would have, according to the Court, the effect of 
requiring a call for competition in the majority of cases where a public authority seeks to create an 
entity composed of other public authorities, such as an inter-municipal cooperative association. This 
would be inconsistent with EU rules allowing public authorities to perform jointly the public-interest 
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tasks conferred on them by using their own administrative, technical and other resources, without 
being obliged to call on outside entities not forming part of its own departments.713 The procedure, 
which is used for adopting decisions, such as majority rule, is of no importance. 
 
The answer to the question of jointly control could be considered to have been already present in 
Stadt Halle where the Court emphasised the relevancy of the fact that the contracting party of the 
public authority was a consortium of several contracting authorities.714 The Court appears to 
confirm that the control-criterion could be met if the subsidiary consists of several public 
authorities, even if one public authority, member of the subsidiary, does not have a complete 
control of it. 
 
2.2.4. Conclusion 
 
Vertical cooperative agreements between public authorities, even when they are entirely public-
owned, could fall within the scope of EU law. This is the case when this kind of cooperative 
agreements is considered to be a public contract or service concession. In all these situations, 
however, there is also a possibility this kind of cooperative agreements will fall outside the scope of 
EU law.  
 
A cooperative agreement between public authorities, in the form of a public contract or a service 
concession, lies outside the scope of EU law, when it is established that one public authority, 
perhaps together with other public authorities, exercises a control over the other that is similar to 
the control it exercises over its own departments. This criterion exposes an important form of 
dependency between the two public authorities. This dependency of the entity on a public authority 
signifies that the entity could actually not be compared with other undertakings active on the 
market. The operator is unable to conduct a policy on its own. The end aspired to by this 
cooperative agreement is also not economic in nature. It aims at objectives of general interest. 
Market access for the other undertakings in this situation is not threatened. Through the decision to 
cooperate (State measure) the situation (cooperative agreement) remains within the ambit of public 
administration.  
 
Based on CJEU case law this criterion is a presumptive expression of two ideas. First, the particular 
situation is regulated solely by considerations and requirements appropriate to the pursuit of 
objectives in the public interest. Second, in the case of a 'similar control' there is no risk that 
competition will be distorted. 
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The application of EU law can be excluded where several public authorities are shareholders of the 
public authority that is to provide the services. Each of the participating public authorities must 
exercise an effective influence and they must together ensure that the public authority is not 
independent. 
 
With the notion of ‘control’ the Court introduced a formal criterion for determining the 
applicability of EU law. The Court interprets this notion functionally throughout. The Court thus 
determines on the basis of the objectives of the internal market the power of Member States to 
regulate the organisation and management of public tasks.  
 
Throughout the case law it is clear that the CJEU is always seeking a balance between, on the one 
hand, the competence of the EU to sustain free movement and free competition and, on the other, 
the competence of the Member States in regard to the organisation or the management of public 
service tasks. Starting from a rather formal premise, the CJEU gradually ended up with a functional 
interpretation of the control-criterion. But it also suggests that in Teckal it would have been better 
had the Court not used formal criteria to keep cooperative agreements between public authorities 
outside the scope of EU law under certain conditions. This has, in our opinion, resulted in a broad 
interpretation of the Directives in favour of the EU. The Directives published on 28 March 2014 in 
the OJEU suggest that the Member States were not happy with this course of events. The Directives 
provide a number of corrections to this broad interpretation (See section 4 of the present chapter). 
 
2.3. The activities criterion 
 
2.3.1. Need for a second criterion? 
 
The public procurement Directives and Articles 49 and 56 TFEU, together with the general principles 
they express, must be regarded as normative if a contract is concluded between a public authority 
and a person legally distinct from that public authority. The public authority needs to organise a 
transparent procedure to safeguard an equal treatment of the interested economic operators. The 
Directives and principles however do not apply if, in addition to the control criterion, the following 
condition is fulfilled: the undertaking controlled by the public authority must perform the majority 
of its activities with the controlling authority or authorities. According to Teckal,715 compliance with 
the control criterion is not sufficient to exclude a vertical cooperative agreement from the scope of 
public procurement Directives. A second criterion has also to be met: the activities criterion. 
 
Simply establishing the existence of structural dependence in relation to the public authority that is 
to award a public contract is not of itself sufficient to make the services provided by the other 
public authority comparable to the services that would be available to the public authority were it 
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to use its own internal resources.716 The presence of the 'activities'-criterion is necessary to prevent 
a public authority from competing with other undertakings via its activities. 
 
This second Teckal-criterion has not been treated extensively in CJEU case law. An initial 
explanation is the fact that the Court always begins by checking the control criterion. Most cases 
considered by the Court failed this first criterion. Thus, there has been no need for the Court to 
check the second criterion. The application of this criterion also seems less difficult. Thus, the 
presence of a quasi-in-house situation depends principally on whether the first Teckal-criterion has 
been met.  
 
Carbotermo717 explains the ratio of the second Teckal-criterion. The fulfilment of this criterion is 
necessary to determine if the separate enterprise is not competing through its activities with third 
parties.718 According to Advocate General Leger the ruling in Teckal is based on the criterion of the 
autonomy of the economic operator.719 Such autonomy, however, is present if the operator is able 
to perform important economic activities for third parties (for the market). In that case, it is 
logical, according to the Advocate General, that the operator be subject to the rules of the market. 
However, if the operator acts primarily for public authorities that control it as they control their 
own services, there is no reason for competition.720 Public procurement Directives endeavour to give 
equal chances to all parties who perform the required activities. It would be a disadvantage if one 
of the competitorswho for a relevant part of his activities is not dependent on a public 
authorityis certain to obtain contracts without fearing competition. Once again EU law appears to 
be applicable if a measure taken by the public authority might hinder the free market. 
 
CJEU case law is primarily concerned with two issues relating to the activities-criterion namely the 
amount of activities an operator may perform for a public authority and whether the activities be 
accomplished by one public authority or is it acceptable that the required activities be 
accomplished by the several different public authorities that make up the cooperative association? 
 
2.3.2. Kind of activities 
 
The CJEU had the opportunity in Carbotermo721 for the first time to clarify the amount of activities 
required to meet the second Teckal-criterion. In order to determine whether the necessary 
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activities are directed to the public authority, the national court must take into account all the 
facts of the case, both qualitative and quantitative.722 
 
The CJEU made clear the manner in which the activities criterion should be understood. An 
undertaking's activity must principally be devoted to a public authority and any other activities are 
only of marginal significance. The relevant activities of the successful undertaking are all those 
activities which that undertaking carries out as part of a contract awarded by the public authority, 
regardless of who is the beneficiary: the public authority itself or the user of the services.723 
According to Advocate General Stix-Hackl the notion ‘controlling authority’ can be understood in a 
broad sense.724 It would not concern only direct shareholders. But this does not include activities for 
third parties where the shareholder would otherwise have had to perform them itself.725 It is also 
irrelevant who pays the enterprise for the activities, whether it be the controlling authority or 
third-party users of the services provided under concessions or other legal relationships established 
by that authority.726 
 
The ‘activities criterion’ is applicable only to activities actually underperformed by a third operator 
at the conclusion of contract.727 Potential activities that may arise afterwards are in principle not 
relevant. 
 
In Carbotermo the CJEU looked at the turnover of the operator. In Asemfo the operator carried out 
more than 55 per cent of its activities for the Autonomous Activities and nearly 35 per cent with the 
State. From these considerations, the Court concluded that Tragsa carried out an essential part of 
its activities for the public authorities and bodies that controlled it.728 Thus, it appears from the two 
mentioned CJEU cases that although the Court formally states that quantitative and qualitative 
elements are equally important to determine the activities criterion, the Court uses mostly 
quantitative elements in its analysis. 
 
This can also be seen in Asociacion Profesional the Empresas.729 In this case the Court addressed an 
argument of the Spanish government. The latter argued that Correos was required to provide 
services to the public authorities and that this was an exclusive right. In that case it would be an 
exclusive cooperation, making the condition of the ‘essential activities’ in any case satisfied. 
Despite a possible exclusive right, the Court considered that this alone cannot satisfy the condition. 
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The second Teckal-criterion is intended to keep the public procurement Directives, and the 
principles of the Treaty, applicable to relationships with companies that can compete with other 
companies.730  
 
In Asociacion Profesional the Empresas, Correos there were an unspecified number of independent 
customers and 2000 competitors. Given the significant number of customers, Correos cannot be said 
to perform the essential part of its activities solely for public authorities. So another element other 
than a quantitative one should be taken into account. The framework within which Correos operates 
is also crucial.  
 
Even today it is not clear at which stage an undertaking carries out an essential part of its activities 
for a public authority. Advocate General Stix-Hackl invoked in her opinion preceding Stadt Halle, 
Article 23 of Directive 2004/17/EC, which excludes contracts awarded to so-called affiliated 
enterprises from the scope of the Directive whose turnover-based threshold is above 80%.731 The 
Advocate General is however not convinced by the 80% ‘rule’. The Directives published on 28 March 
2014 confirm the 80 % threshold.732 
 
2.3.3. Several controlling public authorities 
 
If several public authorities hold the share capital of the successful enterprise, it may be relevant to 
consider whether the activities to be taken into account are those which the enterprise carries out 
for all the controlling public authorities or only the activities carried out for a specific public 
authority.  
 
It should be borne in mind in this connection that the Court has stated that the legally distinct 
person in question must carry out the essential part of its activities with ‘the controlling local 
authority or authorities’.733 It thus envisaged the possibility that the exception provided for could 
apply not only in cases where a single authority controls such a legal person, but also where several 
public authorities do so. Where several public authorities control an enterprise, the condition 
relating to the essential part of its activities may be met if that enterprise carries out the essential 
part of its activities, not necessarily for one of the public authorities, but for all of them.734  
 
Accordingly, the activities to be taken into account in the case of an enterprise controlled by one or 
more public authorities are those which that enterprise carries out for all the public authorities. 
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[92]. 
732 Article 17 of Directive 2014/23/EU ; Article 12 of Directive 2014/24/EU ; Article 28 of Directive 
2014/25/EU.  
733 Case C-107/98, Teckal v. Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121. 
734 Case C-295/05, Asociación Nacional de Empresas Forestales (Asemfo) v. Transformación Agraria SA (Tragsa) 
[2007] ECR I-02999 at [70]. 
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2.3.4. Conclusion 
 
It would not be logical if an independent body should offer services to other operators or local 
authorities without being subject to legislation applicable to public contracts, when it is acting in 
circumstances comparable to those of a traditional economic operator. Its public origin and nature 
are not sufficient to mark it out from other service providers on the market if it is offering the same 
type of services for a similar commercial purpose. The principle of equality imposes that 
comparable situations must be treated equally. Free access to the market has to be guaranteed in 
the same way to all competitors. In regard to public contracts and service concessions public 
authorities have to safeguard equal treatment and transparency. This protection is not necessary if 
the ‘operator’ does not act on the market. 
 
The service provider must carry out the essential part of its activity for the controlling public 
authority or authorities. Consequently, if it engages in commercial activities, the public 
procurement Directives and the principle of equality are applicable, unless those activities 
represent a marginal part of its overall activity.  
 
 
3. Contractual or horizontal cooperative agreements 
 
Until 2009 the CJEU only ruled on situations where public or contracting authorities were member 
of a separate legal entity that then provides services to one or several of these public or contracting 
authorities. This is to be distinguished from the situation where public or contracting authorities 
commit themselves to one another under a contract without becoming together part of a separate 
legal person (horizontal cooperative agreements). Recall that the Court has previously held that a 
contracting or public authority cannot exclude a contract concluded with another public or 
contracting authority from the scope of the public procurement Directives or the principle of 
equality.735 
 
In the last years, the CJEU has had five times the chance to elaborate on horizontal cooperative 
agreements between public authorities: twice in Grand Chamber, which underscores the importance 
of these rulings.736 First, this section will investigate CJEU case law (3.1.). Some relevant 
commentary will then follow (3.2.). 
 
3.1. Analysis of the relevant case law 
  
                                                 
735 Case C-84/03, Commission v. Spain [2005] ECR I-00139.  
736 Case C-480/06, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany [2009] ECR I-
04747; Case C-159/11, Azienda Sanitaria Locale di Lecce, Università del Salento v. Ordine degli Ingegneri della 
Provincia di Lecce and Others [2012] ECR I-00000. 
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It follows from Commission v. Germany737 that the particular form of a contract is not important for 
determining whether cooperative agreements between public authorities is subject to EU law.738 
This consideration paved the way for the CJEU to create criteria for another situation (horizontal 
cooperative agreement) to fall outside the scope of EU law. In Ordine degli Ingegneri739 and 
Piepenbrock740 the CJEU ruled that its case law on horizontal cooperative agreements is applicable 
to all kinds of public authorities, not only local authorities. The same two cases confirmed two 
types of contracts concluded between public authorities do not fall within the scope of EU law. 
 
The first category of contracts are those that meet the Teckal-criteria (vertical cooperation) and 
the second category involves horizontal cooperative agreements. Both categories of cooperation 
must meet a number of other criteria in order to be exempted from the application of EU law. 
There are, in other words, two different types of contract, each with its own, separate criteria. 
Hence, a contract need not necessarily meet the Teckal-criteria to avoid being subject to EU law. 
 
The case law on horizontal cooperative agreements indicates that the CJEU always confirms first 
whether a control similar to the one the public authority has over its own services exists.741 If this is 
not the case, the Court in the relevant case law had the choice of either declaring EU law 
applicable or seeking new criteria to exclude horizontal cooperation from the scope of EU law. The 
Court took the second option, thus widening the competence of the Member States. This option 
expresses the Court's desire in certain situations to safeguard the competence of the Member States 
in matters concerning the organisation and management of public tasks. 
 
Horizontal cooperative agreements fall outside the scope of EU law insofar as public authorities 
establish cooperation with each other aimed at ensuring that a public task that they are required to 
perform is in fact accomplished.742 From the Ordine degli Ingegneri ruling it appears to follow that a 
contract signed between public authorities has at least to ensure the implementation of any task 
                                                 
737 Case C-480/06, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany [2009] ECR I-
04747. See on this case and its implications : M.T. Karayigit, ‘A new type of exemption from the EU rules on 
public procurement established: “in the neighbour’s house” provision of public interest tasks’ (PPLR, 2010), pp. 
183-197. 
738 Case C-480/06, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany [2009] ECR I-
04747, at [47]. 
739 Case C-159/11, Azienda Sanitaria Locale di Lecce, Università del Salento v. Ordine degli Ingegneri della 
Provincia di Lecce and Others [2012] ECR I-00000, at [31]. 
740 Case C-386/11, Piepenbrock Dienstleistungen & Co. KG v. Kreis Düren [2013] ECR I-00000, at [33]. See also 
C-564/11, Consulta Regionale Ordine Ingegneri della Lombardia e.a. v. Comune di Pavia [2013] ECR-00000, at 
[32]; Case C-352/12, Consiglio Nazionale degli Ingegneri v. Comune di Castelvecchio Subequo [2013] ECR-
00000, at [40]. 
741 At [39]. 
742 Case C-480/06, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany [2009] ECR I-
04747, at [37]; Case C-159/11, Azienda Sanitaria Locale di Lecce, Università del Salento v. Ordine degli 
Ingegneri della Provincia di Lecce and Others [2012] ECR I-00000, at [34]; Case C-386/11, Piepenbrock 
Dienstleistungen & Co. KG v. Kreis Düren [2013] ECR I-00000, at [36]. 
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that all public authorities are required to perform.743 This is the first criterion a horizontal 
cooperative agreement must meet if it is to be excluded from the scope of EU law.744  
 
When a public authority enters a cooperative agreement (a state measure), there are no economic 
reasons involved; the decision pursues an objective that is by its nature of general interest. As with 
a vertical cooperative agreement, the Court has formulated no exception to the applicability of 
public procurement Directives. The Directives are not applicable, simply because the contract has 
no effect on the market. As in the Coditel Brabant case,745 the various contracting authorities work 
together, i.e. they all provide a service and do not merely receive a service. With their jointly 
owned resources the participating public authorities discharge a public service task. This explains 
why the ruling in Commission v. Germany relies on Stadt Halle.746 For the first time, in the latter 
case, the Court ruled that a public authority could revert to its own resources without resorting to a 
tendering procedure.  
 
Whereas the CJEU in Commission v. Germany undertook a detailed investigation of all aspects of 
the facts747 before it in the end decided whether EU law was applicable, the Ordine degli Ingegneri 
ruling (a preliminary ruling) contained clear criteria for deciding this question. There are, according 
to the thesis, not five criteria as Advocate General Trstenak proposed in his opinion in Ordine degli 
Ingegneri.748 One criterion had already been discussed above. The two others are listed below: 
 
- No private provider of services shall be placed in a position of advantage vis-à-vis 
competitors. 
- Cooperation shall be governed solely by considerations and requirements relating to the 
pursuit of objectives in the public interest.749 
 
These criteria are cumulative.750 In Commission v. Germany the CJEU located the two last criteria 
within the more general framework of the objectives of public procurement Directives and EU law: 
‘such cooperation between public authorities does not undermine the principal objective of the 
Community rules on public procurement, that is, the free movement of services and the opening-up 
                                                 
743 At [37]. 
744 Case C-159/11, Azienda Sanitaria Locale di Lecce, Università del Salento v. Ordine degli Ingegneri della 
Provincia di Lecce and Others [2012] ECR I-00000, at [36]. 
745 Case C-324/07, Commune d’Uccle et Région Bruxelles-Capital [2008] ECR I-08457. 
746 Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle and RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH v. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische 
Restabfall- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] ECR I-00001. 
747 Case C-480/06, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany [2009] ECR I-
04747. 
748 Opinion Advocate General Trstenjak Case C-159/11, Azienda Sanitaria Locale di Lecce, Università del 
Salento v. Ordine degli Ingegneri della Provincia di Lecce and Others [2012] ECR I-00000, at [66]. See also 
Opinion Advocate General Mengozzi Case C-15/13, Technische Universität Hamburg-Harburg, Hochschul-
Informations-System GmbH v. Datenlotsen Informationssysteme GmbH [2014] ECR I-00000, at [50]. 
749 At [34], [35] and [40]. 
750 At [36]. Case C-564/11, Consulta Regionale Ordine Ingegneri della Lombardia e.a. v. Comune di Pavia 
[2013] ECR I-00000, at [37] ; Case C-352/12, Consiglio Nazionale degli Ingegneri contre Comune di 
Castelvecchio Subequo et Comune di Barisciano [2013] ECR I-00000, at [45]. 
179 
 
of undistorted competition in all the Member States’.751 When the sole purpose of a measure is the 
fulfilment of a general interest and, moreover, not one single undertaking enjoys an advantage, 
market access is not hindered. EU law is not applicable to such measures. 
 
In Ordine degli Ingegneri and Piepenbrock the CJEU tested a concrete situation against the three 
established criteria. The Court established that the contract contained sufficient elements showing 
that, in regard to at least one public authority in the cooperative association, the contract did not 
entail the implementation of a public task.752 The University of Salento performed activities that in 
principle were also executed by engineers or architects (study of the seismic vulnerability of 
hospital structures). This does not constitute academic research, which the Court implicitly 
considered to be an activity of general interest. In Piepenbrock one of the public authorities 
performed a service (cleaning buildings) for another public authority. In that case, the cooperative 
agreement is not established with a view to carrying out a public task that both public authorities 
were required to perform.753 
 
Second, in Ordine degli Ingegneri the Court observes that the University of Salento, which performs 
the service, may also employ third parties to do this. Consequently, a private enterprise can, 
according to the Court, thereby gain an advantage.754 The Court makes the same observation in 
Piepenbrock.755 
 
 
3.2. Comments 
 
The CJEU has developed specific rules concerning the application of EU law to horizontal 
cooperative agreements between public authorities. In addition to the Teckal-criteria, which are 
applicable to vertical cooperative agreements between public authorities, the Court has developed 
its own criteria for horizontal or contractual cooperation to exclude it from the scope of EU law. 
Teckal case law thus retains its relevance.  
 
Case law on horizontal cooperative agreements also makes clear that the CJEU pays attention to the 
intrinsic competences of the Member States to organise and manage public service tasks. Where 
Teckal still in origin relies on the concept ‘contract’, the criteria excluding horizontal cooperative 
agreements from the scope of EU law do not. 
 
                                                 
751 Case C-480/06, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany [2009] ECR I-
04747, at [47]. 
752 At [37]. 
753 Case C-386/11, Piepenbrock Dienstleistungen & Co. KG v. Kreis Düren [2013] ECR I-00000, at [39]. 
754 At [38]. 
755 At [40]. 
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In its case law the Court distinguishes between the two types of contracts (vertical – horizontal). In 
a vertical cooperative agreement, the measure of independence of the contracting party patently 
determines whether EU law is applicable. In a horizontal cooperative agreement, on the other hand, 
it is the purpose of the contract that is primarily decisive. The purpose of a contract must be for the 
accomplishment of a public task common to all the contracting parties (i.e. public authorities). No 
cooperative agreement may have as its purpose the performance of an activity by one public 
authority for another public authority. In that situation the public procurement Directives always 
apply. In addition, a contract must concern considerations of public interest. Clearly, commercial 
objectives will bring the contract within the scope of EU law.  
 
The CJEU emphasises several criteria to exclude cooperative agreements from the scope of EU law. 
The first criterion states that a contract must have the aim of ensuring the accomplishment of a 
public task that all contracting parties are required to perform. The CJEU seems to ground this 
criterion in the Opinion of the Advocate General where the latter explained the concept of 
‘cooperation’. According to the Advocate General ‘the essence of a cooperation consists in a 
common strategy between partners which is based on the exchange and the coordination of their 
respective interests’.756 
 
The CJEU uses the concept ‘cooperation’ for the first time in Coditel Brabant, where it confirms the 
possibility for public authorities to use their own resources to perform the public interest tasks 
conferred on them in cooperation with other public authorities.757 In this case, the CJEU refers to 
Asemfo,758 where it then takes up a situation in which a public authority essentially caries out 
activities to the benefit of controlling authorities. However, the last situation does not really 
involve cooperation for the purpose of accomplishing a common public task. The condition that the 
agreement aims at ensuring the accomplishment of a common public task does not appear to follow 
directly from the case law prefatory to Ordine deghli Ingegneri.  
 
This condition is too strict if from it follows that the public authorities, that sign the agreement, 
must perform a public task that is identical for all of them. In practice, situations can arise where 
an agreement completes a public task whereby the completion of this task fulfils a general interest 
that is different for the two public authorities. For example a non-profit organization could prepare 
meals for the patients of a hospital. The public task of the non-profit organization is the supply of 
meals to the sick and the public task of the hospital is to heal the sick. Both public authorities have 
a common general interest: health care. Is this kind of situation then excluded of the scope of EU 
law. The CJEU case law seems to respond to the negative. 
 
                                                 
756 Opinion Advocate General Trstenjak Case C-159/11, Azienda Sanitaria Locale di Lecce, Università del 
Salento v. Ordine degli Ingegneri della Provincia di Lecce and Others [2012] ECR I-00000, at [75]. 
757 Case C-324/07, Commune d’Uccle et Région Bruxelles-Capital [2008] ECR I-08457, at [49]. 
758 Case C-295/05, Asociación Nacional de Empresas Forestales (Asemfo) v. Transformación Agraria SA (Tragsa) 
[2007] ECR I-02999. 
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The condition that cooperation must be guided by considerations in the general interest seems to 
follow from Coditel Brabant. This condition can be linked to the considerations of the CJEU in 
Deliège759 (see chapter 4). Whenever a public authority takes a measure with solely its own 
interests in mind, there is then no economic interest and thus the objectives set down by the EU are 
also not challenged. Besides, Commission v. Germany states this explicitly. In the case where 
objectives of common interest guide the cooperation, the free movement of services is not 
compromised760 and likewise the situation falls outside the scope of EU law. 
 
The third criterion prohibits public authorities from placing a private provider in a position of 
advantage. This criterion is necessary for the same reasons as the second criterion. This criterion 
presupposes, according to the thesis, that the cooperative agreement has to be concluded between 
public authorities and that no private party participates in such a contract. In Stadt Halle761 and 
Coditel Brabant762 the Court already considered that the participation of a private party is just one 
element to exclude the control-criterion. As such it was not considered as a separate criterion. It 
seems to the thesis that the participation of a private party in a cooperative agreement places this 
private party ipso facto in a position of advantage.  
 
In both Ordine degli Ingegneri763 and Piepenbrock764 rulings the CJEU establishes that in those cases 
the contract could enable a public authority to make use of private firms. This appears to go further 
than the way the Court formulated this criterion earlier in the ruling. The criterion seems to 
necessitate that the agreement realy advantages a private partner. When the CJEU applies the 
criterion, it seems sufficient that the contract foresees the possibility to choose a private partner. 
Continuing in the same vein Mödling765 formulates a criterion that could have been applied here 
too. According to Mödling when a public authority awards a contract it needs only to take into 
account the elements present at that stage. Future elements are relevant only in exceptional 
situations.  
 
Differently from Teckal,766 in Commission v. Germany the Court does not immediately create new 
criteria on the basis of which horizontal cooperative agreements could be placed beyond the scope 
of the public procurement Directives. Perhaps the Court did not wish to get entangled in such 
criteria. Indeed, such criteria narrow the Court's potential room for manoeuvre in the future. In 
Teckal the Court directly applied two formal criteria, which, moreover, seemed to be inspired by 
                                                 
759 Joined cases C-51/96 and C-191/97, Christelle Deliège v. Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées 
ASBL, Ligue belge de judo ASBL, Union européenne de judo and François Pacquée [2000] ECR I-2549. 
760 Case C-480/06, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany [2009] ECR I-
04747at [47]. 
761 Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle and RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH v. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische 
Restabfall- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] ECR I-00001. 
762 Case C-324/07, Commune d’Uccle et Région Bruxelles-Capital [2008] ECR I-08457. 
763 Case C-159/11, Azienda Sanitaria Locale di Lecce, Università del Salento v. Ordine degli Ingegneri della 
Provincia di Lecce and Others [2012] ECR I-00000, at [38]. 
764 Case C-386/11, Piepenbrock Dienstleistungen & Co. KG v. Kreis Düren [2013] ECR I-00000, at [40]. 
765 Case C-29/04, Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of Austria [2005] ECR I-9705. 
766 Case C-107/98, Teckal v. Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121. 
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certain national legal systems. Afterwards, the Court would have had to develop an entire case law 
to find a place for the different kinds of vertical cooperative associations within EU law. In 
Commission v. Germany, the Court adduced several basic elements that legitimate the exclusion of 
a horizontal cooperative agreement from the scope of EU law.  
 
The question arises whether criteria were necessary in order to shield all types of cooperation from 
the scope of EU law. If one starts with the Teckal-criteria, it is evident that the Court was obliged 
by the nature of horizontal cooperative agreements to seek other criteria if it aspired to exclude 
this kind of cooperation. Indeed, in such a situation, a kind of control similar to control over one’s 
own services is precluded (cf. Commission v. Germany, cf. Ordine degli Ingegneri).  
 
Although it is preferable to have criteria against which to test a particular situation, and two kinds 
of criteria are necessary for vertical and horizontal cooperative agreements, they seem to express 
the same idea. If as a consequence of a cooperative agreement a particular entity gains a 
commercial advantage on the market, EU law will then be relevant. There can be no such advantage 
if the entity is not acting independently (control similar to that which it exercises over its own 
departments), and if it deals solely with tasks of general interest that are common to all members 
(shareholders) of the cooperative agreement. The operator will not be market-oriented. 
 
This case law illustrates the manner in which the CJEU tries to find a balance between the 
application of EU law and the latitudes available to public authorities in organising their own 
services.767 The case law on cooperative agreements is based on purely economic considerations, 
with the implication that the fundamental principles of the internal market - with the procurement 
Directive being a derivative thereof - are not applicable to a situation located outside the market or 
to a situation based on considerations in the general interest. 
 
 
4. New Directives 
 
The case law discussed above on determining when cooperative agreements between public 
authorities falls within the scope of EU law was accomplished without assistance from the EU 
legislator: neither a directive nor a regulation was issued. The CJEU simply supplemented the 
content of the existing public procurement Directives opening itself to the criticism that it acted as 
a lawmaker.  
 
However, in an attempt to fill a lacuna in the legislation there has been a number of initiatives on 
the part of European institutions to create a framework for cooperative agreements between public 
                                                 
767 B. Kotschy, ‘Arrêts Stadt Halle, Coname et Parking Brixen’ (RDUE, 2005), p. 849; G. Marchegiani, ‘Les 
relations in-house et le syndrome du cheval à bascule’ (RMCUE, 2006), p. 48; J. Wiggen, ‘Public procurement 
rules and cooperation between public sector entities : the limits of the in-house doctrine under EU 
procurement law’ (PPLR, 2011), p. 158. 
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authorities. Heading the list is a working paper of the European Commission (see 4.1 below). This 
was followed by a number of new proposals for Directives including provisions that could define the 
position of cooperative agreements within the public procurement Directives and EU law in general. 
Finally, these proposals have been amended several times. The EU Parliament has approved the 
different Directives related to the tendering of public contracts and service concessions on January 
2014, 15768.769 They were published on 28 March 2014 in the OJEU. These texts and the different 
proposals will now be briefly discussed. (5.2.) 
 
 
4.1. The Commission’s Working Paper770 
 
The European Commission first made public its view on the applicability of the public procurement 
Directives to cooperation between contracting authorities in a Working Paper.771  
 
The intention was to give a summary of existing case law. First, the European Commission draws a 
distinction between procurement activities, which should benefit from open competition among 
economic operators, and other arrangements which contracting authorities may use to ensure the 
completion of their public tasks. Thus, the European Commission has confirmed the distribution of 
powers between the EU and the Member States on this matter. In the first case the contracting 
authority should apply the public procurement Directives and EU law in general, whereas in the 
other, EU law is not applicable. It is a reaffirmation of the Stadt Halle-ruling.772 A second important 
distinction drawn by the European Commission is between vertical and horizontal forms of 
cooperation. Like the Court, the Commission does not propose to apply the same criteria to exclude 
a particular form of cooperation from the scope of EU law. This confirms what the CJEU later on 
considered in Ordine degli Ingegneri773 and Piepenbrock.774 
 
The European Commission adopted the two Teckal-criteria for vertical cooperative agreements and 
considered that when the criteria are met the agreement falls outside the scope of EU law. The 
Commission adds that the control criterion can be exercised jointly. The Commission links the 
Teckal case law with the contracting authorities’ power of self-organisation. The relation between a 
                                                 
768 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2014-0025; 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2014-0024; 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2014-0026. 
769 For a first commentary see ‘Dossier: Les nouvelles directives “marchés”’, (ACCP, 2014, n° 143) and (ACCP, 
2014, n° 144) ; ‘Special issue – the new EU procurement directives’, (PPLR, 2014, Issue 3) and (PPLR, 2014, 
Issue 4) 
770 See on this working paper: R. Williams, ‘Public-public cooperation – Teckal in 183ractice’ (PPLR, 2012), NA1-
10. 
771 Commission Staff Working Paper concerning the application of EU public procurement law to relations 
between contracting authorities (‘public-public cooperation’), SEC(2011) 1169 final. 
772 Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle and RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH. v. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische 
Restabfall- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] ECR I-00001. 
773 Case C-159/11, Azienda Sanitaria Locale di Lecce, Università del Salento v. Ordine degli Ingegneri della 
Provincia di Lecce and Others [2012] ECR I-00000. 
774 Case C-386/11, Piepenbrock Dienstleistungen & Co. KG v. Kreis Düren [2013] ECR I-00000. 
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contracting authority and its own departments is governed by considerations and requirements 
proper to the pursuit of objectives in the public interest. In this sense the European Commission 
agrees that the object of a measure is decisive as regards the applicability of EU law. In the case 
where the general interest is the driving force behind the action of public authorities, market 
access and competition are not at risk. 
  
As regards horizontal cooperative agreements, the European Commission simply used Commission v. 
Germany775 as a base. The position of the European Commission on this type of cooperation is that 
EU law does not require public authorities to use any particular form in order to carry out jointly 
public service tasks. The European Commission distils different conditions from the ruling in 
Commission v. Germany to place a horizontal cooperation beyond the scope of EU law: 1) only 
public authorities are involved in the cooperation, 2) there is no participation of private capital, 3) 
the character of the agreement is that of real co-operation aimed at the joint performance of a 
common task, as opposed to a normal public contract and 4) the cooperation is governed only by 
considerations relating to the public interest.  
 
The Working Paper was not able to give consideration to the ruling in Ordine degli Ingegneri,776 
when it considered horizontal cooperative agreements. In that case the Court formulated three 
criteria (see above) to exclude this type of cooperation from EU law. These criteria do not fully 
coincide with the content of The Working Paper. 
 
 
4.2. Proposal for new Directives777 and new Directives778 
 
The European Commission has prepared three new proposals for directives: two on the award of 
public contracts779 and one on the award of service concessions,780 In the considerations that 
preceded the proposals on public procurement the Commission makes clear that as regards public 
contracts there is too much legal uncertainty over the application of the public procurement 
                                                 
775 Case C-480/06, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany [2009] ECR I-
04747. 
776 Case C-159/11, Azienda Sanitaria Locale di Lecce, Università del Salento v. Ordine degli Ingegneri della 
Provincia di Lecce and Others [2012] ECR I-00000. 
777 See on the proposals of the EU Commission D. Casalini, ‘Beyond EU Law : the New “Public House”’, in G.S. 
Olykke, C.R. Hansen and C.D. Tvarno, EU Public Procurement – Modernisation, Growth and Innovation 
(Copenhagen: Djof Publishing, 2011), pp. 151-178. 
778 See the first commentaries on the new dispositions : L. Richer, ‘Les contrats entre entités du secteur 
public’, (ACCP, 2014, n° 143), pp. 31-35 ; J. Wiggen, ‘Directive 2014/24/EU : the new provision on co-
operation in the public sector’, (PPLR, 2014), pp. 83-93; G. Clamour, ‘Marchés et concessions “entre entités 
dans le secteur public”’, (CMP 6, 2014). 
779 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on procurement by entities operating 
in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, December 2011, 20 COM(2011) 895 final; Proposal 
for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on public procurement, December 2011, 20 
COM(2011) 896 final. 
780 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the award of concession 
contracts, December 2011, 20 COM(2011) 897 final. 
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Directives to cooperative agreements between public authorities.781 The Commission tries to find a 
balance between the application of the procurement rules and the freedom of public authorities to 
decide how to organise the manner in which they discharge their public service obligations. The 
same train of thought is at the origins of similar provisions regarding the exclusion of some service 
concessions from the scope of EU law. One objective seems to predominant to exempt cooperative 
agreements from the scope of EU law: the cooperation can ‘not result in a distortion of 
competition… in so far as it places a provider in a position of advantage vis-à-vis its competitors’.782 
 
In the different proposals, the Commission makes a distinction between institutional/vertical and 
contractual/horizontal cooperative agreements, and, moreover, uses different criteria for excluding 
the two types of cooperation from the application of public procurement Directives. A comparable 
distinction is also to be found in the proposal on service concessions. Thus, the Commission confirms 
the distinction made in Ordine degli Ingegneri and Piepenbrock and proposes that it is applied to 
service concessions. This distinction was maintained in the texts approved by the EU Parliament and 
published in the OJEU. 
 
4.2.1. Vertical cooperative agreements 
 
Article 12 of Directive 2014/24/EU783 reads as follows: 
‘1. A public contract awarded by a contracting authority to a legal person governed by private or 
public law shall fall outside the scope of this Directive where all of the following conditions are 
fulfilled:  
(a) the contracting authority exercises over the legal person concerned a control, which is similar to 
that which it exercises over its own departments;  
(b) more than 80 % of the activities of the controlled legal person are carried out in the 
performance of tasks entrusted to it by the controlling contracting authority or by other legal 
persons controlled by that contracting authority; and  
(c) there is no direct private capital participation in the controlled legal person with the exception 
of non- controlling and non-blocking forms of private capital participation required by national 
legislative provisions, in conformity with the Treaties, which do not exert a decisive influence on 
the controlled legal person. 
 
A contracting authority shall be deemed to exercise over a legal person a control similar to that 
which it exercises over its own departments within the meaning of point (a) of the first 
subparagraph where it exercises a decisive influence over both strategic objectives and significant 
                                                 
781 Consideration 14.  
782 Directive 2014/24/EU, consideration 31. See also consideration 38 of Directive 2014/25/EU. 
783 See also Article 17 Directive 2014/23/EU and Article 28 Directive 2014/25/EU. 
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decisions of the controlled legal person. Such control may also be exercised by another legal 
person, which is itself controlled in the same way by the contracting authority.  
 
2. Paragraph 1 also applies where a controlled legal person which is a contracting authority awards 
a contract to its controlling contracting authority, or to another legal person controlled by the same 
contracting authority, provided that there is no direct private capital participation in the legal 
person being awarded the public contract with the exception of non-controlling and non-blocking 
forms of private capital participation required by national legislative provisions, in conformity with 
the Treaties, which do not exert a decisive influence on the controlled legal person.  
 
3. A contracting authority, which does not exercise over a legal person governed by private or 
public law control within the meaning of paragraph 1, may nevertheless award a public contract to 
that legal person without applying this Directive where all of the following conditions are fulfilled.  
(a) the contracting authority exercises jointly with other contracting authorities a control over that 
legal person which is similar to that which they exercise over their own departments;  
(b) more than 80 % of the activities of that legal person are carried out in the performance of tasks 
entrusted to it by the controlling contracting authorities or by other legal persons controlled by the 
same contracting authorities; and  
(c) there is no direct private capital participation in the controlled legal person with the exception 
of non- controlling and non-blocking forms of private capital participation required by national 
legislative provisions, in conformity with the Treaties, which do not exert a decisive influence on 
the controlled legal person. 
 
For the purposes of point (a) of the first subparagraph, contracting authorities exercise joint control 
over a legal person where all of the following conditions are fulfilled:  
 
(i) the decision-making bodies of the controlled legal person are composed of representatives of all 
participating contracting authorities. Individual representatives may represent several or all of the 
participating contracting authorities;  
(ii) those contracting authorities are able to jointly exert decisive influence over the strategic 
objectives and significant decisions of the controlled legal person; and  
(iii) the controlled legal person does not pursue any interests that are contrary to those of the 
controlling contracting authorities’.  
 
The Directives would seem to make clear that the notion ‘contract’ is not important for determining 
the applicability of EU law to vertical cooperation arrangements between public authorities. 
Indeed, it presupposes precisely that these arrangements are excluded from the scope of EU law 
even if a contract is present. What is more, the texts approved by the European Parliament, in 
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difference with the Commission proposals, replace the notion ‘contract’ by the notion ‘public 
contract’. This seems to imply that even if all the elements needed to regard a cooperative 
agreement as a public contract are present EU law may still not be applicable. 
 
A public authority shall be deemed to exercise over a legal person a control similar to that which it 
exercises over its own departments where it exercises a decisive influence over both strategic 
objectives and significant decisions of the controlled legal person. The compromise text agreed 
between representatives of the European Council and the European Parliament (hereafter ‘the 
Compromise text’)784 added that the control may also be exercised by another legal person that is 
itself controlled in the same way by the contracting authority. This seems to alter the position of 
the CJEU in Carbotermo. The CJEU considered in this ruling that when the subsidiary concerned was 
only indirectly owned by the public authority through an intermediary holding company, this could 
weaken any control exercised over the subsidiary.785 It seems that the CJEU in its case law excludes 
any kind of indirect control. EU Parliament maintained this modification in the approved texts. 
 
In comparison with CJEU case law the Commission has added in its proposals that the subsidiary 
must carry out at least 90% of its activities on behalf of the controlling authorities. The 
aforementioned case law refers solely to an essential part of the activities. The published texts 
provide that 80 % of the activities must be carried out on behalf of the controlling authorities. This 
corresponds to the percentage advanced by Advocate general Stix-Hackl.786 
 
The third criterion on private participation has been significantly altered by the Compromise text: 
‘there is no direct private capital participation in the controlled legal person with the exception of 
non-controlling and non-blocking forms of private capital participation required by applicable 
national legislative provisions, in conformity with the Treaties, which do not exert a decisive 
influence on the controlled legal person’. This text, also approved by the EU Parliament, changes 
fundamentally the CJEU case law. Stadt Halle affirmed that the participation, even as a minority, 
of a private undertaking in the capital of a company in which the particular contracting authority is 
also a participant precludes in any event the possibility of the contracting authority exercising be 
deemed to have control over that company similar to the control it exercises over its own 
departments.787 Private participation is allowed but it has to be required by applicable national 
legislative provisions. 
 
                                                 
784 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on public procurement, 
2011/0438(COD), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201309/20130913ATT71292/20130913ATT71292EN.
pdf. 
785 Case C-340/04, Carbotermo SpA Consorzio Alisei v. Comune di Busto Arsizio AGESP SpA [2006] ECR I-04137, 
at [39]. 
786 Opinion Advocate general Stix-Hackl C-26/03, Stadt Halle and RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH. v. 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische Restabfall- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] ECR I-00001, at 
[92]. 
787 At [49]. 
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In the case of joint control the Directives contain a number of ancillary conditions. The following 
cumulative conditions must be fulfilled: 
 
(a) the decision-making bodies of the controlled legal person are composed of representatives of all 
participating contracting authorities;  
 
(b) the contracting authorities are able to exert jointly decisive influence over the strategic 
objectives and significant decisions of the controlled legal person;  
 
(c) the controlled legal person does not pursue any interests which are distinct from that of the 
public authorities affiliated to it; 
 
(d) the controlled legal person does not extract any gain other than the reimbursement of actual 
costs from public contracts with the contracting authorities.  
 
Most of these conditions are based on Coditel Brabant.788 Only in the aforementioned ruling has the 
Court made a factual analysis on a basis which in the end decided that EU law did not need to 
apply, because the subsidiary was not sufficiently independent and was not market-oriented. One 
condition is not explicitly stated in the Directives; namely, the holding of capital, but it follows 
from the third general condition that there may be no private participation. The powers of the 
organs of the subsidiary are not directly taken into account. The last condition has not been 
retained in the Compromise text. This seems logical. This criterion could not be found in Coditel 
Brabant. Moreover, this is an element of the definition of the notion ‘public contract’. In Ordine 
degli Ingegneri, the CJEU considered that a contract cannot fall outside the concept of public 
contract merely because the remuneration remains limited to the reimbursement of the 
expenditure incurred to provide the agreed service.789 
 
Coditel Brabant concerned a service concession. The Commission transposed in its proposals these 
conditions to a public contract and the adopted Directives confirm this. These proposals 
demonstrate the interchangeability of the case law. 
 
The new provisions set out in the new Directives provide also an exclusion from the scope of EU law 
when a subsidiary, which is a contracting authority, awards a contract to one of the controlling 
public authorities or to another legal person controlled by the same contracting authority. This is 
proposed on condition that there is no private participation in the legal person being awarded the 
public contract. Here the adopted texts diverge from existing case law and especially from the 
spirit. The case law only provides an exclusion when a controlling authority awards a contract to its 
                                                 
788 Case C-324/07, Commune d’Uccle et Région Bruxelles-Capital [2008] ECR I-08457. 
789 Case C-159/11, Azienda Sanitaria Locale di Lecce, Università del Salento v. Ordine degli Ingegneri della 
Provincia di Lecce and Others [2012] ECR I-00000, at [29]. 
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subsidiary. It is evident that the new Directives wish to allow the Member States to retain more 
powers than might follow from CJEU case law. 
 
4.2.2. Horizontal cooperative agreements 
 
In order to shield a horizontal cooperative agreement from the scope of EU law Article 11(4) of the 
proposed Directives on public procurement and Article 11(4) of the proposed Directive on service 
concessions provide as follows: 
 
‘An agreement concluded between two or more contracting authorities shall not be deemed to be a 
public contract within the meaning of Article 2(6) of this Directive where the following cumulative 
conditions are fulfilled: 
  
(a) the agreement establishes a genuine cooperation between the participating contracting 
authorities aimed at carrying out jointly their public service tasks and involving mutual rights and 
obligations of the parties;  
(b) the agreement is governed only by considerations relating to the public interest;  
(c) the participating contracting authorities do not perform on the open market more than 10% of 
the turnover of their activities that are relevant in the context of the agreement;  
(d) the agreement does not involve financial transfers between the participating contracting 
authorities, other than those tantamount to a reimbursement for actual costs of works, services or 
supplies;  
(e) there is no private participation in any of the contracting authorities involved.’ 
 
The first part of the first condition seems to be congruent with the first criterion set down in Ordine 
degli Ingegneri.790 This criterion requires that cooperative agreements between public authorities 
should have as its purpose an assurance of completion of a public task that they all must perform. 
Whether a contract involves the mutual rights and obligations of the parties seems a superfluous 
consideration. If there are no mutual rights or obligations, there is also no contract. This 
consideration is implicit in the definition of the term ‘public contract’. 
 
The second criterion seems to add nothing new to the criteria established in Ordine degli Ingegneri. 
There is one semantic difference. The CJEU case law requires that ‘the implementation of’ the 
cooperation is guided solely by considerations and requirements related to the public interest. 
According to the proposed directives, the ‘agreement’ is guided by this sort of consideration. 
However, this difference seems of no consequence given the implementation of a contract concerns 
the object of the contract, which is one of the important aspects for deciding that a contract exists. 
 
                                                 
790 Case C-159/11, Azienda Sanitaria Locale di Lecce, Università del Salento v. Ordine degli Ingegneri della 
Provincia di Lecce and Others [2012] ECR I-00000, at [34]. 
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The third criterion is at variance with one of the criteria established by the CJEU on vertical 
cooperation. This condition is associated with the second Teckal-criterion (activities), which the 
CJEU recently ruled not to be applicable to horizontal cooperation. It is surprising this criterion has 
been added inasmuch as it limits the possibilities for public authorities to cooperate. 
 
The fourth criterion was taken from Commission v. Germany. Only financial transfers that cover 
costs may take place between cooperating public authorities. This condition cannot be found in 
Ordine deghli Ingegneri. Thus, the CJEU considered that this criterion is not relevant (see above).  
 
The last condition is a reaffirmation of the third criterion in Ordine deghli Ingegneri. It is, 
moreover, the only condition that is the same as for vertical cooperation. The presence of a private 
undertaking in the cooperation may bring an advantage for the latter, which poses a risk to free 
competition. Consequently EU law is to be applied. Public-private partnerships therefore would be 
subject to EU law insofar as they may be construed to be a public contract or a service concession. 
 
The European Parliament approved texts provide in Article 12.4 the following provision applicable 
to horizontal cooperative agreements: 
 
‘A contract concluded exclusively between two or more contracting authorities shall fall outside the 
scope of this Directive where the following cumulative conditions are fulfilled:  
(a) the contract establishes or implements a cooperation between the participating contracting 
authorities with the aim of ensuring that public services they have to perform are provided with a 
view to achieving objectives they have in common;  
(b) the implementation of that cooperation is governed solely by considerations relating to the 
public interest;  
(c) the participating contracting authorities perform on the open market less than 20% of the 
activities concerned by the cooperation’. 
 
In contrast to the proposed Directives from the Commission, the adopted Directives clearly state 
that under the conditions laid down in the cited text horizontal cooperative agreementss fall 
outside the scope of EU law. The Commission’s proposal still considered that if the criteria 
mentioned in Article 11(2) are fulfilled the agreement concluded between public authorities is not a 
public contract, thus applying the Teckal-ruling. The approved texts clearly confirm that even when 
such cooperation is a (public) contract, under certain conditions it falls beyond the scope of EU law. 
This confirms what the present thesis defended earlier on, namely, that the notion ‘public contract’ 
is not relevant to CJEU case law on cooperative agreements. Unlike vertical cooperative agreement 
the text on horizontal cooperative agreements takes the notion of 'contract' as a premise, and not 
the notion ‘public contract’. 
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The first criterion to exclude horizontal cooperative agreements from the scope of EU law differs 
slightly from the criteria provided in Ordine degli Ingegneri. The text provides that cooperation has 
to ensure that public services required of the public authorities are provided with a view to 
achieving objectives they have in common. The CJEU ruled that a cooperation arrangement 
between public authorities has to ensure that a public task that all public authorities are required 
to perform has been completed. The final text seems to give more freedom to a public authority to 
organise its public service tasks. 
 
The text confirms the third criterion, but raises the percentage of activities that a participating 
authority can perform on the market. The text omits the fourth criterion from the proposal so that 
the approved Directive seems to accommodate to the Ordine degli Ingegneri-ruling. More 
surprisingly the criterion on private participation was not taken. This is the most important 
modification in respect of the Commission proposals and CJEU case law. Private participation has 
always been regarded as a sign that competition could be distorted. Apparently, the European 
Parliament and the European Council agreed that this is not always the case. 
 
4.2.3. Conclusion 
 
The provisions on cooperative agreements in the new Directives create legal certainity. The CJEU 
case law created a lot of uncertainity in different Member States as to how and to what extent 
cooperative agreements could be used to organise or discharge public tasks without the necessity of 
a tendering procedure. Broadly, the provisions of the new Directives confirm the CJEU case law. 
However the new dispositions also contain several remarkable modifications to the existing CJEU 
case law broadening the possibilities for public authorities to cooperate without a duty to consult 
the market. 
 
These provisions, however, are only applicable to public contracts and service concessions above 
the EU tresholds. The CJEU confirmed in its case law that the Teckal-criteria also apply to these 
contracts below the EU tresholds.791 Thus, the CJEU case law examined in the present chapter 
retains its importance for the future. 
 
 
 
5. State and Market 
 
The starting point of the division of powers between the European Union (market liberalisation) 
and the Member State (institutional autonomy) regarding ‘services of general interest’ is quite 
                                                 
791 See Case C-573/07, Sea Srl v. Comune di Ponte Nassa [2009] ECR I-08127, at [35]; Joined cases C-182/11 and 
C-183/11, Econord SpA v. Comuni di Cagno, Comune di Varese, Comune di Solbiate [2012] ECR I-00000, at [26]. 
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straight forward. In principle, Member States are responsible and competent for the definition 
and the interpretation of the concept ‘services of general interest’, for the organization and for 
the use of these services.792  
 
However the CJEU gives a functional interpretation to the general rules on the allocation of 
competences.793 The European Union is still considered mostly as pursuing economic objectives 
(internal market, free competition). Any national measure, which would imply a violation of 
these objectives may be found to be incompatible with EU law. As Koen Lenaerts puts it: ‘Once 
there is a cross border element or link that triggers the application of the substantive law of the 
EU, no area of national law - not even areas traditionally reserved to the Member States - 
remains a safe haven’.794 Therefore, even national measures concerning the definition, the 
organisation and the use of services of general interest may still be subject to the test of 
compatibility with EU law especially when such measures have an impact on the freedom of 
movement. This division of competences should be applied taking into account the principle of 
subsidiarity. This means that European institutions can only regulate when they are better 
placed then the Member States to achieve a certain goal.795  
 
It will become apparent in Chapter 6 that the concept of ‘public service(s)’ and the way they are 
organised, are shaped by the legal system in which they develop. They are an expression of the way 
in which a society thinks of its organisation and how this is executed by the society. More 
specifically it deals with the way in which certain institutions (public authorities) safeguard the 
(national) public interest. In this sense, the thesis defends the proposition that internal market 
rules should only influence this evolution when they are strictly necessary for the realisation of the 
economic targets of the EU. The CJEU should also take this into account in its case law.  
 
In any case, the new public procurement Directives and the concession Directive are encouraging 
the CJEU to consider the competences of the Member States. It has already been observed that the 
new Directives are returning competences to Member States, as opposed to the currently applicable 
Directives as interpreted by the Court. Thus, taking into account the growing Euroscepticism, the 
Court is well advised to give significant consideration to these national tendencies in its decisions. 
An overly functional interpretation of EU law seems to go against the wishes of Member States, a 
wish that was, after all, validated by the EU Parliament. All of this expresses a democratic wish the 
Court cannot ignore on the risk of being further criticized as a ‘gouvernement des juges’.   
                                                 
792 Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol 26 to the Lisbon Treaty. 
793 C.W.A. Timmermans, ‘The basic principles’, in P.J.G. Kapteyn, A.M. McDonnell, K.J.M. Mortelmans and 
C.W.A. Timmermans, The Law of the European Union and the European Communities (Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Kluwer Law International, 2008), p. 138. 
794 K. Lenaerts, Federation and the Rule of Law. Perspectives from the European Court of Justice, (Fordham 
Int.L.J., 2011), p. 1340. 
795 O. Cotte, ‘La répartition des compétences entre l'Union et ses Etats membres dans le domaine des services 
d'intérêt économique général’, in G. Eckert, Y. Gautier, R. Kovar and D. Ritleng, Incidences du droit 
communautaire sur le droit public français, (Strasbourg : Presses universitaires de Strasbourg, 2007), p. 311 ; 
M.T. Karayagit, The Concept of Services of General Economic Interest Revisited (EPL, 2009), p. 580. 
193 
 
 
It follows, for the subject of this thesis, that the criteria which determine if cooperative 
agreements involving the organisation or the management of public service fall within the scope of 
EU law, should be framed within the principle of institutional autonomy of the Member States, 
instead of within the framework of market principles. A less functional interpretation of the criteria 
will entail a larger scope of competences for the Member States, which seemed to be the wish of 
the Member States when the new Directives are implemented.  
 
The sense of a real Union can be achieved also by the European institutions recognizing the 
individuality of each Member States in certain areas. This recognition exists when the Member 
States remain competent in situations which are heavily intertwined with the constitutional 
singularity of each Member State.  
 
 
 
6. General conclusions 
 
Cooperation between public authorities is one of the ways a public authority organises or manages 
its public (service) tasks. In this context, national law normally regulates their activities. However, 
in certain circumstances EU law does have a role; namely, when cooperation between public 
authorities could be defined as a public contract or a service concession. 
 
From the public procurement Directives it follows that, according to one exception, even when 
cooperation is a public contract, a tendering procedure need not be applied. This is the case if a 
public service contract is awarded on the basis of an exclusive right, which a subsidiary enjoys 
pursuant to a published law, a regulation or an administrative provision compatible with the Treaty 
(Article 18 of Directive 2004/18/EC). However, this provision entails merely a limited exception, 
strictly interpreted by the CJEU. For a more general exception, the CJEU had itself to find a 
solution, and it was this pursuit that engendered case law on cooperative agreements between 
public authorities, the central theme of the thesis. 
 
In the first place, this case law makes clear that the way a public authority organises or manages its 
public tasks is not governed by EU law. Public authorities remain free to choose to manage 
themselves their public service tasks, to engage a third party to assume their management, or to 
transfer management of the public service to a third person. Second, EU law is not applicable when 
a public authority uses its own services to accomplish a task (in house). The internal management of 
a public authority has no effect on market behavior and cannot distort competition. The economic 
objectives are thus not put at risk here. In this manner the CJEU has made two constitutional 
choices. The case law contains elements that affect the relationship between State and Market and 
affects the division of powers between the EU and the Member States.  
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From the moment a public authority engages a third person, EU law is applicable if the agreement is 
a public contract or a service concession or more generally when a public authority confers the 
provision of an economic activity to a third party. CJEU case law distinguishes two situations in this 
regard: vertical and horizontal cooperative agreements with a third person. In both cases, a ‘market 
situation’ arises and EU law must be applied when the third person is a private undertaking or if one 
shareholder of the third legal entity is a private undertaking. This is a reflection of the idea that 
this undertaking can gain an advantage as a consequence of the cooperation and thus competition 
could be distorted. On the other hand, other private undertakings will find it more difficult or even 
impossible to benefit from the same State measure. Their access to a particular market is hindered. 
 
From the public procurement Directives point of view it also follows that even cooperative 
agreements concluded between fully publicly owned public authorities is subject to EU law. 
According to CJEU case law this also applies to service concessions. However, CJEU case law on 
vertical or horizontal cooperative agreements also provides a series of criteria that, if met, enable 
these kinds of agreements to fall outside the scope of EU law. The CJEU broadens the competence 
of the Member States to include situations that are not expressly provided for in an existing 
Directive. It is submitted that the CJEU has established a new demarcation in the relationship 
between State and the market. Via public procurement Directives the CJEU has entered onto a 
terrain that does not explicitly come under EU law. 
 
According to this thesis, the criteria that the CJEU has developed to enable vertical and horizontal 
cooperative agreements to fall beyond the scope of EU law, is an expression of the same idea. A 
state measure, i.e. a decision to cooperate in the accomplishment of a public task objective, is of 
no relevance to EU law if it is guided solely by considerations related to the public interest and the 
measure does not advantage a private undertaking. EU law developed on the basis of economic 
objectives and is solely applicable in an economic context. Only state measures that put these 
objectives at risk, give rise to the application of EU law. 
 
In the context of a vertical cooperative agreement the CJEU has developed two criteria: the control 
criterion and the activities criterion. Together they reflect the idea that the public authority that is 
called upon to carry out a task has no independence. Recently the CJEU has confirmed this view: 
‘that the exception concerning the in-house awards is based on an approach according to which, in 
such cases, the awarding public authority can be regarded as using its own resources in order to 
accomplish its tasks in the public interest’796. Thus the decision to cooperate is in these 
circumstances clearly to be situated in the internal organisation of public authorities and not in the 
market. The ‘operator’ cannot be considered to be market-oriented. Application of a State measure 
(the decision to cooperate) could give the operator an advantage over its competitors. If the 
                                                 
796 Case C-574/12, Centro Hospitalar de Setúbal EPE, Serviço de Utilização Comum dos Hospitais (SUCH) v. 
Eurest (Portugal) — Sociedade Europeia de Restaurantes Lda [2014] ECR I-00000 at [35]. 
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operator is not market-oriented, the state measure has no effect on the market and competition is 
to that extent not distorted. The extent of the control and the amount of activities determine the 
object of a measure taken. They inform whether the measure has an economic effect and hence is 
of concern to EU law. 
 
The CJEU case law on horizontal cooperative agreements is clearer in this area. Cooperation 
between public authorities cannot place a private operator in a position of advantage vis-à-vis 
competitors and this cooperation shall be governed solely by considerations and requirements 
relating to the pursuit of objectives in the public interest. However, the CJEU implicitly considered 
in recent case law on a vertical cooperative agreement that. if the contracting parties pursue 
objectives of public interest, the awarding public authority may be exempted from the application 
EU law.797 The target of the measure is an objective of general interest. 
 
The analysis carried out above seems to demonstrate that the CJEU adopted an evolutionary 
approach to the development of the relevant case law. The CJEU interprets EU law in an extensive 
way so as to protect the powers of the Union even though Teckal already had effectively broadened 
the existing exemptions set out in public procurement Directives. The CJEU seems readily to 
acknowledge the uniqueness of certain legal systems in respect of the ways public authorities 
organise the delivery of their public tasks. A broader interpretation of the Teckal-criteria 
(especially the control criterion) and the creation of a second set of criteria to place horizontal 
cooperation outside the scope of EU law, enabled Member States, under certain circumstances, to 
retain competence to set rules for when a public authority may cooperate with another public 
authority in order to organise or manage its public tasks. 
 
Finally, the thesis also postulates that this CJEU case law on cooperative agreements implicitly 
applies the market access-criterion in order to bring a particular situation within the scope (or 
conversely, to shield it from) EU law. If a measure is of a nature (i.e. economic) to hinder this 
access, the public procurement Directives and/or the principle of equality must be applied. In the 
new directives on public procurement and service concessions the EU institutions have 
acknowledged this idea when it approved provisions that emulate the CJEU case law. Distortion of 
competition seems to be the central idea that triggers the application of EU law on cooperative 
agreements. 
 
In a number of points concerning cooperative agreements between public authorities the Directives 
recently adopted by the European Parliament contain changes of vision relating to the division of 
powers between the European Union and the Member States. The CJEU for the most part adopts EU 
law on cooperative agreements in light of the objectives of the EU, which are, namely, the 
realisation of an internal market and assuring free competition. In other words, the competence of 
                                                 
797 At [36]. 
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the EU in matters of cooperative agreements was given a quite broad interpretation. The proposals 
of the European Commission were also premised on this consideration. However, the texts approved 
by the European Parliament marked implicitly a shift of competence from the EU to the Member 
States. The competence of the latter was restored in a number of situations of cooperation where 
under CJEU case law they no longer had it. The texts were adapted in the Parliament under the 
influence of the European Council. This suggests that many Member States did not approve the 
direction the CJEU took in its case law on cooperation between public authorities. It became clear 
that this was a sensitive matter that touched on the very sovereignty of the Member States. 
 
These provisions on cooperative agreements in the new Directives could indicate that the criteria 
developed by the CJEU to exclude these agreements from the scope of EU law were to severe. 
Member States and the institutions of the EU were apparently convinced free access and undistorted 
competition are still protected with the new adopted provisions. It proves that these criteria are a 
mere expression of the balance of powers between the Market (the EU) and the State (Member 
States), between market integration and institutional autonomy.  
 
The CJEU case law on cooperative agreements builds in part on the evolving European Economic 
Constitution and indeed more or less mirrors the relation between the market and intervention 
(State and Market). It plays a role in setting the economic direction of the Union; and it is a factor 
in determining the division of competences between the EU and the Member States. The recent 
Directives, approved by EU Parliament and the case law that preceded them indicate that this new 
distribution of competences in matters concerning cooperative agreements tends to favour the 
Member States. This was also apparent from the Commission’s early proposals. The Member States 
were able to exert their influence even more forcefully in the EU Parliament and via the European 
Council to keep the organisation of public service tasks within their spheres of authority as far as 
possible.  
 
This could reflect a more general aversion in a number of Member States towards the EU. The last 
EU elections saw the rise in several Member States of anti-establishment parties or Eurosceptic 
parties.798 On one hand decisions are still taken by unaccountable institutions, decisions which have 
a significant impact on the whole society of the Member States and on the other hand the economic 
crisis created a clash between the northern and southern EU Member States.799 EU citizens feel like 
they no longer exert an influence on the way their society is being organised. Member States 
expressed this feeling when they contributed to the establishment of the public procurement and 
concession Directives.  
 
 
                                                 
798 http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21603034-impact-rise-anti-establishment-parties-europe-and-
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CHAPTER 6 - INFLUENCE OF EU LAW ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 
 
Cooperative agreements between public authorities is the theme of this thesis. Such cooperation 
has existed and exists in most Member States of the European Union for a long time. This 
cooperation is considered in several Member States to be a typical example of the freedom of public 
authorities to organise their public service(s)800. The principle of free administration by national, 
regional and local authorities has been confirmed in Article 2 of Directive 2014/23/EU: ‘Those 
authorities are free to decide how best to manage the execution of works or the provision of 
services, to ensure in particular a high level of quality, safety and affordability, equal treatment 
and the promotion of universal access and of user rights in public services’. How public authorities 
organise their public service(s) is normally determined by national (administrative) law. In several 
Member States public authorities were not obliged to organise a tendering procedure or at least 
safeguard equal treatment when they wanted to cooperate with another public authority. 
 
The two preceding chapters of this thesis were exclusively concerned with the potential effect of 
EU law on how a public authority organises and manages its public service tasks. This thesis 
concentrated particularly on cooperative agreements between public authorities, which can be 
qualified as a public contract or a service concession. 
 
This chapter of the thesis accordingly explores the extent to which existing EU law (especially CJEU 
case law) influences national law in certain national legal systems. The English and French legal 
systems have been taken as examples. First, the choice of the two legal systems was inspired by the 
circumstance that they are typical examples of two different law systems that are encountered 
especially in Europe; namely, common law and civil law. Secondly, Reitz suggests that many of the 
fundamental differences among the public law systems of the world can best be understood as 
reflecting different types of political economy.801 France802 can considered to be one of the most 
state-centered political economies in the EU and England as the most market centered political 
economy. This distinction could explain the different administrative law in the two countries and 
also justifies the examination of these two legal systems. As they are considered to be the two most 
opposing legal systems in Europe the other legal systems must be situated between those two 
systems. At first the two legal systems will be described as they existed before the CJEU case law 
on cooperative agreements between public authorities emerged. 
 
                                                 
800 The meaning of this concept will be explained in each of the examined legal systems: France and England. 
801 J.C. Reitz, ‘Political Economy as a Major Architectural Principle of Public Law’ (Tulane L. Rev., 2001), pp. 
1121-1157. 
802 Reitz saw no main differences between the French and German political economy and characterized both as 
state-centered political economies, where Germany is less state-centered: J.C. Reitz, ‘Political Economy as a 
Major Architectural Principle of Public Law’ (Tulane L. Rev., 2001), p. 1130. 
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The chapter first examines whether the concept of 'public service(s)' exists in each of these two 
legal systems and, if so, how it may be defined. This will be followed by an examination of how 
these services are organised or managed, taking cooperative agreements between public authorities 
as an example. It will be made clear how EU law and more particular the CJEU case law on 
cooperative agreements between public authorities, has or has not influenced the existing law in 
the legal systems of France and England.  
 
This study will enable a comparison of two national systems with the case law developed by the 
Court of Justice, based on public procurement Directives and on the fundamental rules and 
principles set out in the EU treaties. In addition, the two legal systems will, where germane, be 
compared with one another. 
 
 
1. French system 
 
1.1. Service public 
 
The first question to be addressed is the place of the concept ‘service public’ in French public law 
(1.1.1). Next this section examines how the concept 'public service' is defined in French law. 
(1.1.2). Thirdly, this section will analyse the two criteria that determine the presence of a ‘service 
public’: namely, ‘personne publique’ (1.1.3) and ‘intérêt général’ (1.1.4). Finally, the section shall 
examine the ways a public authority organises or manages its ‘service public’ (1.1.5). 
 
1.1.1. The place of 'service public' 
 
The notion of 'service public' is a fundamental element of the French state and indeed it is one of 
the constitutional precepts of the state. It reflects the relationship between the State and its 
citizens. The establishment, administration, and maintenance of a public service create an 
unbreakable bond between the State and the citizens, whereby the main role of the State is 
ordained to be at the service of its citizens: 'L'État Providence'.803 All citizens have equal access to 
public services. This is at variance with the idea of the State as a 'puissance publique'.  
 
The notion of 'service public' is one of the basic elements of public and administrative law in 
France.804 It justifies the presence and actions of public authorities.805 Public authorities primarily 
exist to look after services of general interest to the benefit of their citizens. The special powers of 
                                                 
803 See F. Moderne, ‘Les transcriptions doctrinales de l’idée de service public’, in F. Moderne and G. Marcou 
(dir.), L’idée de service public dans le droit des états de l’Union européenne (Paris : L’Harmattan, 2001), pp. 
19-20. 
804 L. Duguit, Les transformations du droit public (éd. La mémoire du droit, 1999), p. 33 ; L. Janicot, 
‘L’identification du service public géré par une personne privée’ (RFDA, 2008), p. 67. 
805 P. Delvolvé, ‘Service public et libertés publiques’ (RFDA, 1985), p. 2. 
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a public authority find their justification exclusively in the need for these services and the provision 
thereof.806 The need for a public service legitimises the State and its existence.807 Thus the concept 
of 'service public' is constitutive of French public law.  
 
The theory of ‘service public’ has always been the cornerstone of French administrative law.808 In 
Blanco,809 the French Conseil d'État ruled the competence of the High Administrative Court in 
matters concerning the civil liability of public authorities’ derivative of the concept of 'service 
public'. Legal scholars used this decision to base all of French administrative law on this concept.810 
In consequence of this concept, French administrative law is a mostly autonomous branch of law. 
Usually other rules are applied to public authorities than those applied in the private domain. The 
situation is completely different in England. In the study of the English legal system, it will become 
clear that English common law is extensively applied to public authorities and certainly in their 
relationships with third parties.811 Secondly, English public authorities think and act more market-
centered.  
 
The importance of the ‘service public’ in France also explains why there has been so much 
resistance in France in regard to CJEU case law as the thesis discussed in chapter 5. This case law 
was seen as an assault on the principle of French institutional autonomy. It limits the organisational 
freedom of public authorities.812 Discussing the proposals for the Directives of 2014 the French 
Senate was opposed to the introduction of provisions on cooperative agreements between public 
authorities. The Senate found it to early to implement such provisions.813 However in chapter 3 the 
thesis explained that primary EU law more and more takes account of the concept of ‘service of 
general interest’. 
 
1.1.2. The concept of 'service public' 
 
In light of the importance of the concept of 'service public', a precise and clear definition of the 
concept is in order.  
 
Here lies the crux of the problem in France.814 Over the years it became apparent that it is not easy 
to define this concept. Legislators have not as yet ventured on the creation of such a definition. 
                                                 
806 R. Chapus, Droit administratif général (Paris : Montchrestien, 2001), p. 573. 
807 P. Gonod, F. Melleray, and Ph. Yolka, Traité de droit administratif, T.2 (Paris : Dalloz, 2011), p. 46. 
808 S. Braconnier, Droit des services publics (Paris : PUF, 2007), p. 105. 
809 TC 8 February, 1873, Lebon, 1e suppl., 61, concl. David. 
810 M. Waline, Droit administratif (Paris : Dalloz, 2010), p. 8 ; P.-L . Frier and J. Petit, Droit administratif 
(Paris : Montchréstien, 2012), p. 30. 
811 See M. Waline, Droit administratif (Paris : Dalloz, 2010), pp. 7-8. 
812 C. Pilone, ‘Reflexions autour de la notion de contrat “in house”’, in G. Clamour and M. Ubaud-Bergeron 
(eds.), Contrats publics. Mélanges en honneur du Professeur Michel Guibal, Vol. I (Montpellier : CREAM, 2006), 
pp. 716-717. 
813 http://www.senat.fr/leg/tas11-112.html. 
814 The definition of this concept is not only a problem in France. See in Belgium : P.-O. de Broux, ‘Historique 
et transformation de la notion de service public à la lumière du droit européen’, in H. Dumont, P. Jadoul, B. 
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Legal scholars came to the conclusion that it is a confusing, unstable and even indefinable 
concept.815 The French Conseil d’État has developed criteria to determine what a 'service public' is. 
It was eventually systematised by legal scholars. These following pages of the thesis are based on 
the system proposed by René Chapus816 and adopted by Guglielmi and Koubi.817 
 
The methodology chosen by Chapus has taken full account of the two categories that form the 
concept of 'service public', namely the organic public service and the functional public service818 
and evolutions within administrative law whereby public authorities look after services that are of 
general interest while private entities are chosen by the public authorities to look after these 
services of general interest.  
 
To explain the concept of 'service public', Chapus starts from the following definition, taking into 
account the organic relationship of an activity (ties with a public authority) and the purpose of the 
activity: ‘une activité constitue un service public quand elle est assurée ou assumée par une 
personne publique en vue d'un intérêt public’ [an activity constitutes a public service when it is 
carried out or assumed by a 'public person' with a view to public interest].819 He broadly confirms a 
definition accepted by the majority of legal scholars.820 Two elements are important: the relation to 
a 'personne publique' and a need of general interest. Both elements are cumulative. The two 
criteria will now be examined in more detail. 
 
1.1.3. Relation to a 'personne publique' 
 
A 'service public' always manifests some connection with a 'personne publique' (public authority). A 
'personne publique' decides whether an activity constitutes a 'service public'. Thus, the creation of a 
'service public' enjoys democratic legitimacy821 irrespective of whether the decision comes directly 
from the legislative power or whether the legislative power has delegated authority to the 
executive power. How is the term 'personne publique' understood in France? What kind of relation is 
necessary?  
                                                                                                                                                        
Lombaert, F. Tulkens and S. Van Drooghenbroeck (eds.), Le service public, T. 1 (Brussels : La Charte, 2009), 
pp. 1-56. 
815 P.L. Frier and J.Petit, Précis de droit administratif (Paris : Montchrestien, 2008), p. 179. D. Truchet, ‘Label 
de service public et statut du service public’ (AJDA, 1982), p. 428. 
816 R.Chapus, Droit administratif général (Paris : Montchrestien, 2001), pp. 578 et seq. 
817 G.J. Gugliemi, G. Koubi and G. Dumont, Droit du service public (Paris : Montchrestien, 2007), pp. 89 et seq. 
818 See below for an explanation of both concepts. In an early ruling on 20 december 1935 the Conseil d’État 
set down the difference between the organic ‘service public’ and the functional ‘service public’: C.E., 20 
December 1935, Etablissements Vézia (RDP, 1936), p. 119. 
819 R. Chapus, Droit administratif général (Paris, Montchrestien, 2001), p. 579 ; Definition also cited in S. 
Boussard, L’éclatement des categories de services public et la public par nature (RFDA, 2008), p. 45 and P. 
Gonod, F. Melleray and Ph. Yolka (dir.), Traité de droit administratif, T.2 (Paris : Dalloz, 2011), p. 53. See also 
J. Waline, Droit administratif (Paris : LGDJ, 2010), p. 352 : ‘le service public correspond à la satisfaction d’un 
intérêt général… le service public, directement ou indirectement, relève en dernier ressort d’une autorité 
publique’. 
820 A. de Laubadère, Traité élémentaire de droit administrative (Paris : Dalloz, 1953), p. 35 ; J.-L. de Corail, 
‘L’approche fonctionnelle du service public : sa réalité et ses limites’ (AJDA, 1997), p. 20. 
821 P. Gonod, F. Melleray and Ph. Yolka, Traité de droit administratif, T.2 (Paris : Dalloz, 2010), p. 60. 
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In France three categories of 'personnes publiques' are distinguished: the State, local authorities 
and 'établissements publics' (public institutions).822 
 
The State embraces all central and decentralised administration and a number of local autonomous 
authorities not represented by a legal person and dependent on the State. Local authorities will be 
regions, departments, municipalities, 'collectivités' (communities) with special status as well as the 
'collectivités d'outre-mer' (overseas entities). Both these categories imply a community of persons 
who live on a specific territory.823 
 
An 'etablissement publique' is (a) an independent legal person (b) of public law (c) that manages a 
'service public'.824 This person is specifically created via decentralisation by service (functional 
public service) to administer a specific 'service public'. A body can be designated an 'etablissement 
publique' via a specific legal text. In that case no problem of qualification arises. Next, the Conseil 
d'État has developed in its case law criteria for recognising an 'etablissement publique', when the 
legislator has not qualified the entity: 1) whether it was established by a 'personne publique', 2) if 
its purpose is that of tending to the general interest, 3) what kind of control function the State 
exercises and 4) if the legal person has extraordinary powers.825 The criteria are not cumulative, but 
the more criteria are met, the greater the probability that case law will designate the body as an 
'établissement publique'.  
 
The notion of 'personne publique' shows affinities with the description in chapter 2 of the terms 
‘public authority’ and ‘body governed by public law’ in EU law. It is likely that the Court of Justice, 
as in other cases, took inspiration from French administrative law and the case law of the French 
Conseil d’État. 
 
In regard to the organic relationship, Chapus makes a distinction between a direct and an indirect 
relationship with a 'personne publique'. 
 
In a direct relationship, the public authority manages public service tasks with its own resources and 
with its own public servants. At EU level the term used is an ‘in-house’ situation. This kind of 
                                                 
822 G. Vedel and P. Delvolvé, Droit administratif (Paris : PUF, 1988), p. 844 ; P.L. Frier, Précis de droit 
administratif (Paris : Montchrétien, 2004), p. 190. See also F. Lichère, Droit des contrats publics (Paris : 
Dalloz, 2005), pp. 14-15 : He adds one more category, namely : ‘groupements d’intérêt public’ (public interest 
groupings) with reference to T. confl., 14 February 2000, GIP, Habitat et interventions sociales pour les mal 
logés et sans-abri. 
823 J. Waline, Droit administratif (Paris : Dalloz, 2012), p. 51. 
824 Y. Gaudemet, Traité de droit administratif, T.1 (Paris : LGDJ, 2001), pp. 288-290 ; P.L. Frier, Précis de 
droit administratif (Paris : Montchrétien, 2004), p. 190 with reference to CE 8 February 1999, Service 
départemental incendie et Secours. 
825 R. Chapus, Droit administratif Général, T.1 (Paris : Montchréstien, 2001), pp. 187-188. 
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situation falls outside the scope of EU law.826 This situation is qualified in French law as an organic 
public service. 
 
The relationship with the public authority can, however, be indirect, in which case the service will 
not be managed by the public authority itself. Another legal entity will be positioned between the 
public authority and the 'service public'. However, a decision by a 'personne publique' is still needed 
where a third (private) partner manages the 'service public'. The 'personne publique' must have 
ruled that a specific activity concerns the general interest and thus comes under its responsibility. 
But, the third partner must in real terms assume or have control of the management of the public 
service. This situation qualifies as a functional public service. 
 
Within this category three subcategories may be further distinguished. The first two categories are 
easy to explain.827 Regarding the first category one must look into what control a 'personne publique' 
possesses. This control may, for instance, derive from statutory participation in the capital of the 
entity that manages the 'service public'. If the 'personne publique' is a majority shareholder, it is 
presumed that there is a full and direct connection and consequently this is a 'service public'.828 829 
For the second category, the relationship between public authorities and the legal entity is 
materialised in a contract (e.g. service concession). 
 
If this relationship cannot be demonstrated on the strength of these objective elements, the 
existence of the relationship must be based on several criteria (third category), developed in the 
case law of the Conseil d'État. These elements are not of a cumulative nature. The Conseil d'État 
has indeed recognised that a private entity could be instructed to manage a public service 
independent of any formal contract.830  
 
The latest debate over the recognition of a 'service public' was whether the entity in question 
should possess prerogatives that normally belong to a public authority.831 This question arises when 
a private entity is entrusted with a public task. Indeed, it is always assumed of a 'personne publique' 
that it performs a public task. 
 
                                                 
826 Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle and RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH. v. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische 
Restabfall- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] ECR I-00001. 
827 S. Braconnier, Droit des services publics (Paris: PUF, 2007), p. 165. 
828 CE 20 April 1956, Epoux Bertin, Rec., 167. 
829 The Court of Justice ruled in Asemfo (see chapter 5) that since a public authority holds, alone or together 
with other public authorities, all of the share capital in a successful tenderer this tends generally to indicate 
that that public authority exercises over that company a control similar to that which it exercises over its own 
departments. This indicates that the relationship between the public authority and the 'entity' does not subsist 
in a market context.  
830 CE 13 May 1938, Caisse primaire d'aide et de protection, Rec. 41; CE fr. 31 July 1942, Monpeurt, Lebon 239; 
CE fr. 2 April 1943, Bouguen, Lebon 86; CE fr. 13 January 1961, Magnier, Lebon 33. 
831 L. Janicot, L'identification du service public géré par une personne privée (RFDA, 2008), p. 68.  
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If the private entity has acquired such prerogatives of public power from a public authority, the 
activity managed by this private entity must be considered as a 'service public'.832 The situation is 
less clear if the entity has not acquired such prerogatives. Until the 1990s the Conseil d'État ruled 
out the existence of a 'service public' in such circumstances.833 Thus, the acquisition of a 
prerogative was necessary for the presence of a 'service public'. A decision of July 20, 1990 saw the 
existence of such a prerogative for the first time as an optional criterion.834 This was the first step 
to a less restrictive interpretation of the notion of 'service public' when it is a third person that 
manages the public task. 
  
This discussion seems to have come to an end in some recent decisions by the Conseil d'État. In a 
decision of 22 February 2007,835 the Conseil d'État distinguished two hypotheses. In a first 
hypothesis, a 'service public' exists when the entity that manages the service has the prerogatives of 
a public authority. According to some, this seems to be the primary principle but it should 
nonetheless meet two other distinct criteria: it must have been entrusted with the management of 
a 'service public' and it must be subjected to control by the administration.836 In the second 
hypothesis a 'service public' exists when the public entity does not have the prerogatives of a public 
authority. This is the case when it is apparent by virtue of the general interest nature of its 
activities, its method of establishment, its organisation and how it operates, its duties and the 
measures used to check whether it has achieved objectives that the public authority intended the 
entity to fulfil in the general interest.837 In both hypotheses, the legal entity must have been 
assigned a public task and the public authority must play an important role in how the entity 
operates. 
 
In Commune d'Aix en Provence838 the Conseil d'État upheld the presence of a public service for an 
activity assured by a private entity, considering that in this case a 'personne publique' defined the 
tasks of the private entity, financed the entity, exercised control over it and saw to its proper 
functioning. 
 
In its interpretation of the element ‘personne publique’, the Conseil d’Etat seems to conform its 
case law to the more functional interpretation of the CJEU of the concept of SGI (see chapter 3). 
 
1.1.4. General interest 
                                                 
832 CE 13 January 1961, no. 43548, Lebon 32; CE 23 December 2012, no. 337396, Conseil national de l'ordre des 
médecins. 
833 CE 18 June 1963, Narcy, Lebon 401. 
834 CE 20 July 1990, no. 69867, Ville de Melun, Lebon 220. 
835 CE 22 February 2007, Association du personnel relevant des établissements pour inadaptés, Rec. 92. 
836 M. Long, P. Weil, G. Braibant, P. Delvolvé and B. Genevois, Les grands arrêts de la jurisprudence 
administrative (Paris : Dalloz, 2009), pp. 322-323 with reference to the CE 28 June 1963, Narcy, Rec. 401. 
837 See also CE 20 July 1990, Ville de Melun et Association "Melun-culture-loisirs", Rec. 220. For a recent 
application see CE 6 April 2007, Commune d'Aix-en-Provence, Rec.155. 
838 CE 6 April 2007, Commune d'Aix en Provence (RFDA, 2007), p. 812, concl. F. Séners, note J.-Cl. Douence 
(AJDA, 2007), pp.10-20, chr. F. Lenica and J. Boucher. 
205 
 
 
The second criterion for determining whether a 'service public' exists, has to do with the activity of 
the entity, i.e. whether the entity performs an activity of general interest. According to some this is 
the fundamental element in the definition of 'service public'.839 What is meant by this criterion? 
 
Defining the term 'general interest' is no simple matter.840 Its meaning varies over time and also in 
regard to its applicability by reason of place.841 It is in continuous evolution. There are two ways to 
determine whether an activity is of general interest.842 
 
In the first instance the State itself determines the nature of the activity, such as when the 
Constitution, a law or a 'personne publique' declares an activity to be in the general interest. 
Secondly, the Conseil d'État defines certain activities as being a 'service public par nature' (a public 
service by nature).843 This option may also result in a situation where a service is designated by the 
State to be a 'service public' but this designation is rejected by the Conseil d'État, because it is not 
a 'service public par nature'. It is important here to ascertain whether an activity yields no financial 
benefits, or whether it serves no financial interest but serves the whole of the population.  
 
Any type of activity can be recognised by the judge as a 'service public'.844 Rene Chapus drew a 
distinction between 'activités de plus grand service' and 'activités de plus grand profit'.845 'Activités 
de plus grand service' are activities that meet a general need of the population and not the needs of 
the legal entity itself. There is no desire to make a profit. The 'activités de plus grand profit' is 
aimed at ensuring or improving the funding of the 'activités de plus grand service'. If this is the main 
purpose of the activity, a 'service public' is present. A special exception in this respect is the 
management of governmental property (concession domaniale), which is not regarded as being a 
'service public'.846  
 
It should be noted that the criteria the Court of Justice uses to exclude certain forms of cooperative 
agreements between public authorities from the scope of EU law (see chapter 5) are in some ways 
similar to the criteria that the Conseil d'État has developed to define the concept of 'service public'.  
 
The element 'control similar to that exercised over its own departments' is reflected in part in the 
organic criterion of the term 'service public', where a definite relationship with a 'personne 
                                                 
839 S. Braconnier, Droit des services publics (Paris : PUF, 2007), p. 169. 
840 See also Chapter 3 on the notion ‘contracting authority’. The element ‘general interest’ is one of the 
criteria to qualify an entity as a ‘contracting authority’. It was made clear that this element was also difficult 
to define in EU law. 
841 G. Clamour, Intérêt général et concurrence (Paris : Dalloz, 2006), p. 162. 
842 P.-L. Frier and J. Petit, Précis de droit administratif (Paris : Montchrestien, 2010), p. 189. 
843 Zie hierover S. Boussard, ‘L’éclatement des catégories de service public et la résurgence du “service public 
par nature’ (RFDA, 2008), pp. 43-49. 
844 See examples given by R. Chapus, Droit administratif général (Paris : Montchrestien, 2001), p. 582. 
845 R. Chapus, Droit administratif général (Paris : Montchrestien, 2001), pp. 581 et seq. also reused by J. G.J. 
Gugliemi, G. Koubi and G. Dumont, Droit du service public (Paris : Montchrestien, 2007), pp. 97-98. 
846 TC 24 November 1894, D. 1896 3.3; CE 3 November 1950, Com., 534.  
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publique' is required. The criterion of 'most of the activities' is an element in the functional 
criterion of the concept of 'service public', where it suffices for an entity to create profits. 
Nevertheless it has not been established that the Court of Justice was inspired by French law. 
 
1.1.5. Organisation and management of a 'service public' 
 
In this section a definition of the terms 'organisation' and 'management' will be considered first. 
Next the different ways a 'service public' is managed will be discussed. Finally, it will be made clear 
in what respect a public authority in principle has free choice of all these management methods.  
 
The case law developed by the Court of Justice regarding cooperative agreements between public 
authorities, which has been discussed in detail in chapter 5, affects the way public authorities are 
organised in the different Member States,847 the way they organise their public service848 or manage 
their public service.849 However, in order to verify the effect, the terms 'organisation' and 
'management' require clarification. What do these terms mean in French law?  
 
The terms 'organisation and management' are frequently used interchangeably. In this thesis, the 
term organisation refers to the way a public authority organises itself to serve optimally the general 
interest. If it simply uses its own services, it creates a discrete legal person, it makes use of a third 
party...850 The term 'management' refers to the way a public authority is managed. A public service 
can be managed in different ways — by a public authority or through a third person. 
 
The CJEU case law on cooperative agreements influences aspects of these two elements: the free 
choice of organisation and management of the 'service public'. It may then be asked: which kind of 
elements are influenced and how they are influenced? 
 
The primary subject of this study is cooperative agreements between public authorities: a public 
contract or a service concession may be considered forms of such cooperation. A public authority 
can decide that she performs the public service task by its own departments, or it may entrust the 
managment of the public service task to a third party. This choice concerns the management of a 
public service, when the contract is a service concession. However, the third party can also be a 
legal entity established by a public authority itself. If this legal entity executes the contract, the 
decision of the public authority has more to do with the way a public authority organises itself.851  
  
                                                 
847 E. Fatome and A. Menemis, ‘Intérêt général, concurrence et service public’ (AJDA, 2006), pp. 67 et seq. 
848 E. Fatome and L. Richer, ‘Les procédures de passation des contrats et pouvoir d'organisation du service 
public’, (ACCP 12, 2002), pp. 60 et seq. 
849 Belgian law: A.L. Durviaux and N. Thirion, ‘Les modes de gestion des services publics locaux, la 
réglementation relative aux marchés publics et le droit communautaire’ (JT, 2004), pp. 17 et seq. 
850 E. Fatome and L. Richer, ‘Les procédures de passation des contrats et pouvoir d'organisation du service 
public’ (ACCP, 2002), p. 60. 
851 E. Fatôme and A. Menemis, ‘Intérêt général, concurrence et service public’ (AJDA, 2006), pp. 67 et seq. 
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In direct management the public authority prefers to discharge the 'service public' itself. It is then 
said that the public service is performed en régie, or under public administration, i.e. the public 
authority not only determines the objectives, but itself performs an active role.852 In the English 
system and on a European level, legal scholars use the concept of 'in-house'. A further distinction is 
made in French law between 'régie simple' and 'régie direct'.853 
 
In a 'régie simple' it is the public authority that meets needs of general interest with its own 
resources. None of these resources (financial, material) are separated from the public authority 
either de facto or de jure. In 'régie directe' a secondary distinction is drawn between 'régie 
autonome' and 'régie personnalisée' (personalised administration). In the first case, 'régie' implies 
simply a financial autonomy. In the second type of 'régie', the administration is a separate legal 
person, with decision-making powers over important elements of the policy entrusted to it. This is 
not a real in house-situation. 
 
A public authority can also decide to create a separate legal person, in which case private partners 
may or may not be members of it (vertical cooperative agreements). Accordingly, the following 
structures are distinguished: 'l'établissement public' (see above), 'le groupement d'intérêt public' 
(public interest group), and 'la société d'économie mixte' (mixed economy company). Only the two 
latter structures are germane to this thesis. Both structures concern cooperation between different 
legal persons.  
 
As it will be evident from the following section, a public authority also makes use of a contract to 
organise and manage its services of general interest and to do so it establishes legal relations with 
private partners and other public authorities. Here the relationship is a simple contractual and 
horizontal relationship. 
 
The different ways of organizing the ‘service public’ were confirmed by the Conseil d’État in 
Commune d’Aix-en-Provence.854 
 
The basic principle in regard to the organisation and management of a public service is that in 
France a public authority is free to choose how it wishes to organise or manage its 'service 
public'.855 856 The choice made by a public authority of how to organise its public service is regarded 
                                                 
852 G.J. Gugliemi and G. Koubi with G. Dumont, Droit du service public (Paris : Montchrestien, 2007), p. 321. 
853 S. Braconnier, Droit des services publics (Paris : PUF, 2007), pp. 403 et seq. 
854 CE 6 April 2007, Commune d'Aix en Provence (RFDA, 2007), p. 812, concl. F. Séners, note J.-Cl. Douence 
(AJDA, 2007), pp.10-20. 
855 E. Fatôme and A. Menemis, ‘Concurrence et liberté d'organisation des personnes publiques : éléments 
d'analyse’ (AJDA, 2006), p. 68; P.J. Frier and J. Petit, Précis de droit administratif (Paris, Montchrestien), p. 
201. See also CE 6 April 2007, Commune d'Aix en Provence (RFDA, 2007), p. 812, concl. F. Séners, note J.-Cl. 
Douence (AJDA, 2007), pp.10-20; CE 4 March 2009, Syndicat national des industries d'information de gaz 
(AJDA, 2009), p. 891, note J.D. Dreyfus. This free choice has been confirmed by the CJEU in its case law (see 
chapter 5). 
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as an essential power belonging to a public authority.857 A Tribunal administratif (administrative 
tribunal) recently ruled that at the moment a public authority sets about conducting and awarding a 
competitive procedure, it can, at any moment, put an end to that procedure and instead choose to 
assign the task to an entity over which it exercises decisive control.858 The House of Lords in the 
United Kingdom has ruled along the same lines, where according to the Court a public authority is 
granted the ability to stop an awarding procedure and elects instead to get its own services to carry 
out the task.859 
 
In the first place, free choice entails that a public authority may elect to discharge its public service 
itself or call on a third party to manage the service or privatise a public service.860 In France, if a 
public authority chooses to employ its own departments, the Conseil d'État ruled long ago that no 
tendering procedure has to be organised by the public authority.861 The CJEU case law on 
cooperative agreements has no influence on this free choice. 
 
If a public authority calls on a third party, it must first and foremost make sure that it does not 
transfer the whole of its powers.862 If the third party receives an independent task managing the 
public service (externalisation), the obligation to organise a competitive procedure was already 
accepted long ago. However, cooperation with other public authorities (mutualisation) was 
regarded more as an instance of the free choice a public authority enjoys to organise and manage a 
'service public'.863 France took a completely different view when looking at cooperative agreements 
between public authorities in comparison with the EU. The EU pursues first and foremost economic 
objectives. Any measure taken by the State that endangers these objectives falls under the scope of 
EU law. Consequently according to EU law a public authority is not free in its choice to cooperate 
with another public authority.864 Even if cooperation between public authorities could be qualified 
as a public contract or a service concession, the Conseil d’État considered until recently that the 
public procurement regulations and the principle of equality are not applicable (see 1.2.). 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
856 France never adopted a compulsory competitive tendering as was introduced in England in the 1980s. In that 
system local authorities were obliged to put their own administration in competition if they wanted to manage 
the public service task in house. See section 2. 
857 J.-M. Auby, ‘La notion de concession et les rapports des collectivités locales et des établissements publics, 
de l'électricité et du gaz dans la loi du 8 avril 1946’ (CJEG, 1949), p. 8. 
858 TA Montpellier, 23 March 2012, FADUC et Mme. Fraysse, n° 1002680 (AJDA, 2012), p. 1521. 
859 R.v Portsmouth City Council ex parte Peter Coles and Colwick Builders Limited and George Austin Limited, 
(C.L.C., 1997), p. 407. 
860 See also J.-D. Dreyfus, ‘Externalisation et liberté d’organisation du service’ (AJDA, 2009), pp. 1529-1534. 
861 CE 26 June 1930, Bourrageas, Lebon 659; CE 29 April 1970, Soc. Unipain (AJDA, 1970), p. 430, concl. 
Braibant. See also chapter 5 on the Stadt Halle-ruling of the CJEU. 
862 CE 17 March 1989, Synd. psychiatre français (RFDA, 1991), p. 267, concl. B. Stein. 
863 O. Berthelot, ‘Liberté du commerce et de l'industrie et transferts de compétences; socialisation de 
l'économie ou privatisation du service public’ (AJDA, 2003), p. 707. 
864 See also G. Eckert, ‘Contrats entre personnes publiques et droit de la concurrence’ (AJDA, 2013), p. 849. 
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1.2. Cooperative agreements between public authorities  
 
The section shall first give a brief historical overview of the genesis and evolution of the 
phenomenon of 'cooperation between public authorities' in France (1.2.1.). Next it shall examine 
the freedom of a public authority to choose its contract partner (1.2.2.). Third it raises the question 
to what extend a public authority is free to choose another public authority as contract partner 
(1.2.3.). Fourth it follows the evolution of the case law of the Conseil d'État in respect of the extent 
to which a public authority is free to conclude a public contract or a service concession with 
another public authority (1.2.4.). Finally the section explores how the French legislature has let 
itself be influenced by CJEU case law in that it has created new forms for a public-law legal person 
that will potentially fall outside the scope of EU law (1.2.5.). 
 
1.2.1. Historical evolution 
 
In France a public authority has different ways to organise and manage its 'service public'. One of 
these ways is to cooperate with other public authorities.  
 
Cooperation between public authorities is not a recent phenomenon in France.865 In 1899, Hauriou 
already wrote: ‘il devient difficile de ne pas reconnaître que la gestion … est essentiellement 
coopérative, comme d’ailleurs tout travail est cooperative, après celle des administrés, après celle 
des fonctionnaires voilà que nous constatons la coopération des administrations elles-mêmes’ [It 
becomes difficult not to acknowledge that management... is essentially cooperative insofar as all 
the work is done in cooperation. After cooperation among those administered, after cooperation of 
civil servants, there is now even cooperation between administrations].866 
 
In the last few decades of the past century cooperation between public authorities came more and 
more to be viewed as one of the ways a public authority could achieve objectives of general 
interest, and it has been increasingly used in measure as tasks of general interest increased in 
number. It is one of the ways a public authority is enabled to outsource its tasks. In France as well, 
public authorities have increasingly used this device and continue to use it to improve their 
organisation of the ‘service public’.867 
 
Cooperation between authorities has been taking place on a contractual basis for the past 20 to 30 
years, especially at the local level. 
 
                                                 
865 J.-M. Pontier, ‘Cooperation contractuelle et cooperation institutionnelle’ (Rev.Adm., 1994), p. 162.  
866 M. Hauriou, La gestion administrative, étude historique du droit administratif (Paris, 1899), p. 31. 
867 C. Pilone, ‘Reflexions autour de la notion de contrat « in house »’, in G. Clamour and M. Ubaud-Bergeron 
(eds.), Contrats publics. Mélanges en honneur du Professeur Michel Guibal, Vol. I (Montpellier : CREAM, 2006), 
p. 702. 
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Public authorities cooperate in various ways but only contractual cooperative partnerships, 
horizontal and vertical, are considered in the thesis. That is why the notion of ‘cooperative 
agreements’ is used. 
 
It has long been considered normal in France for a public authority to use the contractual approach. 
The second half of the twentieth century in France and in neighbouring countries as well, was 
marked by an increasing use of the contract in the way a public authority conducts its business.868 
The term used in France is 'l'administration contractuelle' (the contracting authority).869 The 
capacity of public authorities to conclude agreements has hardly been questioned nor has legal 
theory sought to elucidate the foundations of this capacity. Nevertheless, the use of a contract by 
public authorities is not a normal situation since in principle in French law public authorities are 
presumed to act unilaterally. A public authority does not allow itself to be bound by another 
party.870 However, in practice public authorities have taken the liberty to operate via a contract. 
 
In France, the capacity of a public authority to make use of the contract is associated with its 
quality as a legal person.871 As a legal person, a public authority is endowed with certain powers 
that enable it to serve the general interest, and within the scope of these powers, public authorities 
can operate with a certain autonomy.872 Its quality as a legal person empowers a public authority to 
act via a contract. 
 
In France, the existence of agreements between public authorities was already apparent under the 
Ancien Régime, and recourse to such an instrument increased rapidly in the 19th century.873 The use 
of the contract to formalise cooperation became more frequent in the beginning of the seventies of 
the twentieth century.874 In the last few years the use of a contract has been used increasingly 
                                                 
868 B. Stirn, ‘La liberté contractuelle, droit fondamental en droit administratif’, (AJDA, 1998), p. 673; L. 
Richer, ‘La contractualisation comme technique de gestion des affaires publiques’, (AJDA, 2003), p. 973; for a 
recent historical overview of the use of contract by a public authority in diverse sectors: X., ‘Un recours accru 
au contrat pour conduire l'action publique ou édicter des normes’, in Rapport public 2008. Le contrat, mode 
d'action publique et de production de normes (Paris : La Documentation Française, 2008), pp. 17-90. 
869 See J. Pini, ‘Autorité et contrat dans l'administration moderne en France’, in X., Annuaire Européen 
d'administration publique (P.U.A., 1997), pp. 80 et seq.; C. Brechon-Moulènes, ‘Liberté contractuelle des 
personnes publiques’ (AJDA, 1998), p. 643; Dossier: L'administration contractuelle, (AJDA, 2003); Y. Jegouzo, 
‘L'administration contractuelle en question’, in X., Mouvement du droit public. Mélanges en l'honneur de 
Franck Moderne (Paris : Dalloz, 2004), pp. 544 et seq. 
870 L. Duguit, Les transformations du droit public (éd. La mémoire du droit, 1913), p. 161. 
871 C. Brechon-Moulènes, Liberté contractuelle des personnes publiques (AJDA, 1998), p. 644; P.-L. Frier, 
Précis de droit administratif (Paris : Montchrétien, 2004), p. 322. 
872 S. Nicinski, ‘Le dogme de l'autonomie de la volonté dans les contrats administratifs’, in G. Clamour en M. 
Ubaud-Bergeron (eds), Contrats publics, Mélanges en l'honneur du Professeur Michel Guibal, T.I (Montpeller : 
CREAM, 2006), p. 49 with reference to C. Brechon-Moulènes, ‘Liberté contractuelle des personnes publiques’ 
(AJDA, 1998), p. 643.  
873 D. Pouyaud, Contrats entre personne publiques (Juris classeur Administratif, 675), p. 3, no. 1 ff.; J.M. 
Peyrical, Les contrats de prestation entre collectivités publiques (AJDA, 2000), p. 582. 
874 J.-F. Dreyfus, Contribution à une théorie générale des contrats entre personnes publiques (Paris : 
L'Harmattan, 1997), p.12. 
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when public authorities wished to cooperate, so that this was even referred to as an example of the 
generalisation of the 'procédé contractuel'.875 
 
Hence, there has been little discussion of the use of a contract by a public authority to cooperate 
with another public authority. However, this is not a topic that falls within the scope of the thesis. 
The more interesting issue is in what measure a public authority is free to call upon another public 
authority for the provision of a (public) service.  
 
1.2.2. Selection of a contract partner 
 
French administrative law bases the choice of a contract partner on the same principle as French 
private law: 'la 'liberté contractuelle' [the freedom to contract]. Just as for other government 
contracts, legislation and case law concerning public contracts and service concessions have set 
conditions on the freedom a public authority has to conclude a contract with another public 
authority. The thesis shall explore how a 'personne publique' in France chooses its contractual 
partners.  
 
The basic criterion to be applied for determining to what extent public authorities in France freely 
choose a contract partner, is the principle of 'liberté contractuelle' (contractual freedom)876: ‘La 
liberté contractuelle consistera donc dans le fait que la formation du contrat sera entièrement 
abandonnée aux deux parties; elle sera présente à chaque moment, à chaque fase de la formation 
du contrat: liberté de contracter ou de ne pas contracter, liberté de choisir le type de contrat, 
liberté de choisir le co-contractant, liberté de déterminer le contenu du contrat’ [Thus contractual 
freedom will be defined by the condition that the creation of a contract will be left entirely to the 
two parties; it will be present at each and every moment, in each phase in the creation of a 
contract: freedom to make a contract or not make a contract, freedom to choose the contracting 
party and freedom to determine the content of the contract].877 
 
In private law, the freedom of contract is traditionally a consequence of the principle of the 
autonomy of will, the capacity to create one's own law.878 It is difficult to reconcile this principle 
with the principles that constitute the foundations of the actions of public authorities. Normally 
                                                 
875 F. Moderne, ‘L'evolution récente du droit des contrats administratifs : les conventions entre personnes 
publiques’ (RFDA, 1984), p. 5; N. Poulet-Gebot Leclercq, ‘La contractualisation des relations entre les 
personnes publiques’ (RFDA, 1999), p. 552. 
876 For a comprehensive study of this concept see: P.-Y. Gadhouin, La liberté contractuelle dans la 
jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel (Paris : Dalloz, 2008), p. 415. 
877 C. Brechon-Moulènes, ‘La liberté contractuelle des personnes publiques’ (AJDA, 1998), p. 644: Contractual 
freedom implies that the creation of a contract is left entirely to the two parties; it shall be present at every 
moment, in every phase of the creation of the contract. Freedom to enter into a contract or not to enter into a 
contract, freedom to choose the type of contract, freedom to choose the contract partner, and freedom to 
determine the content of the contract. See also F. Llorens, ‘Le recours des personnes publiques à la vente 
d’immeuble en l’état futur d’achèvement : une condamnation partielle’ (CJEG, 1991), pp. 253-254. 
878 S. Nicinski, ‘Le dogme de l’autonomie de la volonté dans les contrats administratifs’, in G. Clamour en M. 
Ubaud-Bergeron (eds), Contrats publics, Mélanges en l'honneur du Professeur Michel Guibal, T.I (Montpeller : 
CREAM, 2006), Volume I, p. 45. 
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public authorities act unilaterally and act in the general interest. However, in France it has always 
been recognised that a public authority may operate on a contractual basis. 
 
The principle of contractual freedom, as a principle of private law is, however, problematic in 
France when applied to 'contrats administratifs' [administrative contracts]. This type of agreements 
is regarded purely as a contract of public law nature and private law is not applicable to it. To that 
extent the notion of autonomy of will is also out of place here. After an examination of case law 
and legal theory another conclusion beckons. 
 
Until a few decades ago, it was a self-evident matter that contractual freedom was applicable to 
'contrats administratifs'.879 On the other hand, the term 'contractual freedom' was not mentioned 
directly in regard to 'contrats administratifs', which fundamentally are meant to serve the general 
interest of a public service.880 The autonomy of these contracts in regard to general contract law 
gives rise to the application of particular set of rules and principles. 
 
However, attention to the principle has increased exponentially in recent times. This growing 
importance has been linked to the increasing interest of public authorities in the contractual 
approach.881 This increasing interest has ultimately produced case law in the Cour constitutionnelle 
(Constitutional Court) and the Conseil d’État (Council of State), both of which invoke the principle 
of 'liberté contractuelle' (the principle of contractual freedom). 
 
In the context of 'contrats administratifs' contractual freedom is associated with the discretionary 
powers of public authorities.882 A public authority enjoys a certain freedom within the limits of 
these powers. The highest courts in France have confirmed the contractual freedom of public 
authorities and considered it to be a general principle of law and of constitutional value: Conseil 
constitutionnel (Constitutional Court )883 and Conseil d’État.884 
 
                                                 
879 Ch. Brechon-Moulènes, ‘La liberté contractuelle des personnes publiques’ (AJDA, 1998), p. 643. see also N. 
Symchowisz, Droit public des montages contractuels complexes (Paris : Imprimerie Nationale Éditions, 2003), 
p. 84. 
880 F.-X. Fort, ‘Les aspects administratifs de la liberté contractuelle’, in X., Contrats publics. Mélanges en 
l’honneur du Professeur Michel Guibal, T. I (Montpellier : CREAM, 2006), p. 30. 
881 B. Stirn, La liberté contractuelle, droit fondamentale en droit administrative (AJDA, 1998), p. 673. 
882 G. Péquignot, Théorie générale du contrat administratif (Paris : Pédone, 1945), p. 189 ; E. Picard, La 
liberté contractuelle des personnes publiques constitue-t-elle un droit fondamental ? (AJDA, 1996), p. 651; S. 
Nicinsky, ‘Le dogme de l’autonomie de la volonté dans les contrats administratifs’, in Contrats publics. 
Mélanges Michel Guibal, T. I (Montpellier : CREAM, 2006), p. 49. 
883 C.c. no. 2000-437, 19 December 2000 ; C.c. no. 2006-543, 30 November 2006. P. Delvolvé, ‘Constitution et 
contrats publics’, in Mouvement du droit public. Mélanges Franck Moderne (Paris : Dalloz, 2004), p. 483; L. 
Favoreu and L. Philip, Les grandes décisions du Conseil Constitutionnel (Paris : Dalloz), p. 457; A. Duffy, ‘La 
constitutionnalisation de la liberté contractuelle’ (RDP, 2006), pp. 1573-1584 ; Ph. Terneyre, ‘A propos de la 
liberté contractuelle’ (AJDA, 2007), p. 1907 ; L. Richer, Droit des contrats administratifs (Paris : LGDJ, 2008), 
p. 138 ; contra : Ph. Guettier, Droit des contrats administratifs (Paris: Thémis, 2008), p. 134 : According to 
this author, contractual freedom has no constitutional status. 
884 CE Fédération française des professionnels immobiliers et commerciaux, 30 October 1980, Leb. 348 ; CE SA 
GBA Berry-Loire, 20 January 1989, Leb. 26 ; C.E. Société Borg Warner, 28 January 1998 (AJDA, 1998), p. 287. 
Ch. Brechon-Moulènes, ‘Liberté contractuelle des personnes publiques’ (AJDA, 1998), p. 643. 
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1.2.3. Freedom to choose a public authority as contract partner? 
 
The question raised in this thesis is to what extent cooperative agreements between public 
authorities, insofar as they can be called a public contract or a service concession, may be freely 
concluded or whether a tendering procedure has to be organised and this under the influence of EU 
law. The case law of the Conseil d'État has undergone an entire evolution on this topic, basically 
influenced by the case law of the CJEU. This evolution will now be examined in detail, divided into 
several different periods. 
 
It had long been assumed that, in the absence of a legal text, cooperative agreements between 
public authorities are not subject to any form of competitive tender. Legal theory deemed that in 
regard to the French public procurement legislation that this regulation ‘a été conçu en fonction 
des relations entre les collectivités publiques et les cocontractants du secteur privé’ [was construed 
as a function of relations between public authorities and cocontractors in the private sector].885  
 
In the event, a public authority is free to choose its contract partner (i.e another public 
authority).886 Some legal scholars considered that this liberty has its origins in the freedom of a 
public authority to discharge their public service tasks in house.887 This free choice is linked to the 
intuitu personae nature of certain of these agreements. Some legislation explicitly provided for the 
freedom of municipalities, departments and regions to conclude contracts with each other.888 But 
where there any legal text in this first period that provided if a public contract or a service 
concession between public authorities was subject to competitive tender? A distinction should be 
drawn here between a service concession and a public contract. 
 
As regards the 'délégation de service public' (service concession, in 1993 the French legislature 
passed the 'Sapin law' (law of 29 January 1993 relative to ‘la prévention de la corruption et à la 
transparence de la vie économique et des procédures publiques’ [on the prevention of corruption 
and transparency in economic life and public procedures]). This law sets down specific obligations 
regarding transparency and competition whenever public authorities undertake a 'délégation de 
service public'. However it is a question whether these obligations also apply to cooperative 
agreements concluded between public authorities. 
 
                                                 
885 F. Moderne, ‘La concurrence des services techniques de l’Etat et des techniciens privés auprès des 
collectivités locales’ (RD.imm., 1982), p. 467; See also F. Raynaud and P. Tombeur, ‘Chronique générale de 
jurisprudence administrative française’ (AJDA, 1998), p. 557 ; O. Berthelot, ‘Liberté du commerce et de 
l'industrie et transferts de compétences; socialisation de l'économie ou privatisation du service public’ (AJDA, 
2003), p. 797. 
886 A. de Laubadère, F. Moderne and P. Delvolvé, Traité des contrats administratifs (Paris : LGDJ, T.1, 1983), 
p. 694. 
887 G. Eckert, ‘La cooperation public-public, entre espoirs et inquiétudes’, in Mélanges en l’honneur du 
professeur Richer (Paris : LGDJ, 2013), p. 617. 
888 Articles 2, 45 and 69 I of Statute no. 82-213 of March 1982, 2. See also chapter 1 of a Decree of June 1983, 
9. 
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The 'Loi Sapin' is applicable only if the contracting partner of the public authority is an undertaking. 
Opinions were, however, divided on whether a public authority can indeed be an enterprise. Some 
were of the opinion that public authorities can be considered undertakings889 in particular, when 
they wish to undertake a 'délégation de service public'.890 Others draw a distinction between, on the 
one hand, the State and local authorities, and 'établissements publics', on the other. Only the latter 
may be considered enterprises.891 In 2000 one legal scholar claimed that the applicability of the 
principle in the Sapin Law concerning the 'délégation de service public' enjoys general 
acceptance.892 However, no relevant case law was adjudicated in this period so applicability 
remained uncertain. 
 
The second type of agreement of interest is one, which under EU law, falls within the scope of the 
public procurement Directives. In the first period, the relevant legislation did not stipulate that 
agreements between public authorities were subject to the public procurement Directives. 
Generally it was also accepted that such contracts need not be concluded in conformity with the 
procedures provided with regard to the awarding of public procurement contracts.893 By their very 
nature such agreements are exempted from public procurement regulations. Compliance with the 
rules on equal treatment in the conclusion of a public contract originally took its inspiration from 
solicitude to shield the interest of a public authority in its relation to private undertakings. This 
concern is absent when a public authority engages with another public authority.894 
 
According to some French authors the legislation on public procurement contracts is only applicable 
to agreements concluded between a public authority and a private service provider.895 Chapter 5 
explained that some Advocate generals thought in the same vein about EU (public procurement) 
law. Tendering to competition is meant first and foremost to protect the interests of public 
authorities.896 Some case law simply exempted cooperation between public authorities from the 
ambit of applicability of French legislation on public procurement.897 
 
In 1998 the Conseil d'État seized the opportunity to render a decision on the applicability of the 
principles of EU law that are the foundation of the public procurement Directives concerning 
                                                 
889 J.-CL. Douence, ‘La dévolution contractuelle du service public local’ (Rép. Dalloz Collectivités locales, 
1995), p. 6150-12. 
890 J.D. Dreyfus, Contribution a une théorie générale des contrats entre personnes publiques (Paris : 
L'Harmattan, 1997), p. 294. 
891 D. Laurent and O. Rousset, ‘Convention de délégation de dervice public local et loi Sapin: la transparence 
dans le brouillard’ (LPA, 1994), p. 1. 
892 J.D. Dreyfus, ‘Actualité des contrats entre personnes publiques’ (AJDA, 2000), p. 579. 
893 L. Richer, La qualité du cocontractant de l'administration ; contrats entre collectivités publiques (Paris : 
Ed. Le Moniteur, 1996), II. 220.1.7, p. 3 ; TA Poitiers, 16 March 1983, Syndicat régional des entrepreneurs de 
travaux publics de Poitou-Charentes, Lebon T. 779. 
894 G. Eckert, ‘Contrats entre personnes publiques et droit de la concurrence’ (AJDA, 2013), p. 849. 
895 F. Moderne, ‘Les Conventions des prestations de services entre l'Etat et les collectivités’ (EFE, 1996), no. 
29, cited by J.-D. Dreyfus, ‘Actualité des contrats entre personnes publiques’ (AJDA, 2000), p. 579. 
896 G. Eckert, ‘Les contrats échappant aux règles de publicité et de mise en concurrence’ (AJDA, 2013), p. 849. 
897 TA Poitiers, 16 March 1983, Syndicat régional des entrepreneurs de travaux publics de Poitou-Charentes 
(Lebon T.), p. 779. 
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cooperative agreements between public authorities.898 In France the 'Communautés' (communities) 
had on basis of Article L.165-1 and 1 of the Code des communes the competence to enlarge and 
operate a sewage system as well as a water purification plant to the benefit of its municipalities (its 
members). A decision of 14 January 1997 from the Communauté du Piémont de Barr expressed the 
wish to entrust the management of these facilities to another public authority. No competitive 
tender was organised when this agreement was concluded. 
 
First the Conseil d'État determined that this agreement was a public contract by virtue of the 
French public procurement legislation. Next the Conseil d'État determined that the public 
procurement legislation does not explicitly provide that agreements between public authorities 
must be considered as public contracts and are thus subject to a tendering procedure. Therefore, 
according to the Conseil d'État, the French legislation on public procurement is not applicable.  
 
The decision to tender the relevant contract was also criticised directly on the basis of the public 
procurement Directives. The Conseil d’État based its decision on this critique and confirmed that 
the agreement does constitute a public contract under the [EU] public procurement Directives. 
According to these Directives the conclusion of such a contract is subject to prior publication and 
the equal treatment of interested candidates. The European legislation on public contracts makes, 
according to the Conseil d’État, abstraction of the nature of the service provider. The provider can 
be a private company or a public authority. It was established that the French national legislation in 
this regard was not compatible with the European Directives and thus the Conseil d'État applied the 
public procurement Directives directly. 
 
In this decision the Conseil d'État abstracts from the fact that the contracting authority is a member 
of or is a shareholder in the service provider. Later on the CJEU in its case law made it clear that 
under certain conditions in such a situation the public procurement Directives do not apply.  
 
In its ruling in Communauté de Piémont de Barr the Conseil d'État anticipates pronouncements of 
the CJEU, specifically that cooperative agreements between public authorities can under certain 
circumstances fall within the scope of EU law. There is no case law comparable to Communauté de 
Piémont de Barr regarding service concessions prior to the case law of the Court of Justice in regard 
to quasi-in-house situations. 
 
In the ‘Code des Marchés publics’ of 2001 and 2004 the French legislator confirmed explicitly a 
public contract concluded between public authorities has to be subject to a tendering procedure.  
 
1.2.4. Evolution case law 
 
                                                 
898 C.E. 20 May 1998, Communauté de communes du Piémont de Barr (AJDA, 1998), p. 553. 
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CJEU case law, from which it is deduced that cooperative agreements between public authorities 
also come under the scope of EU law in certain circumstances, and as a consequence a public 
authority may not freely conclude such an agreement, was highly criticised and feared in France. It 
was seen as a threat to national sovereignty. It challenged the national competence to create 
regulations that determine how a public service has to be organised. On the basis of the freedom to 
organise and manage a public service, as recognised in France, a public authority was also enabled 
to enter directly into a cooperative agreement with another public authority without organising a 
tendering procedure,899 even if this cooperative agreement could be qualified as a public contract 
or service concession. 
 
In Communauté Piémont du Barr the French Conseil d'État anticipated the CJEU case law and 
placed limits on the free choice of a public authority to organise and administer a public service. In 
the aftermath of Teckal900 the French legislature also introduced an exception to the applicability of 
the public procurement Directives to cooperation between public authorities. The two Teckal-
criteria were introduced into French legislation.901 The Conseil d’État deemed that the provision 
that set down that Teckal may also be applicable to a cooperative agreement between a public 
authority and a semi-public company does not conflict with EU law.902 However, Stadt Halle903 and 
subsequent CJEU case law has made it clear that the Court of Justice gives a strict interpretation to 
the Teckal-criteria. The fear of a serious limitation being placed on national competence in regard 
to the organisation and management of a public service remained. 
 
In Commune d'Aix-en-Provence904 the Conseil d'État confirmed there is also a direct management if 
the statutory objective of the created entity is solely the management of the public service and 
insofar as public authorities or the entities creating the legal person exercise over the person 
concerned a control which is similar to that which it exercises over its own departments (quasi-in-
house). The legal person has the possibility of engaging in additional commercial activities.905 Thus 
the Conseil d’État considers an in house provision to be equal to a situation where a public authority 
provides a public service task to another public authority insofar as the two Teckal-criteria are met. 
However the Conseil d’État also confirmed that the presence of a private company as a shareholder 
in the entity that concludes the contract imposes the application of a tendering procedure. Public 
authorities can also decide together to create and manage such a public service. As such the Conseil 
d’État confirms Teckal,906 Stadt Halle907 and Coditel Brabant.908 
                                                 
899 E. Fatôme and A. Menemis, ‘Concurrence et liberté d'organisation des personnes publiques’ (AJDA, 2006), p. 
69. 
900 Case C-107/98, Teckal v. Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121. 
901 Article 3 of the Decree of March 2001, 7 'portant Code des Marchés publics'.  
902 CE 9 July 2003, Féd. Française des entreprises gestionnaires des services, aux équipements, à l’énergie et à 
l’environnement et autres, Req. N° 239879 (CMP, 2003), comm. 169. 
903 Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle and RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH v. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische 
Restabfall- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] ECR I-00001. 
904 CE 6 April 2007, Commune d’Aix en Provence (RFDA, 2007), p. 812, concl. F. Séners, note J.-Cl. Douence 
(AJDA, 2007), pp.10-20, chr. F. Lenica and J. Boucher. 
905 Case C-573/07, Sea Srl v. Comune di Ponte Nassa [2009] ECR I-08127. 
906 Case C-107/98, Teckal v. Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121. 
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The Conseil d'État has further elaborated its case law explaining within which limits a public 
authority may cooperate with another public authority without respecting a competitive tendering 
procedure. This case law will now be discussed. No distinction will be made between vertical and 
horizontal cooperation because it will appear the Conseil d’État uses the same criterion to exclude 
both situations from the obligation to use a tendering procedure. 
 
The Conseil d’État has issued decisions in a variety of situations on whether the relation between a 
public authority and a third person is or is not obliged to set up a competitive procedure. Often this 
has had to do with the application of the rules and regulations concerning public contracts or 
service concessions.  
 
In Commune d’Aix-en-Provence909 the Conseil d'État had to issue a decision in a case where 
Commune d'Aix-en-Provence had granted two subsidies to an association that managed the 
organisation of a festival. This case concerned a situation where no real cooperation was 
established between a public authority and a third party. In this case a private initiative was 
already in place and in their actions a public authority recognised this initiative to be a public 
service. In Syndicat national des industries d'information de gaz910 the decision concerned an 
agreement concluded between on the one hand 11 hospitals,911 and on the other a hospital union. 
Via this agreement the two parties established a groupement d'intérêt public (public interest 
grouping) (GIP) (vertical cooperative agreement). In the particular situation it was a legal person 
that was responsible for the study, design, and development of an information system to support 
the activities and management of a hospital and secondarily for making it available to the members. 
In Commune de Veyrier-du-Lac912 the Conseil d'État was obliged to rule on an agreement concluded 
between the Communauté d'agglomération d'Annecy and the Commune de Veyrier-du-Lac 
(municipality), where one of the two parties did not constitute a part of the other (horizontal 
cooperative agreement). The Communauté had been assigned by the municipality the management 
of its public service pertaining to the distribution of potable water. There had been no competitive 
tender procedure set up before this agreement was concluded. 
 
In all three cases the Conseil d’État applied the same criterion to determine whether and in what 
manner a public authority is required to set up a competitive procedure whenever it enters into a 
                                                                                                                                                        
907 Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle and RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH v. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische 
Restabfall- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] ECR I-00001. 
908 Case C-324/07, Commune d’Uccle et Région Bruxelles-Capital [2008] ECR I-08457. 
909 CE 6 April 2007, Commune d'Aix en Provence (RFDA, 2007), p. 812, concl. F. Séners, note J.-Cl. Douence 
(AJDA, 2007), pp.10-20, chr. F. Lenica and J. Boucher. 
910 CE 4 March 2009, Syndicat national des industries d'information de gaz (AJDA, 2009), p. 891, note J.D. 
Dreyfus. 
911 Hospitals also must be considered public authorities in the sense of the public procurement directives. This 
could be derived from C-300/07, Hans & Christophorus Oymanns GbR, Orthopädie Schuhtechnik v. AOK 
Rheinland/Hamburg [2009] ECR I-04779. 
912 CE 3 February 2012 (AJDA, 2012), p. 555. 
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relation with a third party. The Conseil d’État made the answer to this question dependent on 
whether a third party can be considered as an ‘operator on a competitive market’. 
 
In its case law the Conseil d’État has not defined the notion of ‘operator on a competitive market’. 
It should be noted that the notion of 'operator on a competitive market' is not identical with the 
notion of 'operator' as used in the definition of the term 'public contract'. The presence of an 
operator implies in itself that the agreement must be deemed a public contract irrespective of the 
nature of the operator.913 From the case law of the Conseil d’État it appears that this notion of 
'operator on a competitive market' results in a much broader exclusion of EU law when public 
authorities cooperate. 
 
The Conseil d’État pre-eminently uses, in Commune d’Aix-en-Provence, two criteria to judge 
whether or not a contract involves an operator on a competitive market. First, the nature of the 
activity and particular conditions under which the activity takes place. Second, when a private 
person performs a public service, this may also fall outside the scope of EU law. According to Stadt 
Halle a cooperative association with a private person is always subject to the application of EU 
law.914 Hence the Conseil d’État goes further than that which the CJEU allows. The Conseil d'Etat 
presents in its case law a somewhat peculiar argument. When a public authority made use of a third 
person that is not market-oriented there can be no public contract or service concession. It thus 
follows according to the Conseil d’État that no tendering procedure need be organised. The Conseil 
d'État confuses two things, however: On the one hand there is the qualification of an agreement, 
but on the other there is the issue of the applicability of the public procurement Directives to this 
agreement. Quasi-in-house case law is concerned with the second question. In this particular case, 
the nature of the operator is not decisive for exclusion from EU law. 
 
According to Syndicat national des industries d'information de gaz public authorities may also freely 
choose a separate legal person to perform a task or service in the case where the public authority 
exercises over the person concerned a control which is similar to that which it exercises over its 
own departments and, at the same time, that person carries out the essential part of its activities 
with the controlling public authority or authorities. This is a reiteration of the two Teckal-criteria. 
In such a case, according to the Conseil d'État, this legal person cannot be considered an operator 
on a competitive market.915 Payment to the GIP by members for the right of use alters nothing in 
this regard. 
 
                                                 
913 Case C-305/08, Consorzio Nazionale Interuniversitario per le Scienze del Mare (CoNISMa) v. Regione Marche 
[2009] ECR I-12129.   
914 C-26/03, Stadt Halle and RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH v. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische Restabfall- 
und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] ECR I-00001. 
915 For a critique of this criterion see L. Richer, ‘L'introduction de la notion d'activité économique dans le droit 
des contrats publics’, in Conseil d’Etat, Rapport public 2008. Le contrat, mode d'action publique et de 
production de normes (Paris : EDCE, 2008), pp. 359 et seq. 
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On the one hand, the Conseil d'État faithfully applies the two Teckal-criteria to the inter-
institutional form of cooperation. On the other hand, the Conseil d'État creates a link to its 
Commune d'Aix-en-Provence case. As the two Teckal-criteria have been met, the created legal 
person is presumably not an operator on a competitive market. This likewise applies when the legal 
person consists of several members. When that is the case, collective control is sufficient.916  
 
In Commune de Veyrier-du-Lac the intent of cooperation is that the public service, namely, the 
distribution of drinking water should be operated on the whole territory of the participating 
authorities. Thus, the municipality as a participating authority has the benefit of more efficient 
facilities and equipment. The price the residents of the municipality must pay for the potable water 
must, on the one hand, be proportional to the amount of investments and, on the other cover the 
costs of production and distribution of the potable water. There are no indirect financial transfers 
between the public authorities. According to the Conseil d'État this proves the absence of an 
operator on a competitive market. Consequently, the agreement falls outside the scope of 
applicability of the French regulations concerning a 'commande publique' [public contract]. This 
decision goes quite far in the application of the principles the Court of Justice has established in its 
case law regarding cooperative agreements between public authorities. In the case in question, at 
issue was a horizontal form of cooperation. None of the cooperating public authorities has any 
control on the other. Thus, only the CJEU case law on horizontal cooperative agreement is 
relevant.917 
 
In CJEU case law a horizontal cooperative agreements requires that the intent of the cooperative 
agreement between public authorities is to ensure a public task in which all of them are required to 
participate.918 In Commune de Veyrier-du-Lac one public authority performs a task for another 
public authority. The contracting authority does not itself perform any service. The public authority 
does not really participate in the performance of the public task. It merely pays another public 
authority to carry out its public task. This kind of cooperation does not seem to fulfil the criteria 
established by the CJEU for a horizontal cooperation. Nevertheless, the Conseil d’Etat accepted the 
exclusion of this situation from the application of the public procurement regulations. Finally the 
ruling of the Conseil d'État also attaches importance to the fact that money paid by the contracting 
authority should only cover the operator's costs. According to Ordine deghli Ingegneri919 this is only 
an adequate response to the term 'price', one of the conditions for applying EU law. 
 
                                                 
916 See Case C-324/07, Commune d’Uccle et Région Bruxelles-Capital [2008] ECR I-08457. 
917 See also Case C-480/06, Commission v. Germany [2009] ECR I-04747; Ordine at [33]. 
918 Case C-159/11, Azienda Sanitaria Locale di Lecce, Università del Salento v. Ordine degli Ingegneri della 
Provincia di Lecce and Others [2012] ECR I-00000, at [34]; Case C-386/11, Piepenbrock Dienstleistungen & Co. 
KG v. Kreis Düren [2013] ECR I-00000, at [36]. 
919 Case C-159/11, Azienda Sanitaria Locale di Lecce, Università del Salento v. Ordine degli Ingegneri della 
Provincia di Lecce and Others [2012] ECR I-00000. 
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This raises the question of whether the French Conseil d'État has gone too far here.920 In a 
Memorandum of 4 October 2011921 the European Commission recognises that a horizontal form of 
cooperation lies beyond the scope of applicability of EU law only if the agreement concerns the 
joint accomplishment of a common task. As such the Commission opposes this kind of cooperation to 
a normal public contract. In a public contract there is one party that provides and another that 
'pays'. Even in this last situation the French Conseil d’État admitted the free choice of a public 
authority to choose its contract partner. As such, the Conseil d’État is one step ahead of the CJEU. 
 
In Syndicat national des industries d'information de gaz the Conseil d'État seems presumably to be 
averring that the diverse CJEU case law on vertical and horizontal cooperative agreement, 
respectively all have the same basic features, and the present thesis wishes to emphasise precisely 
this point: The third party performing the service for the public authority is not on the market, and 
because of this the State measure favouring cooperation with this operator can in no way be 
detrimental to competition. However the criterion of ‘operator on a competitive market’ of the 
Conseil d'État seems to go further than CJEU case law. 
 
This particular decision enables public authorities together to construct a legal person, which then 
performs services for these public authorities. Cooperation between (local) public authorities, 
which is a common form of public service organisation in France, remained thus for the greater part 
outside the scope of EU law. 
 
1.2.5. Sociétés publiques locales (local public companies)922 
 
Beside the possibilities that flow from the case law of the Conseil d'État for public authorities to 
conclude cooperative agreements without having to deal with EU law, the legislature has also 
created a context in which certain forms of cooperative agreements between public authorities are 
according to it not subject to a tendering procedure. 
 
On the basis of the law of 13 July 2006 en matière d’engagement national pour le logement923 
(concerning national involvement in housing) collectivités territoriales and their groupements had 
the possibility to participate in companies, wholly owned by them. These sociétés publics locales 
had the competence to realise any project involving the organisation of public space. Collectivités 
locales and their groupements were enjoined to exercise a stricter control on these companies and 
                                                 
920 See L. Richer, ‘Un contrat d'entente intercommunale n'est pas une délégation de service public’ (AJDA, 
2012), p. 558. W. Zimmer, ‘Convention conclue par deux collectivités territoriales en vue d’exercer en 
coopération un service public’ (CMP 5, 2012), pp. 19-20. 
921 Commission Staff Working Paper concerning the application of EU public procurement law to relations 
between contracting authorities (public-public cooperation) SEC (2011), 1169 final. 
922 See S. Brameret, Les relations des collectivités territoriales avec les sociétés d’économie mixte locales 
(Paris : LGDJ, 2012), p. 254, footnote 46. 
923 Law no. 2006-872 (JORF, 16/06/2006), p. 10622. 
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these companies could only engage in activities that were to the benefit of the collectivités 
territoriales and their groupements. 
 
The law no. 2010-559 of 28 May 2010 pour le développement des sociétés publiques locales924 [for 
the development of local public authorities] for the first time enables collectivités territoriales 
(local public authorities) to manage their tasks of general interest together without the necessity to 
consult the market. To that end the public authority has to establish sociétés publiques locales.925 
The purpose of this legislation was to enable the establishment of certain companies without being 
subject to EU law.926 According to some, the French legislator wanted clearly to give public 
authorities an instrument to circumvent public procurement Directives.927 If this is truly the intent, 
then reference should be made to one of the considerations in Commission v. Germany: 'It must, 
furthermore, be stated that there is nothing in the information … to indicate that … the local 
authorities at issue were contriving to circumvent the rules on public procurement'.928 An attempt to 
circumvent the application of EU law is one of the elements that could persuade the CJEU to find a 
national law or a state measure to be in conflict with EU law.  
 
The establishment of such sociétés publiques locales falls wholly within the vertical or institutional 
cooperative agreements between public authorities. In that context only the Teckal case law929 is 
relevant. 
 
The law of 28 May 2010 enabled the establishment of sociétés publiques locales without it being 
necessary to set up a competitive tender procedure. The freedom to organise its public service 
seems safeguarded for these public authorities. Sociétés publiques locales consist wholly of capital 
from the collectivités territoriales or their groupements. These companies have the competence to 
maintain and administer any activity of general interest.930 A company may pursue its activities only 
to the benefit of its shareholders and only on their territory. In this the French legislature is more 
restrictive than the case law of the Court of Justice requires. The Court sets only the one condition 
that most of the activities engaged in by the created company must be to the benefit of the parties 
who established it or of its shareholders (Teckal). Finally, sociétés publiques locales take the form 
of a societé anonyme. 
 
                                                 
924 Article L 1531-1 of the code général des collectivités locales (JORF, 29/5/2010), p. 9697 ; see also Article L. 
327-1 du code de l’urbanisme creating the possibility of a société publique locale d’aménagement (SPLA). 
925 On 1 June 2012 the various public authorities created 70 SPL: see A. Samson-Dye, ‘Irrégularité du recours à 
un contrat in house entre une SPLA et une collectivité très minoritaire’ (CMP, 2013), p. 37. 
926 J.-F. Auby, ‘Les sociétés publiques sociales. Un outil aux contours incertains’ (RFDA, 2012), p. 101. 
927 G. Kalflèche, ‘Le contrôle des collectivités sur les sociétés publiques locales faut-il rénover le in house’ 
(RFDA, 2012), p. 1120. 
928 C-480/06, Commission v. Germany [2009] ECR I-04747, at [48]. 
929 Case C-107/98, Teckal v. Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121. 
930 Article L 1531-1 CGCT. 
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However, the creation of a société publique locale is not in itself sufficient to circumvent the 
obligation to set up a competitive tender procedure.931 Regarding the criterion of similar control the 
law of 28 May 2010 provides only that all of the SPL's capital shall be wholly in the hands of the 
shareholders. However, according to CJEU this creates only a presumption of similar control.932 But 
if in a specific case an SPL is set up or commissioned, then in the event of dispute, it must be 
demonstrated that all elements are present for there to be a similar control.933 To achieve this, 
when an SPL is set up, the statutes must provide for special and divergent dispositions. Merely 
adopting the usual dispositions in the assumption of the form of a société publique locale will 
probably not be sufficient.934  
 
In a quite recent ruling the Conseil d’État judged that a shareholder in an SPLA does not exercise a 
comparable control when it has had no direct influence on the important internal decisions of the 
SPLA.935 The Court was examining the statutes and the concrete operations of the SPLA. The Conseil 
d'État was looking at a situation where a minority shareholder concludes an agreement with a public 
authority of which it is itself a part. Where this shareholder has no direct influence on the decisions 
of the public authority then there can be no control such as control over one’s own services. The 
Conseil d’État confirms the Econord case.936 As already stated, the CJEU demanded in this case an 
effective control on the part of the various shareholders. The Conseil d’État has confirmed the 
decision of the Cour administrative d’Appel de Lyon. 
 
 
1.3. Conclusion 
 
In Europe, the French legal system is a preeminent example of a legal system in which the concept 
of 'service public' plays a central role in delimiting the role and the powers of a public authority. 
The ‘service public’ is regarded as a kind of national emblem. The organisation and management of 
a ‘service public’ belongs in principle among the prerogatives of the sovereign State. In France it 
was assumed that a public authority is free to choose how a ‘service public’ is organised and 
managed. 
 
                                                 
931 S. Nicinski, ‘La loi du 28 mai 2010 pour le développement des sociétés publiques locales’ (AJDA, 2010), p. 
1763 ; S. Brameret, Les relations des collectivités territoriales avec des sociétés d'economie mixte locales 
(Paris : LGDJ, 2012), pp. 259-262. 
932 Case C-340/04, Carbotermo SpA Consorzio Alisei v. Comune di Busto Arsizio AGESP SpA [2006] ECR I-04137, 
at [38]. 
933 See TA Montpellier, 23 March 2012 (AJDA, 2012), p. 1521 ; S. Brameret, Les relations des collectivités 
territoriales avec les sociétés d’économie mixte locales (Paris : LGDJ, 2012), p. 261 ; T. Bangui, ‘L'effectivité 
du contrôle analogue des Sociétés publiques locales’ (CMP 5, 2012), p. 7. 
934 S. Brameret, Les relations des collectivités territoriales avec les sociétés d’économie mixte locales (Paris : 
LGDJ, 2012), p. 262. 
935 C.E., 6 November 2013, Commune de Marsannay-la-Côte, n° 365079. See also CA Lyon, 7 November 2012 
(CMP, 2013), p. 37. 
936 Joined cases C-182/11 and C-183/11, Econord SpA v. Comuni di Cagno, Comune di Varese, Comune di 
Solbiate [2012] ECR I-00000. 
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Because of EU law, since the 1990s both the term 'service public' and the free choice of 
management and organisation of a public service have been under pressure. The thesis has shown 
that the description of the concept 'service public' in France is more and more convergent with the 
description of SGI in European Union law. The functional interpretation, in which the nature of the 
activity is decisive, is gaining more and more favour. On the other hand the freedom of public 
authorities to provide a public service task with its own administration was not influenced by CJEU 
case law. Member States have still the competence to regulate this situation. 
 
According to EU law, whenever a public authority calls on a third party to maintain and administer a 
public service, it must guarantee equal treatment to the citizens of other Member States. 
Consequently, there is hypothetically no free choice. The same is true when the third party is a 
public authority. This cooperative agreement between public authorities, as means to organise the 
'service public', is not free. 
 
Ahead of the Court of Justice the Conseil d'État in France declared the Directives on public 
procurement to be applicable to agreements concluded between public authorities. Case law on 
cooperative agreements between public authorities is a good example of how EU law influences 
national administrative law. In its case law the Conseil d’État applies public procurement Directives 
directly and considers how the CJEU has interpreted these Directives. On this basis EU law has been 
able indirectly to influence how the Conseil d’État thinks in regard to the freedom to choose how a 
'service public' is organised. The Conseil d’État abandoned its case law where it confirmed a public 
authority freely chooses the public authority with whom it concludes a contract. 
 
Later the Conseil d'État confirmed the Teckal case law of the Court of Justice and even expanded 
it. Nevertheless, from the case law of the Conseil d'État it appears that in the case of cooperative 
agreements between public authorities the Conseil d'État takes into account CJEU case law, but 
that in a sense it applies this case law in its own (peculiar) way. The case law of the Conseil d’État 
still attempts to safeguard as far as possible the free choice of public authority to organise its 
public service and this in a way that is incompatible with the CJEU case law.  
 
Finally, the legislature also intervened to consolidate Teckal case law. The legislature is seeking a 
regulation that would permit the local authority to cooperate without EU law being thereby 
applicable. However, such legislation is at the moment not conclusive so that the public authority 
must make sure that all the conditions of quasi-in-house (Teckal) case law have been met when 
cooperation is established.  
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2. The English system 
 
This section examines the concept 'public service', the organisation of public services and the 
cooperation between public authorities, just as was done in the preceding section for the French 
legal system. The question then arises if the EU law has influenced these elements of English law. 
The primary focus will be on the system, as it presently exists in England. The analysis that follows 
is valid only for the English law system. Sometimes, the section also mentions specificities of the 
Scottish legal system. 
 
2.1. Public services 
 
This section first explores whether administrative law exists as an independent branch of law in 
England. Indeed, if it does not, the study of the English system is not pertinent to the present 
thesis. Second, this section attempts to define the concept of ‘public service’ according to English 
law. 
 
2.1.1. Administrative law 
 
The English legal system is very different from most continental legal systems. This is certainly the 
case in respect of how the law applies to public authorities. 
 
In most continental legal systems, a clear distinction is made between public law and private law. 
On the continent, public authorities are governed wholly or in part by their own body of law, which 
is distinct from the civil law that applies to the relations between individuals. For a long time no 
such distinction was made in England. Administrative law did not exist as a distinctive branch of 
law. The decision in O'Reilly v. Mackman937 marks the origin of this distinction in the English legal 
system.938 
 
In the 19th and into the 20th century there was a certain aversion toward a growing administration. 
The importance as well as the number of public authorities increased in measure during the 20th 
century, as they were obliged to take on ever more tasks. Public authorities found themselves 
intervening increasingly in economic and social life. In the 1940s the role of the State expanded, 
providing an ever wider array of services to citizens. 
 
For a long time in English law, the organisation and behaviour of public authorities were not 
considered to be a separate legal domain. Administrative law did not exist.939 Common law by and 
large also applied to the behaviour of public authorities. A public authority was subject to the same 
                                                 
937 [1983], 2 AC 237. 
938 D. Oliver, Common Values and the Public-Private Divide (London: Butterworths, 1999), p. 201. 
939 See A.V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution (1985). 
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law as was applicable to citizens. This originates from the fact that in England there is no such thing 
as administrative courts.940 In addition, within the institution of judicial review there was 
considerable reluctance on the part of the court to control the actions of the administration.941 
 
From the middle of the twentieth century the importance of administrative law began to grow. 
Indeed, one can even say there was a revolution in the significance of this branch of law: ‘any 
judicial statement on public law made before 1950 are likely to be a misleading guide to what this 
law is today’.942 From the 1960s especially, the courts began anew to allocate to administrative law 
a place of its own.943  
 
In England there are diverse views on what is meant by the term 'administrative law': ‘There is 
considerable diversity of opinion concerning the nature and purpose of administrative law. 
Description and prescription are not easily separated. For some, it is the law relating to the control 
of government power. Others place greater emphasis on rules designed to ensure that the 
administration effectively performs tasks assigned to it. Yet others see the principal objective of 
administrative law as ensuring governmental accountability and fostering participation by interested 
parties in the decision-making process’.944 What is certain in any event is that the concept of 'public 
service', in contrast to the French administrative law, plays no central role in the definition of 
English administrative law. This perhaps explains in part why CJEU case law on cooperative 
agreements between public authorities has had less of an impact in England and was less questioned 
than in France. 
 
2.1.2. Notion of public service 
 
Unlike the French legal system, English administrative law has no general theory of public service. 
Moreover, the concept of 'public service' is unknown and the term does not shed much light on the 
particular uniqueness of administrative law. It is not fundamental to any justification for the 
existence of public authorities. The principal difference between France and England is that in 
France the concept of 'service public' is at the very core of administrative law. This concept 
constitutes the uniqueness of administrative law in France. 
 
'Public service' is not a juridical concept in English law. In any event, it is not the equivalent of the 
notion 'public authority', i.e. a legal person that carries out a specified activity. The term rather 
refers to public servants working in a public administration.945 The notion of 'public services' is more 
                                                 
940 Neither in Schotland. 
941 See M. Taggart, ‘Reinventing Administrative Law', in N. Bamforth and P. Leyland (eds.), Public Law in a 
multi layered constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003), p. 312. 
942 RVIRC, export Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617, at [649]. 
943 H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth, Administrative law (Oxford: OUP, 2009), p. 14. 
944 P. Craig, Administration Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2012), p. 3. 
945 D. Triantofyllou, ’Les mutations de la notion de service public en droit comparé’, in Service public et 
Communauté Européenne entre intérêt général et le marché (Paris : la documentation française, 1998), p. 53. 
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adequately reflective of the accomplishment of tasks of general interest on behalf of citizens.946 
Differently from in French law, the notion of 'public services' has an entirely functional significance. 
The nature of the activity is primordial; the nature of the legal person does not characterise the 
activity. In this sense, English law is fully in line with EU law, which also gives a functional meaning 
to the notion 'services of general interest'. All activities that serve the general interest are public 
services. This produces a diversified array of persons engaged in carrying out these activities. 
 
One author defines the term 'public services' as follows: ‘A more appropriate legal criteria for 
distinguishing public from private services is whether the existence of the service is a matter for 
consumer sovereignty in the market, or of authoritative public decision’.947 The status of the 
financing of a person is not important for distinguishing a public service from a private activity. 
Moreover, the performance of a task of general interest can only take place when an explicit legal 
authorisation is present.948 Such authorisation may be requested by both public authorities and 
private parties. 
 
A public service does come into being only when the legislature so decides. Unlike in France, 
'general interest' is not in itself sufficient to engender 'public services'. Legislation is created ad hoc 
and various rules are thereby likewise created to be applied to a public service. Police, schools, 
justice and the NHS are deemed to be public services.949 There are various considerations that can 
help to explain the genesis of such legislatively created activities: public health, security, the 
public order, accessibility of vital services, consumer protection, etc.950 Public authorities intervene 
if the existence of the social group has to be protected. The role of a public authority is more than 
simply that of providing formal institutional support. 
 
Sometimes the term is also to be found in the case law of the House of Lords.951 In Foster v. British 
Gas952 the House of Lords was called upon to rule on an alleged instance of unequal treatment of a 
woman in the process of retiring. The issue was whether English law was not in conflict with EU law, 
or more specifically, whether the British Gas Corporation fell within the scope of applicability of 
                                                 
946 J. Bell and T.P. Kennedy, ‘La notion de service public au Royaume-Unie et en Irlande’, in F. Moderne and G. 
Marcou (eds), L'idée de service public dans le droit des états de l'Union Européenne (Paris : l'Harmattan, 2001), 
p. 225. 
947 I. Harden, The Contracting State (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1992), p. 8.  
948 J. Bell and T.P. Kennedy, ‘La notion de service public au Royaume-Unie et en Irlande’, in F. Moderne and 
G.Marcou (eds), L'idée de service public dans le droit des états de l'Union Européenne (Paris : l'Harmattan, 
2001), pp. 230-231. 
949 HM Government, Open public services White Paper, p. 6, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/255288/OpenPublicServices-
WhitePaper.pdf. 
950 See J. Bell and T.P. Kennedy, ‘La notion de service public au Royaume-Unie et en Irlande’, in F. Moderne 
and G.Marcou (eds), L'idée de service public dans le droit des états de l'Union Européenne (Paris : l'Harmattan, 
2001), pp. 238-243. 
951 This Court has been renamed ‘Supreme Court’. 
952 Foster v. British Gas, AC 2 (1991), pp. 206-317.  
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Directive 76/207/EEC of 6 February 1976.953 The House of Lords posed a preliminary question in re 
to the Court of Justice. According to the Court of Justice the aforementioned Directive was 
applicable to ‘a body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, pursuant to a 
measure adopted by the state, for providing a public service under the control of the state and has 
for that purpose special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in 
relation between individuals, is included... among the bodies against which the provisions of a 
directive capable of having direct effect may be relied’.954 Thus, via the case law of the Court of 
Justice the concept of 'public service' found its way into the case law of the House of Lords and thus 
into English law. 
 
The House of Lords confirmed this precept and ruled that British Gas was subject to this Directive 
because it was a corporation that had been given exclusive control of the public gas supply and had 
special powers beyond those resulting from transactions between individuals. 
 
In Scotland, the Scottish Parliament passed the Public Services Reform (Scotland) Act 20 on March 
25, 2010.955 The overarching purpose of this Bill is to help simplify and improve the landscape of 
Scottish public bodies, to deliver more effective, coordinated government that can better achieve 
its core functions for the benefit of the people of Scotland. From this Bill it would seem that in 
Scotland as well, the concept of 'public service’' is not in itself a juridical concept. Public services 
are public bodies that deliver certain services to the benefit of the citizens. 
 
 
2.2. The organisation or management of public services 
 
Since the concept of 'public service' does not exist in English law and the term 'public services' does 
not refer to a legal person but to specified activities, the concepts of 'organisation' or 'management' 
are not particularly to the point. It is better to speak of the provision of public services. In the last 
half of the past century the way in which public services were provided underwent major changes in 
England. Under Margaret Thatcher the Government promoted the use of commercial ‘techniques’ 
and so the concept of value for money was developed.956 Value for money is still an element taken 
into account in the provision of public services. National and local authorities apply the concept of 
value for money in their search for economy, efficiency and effectiveness.957  
 
                                                 
953 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment 
for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working 
conditions, OJ [1976] L 039/40. 
954 Foster v. British Gas, AC 2 (1991), at [20]. 
955 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2010/8/data.pdf. 
956 S. Arrowsmith, The law of public and utilities procurement, Vol. I, (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014), p. 17. 
957 Arrowsmith gave a description of value for money in public procurement: ‘VMF is commonly assessed by 
balancing assessment of the quality of tenderers against the price to be charged by the provider under the 
proposed contract, which equates to the cost of the service for the procuring entity’ (S. Arrowsmith, The law 
of public and utilities procurement, Vol. I, (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014), p. 18). 
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Vincent-Jones implicitly distinguishes three ways in which a public service can be provided: direct 
provision, contract, or privatisation with a public authority as market regulator.958 Just as in France, 
public authorities in principle have free choice in how to provide public services. EU law also 
guarantees this free choice. In the following, this principle will be nuanced a bit for local 
authorities. I. Harden describes the three categories on the basis of which a public authority may 
intervene as follows: a) services provided by a public body directly, b) services purchased by a 
public body through contract and c) services which a private body has a public law duty to 
provide.959 The provision of public services is done ‘through a hybrid combination of mechanisms of 
public and private ordering’.960 The influence of the government will from direct to indirect 
influence vary depending on which of these ways is chosen. The different ways in which public 
services are managed today in England do not differ much if at all from the way this occurs in 
France. 
 
From the perspective of certain case law it may be stated that in England a public authority is free 
to choose between a direct or ‘in house’ provision and the conclusion of a contract with a third 
party. In Montpellier Estates v. Leeds City Council961 Superstone J. considered a public authority 
‘acted lawfully in deciding to abandon the tender exercise, having discovered that the award of the 
contract on the basis of the advertised award criteria would not achieve value for money’. The 
public authority abandoned the tendering procedure and chose for an ‘in house’-provision.962 
 
The thesis now explores the ways in which public services are provided, albeit with attention 
primarily focussing on the conclusion of contracts with third parties. The ways of intervening are to 
be found on both the national level and the local level (local governments). These ways of 
intervening are also used in Scotland. 
 
2.2.1. Direct provision 
 
At present, only in a few situations a public authority assumes the direct provision of a public 
service.963 This way of intervening was especially common at the beginning of the last century with 
                                                 
958 P. Vincent-Jones, ‘Responsive Law and Governance in Public Services Provision: A Future for the Local 
Contracting Authority’ (Modern Law, 1998), p. 362 ; see also J. Bell and T.P. Kennedy, ‘La notion de service 
public au Royaume-Unie et en Irlande’, in F. Moderne and G.Marcou (eds), L'idée de service public dans le droit 
des états de l'Union Européenne (Paris : l'Harmattan, 2001), pp. 248-254. 
959 I. Harden, The Contracting State (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1992), p. 9. 
960 P. Vincent-Jones, ‘The New Public Contracting’ (Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 2007), p. 259. 
961 [2013] EWHC 166. 
962 R. Ashmore, ‘United Kingdom - reminder that contracting authorities can switch to an inhouse “Plan B” 
solution if it represents value for money and is done in good faith: Montpellier Estates Ltd v. Leeds City 
Council’ (PPLR, 2013), pp. NA68-NA72. 
963 D. Guinard, Réflexions sur la construction d'une notion juridique : l'exemple de la notion de services 
d'intérêt général (Paris : l'Harmattan, 2012), p. 95, nr. 91. 
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the advent of the Social Welfare State.964 Tasks were performed by government departments, which 
were branches of the central administration staffed by civil servants.965 
 
However, the Thatcher government introduced a more modern system of management (New Public 
Management).966 It was thought that the organisation of public administration should mirror the way 
private companies are structured. The idea was to reduce the role of government. The way in which 
government and citizen faced off against one another would have to be fundamentally altered as a 
consequence of these reforms. The goals of reform were: efficiency, effectiveness and 
accountability. Market principles were introduced in the management of public authorities. 
 
One of the reforms was the Next Step-initiative,967 in which the management of certain powers was 
transferred from the central administration to executive agencies. These agencies enjoy a certain 
financial autonomy, but have no legal personality. The relationship between the administration and 
the agency is governed by a Framework Document. The Framework Document defines the goals and 
functions of the agency. Some authors consider this relationship to be contractual in nature.968 The 
agencies perform mainly the executive functions of government. The presence of these agencies is 
still required. The present government sees these agencies as the ‘default delivery option in cases 
where there is a need to deliver public functions within central government but with a degree of 
operational independence’.969 
 
The relations between a central administration and these executive agencies can, with a basis in EU 
case law, be considered as in-house situations. Sometimes the executive agencies are not 
independent legal persons. The relationship between the central administration and the agency is 
not a contractual relation. Such situations do not fall under the scope of EU law.970 
 
In Portsmouth City Council971 the Court of Appeal confirmed the public procurement Directives do 
not apply to in house provision. In 1991 Portsmouth City Council decided to reorganise its housing 
repair and maintenance work and to that end it proposed to conclude three contracts with the 
private sector: a maintenance contract, an improvement contract and a BISF contract (external 
renovation of a specific group of houses). The conclusion of the first contract was announced in the 
Official Journal of the European Union, in which it was stated that the contracting partner would be 
chosen on the basis of best value for money.  
                                                 
964 M. Donnelly, Delegation of Governmental Power to Private Parties (Oxford: OUP, 2009), p. 61. 
965 A.W. Bradley and K.D. Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law (London: Pearson, 2005), p. 268 ; P. 
Vincent-Jones, The New Public Contracting (Oxford: OUP, 2006), p.169. 
966 See also M. Donnelly, Delegation of Governmental Power to Private Parties (Oxford: OUP, 2009), pp. 62-63. 
967 Improving management in Government: the Next Steps (1988). 
968 M. Freedland, ‘Government by Contract and Public Law’ (PL, 1994), p. 88. 
969 Minister for the Cabinet Office (2011), pp. 41-42. 
970 Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle and RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH. v. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische 
Restabfall- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] ECR I-00001. 
971 R.v. Portsmouth City Council ex parte Peter Coles and Colwick Builders Limited and George Austin Limited, 
(C.L.C., 1997), p. 407. 
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Prior to the 1991 decision, Portsmouth City Council had the work done in part by an in-house 
department, Portsmouth Contract Services (PCS). In taking the decision to do this work Portsmouth 
City Council was obliged not to act anti-competitively.972 Portsmouth City Council had to explore 
what the financial consequences would be of whatever choice it made, i.e. full or partial in-house 
completion of the work or completion wholly by a third party. In that period, a local government in 
England could not have any works completed wholly in-house. Under certain circumstances, a public 
authority was obliged to let an in-house service compete with third parties for the purpose of 
performing a public service. (see infra) This option seemed to present itself in the commented case 
and an awarding procedure was therefore organised. 
 
Although Portsmouth City Council had earlier chosen to issue a public procurement contract for a 
maintenance job, it opted during the awarding procedure, to have a cost-benefit analyses done and 
on the basis of that result decided to have the job partially done in-house. Consequently the PCC 
reverted in part to its earlier decision to allow the market to come into play for the entire contract. 
However, this decision to go for in-house execution of the work was not taken on the basis of best 
value for money. Some tenderers protested against this course of affairs. But the Council of PCC 
replied that the Regulations on Public Procurement do not apply to the choice for PCS. 
 
The case was ultimately taken to court.973 According to the judge, when the public authority 
published the tendering procedure for the conclusion of the three contracts, it should have notified 
that in awarding the contracts it took into account the influence of the choice on its own financial 
situation. The judge viewed this as an awarding criterion, which however had not initially been 
made public. The judge argued that this was a violation of the public procurement directives.  
 
But Portsmouth City Council did not agree with this judgment and therefore brought the case before 
the Court of Appeal where they presented a new defence. They argued that public procurement 
directives were not applicable to its relationship with PCS. Indeed, this relationship was not a 
contract in the sense of the public procurement Directives. Legatt PJ reasoned as follows: ‘I regard 
it as inescapable that, when awarding work to PCS the Council were not entering into a public 
service contract within the meaning of the works directive, which could therefore have no 
application to the transaction’. He based this opinion on an earlier ruling of the Queen's Bench 
Division in R. v. Cumbria cc Ex p. Cumbria Professional Care Ltd974: ‘Since, as a matter of law, the 
respondents cannot contract with themselves, the Directive cannot, in my judgment, be called into 
play … A contract as recognised by domestic law, is not made when, as the result of an 
administrative decision a service provider, who happens to/be in-house with the purchasing 
authority is selected to perform a function which the purchaser can lawfully award to itself’. 
                                                 
972 Section 9 (4) (a a q a) of the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980. 
973 Mr. Justice Keene, Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court. 
974 (C.C.L. Rep 3, 2000), p. 79. 
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Holehouse LJ confirmed this: ‘Where a local authority, as did this County Council, decides to use its 
own direct labour department, it is not deciding to award a contract: it is deciding not to award a 
contract. Such a decision is something which falls outside the purview of the directives’.  
 
The upshot of this judgment from the Court of Appeal was the determination that when a public 
authority makes use of its own department there is no contract and that consequently public 
procurement Directives are not applicable. This was later explicitly reconfirmed by the CJEU in 
Stadt Halle.975 However, the Court of Appeal did not take, nor was it obliged to take, any decision 
concerning situations that are similar to an in-house situation. In this case at issue was not a 
cooperative agreement between two independent public authorities, and hence the Teckal case law 
was not applicable.  
 
2.2.2. Contracting 
 
The idea of New Public Management (hereinafter NPM) was applied in England in the 1980’s and 
introduced market principles in the management of administration. One of the objectives of NPM 
was the increased use of the contract. Before that time, contracts were generally used by public 
authorities to purchase goods and services (public procurement). 
 
The contract is becoming steadily more important in governance. One aspect of this increased use 
was the introduction of Compulsory Competitive Tendering in 1980 at the level of local government. 
Via a contract local authorities request a third party (public or private) to accomplish some tasks for 
them. The third party accomplishes a task that indirectly benefits the management of the 
administration or the third party receives directly the responsibility to manage the public service 
itself. Compulsory Competitive Tendering set down that local public authorities are obliged to open 
services, that they in principle would prefer to perform internally, to competition. On this point the 
English system went further than even EU law ever required. From the perspective of EU law a 
public authority retains the option of either having its own departments perform a service or 
selecting a third party to do this. 
 
The contractual procedure is used in various ways in the provision of public services. Davies 
recognises six categories: 1) procurement, 2) providing services by contracting with private bodies 
(e.g. contracting out), 3) the private finance initiative and other public-private partnerships (PPPs), 
4) agreement between the government and a self-regulatory organisation, 5) various types of 
agreement internal to government and 6) contract of employment with staff.976 The present thesis 
will only be concerned with the 2nd, 3rd and 5th categories. The first category comes under EU law 
insofar as a public contract is involved. In this regard English law does not differ from French law. 
                                                 
975 Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle and RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH. v. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische 
Restabfall- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] ECR I-00001. 
976 A. Davies, Accountability: A public law analysis of government by contract (Oxford: OUP, 2001), p. 1: see 
also C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and administration (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), p. 339. 
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The national laws have transposed the European Directives. The 4th and 6th categories are too far 
removed from the types of contracts with which the thesis is concerned. 
 
Since the 1980s the English government has, as mentioned earlier on, been looking for other 
approaches to the organisation of the activities of its various departments. Contracting out was one 
of the possible alternatives. In the case of contracting out, an in-house service is delivered by a 
third party, but the public authority remains responsible for the functioning of this service.977 In 
fact, public contracting out is comparable to a service concession. In both cases a public function or 
activity is transferred to a third party and the third party accomplishes the task for the public 
authority. In such a situation an administration is required to compete with a private partner for a 
particular service. Competition, it is assumed, should ensure a better, more efficient, more 
imaginative and cheaper provision of services. In the evolution of contracting out-systems a 
distinction should be made between central and local government. 
 
Contracting out for central government came into being under Thatcher; Central Government was 
required to conduct a review to determine if public services should be managed in house or should 
be contracted out. The 1977 Labour government continued the policy of contracting out, whereby 
the choice for the method of service provision was determined case by case. The 
Conservative/Liberal Coalition Government maintained the same policies for central government.978 
According to the government, public services can be provided by a wide range of providers including 
public providers.979 
 
On the other hand, local authorities were required to tender in-house services under the Local 
Government Act 1980, the Local Government Act 1988 and the Local Government Act 1992. As such 
‘contracting out’ was in principle obligatory. This was called 'Compulsory Competitive Tendering' 
(hereinafter CCT).980 Services and activities subject to CCT were explicitly listed in the Local 
Government Act. After the 1997 elections, 'Best Value' replaced CCT for local authorities.981 The 
objective of 'Best Value' is ongoing improvement in the quality of the services provided by local 
authorities and to secure the efficient and effective provision of local services. The Coalition 
Government continued this policy.  
 
                                                 
977 M. Freedland, ‘Government by Contract and Public Law’ (PL, 1994), p. 87.  
978 S. Arrowsmith, The law of public and utilities procurement, Vol. I, (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014), p. 33. 
However Craig recognises a different approach by the Coalition government: P. Craig, Administration Law 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2012), p. 115. 
979 White paper, Open public services (2011), para. 6.1., 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/255288/OpenPublicServices-
WhitePaper.pdf. 
980 M. Trybus, 'From the indivisible crown to Teckal : the In-House provision of works and services in the United 
Kingdom’, in M. Comba and S. Treumer (eds), The In-House providing in European Law (Copenhagen: Djöf 
Publishing, 2010), p. 189. 
981 Local Government Act 1999. Departement of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, Modernising Local 
Government: Improving Local Services through Best Value (1997). 
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Use of the Private Finance Initiative in its present form in England goes back to 1992.982 The original 
purpose of PFI was to finance public infrastructures with private funds. Public authorities983 were 
encouraged to provide public services via private capital funding. The use of PFI was situated within 
a broader framework of reform of the way the general interest is managed. 
 
A quite recent definition of PFI is as follows: ‘PFI is an arrangement whereby the public sector 
contracts to purchase services, usually derived from an investment in assets, from the private 
sector on a long-term basis, often between 15 to 30 years’.984 They are contracts for the provision 
of capital and assets.985 Public-Private partnership (PPP) is a more general notion in which PFI 
constitutes one element.986 PPP covers a broad range of business structures and partnership 
arrangements. The aim of every PPP is to deliver high quality services (better government). 
 
Three types of PPP may be distinguished987: 1) the private sector finances the infrastructure and a 
public authority pays for right of use, 2) the private sector builds the infrastructure and may collect 
a toll on it and 3) an infrastructure is built by the private sector and is paid for in part from rent 
and in part from toll. However, it may also act through the private sector whereby the latter takes 
shares in government companies. 
 
In both PFI and PPP a contract is concluded between two different legal persons.988 This type of 
cooperation may be either horizontal or vertical. These are always long-term contracts. The 
conclusion of these kinds of contracts is generally governed by the public procurement Directives or 
the European principle of equality if a contract clearly shows a cross-border interest. 
 
 
2.3. Cooperative agreements between public authorities 
 
In the foregoing the thesis examined some of the ways in which public authorities manage or 
administer their public services. In England, when legal theory addresses the issue of the ways in 
which pubic authorities administer a public service there is usually no mention of the situation 
where a public authority cooperates with another public authority to improve service to the public. 
This kind of cooperation should, according to the present thesis, also be mentioned among the ways 
public services are provided.  
                                                 
982 See N. Lamont, Chancellor of the exchequer, Autumn Statement, vol.128, col. 996 (12 November 1992). 
983 For local authorities see: P. Craig, Administration Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2012), pp. 126-128; 
Local Government and the Private Finance Initiative, (1998). 
984 H.M. Treasury, Managing Public Money (2008), p.18. 
985 A. Davies, The Public Law of Government Contracts (Oxford: OUP, 2008), p.10. 
986 A. Davies, o.c., p.10. 
987 M. Freedland, ‘Public Law and Private Finance-Placing the Private Finance Initiative in a Public Law’ (PL, 
1998), pp. 290-291; P. Craig, Administrative Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2012), p.120. 
988 Y. Marique, 'An English Legal perspective on Public-private partnerships', in F. Lichère (eds), Public-Private 
Partnership Reports of the XVIII Congress of the Internatinal Academy of Comparative Law (Brussels: Bruylant, 
2011), pp. 111-112.  
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The thesis is exclusively concerned with the cooperative agreements between public authorities 
insofar as it may be deemed contractual and, in particular, where said contract is a public 
procurement or a service concession. The thesis will now look into the use of the contract by public 
authorities in England (2.3.1.) and the possibilities for the Courts to review the conclusion of these 
contracts (2.3.2.), after which the thesis will explore the phenomenon of cooperative agreements 
between public authorities in England and Scotland (2.3.3.) and analyse existing case law in England 
(2.3.4.). 
 
2.3.1. The use of the capacity to contract by public authorities 
 
In England no legal distinction is made in principle between a situation in which a public authority is 
a partner in a contract and a situation where solely private persons are involved. Normally the same 
law is applicable to both forms of contract989 and accordingly the concept 'contract' is given the 
same definition. The doctrine of the 'contrat administratif' is unknown to English or Scottish 
administrative law. According to some legal theories more recent case law appears to suggest that 
government contracts do not always come under the same applicable law as private contracts.990 
 
The present thesis calls all contracts concluded by a public authority 'government contracts'.991 The 
notion 'public contract' has usually a more specific meaning within the scope of the public 
procurement Directives. This section of the thesis will, however, deal with all contracts concluded 
by a public authority.  
 
In common law the custom of deducing juridical consequences from the definition of a term is less 
widespread as in continental law. For this reason most books on contract law provide no clear 
definition of the notion 'contract'. Nonetheless note should be taken of the following definition of a 
'contract': ‘A contract consists of an actionable promise or promises. Every such promise involves at 
least two parties, a promisor and a promise, and an outward expression of common intention and of 
expectation as to the declaration or assurance contained in the promise’.992 Common contract law is 
concerned with the kind of promises that are enforceable, which may trigger binding legal 
consequences. In the present thesis the term 'contract' is used in the sense given by public 
procurement Directives. 
 
There is no special law applicable to contracts in which a public authority is one of the contracting 
parties: ‘The legal framework for government contracts in England is a complex blend of internal 
                                                 
989 P. Craig and M. Trybus, 'England and Wales', in R. Nogouellou and U. Stelkens (eds), Comparative Law on 
public contracts (Brussels: Bruylant, 2010), p. 339. 
990 P. Birkinshaw, ‘Contrats publics et contractualisation’ (RFDA, 2006), pp. 1028-1029 ; S. Arrowsmith, The law 
of public and utilities procurement, Vol. I, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2014), p. 11. 
991 Anne Davies uses this concept to determine the contracts used by a public authority. See A. Davies, The 
Public Law of Government Contracts (Oxford: OUP, 2008), pp. 2 et seq. 
992 J. Beatson, A. Burrows and J. Cartwright, Anson's Law of contract (Oxford: OUP, 2010), p. 29. 
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government guidance, domestic law and EU law requirements’.993 The requirements in EU law are 
the subject of this thesis. Public authorities have guidelines that are of help in the conclusion and 
completion of government contracts.994 But these guidelines do not purport to be laws in the strict 
sense of the term. They do not have their origin in legal texts that have been approved by 
Parliament. They are rather referred to as soft law.995 This also explains why the provisions that are 
applicable to a government contract can be quite diverse. 
 
By virtue of these guidelines public authorities are able to diverge widely from the rules that 
normally apply to a contract. The applicable rules depend largely on the public authority that is the 
contracting partner in the contract. Although such contracts are concluded under common law the 
influence of the latter is quite limited in practice.996 Usually the mutual rights and obligations of the 
parties to such contracts are determined by standard government contract terms.997  
 
The capacity to contract is not equally obvious for all public authorities. The Crown has the power 
to enter into a contract because it has all the powers of a natural person.998 Legal scholars associate 
this capacity with what they call ‘the third source of authority for government action’: ‘the 
freedom which government has to do anything that is not prohibited by law’.999 The approval of 
Parliament is not needed. Crown agents (Ministers and Crown corporations) can conclude contracts 
on behalf of the Crown in connection with their activities.1000 Other public bodies need the power to 
be conferred to them by legislation. These public bodies can only conclude a contract if they are 
authorised by statute.1001 However a public body can enter into a contract in connection with an 
activity or project, when it was expressly authorised to carry out this specific activity or project.1002 
For local authorities, the Localism Act 2011 has broadly widened their capacity to enter into a 
contract. S.1(1) of the Localism Act confers a general power of competence on most local 
authorities in England. Most local authorities are considered to have the same power as private 
individuals to enter into a contract.1003 Some limitations to the general power are provided in S.2 of 
the Localism Act. 
 
                                                 
993 A. Davies, The Public Law of Government Contracts (Oxford: OUP, 2008), p. 33. 
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87. 
236 
 
All public authorities are normally free to opt for other than the contractual route. To that extent, 
the English legal system does not differ from the French system. As already mentioned, EU law does 
not restrict this choice. Just as in the continental legal system, freedom of contract for an English 
public authority is not so broadly construed as for a private person.1004 There are various rules and 
principles of public law that restrict this freedom to some measure.  
 
The use of a contract to procure public services can, according to Harden, in two ways: ‘services 
performed directly for citizens... or indirectly to support government operations’.1005 The 
organisation of the first category of public services via contract has only recently entered into 
practice. 
 
2.3.2. Judicial Review 
 
Citizens only enjoy effective rights, when national judicial system offers them protection 
(remedies), especially in relation to the activities of a public authority1006. This also applies when an 
operator participates in a public tendering procedure or when an operator is not given the chance 
to participate. Judicial review is a system that guarantees protection to the citizen against the 
exercise of public authorities powers. 
 
Remedies against actions of public authorities can be divided in two categories: ordinary remedies 
and prerogative remedies.1007  These are the means of obtaining judicial review (challenging the 
legality of public authority’s action). Specific remedies are provided for public contracts above the 
thresholds in Part 9 of the United Kingdom Public contract Regulations and Utilities Contract 
Regulations. 
 
In general a citizen in England disposes of a significant range of remedies to challenge a decision of 
a public authority. In general courts recognise that a public authority has to guarantee certain rights 
to citizens. Public authorities’ decisions and actions can be challenged on the basis of illegality, 
irrationality and procedural unfairness.1008 The Courts created certain principles to control the 
exercise of administrative powers: the rule against bias and the right of a fair hearing.1009  The 
thesis does not intend to discuss these principles and the system of judicial review. There is no 
doubt that judicial review has been success in the exercise of control.1010 There has also been a 
                                                 
1004 A. Davies, The Public Law of Government Contracts (Oxford: OUP, 2008), pp. 121-124. 
1005 I. Harden, The Contracting State (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1992), pp. x-xi. 
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1008 R (Wheeler) v. Office of the Prime Minister (EWHC, 2008), p. 1409 admin. 
1009 This is a distinction made by Wade & Forsyth which encompasses all principles of judicial review. 
1010www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp2006/rp06-044.pdf; 
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significant increase of litigation in public procurement.1011 However, a question arises as to how far 
aggrieved citizens can invoke principles of judicial review and to what extent they can do this in 
respect of contractual and procurement powers of public authorities. 
 
In 1990, Arrowsmith acknowledged that there has been a notable increase in the number of 
reported cases in which the exercise of contractual powers has been challenged on public law 
grounds, and in several cases the courts have accepted that judicial review is possible.1012 However 
she also saw an ambivalence in the attitude of courts to the availability of judicial review to 
contractual decisions. Some court decisions demanded the presence of a specific ‘public law’ 
element to review pure contractual powers. This condition seems to be predominant now in most 
contract and procurement cases involving public bodies.1013 
 
A public element is present when there is a statutory underpinning to the public authority’s 
decision.1014 It seems the Courts’ approach is that the public element may exist if a specific statute 
imposes the use of tendering procedures when a public authority wants to conclude a contract.1015 
This is the case for public procurement. In some decisions it is considered that a public element is 
present if a contract concerns a function of public importance.1016 Public service concessions are 
contracts where a public authority transfers a service of general interest to another legal person. It 
could be considered as a contract that concerns of function of public importance. 
 
The application of judicial review principles to be considered in procurement cases are: the right to 
a hearing, breach of natural justice, principles of fairness, fiduciary duty, principle of legitimate 
expectations.1017 Consequently, public authorities’ decision to cooperate are not only subject to EU 
(public procurement) law, but also to principles of judicial review.  
 
2.3.3. Cooperation 
  
The preceding pages made it clear that in England public authorities continue to seek original ways 
to provide public services to citizens. One of these is the cooperation between public authorities. 
Public authorities set up an independent entity or organise shared services. These 'shared services' 
have gained currency in recent years. Shared services or joint arrangements are of course no new 
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phenomenon in the business of providing public services in England. Thus, the Local Government Act 
1972 already features provisions for Joint Committees, for delegation and for secondment of staff.  
Before describing the use of cooperative agreements or shared services, this section will examine  
how far public authorities in England may conclude cooperative agreements. The thesis has already 
pointed out that the Crown has a general capacity to conclude contracts and thus also to enter into 
a cooperative agreement. Since the entry into force of the Localism Act most local authorities have 
now also the general power to enter into a cooperative agreement. For local authorities and 
especially for other public bodies a distinction should be made between the acting as a contracting 
authority, as an operator or to constitute joint companies or other complex shared services 
agreements. Most local authorities have the power to act as a contracting authority. Other public 
bodies, than the Crown, must find this power in statutory provisions. Local authorities can also act 
as providers according to S.1 of the Local Authorities Act 1970. For other public bodies this is less 
clear. The creation of joint companies by public authorities is covered normally by the general 
power under the Localism Act. Other public bodies have to look into their applicable legislation. 
 
Shared services are a way whereby public services are mutually created by public authorities in 
England and Scotland. Public authorities bundle their powers in several different areas to come up 
with more productive and more efficient public services. This means is of relevance for the present 
thesis only insofar as this form of cooperation between public authorities displays characteristics of 
a public contract or a service concession and hence the CJEU case law on cooperative agreements is 
indeed relevant.  
 
The endeavour to create more efficient public services in England and Scotland dates to around 
2004. In England this was the result of 'the Gershon Review'.1018 According to the original 
recommendations of this report, savings could be sought through the development of shared 
services.1019 The need for a new Shared Services approach was also emphasised in the 
'Transformational Government' report,1020 which was an outcrop of the Gershon Review. Customer 
needs were its focal point. This document also states the purpose of shared services: ‘Shared 
services provide public service organizations with the opportunity to reduce waste and inefficiency 
by re-using assets and sharing investments with others’ (p. 12).  
 
The report 'Building a Better Scotland'1021 appeared in 2004 in Scotland. The aim of this rapport was 
to bring efficiency, innovation and productivity to public services. In regard to cooperation between 
pubic authorities the objective is stated explicitly: ‘to examine the public sector as a whole, and 
realise efficiencies through joining up in purchasing, in accommodation, and in support services’.1022 
                                                 
1018http://www.theworkfoundation.com/assets/docs/publications/119_efficiency,%20efficiency,%20efficiency.
%20%20the%20gershon%20review.pdf. 
1019 Gershon Review, p. 8. 
1020 www.parsdigitalorg/ documentos/docs innovacion/2005/Transformational government.pdf. 
1021 www. scotland.gov.uk/Recource/Doc/26800/0025698.pdf. 
1022 Building a Better Scotland, p. 1. 
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One of the points of action is Shared Support Services: ‘It should generate substantial efficiency 
savings’.1023 Shared Services is one of the five ways suggested by this report to arrive at efficient 
public services.  
 
The two reports in England and Scotland marked the start of the rise of Shared Services as a way to 
improve the efficiency of public services. In Scotland in 2006 an advisory document from key players 
laid out ‘A shared approach to building a better Scotland’.1024 It contained a number of concrete 
proposals on how Shared Services could be used throughout Scotland. During the consultations that 
produced this document the key players set out a number of different opinions. In 2007 the Scottish 
Government produced the following document based on these consultations: 'Shared Services-
Guidance Framework December 2007',1025 which, inter alia provides tips for considering where they 
are on the Shared Services Journey. It aims to provide information, education, guidance and case 
study examples to those considering Shared Services and to those already on a Shared Services 
journey (p. 6). This report was updated in 2011.1026 
 
In England the present government underscored the importance of Shared Services once again in 
2011.1027 Throughout 2006 and 2007 awareness increased steadily in England and Scotland on the 
potential influence of European Union Law on Shared Services. Two reports appeared that explored 
the influence of the EU Public Procurement Rules: ‘Shared Services in Government - EU Public 
Procurement Rules Considerations’1028 and ‘Shared Services in the Scottish public sector: Impact of 
the EU Public Procurement Rules’.1029 
 
My training during two weeks at a law office in Edinburgh in the summer of 2012 showed clearly 
that public authorities in Scotland are aware of the influence of EU law should they want to make 
use of shared services. This experience in a law office was however not sufficient to ascertain that 
Scottish public authorities check before every form of cooperation with another public authority on 
conformity with EU law. However, law offices are regularly contacted for advice on the matter. 
 
Although public authorities are using Shared Services increasingly, and the influence of EU law is 
pervasive, the interplay between them has given little reason for conflicts demanding a resolution 
at the courts. In the next section the few existing relevant cases will be examined. 
 
2.3.4. Case law 
 
                                                 
1023 Building a Better Scotland, p. 17. 
1024 www.scotland.gov.uk/recource/Doc/115423/0028606.pdf. 
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There are two known cases where an English Court had to rule on a cooperative agreement between 
public authorities regarding the application of EU law, and more specifically the public procurement 
Directives. At the beginning of 2011 the UK Supreme Court had the occasion to issue a decision on 
the impact of the Teckal case law on the ability of public authorities to cooperate with a third 
party, of which it is a part, to perform services for it without giving other companies the chance to 
state their interest in the matter.1030 At the end of 2013 the Court of Appeal – Queen’s Bench 
Division issued a second decision on the application of the Teckal case law.1031 
 
In Brent London Borough Council and others v. Risk Management Partners Ltd1032 the Supreme Court 
issued a judgment on the applicability of Public Contract Regulations 20061033 to an insurance 
contract concluded between various local authorities and London Authorities Mutual Ltd (LAML). In 
2006 and 2007 these local authorities concluded mutual insurance arrangements with LAML against 
various classes of risk. LAML is a company limited by guarantee and is made up exclusively of local 
authorities. The purpose of participation in LAML was to keep costs down and to raise the standard 
of risk management for the local authorities.  
 
Brent LBC had, during the period when Brent LBC was considering becoming a shareholder in LAML, 
announced the awarding of a public contract for which RPM, an insurance company under private 
law, had made a tender. The purpose of this public procurement was to conclude an insurance 
agreement with a third party. However the moment the participation of Brent LBC in LAML became 
effective, Brent LBC had stopped the awarding procedure. But RPM found this unacceptable and 
initiated a judicial procedure. It argued that the contract made between Brent LBC and LAML is a 
public procurement contract and hence fell under the purview of Regulations 2006. Therefore it 
should be open to competition. A number of local authorities, shareholders in LAML, one of which 
was Harrow London Borough Council, intervened in the procedure.  
 
Within the Court of Appeal Stanley Burton LJ argued that Brent had acted in breach of the 2006 
Regulations when it abandoned the tender process and awarded (concluded) the insurance contract 
to LAML.1034 According to him the control criterion had not been met. Pill LC argued as follows: ‘The 
intention to achieve the aim of operational independence is illustrated by the powers of the board 
and the arrangements made with the management company and the terms of policies issued. I find 
it difficult to see how LAML can operate effectively unless its board has considerable freedom to 
manage its insurance business. The nature of the business and the possibly differing interests of 
different authorities and affiliates are antithetic to the necessary local authority control’.1035 
                                                 
1030 See also M. Trybus, 'From the indivisible crown to Teckal : the In-House provision of works and services in 
the United Kingdom’, in M. Comba and S. Treumer (eds), The In-House providing in European Law 
(Copenhagen: Djöf Publishing, 2010), pp. 193-211. 
1031 Tachie v. Welwyn Hatfield BC [2013] EWHC 3972 (QB); [2014] B.L.G.R. 100 (QBD). 
1032 (2011), UKSC 7 (2011), 2 W.L.R.166. 
1033 2006 SI/5. 
1034 (2008), EWHC 1094 (Admin); (2008) LGR429. 
1035 (2009), EWCA Civ p. 490, at [131]. 
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Criticism of this judgment was not long in coming. The view was that the Court of Appeal had taken 
a too one-sided view of the powers of the Board of LAML.1036 
 
Brent LBC and Harrow LBC appealed to the Supreme Court. Brent LBC reached a settlement before 
the Supreme Court handed down its judgment. The Supreme Court was solely required to rule on 
the dispute between Harrow LBC and RPM on the applicability of Regulations 2006 to the conclusion 
of the insurance contract between Harrow and LAML.  
 
Hope LJ affirmed in the first place that the Teckal exemption is applicable to the 2006 Regulations. 
The basis for this assertion is to be found in the underlying purposes of the public procurement 
regulations. They have to give effect to the public procurement Directives.1037 These Directives and 
their interpretation have to be applied in a similar way in all Member States. This is an application 
of the principle of loyal cooperation (see chapter 1). The Teckal case law contains such an 
interpretation of the public procurement Directives. Consequently, this case law is also applicable 
in England. Therefore Hope LJ judged that the nature of the contract (an insurance contract) was of 
no relevance in determining whether the Teckal case law is applicable. It was necessary to examine 
whether the Teckal criteria had been met.1038 For this Hope LJ referred to the relevant case law of 
the Court of Justice. On the basis of the case law of the CJEU Hope LJ judged as follows1039: 
 
- an individual control of one local authority is not necessary  
- no private interests can be involved in the collective cooperation 
- public authorities must act exclusively in the public interest 
 
Hope LJ concluded the members of LAML (local authorities) controlled a subsidiary, which was 
designed exclusively for the performance of their public functions.1040 There is a collective control 
over strategic objectives and significant decisions. Regarding the activity test was observed that 
LAML only provides insurance to participating members and affiliates. The participating members 
were all public authorities and the affiliates are associated with the participating members.  
 
Roger LJ also examines in depth the case. He explains in a clear way the purpose of the public 
procurement Directives and the rationale behind the Teckal case law: ‘The directive is not intended 
to protect the commercial sector by forcing public authorities to obtain the services which they 
need on the commercial market. For instance, a local authority can have its own architect's 
department and does not need to look outside to obtain the services of an architect or architects to 
design municipal buildings or housing. It is free to obtain these services in-house. The purpose of 
                                                 
1036 See M. Trybus, 'From the indivisible crown to Teckal : the In-House provision of works and services in the 
United Kingdom’, in M. Comba and S. Treumer (eds), The In-House providing in European Law (Copenhagen: 
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1038 At [30]. 
1039 At [53]. 
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the Directive is simply to ensure that, if public authorities do decide to obtain the services which 
they need from outside bodies, proper procedures are followed to ensure that potential providers of 
the services have an opportunity’.1041 Thus Roger LJ reconfirms that in-house provision is beyond the 
scope of EU law. 
 
According to Roger LJ public authorities may cooperate with other local authorities to ensure that, 
collectively, they have the necessary resources to do so.1042 If the cooperation takes the form of 
establishing a body, the public procurement Directives will not apply if the cooperating public 
authorities obtain their services or products from the body. They obtain the products or services in-
house, in cooperation with other public authorities.1043 Private investment is excluded and the body 
cannot be market oriented. Consequently, Roger LJ determined that control can be exercised by all 
the public authorities combined. A 75% majority of participating members present and voting at the 
meeting may issue any direction to the board by special resolution. For this reason, according to 
Roger LJ, the public authorities that contract with LAML have a power of decisive influence over 
both the strategic objectives and significant decisions of LAML. LAML is a vehicle that the 
participating London boroughs control, and through which they can arrange for the provision of 
insurance to each other and to their affiliates. The boroughs achieve this by utilizing resources in 
the form of capital contribution and premiums. No capital is contributed by any private body – nor is 
any such contribution envisaged in the future. The whole purpose of the scheme is to keep it within 
the ambit of the public authorities and not to transfer it to an outside body.1044 
 
The Supreme Court bases its judgment mainly on the objectives of the public procurement 
Directives and not on the literal wording of the definition of a public contract: 
 
‘The 2006 Regulations give effect to the Directive in English law. In other words, they are the way 
in which English law secures the free movement of services and the opening-up to undistorted 
competition in relation to contracts, which are to be placed by English local authorities. That being 
the purpose of the Regulations, they, too, cannot be meant to apply in circumstances where that 
purpose is not relevant because a contracting authority intends to contract with a body which is not 
properly to be regarded as an outside body. Although the Teckal criteria were formulated with 
particular reference to the predecessors of the Directive, they are simply a way of identifying 
situations where the authority can be regarded as obtaining the products or services which it 
requires in-house and, so, where there is no need to secure the free movement of services and the 
opening-up to undistorted competition. In my view, the criteria are an equally good indication of 
situations where, for that reason, the 2006 Regulations have no application. The insight of Advocate 
General Trstenjak in para 83 of her opinion in Coditel Brabant [2008] ECR I-8457, 8482, is 
instructive. To hold that the Regulations did apply in these circumstances would involve saying that 
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the legislature intended to attach weight to competition law objectives in an area where they have 
no legitimate application. This would, in turn, involve inappropriate interference with local 
authorities' right to co-operate in discharging their public functions’.1045  
 
The Supreme Court showed the clear link between the TFEU provisions on free movement and 
public procurement Directives. Both have the same objectives. Only when a cooperative 
arrangement can distort competition or hinder free movement is the decision to cooperate (state 
measure) subject to EU law. There can be no such distortion when a public authority applies a 
measure that affects solely its own organisational structure. The purpose of the measure has no 
effect on market events. 
 
In Tachie v. Welwyn Hatfield BC the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court (before mr. Justice 
Jay) had to deal with three appeals brought under s.204 of the Housing Act 1996 challenging a 
decision by Welwyn Hatfield Borough Council to contract out its homelessness functions under Pt VII 
of the Housing Act 1996 to an arms length management organisation (‘ALMO’).1046 ALMOs have a 
significant degree of independence from their parent local authorities, they are 100% controlled by 
the latter and are usually constituted as companies limited by guarantee. One of the issues that 
arose was if the Teckal ‘exemption’ was applicable to the process of contracting out to ALMOs. 
 
Mr. Justice Jay confirmed that public authority decisions to engage a contractor are normally 
subject to the public procurement regulations. However, he also recalled the two Teckal-criteria as 
an exception to this general rule. The judgment only concerned the control-criterion. Mr. Justice 
Jay considered: ‘I cannot agree … that it is relevant to consider the degree of control in fact 
exercised … at all material times; the focus must be on the nature of the arrangements between the 
two entities as constituted by the contractual and other documentation, and these have not 
changed... It is the presence, or absence, of salient features in these arrangements which will 
determine whether or not a procurement exercise should have been implemented’.1047 
 
In the present case the local authority exercises a complete control on the Trust. No private 
interests are involved, the Respondent is acting solely in the public interest in the carrying out of its 
public service task, and there is no contriving to circumvent the rules on public procurement.1048 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
 
The way the provision of public services in England is organised has undergone a significant 
evolution. More and more public services have been contracted out or even privatised. This 
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evolution took place without any influence from EU law. Privatisation also reduces the scope of the 
public procurement Directives. However, if a public authority chooses to cooperate with another 
public authority to provide public services, EU law may have an influence as to the extend to which 
the public authority can freely choose its contract partner.  
 
In the first place, the discussed case law confirms that a purely in-house situation lies beyond the 
reach of EU law and that a public authority can freely choose for such a provision. This case law 
indicates that the system of Compulsory Competitive Tendering went further than was necessary on 
the strength of EU law. Second, the English Courts faithfully applies Teckal case law. This is 
somewhat different from the French Conseil d'État, which gives a broader interpretation to CJEU 
case law and seems to go too far. In the event the English courts explicitly devote attention to the 
objectives of public procurement Directives and on the basis of the latter they have then 
formulated a specific reply to the question of the applicability of these Directives. It demonstrates 
that the Teckal criteria may be considered a formalised rendition of these objectives. 
 
In Brent the Supreme Court emphasises several times the link between case law on vertical and case 
law on horizontal cooperation.1049 The question of the applicability of EU law to both kinds of 
cooperation would have to be answered similarly. Indeed, the same objectives determine the 
applicability of EU law. Although the CJEU has used other criteria to exclude one or the other form 
of cooperation from the scope of EU law, application of the criteria would have to be driven by the 
objectives that free trade remains guaranteed and that competition is not distorted. 
 
 
 
3. General conclusions 
 
Chapter 6 of the thesis purported to explore how public service tasks in France and England are 
organised and especially how this organisation is or is not influenced by EU law and more 
specifically by CJEU case law on cooperative arrangements between public authorities. 
 
First, the idea of 'public service' seems to play totally disparate roles in France and England. In 
France the concept is of constitutional value, what is more, determines the autonomy of 
administrative law. Public service is an important juridical concept in France with its own content. 
This concept is unknown in England and consequently also has no juridical purport. Of course public 
authorities perform public service tasks as well, but in England such tasks do not mean that public 
authorities have a special law that is applicable to them. From the research it appears that, in 
regard to determining whether an activity is a public service task, the French and English systems 
are converging. More and more a functional interpretation tends to be favoured in these two 
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systems. And in this regard they are coming to conform more and more to the EU understanding of 
the concept. It is thus first and foremost the purpose of the activity that determines whether it is a 
public service. 
 
The organisation and management of public service tasks by public authorities is comparable in 
France and England. The form of organisation to be chosen was not always determined in the same 
way in France and England. In France it was assumed for a long time that a public authority was 
always free to organise a public service as it wished. In England the same was the case until the end 
of the seventies. However, in the eighties legislation was passed that obliged public authorities to 
allow their in-house departments to participate in tendering procedures when they wished to allow 
a public task to be carried out. In these circumstances, therefore, there was no free choice in the 
organisation of a public service task. Since the 1990s this system was abandoned. But with the 
advent of the Teckal case law, the highest courts in both countries determined that when a public 
authority uses its own services, it need not organise a tendering procedure. The choice of one or 
another form of organisation is free; it is not determined by EU law. 
 
Clearly, France has had a much longer tradition in matters of cooperative agreements between 
public authorities than England. Also, the application of public procurement Directives to that kind 
of arrangement has been a topic of consideration much longer in France. Until 1998 the response to 
this issue in France was negative. However, under the pressure of EU law the Conseil d'État 
modified its attitudes in this regard. Cooperative arrangements between public authorities can be 
construed as subject to the application of public procurement Directives. In this regard, the Conseil 
d'État anticipated Teckal. In England the High Court was given the chance to confirm this only in 
2011. 
 
In both France and England the respective Supreme Courts have assimilated the Teckal case law. In 
both countries the Supreme Courts seem to apply CJEU case law with due consideration given to the 
EU objectives and the public procurement Directives. This national case law confirms that the 
criteria developed by the CJEU are simply a concretisation of the aforementioned objectives. They 
must then also be interpreted and applied in conformity with these objectives. However, in France 
the Conseil d'État goes further and has developed its own criterion to exempt vertical and 
horizontal cooperative agreements from the requirement to organise a competitive tendering 
procedure. The interpretation given by the Conseil d'État seems to be in conflict with CJEU law. It 
demonstrates that France still clings to the national competence to organise public tasks. The most 
recent Directives seem to tend in this direction. Indeed, the Directives contain quite a number of 
ways for a public authority to cooperate without being subject to EU law (see chapter 5). 
 
In France the legislature also seized the initiative as a consequence of Teckal case law. It created 
new legal forms for local authorities whereby the choice of these new forms would automatically 
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lead to an exception to the application of EU law. Case law shows, however, that this is not the 
case. 
 
This chapter has shown that CJEU case law has a direct influence on how cooperative agreements 
between public authorities must be conceived in France and England. In France such agreements 
fall normally under the scope of administrative law, a branch of law that is outside the ambit of EU 
competence. However a teleological interpretation of the CJEU puts this element of national 
administrative law within the ambit of EU law. It is a good example of how Article 345 TFEU has to 
be understood. Most of the public authorities decisions fall within the scope of EU law if they hinder 
or could hinder market access or if they distort or could distort free competition. To that extent the 
freedom of Member States to regulate the organization and management of public service tasks and 
the freedom of public authorities to organise or manage their public service tasks is limited. In 
England, as a consequence of CJEU case law, new soft law inspired by public law, was created for 
application to cooperative arrangements between public authorities (shared services). 
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CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
The main objective of this thesis was to examine if EU (public procurement) law has had some 
impact and influence on how national public authorities make decisions on how to organise the 
manner in which they discharge some of their public service tasks.  In order to test this the thesis  
 
(i) narrowed the research to cooperative agreements between national public authorities within the 
EU law on public contracts and service concessions; 
(ii) limited the EU Member States to France and the UK.  
 
The two main research questions of this thesis that comply with this objective are: 
 
A) Do agreements between national public authorities whereby they cooperate in discharging their 
public tasks come within EU law and, in particular, within the scope of the EU public procurement 
Directives? 
 
In order to answer this question the following sub-research questions have been identified: 
 
(i) What kind of situations regarding the organisation of public tasks are influenced by EU law? 
(Chapter 3) 
(ii) How is it possible that these situations been influenced by EU law? (Chapter 4) 
(iii) To what extent are these situations influenced by EU law? (Chapter 5) 
 
B) Has there been influence of EU law in shaping or changing the national administrative law in 
France and the UK?  
 
In order to answer this question the thesis has identified the following sub-research questions: 
 
(i) How do public authorities in France discharge their public service tasks? (Chapter 6) 
(ii) How do public authorities in the UK discharge their public service tasks? Do they cooperate with 
each other? (Chapter 6) 
(iii) What, if any, has been the influence of EU law (both legislative and case law) on how France 
and the UK organise the manner in which their national public authorities discharge their tasks? 
(Chapter 6) 
 
The central focus of the thesis was the cooperation between public authorities, but not every kind 
of cooperation was of interest for this study. The study was in the first place limited by the very 
concept of ‘public authority’. Accordingly, of relevance for the thesis was solely the form of 
cooperation that may be defined in EU law as a public contract or a service concession. For this 
reason this thesis uses the general term 'cooperative agreements'. Finally, cooperative agreements 
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are only relevant when their object is governed by considerations and requirements in the pursuit of 
objectives in the general interest. Hence this thesis is constrained by three terms: 1) public 
authority, 2) public contract or service concession and 3) public service task. 
 
As discussed and demonstrated in Chapter 3, a public authority is an entity capable of making 
decisions irrespective of any financial or commercial motive. Its actions and decisions are based on 
general non-commercial considerations, but such actions and decisions may, nevertheless, hinder 
access to markets and/or distort free competition (Chapter 4). In Chapter 3 the thesis made a 
distinction between two categories: namely, contracting authorities and public authorities, although 
both are indifferently referred to as a ‘public authorities’. A contracting authority is defined as such 
in the EU public procurement Directives. The CJEU has itself defined the essence of the term 
‘public authority’; namely, public authorities are in general entities that do not perform their 
activities, which are not of a commercial nature, on the market.  
 
Cooperation amongst public authorities, as discussed in Chapter 3, must be a contract and more 
specifically a service concession or a public contract. According to the CJEU a contract is an 
agreement concluded between two independent legal persons who have a certain freedom to 
negotiate the content of the contract. The independent character of the relationship between the 
two parties defines it as a contract. The major difference between a public contract and a service 
concession is the nature of the quid pro quo. In a public contract the contracting public authority 
pays a price. In a service concession the public authority transfers an exploitation right. 
Additionally, all or a significant share of the risk must also be transferred along with the transfer of 
this right. In both contracts the public authority charges a third party to execute an economic 
activity. 
 
The term ‘public service task’ is defined neither by EU law nor by the CJEU. A premise of the thesis 
in Chapter 3 is that this term should have the same meaning in regard to the application of EU law 
as does the term ‘service of general interest’. In any definition of this term, there is one element 
that must be present; namely, the element ‘general interest’. Such service exists if a public 
authority takes measures to entrust an activity that has a universal and compulsory nature. 
 
This thesis thus concerns itself with cooperative agreements between public authorities when these 
agreements are about the organization or management of public service tasks. The next key 
question is to establish the applicable law in the case of such a decision to cooperate. As indicated 
in the chapter 1 of this thesis, a central question is to determine the extent to which EU law has a 
bearing on national administrative law governing cooperative agreements between public 
authorities. 
 
In most European countries public authorities discharge services of general interest. A separate 
body of law gradually came into being in the Member States, applied exclusively to the actions and 
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decisions of public authorities. The functioning and the organisation of these public authorities are 
also governed by the same body of law that became known as ‘national administrative law’. (see 
chapter 6) 
 
The way public authorities are organised is freely chosen in many of the EU Member States. This 
means that they are able to discharge the tasks of general interest themselves or they may call 
upon a third party, a private undertaking, another public authority or choose to privatise public 
service tasks. In any case each Member State decides by itself which rules shall be applicable to the 
organisation and management of their public service tasks. This thesis selected in chapter 6 the 
French and English legal systems as examples to demonstrate how each legal system addresses the 
situation. 
 
In France, administrative law occupies a separate place in the legal system. This special place is 
defined by the term ‘service public’. The discharge of tasks in the general interest requires the 
application of special divergent legal rules to the bulk of the actions of a public authority. To take 
on tasks of general interest French public authorities provide them in-house or in cooperation with 
other parties. The choice between these two kinds of management is free. Even the choice to 
cooperate with another public authority, to this end, is free. There is complete freedom to organise 
the ‘service public’, as was demonstrated in chapter 6. 
 
The concept of ‘public service’ is unknown in England according to chapter 6. To develop a separate 
administrative law was also unimportant. It was not until the second half of the 20th century that 
administrative law was recognised as  a separate branch of law. The actions and decisions of any 
public authority, for the most part, fell under English common law, even when public authorities 
wished to conclude a contract. In each and every situation a public authority was free to decide 
how it wished to organise its public service tasks and moreover, to choose a third party as a 
contracting partner.  
 
The central question this thesis poses is whether EU law is relevant to cooperative agreements 
between public authorities and, more precisely to the decision of a public authority to enter into 
such an agreement. In order to answer this question the thesis examined in chapter 4 how EU law 
might have impacted on the activities of public authorities and what element of EU internal market 
law could be relevant to explain the CJEU case law on cooperative agreements between public 
authorities. Furthermore, the public procurement Directives and the CJEU case law interpreting 
these Directives were analysed in chapter 5 to verify i) to what extent EU law has a bearing and ii) 
under what conditions these cooperative agreements fall under the scope of EU law. Finally this 
thesis examined in chapter 6 to what extent EU law has influenced existing national (administrative) 
law. 
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Regarding the first aspect of the research this thesis makes clear in chapter 4 that the influence of 
EU law on cooperative agreements between public authorities could be explained on the basis of 
internal market law. EU competition law can not explain this case law. This thesis proposes in 
Chapter 4 that the decision to cooperate with a third party actually should be deemed equivalent to 
a ‘State measure’. This decision can influence events on the market. This thesis postulates that the 
third party helps the public authority in the organisation or the management of its public service 
tasks. Thus the third party provides a service and this service is provided for remuneration. 
Consequently, the provisions concerning free movement of services is especially relevant. Another 
premise is that for EU law to be applicable to the cooperative agreements of public authorities, the 
agreements must not concern a purely internal situation, but a cross-border interest has to be 
present. Thus EU law is relevant to cooperative agreements between public authorities. 
 
The research and argumentation in chapter 4 demonstrates that the criterion of a ‘restriction’ is the 
crucial aspect that may explain why cooperative agreements can be excluded from the scope of EU 
law. The decisions of a public authority to cooperate are subject to EU internal market rules if they 
can restrict or hinder market access, if they can distort or likely to distort free competition. If a 
decision (State measure) of a public authority has such an effect the public authority must meet 
two obligations: First, it must guarantee that all undertakings that may be interested in the 
conclusion of an agreement have an equal chance to do so. Second, the public authority must 
guarantee transparency, which means that it must give notice in an appropriate form that it intends 
to conclude a cooperation agreement and indicate which factors will be under consideration in the 
agreement. 
 
This thesis claimed in chapter 4 that a distortion of free competition is absent if the object of the 
decision to cooperate (State measure) is alien to the regulation of an economic activity. This kind of 
regulation is absent if a public authority takes a decision that is proper or inherent to its own 
organisation. If a decision is based solely on considerations of general interest and it does not give 
any advantage to a private undertaking then EU (public procurement) law is not applicable. 
 
The second aspect of this research (Chapter 5) concerned the conditions that determine the 
applicability of EU law to cooperative agreements between public authorities. This question first 
came up in regard to public procurement Directives. The central point was the CJEU's interpretation 
of the concept of ‘public contract’ and more specifically the element ‘contract’. A (public) contract 
exists, according to the CJEU, even when the two independent legal persons are public authorities. 
Consequently, in this situation the public authorities are obliged to organise a tendering procedure. 
Their freedom is restricted. The CJEU also has made clear that no contract exists if an agreement is 
made internal to the public authority. If a public authority uses its own administration and its own 
technical resources to perform public service tasks (in-house provision) the public procurement 
Directives do not apply. Thus, the CJEU has made a first constitutional choice. EU law is not 
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applicable to public authority decisions that concern its internal organisation according to 
chapter 5.  
 
The CJEU equated this last situation with a situation where the public authority exercises a control 
similar to that which it exercises over its own departments and the entity carries out the essential 
part of its activities with the public authority that owns it (quasi-in-house or vertical cooperative 
agreements). Later the CJEU ruled that the form of cooperation is not important for determining 
whether public procurement Directives are applicable and hence horizontal cooperative agreements 
could also be beyond their scope. CJEU case law also makes clear that the same argument applies 
to service concessions. The CJEU has developed separate criteria for placing vertical or horizontal 
cooperative agreements beyond the scope of EU law. This thesis then examined in chapter 5 the 
criteria more thoroughly to determine the objectives they serve. With this case law the CJEU made 
a second constitutional choice. Under certain conditions EU (public procurement) law is not 
applicable to cooperative agreements between public authorities. 
 
As stated earlier a vertical cooperative agreement falls outside the scope of EU law if the public 
authority exercises a control similar to that which it exercises over its own departments and the 
entity concerned performs the essential part of its activities with the public authority that owns it. 
Two criteria should be kept separate: i) the control-criterion and ii) the activities-criterion. Both 
criteria reflect the idea of the dependence that must subsist between public authorities that work 
together cooperatively. In regard to the control criterion the CJEU decided that if the service 
provider has one private party as shareholder, EU law applies to the decision to cooperate. The 
choice for such a private undertaking without the presence of any tendering procedure could distort 
free competition. Even if all shareholders are public authorities, EU law may be applicable. In that 
situation one has to take into account all the legislative provisions and relevant factual 
circumstances. If, taking into account all these elements the public authority has a decisive 
influence over both strategic objectives and significant decisions the control-criterion is fulfilled. 
Three factors may determine whether sufficient control is present: i) capital, ii) a market 
orientation character or iii) the control mechanisms. Secondly, the operator’s activities must sub-
serve principally the public authority. According to the CJEU the control- and activities-criterion 
can be present even if several public authorities are shareholders of the operator. The control of 
each shareholder can be minor, but it must be effective. 
 
Horizontal cooperative agreements fall outside the scope of EU law insofar as public authorities 
establish cooperation with one another with the aim of ensuring that the public task they are 
required to perform is in fact accomplished. This kind of agreement should be governed solely by 
considerations and requirements relating to the pursuit of objectives in the general interest. As with 
vertical cooperative agreements the agreement cannot place a private undertaking in a position of 
advantage vis-à-vis its competitors.  
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According to chapter 5 of this thesis, the criteria that the CJEU has developed to enable vertical 
and horizontal cooperation to fall beyond the scope of EU law, is an expression of the same idea. A 
State measure, i.e. a decision to cooperate in the accomplishment of a public task objective, is of 
no relevance to EU law if it is guided solely by considerations related to the public interest and the 
measure does not advantage a private undertaking. EU law is developed on the basis of economic 
objectives and is solely applicable in an economic context. Only State measures that put these 
objectives at risk give rise to the application of EU law. The measure has to be alien to the 
regulation of an economic activity. To avoid the risk of distortion the CJEU has ‘invented’ criteria 
that express the need for a strong dependent relation between cooperating public authorities. The 
criteria are, in the vision of the thesis, the reflection of the objectives of the fundamental freedoms 
and the public procurement Directives. Taking into account the functional interpretation method of 
the CJEU it interprets these criteria on the basis of these objectives. The criteria also include the 
vision of the CJEU on the division of powers between the EU and the Member States related to 
cooperative agreements. 
 
The new Directives on public procurement and service concessions were published in March 2014, 
and contain provisions that seek to implement CJEU case law on cooperative agreements. However, 
this thesis makes it clear in chapter 5 that these Directives go further and apply also to situations 
other than the ones accepted by the CJEU, and place cooperative agreements outside the scope of 
EU law. Briefly put, the new Directives grant more powers to the Member States than the CJEU.  It 
remains to be seen how the CJEU will interpret these new provisions. In the light of the Treaty 
objectives, an ‘economic’ interpretation is required, taking into account the objectives regarding 
the realisation of an internal market. 
 
Chapter 6 of this thesis then asked if and how the CJEU case law has influenced the national legal 
systems of France and England. In France, the Conseil d’Etat anticipated the CJEU rulings and 
already in 1998 affirmed the applicability of public procurement Directives on cooperative 
agreements between public authorities. Secondly, the French legislature integrated the Teckal-
criteria (control and activities) into the Code des Marchés Publics in 2001. However, the Conseil 
d’Etat put forth its own criterion for placing cooperative agreements beyond the scope of EU law. If 
the entity that concluded an agreement with a public authority is not an operator on a competitive 
market, the public authority does not have to organise a tendering procedure. It can choose to seek 
its contractor. The Conseil d’Etat uses one criterion to exclude both vertical and horizontal 
cooperative agreements beyond the scope of EU law. Furthermore, even agreements where one 
pubic authority performs a service for another public authority for remuneration can be excluded 
from the scope of EU law according to the Conseil d’Etat. This goes far beyond the CJEU case law. 
The French legislator also took action. It created a new kind of legal person (société publique 
locale), whereby a contract newly concluded between a public authority with such a legal person 
will necessarily fall beyond the scope of EU law. But the case law of the Conseil d'Etat indicates 
that this is not always the case. (see chapter 6) 
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In England the influence of EU law is less obvious. Government documents, examined in chapter 6, 
show that CJEU case law on cooperative agreements is indeed taken into account. The influence is 
more difficult to show as there is much less case law concerning the application of public 
procurement Directives or the principle of equality. This consequently is also the situation with 
cooperative agreements. Existing case law does indeed show that the difference between in-house 
provision and provision of services by a third party is taken into account. The English courts clearly 
specify that for the first category no tendering procedure needs be organised. As for cooperative 
agreements, the Supreme Court reverted to the objective of the public procurement Directives to 
establish that under certain circumstances EU law was not applicable to cooperative agreements. 
The Supreme Court applies the CJEU criteria more consistently than the Conseil d'Etat. The 
Supreme Court also seems to draw a link between CJEU case law on vertical and horizontal 
cooperative agreements. In England there was no legislative initiative to adapt legislation to CJEU 
case law on cooperative agreements. But this will presumably now be necessary with the new 
Directives. (see chapter 5) 
 
The research questions that can be found at the beginning of this chapter could be answered in the 
following way: 
 
A) Cooperative agreements concluded between national public authorities come within the scope of 
EU (public procurement) law 
 
(i) The CJEU and the 2014 Directives on public contracts and service concession confirm that the 
decision to tender or conclude a public contract and service concession comes under the scope of 
EU law even if the object of these contracts is the organisation of management of a public task. 
(ii) The public authority’s decision to cooperate is a State measure. As such it can be influenced by 
EU internal market law. If these decisions have a cross-border interest and they distort competition 
or hinder market access (restriction), EU internal market law applies. The obstacle to market access 
or the distortion of competition explains when a decision to cooperate enters into the scope of EU 
law. According to the thesis this also explains the CJEU case law on cooperative agreements. 
(iii) Vertical cooperative agreements fall outside the scope of EU law if the public authority 
exercises a control similar to that which it exercises over its own departments and the entity 
concerned performs the essential part of its activities with the public authority that owns it. 
Horizontal cooperative agreements fall outside the scope of EU law insofar as public authorities 
establish cooperation with one another with the aim of ensuring that the public task they are 
required to perform is in fact accomplished. This kind of agreement should be governed solely by 
considerations and requirements relating to the pursuit of objectives in the general interest. The 
agreement cannot place a private undertaking in a position of advantage vis-à-vis its competitors.  
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B) The CJEU case law on cooperative agreements has had an influence on national law in France and 
England.  
 
(i) In France and England public authorities discharge their public service tasks in house or in 
cooperation with third parties.  
(ii) Public authorities also cooperate with one another to discharge public service tasks. 
(iii) Especially the case law of the Supreme Courts in both countries takes account of the CJEU 
case law. Moreover, in France the legislator has intervened to provide a framework for vertical 
cooperation between local public authorities. 
 
This thesis makes clear that the influence of EU law on national law is also significant in areas that 
in principle are within the exclusive competence of the Member States. In particular, this influence 
is felt in administrative law. This is an area of the law inextricably associated with the uniquely 
autonomous nature of each Member State and is applicable to the way Member States and their 
public authorities organise and manage their public administration. National administrative law is 
increasingly acquiring an EU coloration so that the notion of ‘European administrative law’ is 
becoming more and more apposite. 
 
EU law sees this national administrative law through economic spectacles. This branch of the law 
governs the decisions of public authorities. However, when decisions (State measures) have 
consequences for the market, some of the other provisions of the EU treaties may be relevant. 
These decisions must not imperil the realisation of the internal market. 
 
The driving force behind this influence is the CJEU via its functional interpretation of EU law. But 
this interpretation is also reaffirmed by the regulatory capacity of EU institutions in this area. 
Provisions on cooperative agreements between public authorities may now be found in the new 
Directives adopted in March 2014. Compared to the CJEU's broad interpretation, the new Directives 
bring within their scope more situations in which cooperative agreements between public 
authorities fall outside the scope of EU law. Thus the Member States are able to bring their 
influence to bear and restrict the impact of EU law on its national administrative law.  
 
This also shows that the division of competences between the EU and Member States, and the 
relationship between Market and State is still evolving. The European economic constitution is 
continually in evolution. However, the new Directives display a tendency for the Member States to 
turn inwards toward themselves and also show a certain mistrust of the EU.  
 
 
